Mfr Nara- T3- Dos- Raphel Robin- 12-8-03- 00970

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MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Robin Raphel Type of Event: Interview Date: December 8, 2003 Special Access Issues: none Additional notes: NA~... . . .Prepared by: Scott All . Reviewed by: Len Haw e Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy) Location: Main State Participants - Commission: Scott Allan and Len Hawley Participants- State: John-Alex Romano Interviewee Background Ambassador Raphel was the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs from August 1993 through June 1997. Since then she served as Ambassador to Tunisia, from 1997-2000, and as the vice president of the National Defense University, from 20002003. She is currently State's coordinator for Iraqi reconstruction efforts. Early Views Upon becoming the Assistant Secretary, Raphel described a general lack of South Asia interest in Washington. While some at State were very committed, it was hard to get sustained focus on the region because of its geographic distance and lack of vibrant economies. Pakistan and other countries were low priorities for official Washington as other issues, such as the rebuilding of the Warsaw bloc, occupied attention in the mid 1990's. During that time, the South Asia bureau's main concerns centered on Indo-Pak . relations, Pakistani democratization and the nuclear issues. There was also "great concern" about the worsening situation (civil war and narcotics trafficking) in Afghanistan; Raphel noted that "Afghanistan was not a central focus for people in this town [Washington]" and that "there was noJight-shinning-ther-e-:~aphel-hoped-that.----efforts, at this time, could be made to stabilize Afghanistan and "get it back on its feet." Raphel said that the Taliban appeared in mid-1994, when its troops were escorting commercial convoys across southern Afghanistan. At that time, little was known about the group and their early rhetoric focused on bringing "law and order" to the southern part of the country. Raphel noted that they were not spouting a radical message at the time and were seen by Washington as "conservative Pashtuns, [who were] pretty much in tune with southern Afghan values."

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UNCLASSIFIED Engaging the Taliban In mid 1994, as the Taliban was exerting its influence in southern Afghanistan, State's policy was to end the fighting and stabilize the country. This remained the case through her entire tenure. Raphel indicated that State was engaging all the factions and providing them with the same message-work with each other and form a broad-based government. One group was not seen as any more legitimate than another. According to Raphel, we did not favor any faction, including the Taliban, over another -- "[w]e approached them all evenhandedly," Raphel said. She had no reason to believe that the CIA was secretly supporting the Taliban. But concerns with the Taliban grew Raphel said. While it continued to emphasize its preference for stability and order, the Taliban's rhetoric became less and less "in sync with a lot of their actions." This was especially the case with women's rights. And human rights violations appeared to increase as the movement seized Kabul, in September 1996, and was also extending its influence to non-Pashtun parts of the country. Concern grew "when its [the Taliban's] conservative elements began to assert themselves." As a result, Raphel indicated, State's approach toward the Taliban changed. She noted that State increased its objections regarding rights violations. But this did not mean that we stopped engaging the Taliban, Raphel said. She called for continued U.S. engagement with them (and all parties) since harsh ultimatums would probably be counterproductive. Sanctions, she said, would "not go far because they [the Taliban] didn't have much to loose." Raphel confirmed that she met with the Taliban during her tenure. There were a "few" Washington meetings and she also conducted meetings with them in Peshawar and Khandahar. Raphel estimated meeting the Taliban half a dozen times. Raphel said she would press them to work with the other warring factions, address narco-trafficking and, as time went on, call their attention to human rights violations. Taliban responses were usually consistent in that they would claim to be establishing "order" in a chaotic Afghanistan. They would also ask Raphel for patience as they addressed their internal problems. When the Taliban took control of Kabul in September 1996, the movement sought international and U.S. recognition. State told Taliban representatives that the U.S. would' not grant this because Washington "recognized states not governments." In connection with Bin Ladin, he was on the radar screen. She remembers when he was in Sudan and when he appeared in Afghanistan. Raphel said that during her time at the South Asia bureau, Washington requested that the Taliban expel Bin Ladin but noted that Washington did not request that they turn Bin Ladin over to the United States. The feeling, she said, was that we should "keep him on the run."

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Pakistan Pakistan favored the Taliban. The Taliban leaders provided Islamabad with a friendly Pashtun government which gave Pakistan "strategic depth" in the event of a conflict with India. Here Pakistani forces could retreat and regroup in neighboring Afghanistan if Pakistan suffered an Indian invasion. During her tenure, the Pakistanis denied aiding the Taliban but support became more "blatant" as time went on. Raphel also believed that the Pakistanis saw the Taliban as unsophisticated and thus easy to manipulate. UNOCAL Raphel said that there was much skepticism about the success of a UNOCAL pipeline, but it was worth giving it a try. Raphel believed that, at the time, the UNOCAL project was "an extremely good idea" because, it could be a carrot for the warring factions. In order for the pipeline to succeed (and for royalties to be paid to Afghanis) the factions would have to make peace. There was a possibility that it could be a "unifying factor for Afghanistan" she said. The pipeline could also reduce tensions between India and Pakistan since it would run to markets in both of those countries. Raphel said that early in the project's life, UNO CAL may have favored working with the Taliban. But it quickly became apparent that UNOCAL would have to work with all the factions to .seek a stable Afghanistan for their project. UNOCAL representatives met with Raphel three or four times and, Raphel recalled, asked her about political questions in the region. Raphel said that with UNOCAL being an American company, they had no problem providing the company with assessments of the political situation in the area. The State Department, she said, provided little else. Future Recommendations Raphel said it is essential for the United States to stay engaged in South Asia and committed to Afghanistan, where warlordism is problematic. Additionally, keeping Indo-Pak tensions low is very important over the long term. Wealthy countries must be willing to assist the countries of South Asia. It benefits the U.S. and others to promote education, economic development and opportunity in South Asia. This must be done is a way which is not "smothering" or which can be characterized as "colonial" by detractors. Raphel noted how Washington used one ideology, radical Islam, to defeat another, communism, in Afghanistan. This, she cautioned, while successful in the short run, came back to haunt the U.S. As a result, policymakers should consider the dangers when working with highly ideological movements.

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