Mfr Nara- T3- Dos- Milam William- 5-10-04- 00723

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Ambassador William Milam Type of Event: Second Interview (First interview with Ambassador Milam was December 29, 2003) Date: May 10,2004 Special Access Issues: Treat as Cs.liiEisBti81 Prepared by: Scott Allan ------Reviewed by: Len Hawley Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy) Location: 2100 K St. Participants: 9-11 Commission: Scott Allan and Len Hawley Interviewee

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Background

Ambassador Milam spent a majority of the last ten years of his career as an ambassador. From 1990-1993, he served as Ambassador to Bangladesh. He returned to Washington in 1993 and served as a Special Negotiator for the State Department's ("State") Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science for two years. In 1995, he was appointed Ambassador to Liberia and from September 1998 - July 2001, he served as Ambassador to Pakistan. Since 2001, Ambassador Milam has been a Senior Fellow at the Wilson Center. (U) Winter/Spring

2001

In January 200 I Ambassador Milam sent a cable titled Optionsfor Dealing with the Afghan Terrorism Problem to Main State describing the state of U.S.-Tali ban relations. Milam said that sending such an assessment to Washington for a new administration was normal. He observed that the current strategy, which he labeled "incrementalism" was not likely to persuade the Taliban to end the Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. The policy had, he told us, "reached the end of its rope." Therefore, he described a number of other options in the memo for the incoming administration to consider. (U)

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Milam said that he never thought that sanctions would pressure the Taliban. He believed that the Taliban did not care about sanctions but that they did care about international recognition. "We needed to raise the stakes on both sides [of the policy equation]" the ambassador told us. During the spring of 2001, Milam said he favored a policy stressing "bigger sticks and bigger carrots." New incentives could include u.S. recognition and economic assistance while more forceful sticks could include assisting the Northern Alliance with material and money. For much of his tenure, Milam argued against aiding the Northern Alliance, but as time went on he said he began changing his mind on the option. (C)

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GSldieerrtiai Meeting with the Taliban Milam continued to meet with the Taliban up until he left Pakistan in July 2001. He does not think the volume of meetings increased or decreased si~nificantly from the fall of 2000 through his departure.) 9/11 Classified

Information

Milam said that the discussions from October 2000 through July 2001 were no more fruitful than previous meetings with the Taliban. Milam said that by 2001, he was convinced that the Taliban would not render Bin Ladin. Milam stressed that "Mullah Omar was calling the shots [on Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan]" and that Taliban envoys such as Wakil Mutawakil and Mullah Jalil had no authority to tum Bin Ladin over. In fact, Milam said he often went "beyond his instructions" by dangling recognition in trade for Bin Ladin but that even this carrot went nowhere. (U) The ambassador said he could not recall making outright military threats to the Taliban. Milam thought that would have gone beyond his instructions. He said he definitely did not specifically mention outright military strikes in his July 2001 demarches. Nonetheless, he said he was not surprised if State's counterterrorism chief, Michael Sheehan, made specific mention of military strikes in the 1999 timeframe. (U) •

The Bush Transition Milam said Secretary Powell's State Department was slow in filling senior spots. The ambassador said that they "had trouble getting their ducks in order." Milam also said he had difficulty getting seventh floor attention and never received any follow ..up inquiries to his January 200 I assessment cable. (U) In May 2001 Milam met with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Milam believed that Armitage was concerned with South Asia and their meeting focused primarily on the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan. As time went on, Milam believed that the new administration was trying to improve the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, but Milam said he "couldn't get a pulse" on where the Bush administration stood on the Afghanistan issue. (U) Recommendations Milam said that the USG needs to spend more attention on reconstruction efforts for Afghanistan and Iraq. He even suggested that a high level office focusing on the issue needed to be established. (U)

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The ambassador fears that our public image in the Islamic world will be negative until Washington settles the Iraq crisis and adopts better policies in connection with the Middle East peace process. (U)

ConNecntial

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When working with countries in the Islamic world, we "need to stick with them." Washington must show these countries that we are willing to commit to them. (U) For Afghanistan, Milam stressed that we have to have better coordination in the field. He thinks multilateral cooperation must be pooled more effectively. The U.S. can lead in Afghanistan but will need to call heavily on others. (U)

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