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US-Saudi Arabia Relations Disadvantage US-Saudi Relations DA 1NC.................................................................................................................................................................3 Uniqueness – Relations Good (1/2).......................................................................................................................................................4 Uniqueness – Relations Good (2/2).......................................................................................................................................................5 Uniqueness – Oil Prices High................................................................................................................................................................6 Link – Alterative Energy Reduces Energy Dependence (1/2)...............................................................................................................7 Link – Alterative Energy Reduces Energy Dependence (2/2)...............................................................................................................8 Link – Saudi Relations (1/2)..................................................................................................................................................................9 Link – Saudi Relations (2/2)................................................................................................................................................................10 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse 1NC................................................................................................................................................11 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Reform Link / AT: Collapse Inevitable (1/2)..............................................................................12 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Reform Link / AT: Collapse Inevitable (2/2)..............................................................................13 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Oil Prices Link (1/2)...................................................................................................................14 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Oil Prices Link (2/2)...................................................................................................................15 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Economy Scenario......................................................................................................................16 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Economy EXTN..........................................................................................................................17 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Economy – AT: Case Solves.......................................................................................................18 Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Anti-Americanism Impact...........................................................................................................19 Relations Good – Dollar 1NC..............................................................................................................................................................20 Relations Good – Dollar – Euro Shift EXTN......................................................................................................................................21 Relations Good – Dollar – Economic Collapse EXTN........................................................................................................................22 Relations Good – Dollar – AT: China Alt. Cause ................................................................................................................................23 Relations Good – Middle East Stability 1NC......................................................................................................................................24 Relations Good – Middle East Stability – Link EXTN........................................................................................................................25 Relations Good – Middle East Stability – Oil Link.............................................................................................................................26 Relations Good – Middle East Stability – AT: Alt. Cause....................................................................................................................27 Relations Good – Terrorism.................................................................................................................................................................28 Relations Good – Terrorism EXTN (1/2).............................................................................................................................................29 Relations Good – Terrorism EXTN (2/2).............................................................................................................................................30 Relations Good – Israel-Palestine........................................................................................................................................................31 Relations Good – Israel-Palestine – Link EXTN.................................................................................................................................32 Relations Good – Proliferation.............................................................................................................................................................33 Relations Good – Proliferation EXTN.................................................................................................................................................34 Relations Good – Hegemony...............................................................................................................................................................35 Oil Dependence Good – Mid-East Stability.........................................................................................................................................36 Oil Dependence Good – Mid-East Stability EXTN.............................................................................................................................37 Oil Dependence Good – Proliferation..................................................................................................................................................38 Oil Dependence Good – Protectionism................................................................................................................................................39 Oil Dependence Good – Chinese Rise.................................................................................................................................................41 Oil Dependence Good – Iraq................................................................................................................................................................42 Oil Dependence Good – Iraq EXTN....................................................................................................................................................43 Oil Dependence Good – Turns Case....................................................................................................................................................44 Oil Dependence Good – Dependence Inevitable.................................................................................................................................45 Oil Dependence Good – AT: Mid-East Dependence............................................................................................................................46 Oil Dependence Good – AT: Price Spikes (1/2)...................................................................................................................................47 Oil Dependence Good – AT: Price Spikes (2/2)...................................................................................................................................48 Oil Dependence Good – AT: Price Spikes – AT: Saudi........................................................................................................................49 Oil Dependence Good – AT: Terrorism ...............................................................................................................................................50 Oil Dependence Good – AT: Petro-States............................................................................................................................................51 Oil Dependence Good – AT: Iran.........................................................................................................................................................52 AT: Saudi Relations (1/2).....................................................................................................................................................................53 AT: Saudi Relations (2/2).....................................................................................................................................................................54 AT: Saudi Collapse...............................................................................................................................................................................55 AT: Euro Shift .....................................................................................................................................................................................56 AT: Euro Shift – PetroEuro Good – Economy ....................................................................................................................................57 AT: Euro Shift – PetroEuro Good – Economy EXTN (1/2).................................................................................................................58 AT: Euro Shift – PetroEuro Good – Economy EXTN (2/2).................................................................................................................59 SDI 2008

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US-Saudi Relations DA 1NC A. Uniqueness and internal link – US-Saudi relations are strong – oil is the key to maintain relations Teslik, CFR Associate Editor, 5/16/2008 [Lee Hudson, "A complicated alliance," http://www.cfr.org/publication/16255/complicated_alliance.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F413%2Fsaudi_arabia] Seventy-five years ago this month, California’s Standard Oil Company closed a deal with the finance minister of Saudi Arabia, a country the United States had only officially recognized two years earlier. The agreement granted the oil firm an exploration contract and initiated a multifaceted and sometimes thorny bilateral economic relationship. Today,

oil still

dominates U.S.-Saudi ties, which went on display May 16 when President Bush met Saudi’s King Abdullah. But the fairly straightforward buy-sell dynamic between the world’s leading importer and leading exporter of crude is increasingly complicated by a host of other issues, from security cooperation to currency concerns. Bush’s meetings with Abdullah spotlighted this complexity. The past year has witnessed a historic run-up of oil prices, and some analysts are now projecting a “super-spike” (WSJ) that could bring even greater price increases. With U.S. consumers feeling the pinch, Bush pressed Saudi officials to boost oil production as a way of easing prices. U.S. senators have already threatened to block a major arms deal (AFP) between the countries if oil prices continue their rise. Some analysts say this focus is misguided. Given the way crude oil trades, there is only so much that can be done by Saudi Arabia, which already produces nearly a quarter of the world’s crude. To a certain extent Riyadh already runs interference for Washington within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), where some member states, including Iran and Venezuela, are pushing for production cuts (IHT). Saudi’s King Abdullah, who holds significant sway in the bloc, has resisted these calls and argued that OPEC should hold production steady. Given this dynamic, few analysts were surprised when Abdullah rebuffed Bush's calls for production hikes (WSJ). Meanwhile, a

host of other issues are bubbling. The United States has sought a close working relationship on counterterrorism with Saudi Arabia, which is home to a conservative, majority Wahhabi Muslim population and is the origin of fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers. Under pressure from Washington, Saudi Arabia has launched new efforts to crack down on militants, including programs to find and rehabilitate jihadists (USNews). The U.S. State Department outlines the different means of counterterrorism cooperation it is pursuing with Riyadh in its 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism. These include intelligence sharing and encouraging Saudi Arabia to play a broader role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East. Along the same lines, Washington

has long sought Riyadh’s support as a Sunni counterbalance to Shiite-dominated Iran and its proxies, including the militant group Hezbollah.

B. Link – Alternative energy dooms Saudi relations – cuts US oil demand Marshall, DOD Office of Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment Director, 1/8/2002 [Andrew, "The Sino-Saudi Energy Rapprochement," www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/SinoSaudiStudyFinal.pdf] However, it is not impossible to imagine shifts in US policies. Two sorts of shifts are possible. One change in policy would involve a combination of supply and demand side policies that would result in a substantial reduction rather than a growth in the US appetite for crude oil imports. In the aftermath of September 11th, it is conceivable that the US would start to pursue policies that could substantially reduce the role of the oil in the transportation sector. Raising automobile efficiency standards could reasonably reduced imports by 1 million b/d or more within seven years. Enhanced R&D in fuel cell technology and hybrid vehicle technology, combined with a federal procurement program to assure that all US government owned vehicles were fueled by these non-conventional supplies could shave another 1 mb/d from imports within seven years. Under these circumstances, the US would not only cease to be the high growth market for foreign oil. Its market would actually shrink, making it significantly less attractive for any major supplier, including Saudi Arabia.



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Uniqueness – Relations Good (1/2) US and Saudi Arabia overcoming differences now China daily, staff writer, 2008 [”BUSH PLEAS FOR CHEAPER FUEL MAY FALL ON DEAF EARS AGAIN”, May 13, lexis, Ricardo Saenz ]

Oil, Iraq, Iran and Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking are high on the agenda as Bush and King Abdullah try to smooth US-Saudi relations that deteriorated in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq Saudi Arabia and the United States both view Al-Qaida as a threat. But 15 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers were of Saudi origin, as is al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, which tarnished Saudi Arabia's image in the eyes of the American public. The invasion of Iraq over the strong opposition of Saudi Arabia further exacerbated tensions and made the United States unpopular with the Saudi public. "We have an odd disconnect here. We have a recognition on the part of the governments in both countries that this

is a very important relationship," said Chas Freeman, president of the Middle East Policy Council. "But in both cases, the public is extremely negative. Saudi Arabia has been successfully vilified in American politics, and the United States is now extraordinarily unpopular in Saudi Arabia," said Freeman, a former US ambassador to Riyadh.

US and Saudi Relations are high despite the Iraqi War China daily, staff writer, 2008 [”BUSH PLEAS FOR CHEAPER FUEL MAY FALL ON DEAF EARS AGAIN”, May 13, lexis, Ricardo Saenz ] White House national security adviser Stephen Hadley said the US-Saudi relationship was in "pretty good shape" despite stresses over the Iraq war. The United States wants Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to improve their relations with Iraq. "We would like to see them offering greater diplomatic support for Iraq, embracing Iraq as a part of the Arab family. They have not gone as far as we would like on that score," Hadley said.Iran ascendancy The United States and Saudi Arabia both want to keep growing Iranian influence in the region at bay.

"Most Saudis believe that that ascendancy in the region has come about as a result of American policy, that is the United States occupies Iraq militarily, but Iran occupies it politically," Freeman said. Iraq has a Shi'ite-led government, and Iran is ruled by the same sect of Islam, while rulers of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries are Sunni. Despite close personal ties among Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, King Abdullah and other Saudi officials, the tear in US-Saudi relations has yet to be fully repaired. But the bond forged decades ago on energy and security issues will continue in the years ahead regardless of who succeeds Bush in January, analysts said.

US – Saudi Relations are high –ties sustain relations despite differences Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2008 [Christopher M., “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33533_20080522.pdf, p. 24, Ricardo Saenz ]

Saudi-U.S. relations have grown increasingly complex as the number of policy challenges facing both countries has multiplied and as both countries’ security and economic interests have become more intertwined. The United States remains the principal external actor in the Middle East region, but by most accounts, many regional policy makers, including those in Saudi Arabia, perceive potential U.S. influence to be limited by current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Saudi confidence in U.S. influence and guarantees reportedly has diminished, and the ability of the United States to simultaneously pursue a political and social reform agenda and a close strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia remains in question. Saudi Arabia has weathered economic strains and a dangerous domestic terrorism campaign and arguably has emerged as the most economically and politically powerful Arab state.47 Growing demand for oil in developing countries, declining oil reserves outside of the Persian Gulf region, and expanding. Saudi oil revenues are likely to further raise Saudi Arabia’s international profile and influence over time. U.S. national security interests with regard to Saudi Arabia are likely to persist, while U.S. efforts to achieve policy goals may be complicated by these trends. At present, formal U.S.-Saudi security and political relationships remain strong, in spite of differences on some key policy issues.

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Uniqueness – Relations Good (2/2) Uniqueness – Relations high now due to military Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2008

[Christopher

M., “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33533_20080522.pdf, p. 24, Ricardo Saenz ]

Longstanding military training programs remain an important pillar of U.S.- Saudi relations. The United States has played an integral role in the development, training, and arming of the Saudi Arabian military since the 1940s, when U.S. military advisors first carried out a comprehensive assessment of the kingdom’s defense requirements.49 Since the 1940s, a number of subsequent U.S. defense assessments, joint planning activities, and training programs have established close and cooperative relationships between the U.S. military services and their Saudi counterparts. The Saudi Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology and training as a guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military procurement and modernization initiatives based on the recommendations of U.S. defense surveys.50 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers completed a series of massive military infrastructure construction projects across the kingdom; many U.S.-built facilities remain critical to the operations of Saudi security forces.

Relations are high now and are increasing due to counter-terrorism efforts Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2008 [Christopher M., “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33533_20080522.pdf, May 22 p. 26-27, Ricardo Saenz ]

The Administration’s January 2008 Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia asserts that, “Victory for the United States in the global war on terrorism will be impossible without a partnership to dry up funds for terrorists and to combat Islamic extremism in the kingdom.”58 Terrorism has long been an issue in U.S.-Saudi relations, and the strategy document constitutes

the latest acknowledgment by U.S. officials of the roles that Saudi nationals play in both supporting and combating terrorism. U.S. policy makers sought the support of Saudi authorities throughout the 1970s and 1980s in combating various terrorist groups. However, after terrorist attacks on U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the need for additional U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation grew more urgent. Current counterterrorism issues include joint U.S.-Saudi efforts to eliminate threats posed by violent extremists in the kingdom as well as internationally. U.S. officials acknowledge significant Saudi domestic counterterrorism efforts and encourage the Saudi government to build upon the positive steps it has already taken to combat international terrorism. Both U.S. and Saudi officials have said the impetus for closer counterterrorism cooperation in recent years came from a series of terrorist attacks against Saudi, U.S., and other facilities in Saudi Arabia beginning in May 2003. One knowledgeable observer described the May 2003 attacks as “the inevitable wake up call” for Saudi leaders increasingly concerned over attempts by terrorists to target the Saudi regime.59 According to the 9/11 Commission’s final report, “[a]s in Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, [Saudi] attitudes changed when the terrorism came home.”

US – Saudi Relations are high due to Iraq war Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2008 [Christopher M., “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33533_20080522.pdf, May 22 p. 32-33, Ricardo Saenz ]

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Iraq has been tense historically, although periods of Saudi-Iraqi cooperation have occurred when supported by convergent interests, most notably during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Saudi Arabia publicly opposed the

U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but provided logistical support to U.S. forces,78 and Saudi officials have called on U.S. forces not to leave Iraq on an “uninvited” basis.79 Saudi Arabia’s principal interests with regard to the conflict in Iraq are — first, to prevent instability and conflict in Iraq from threatening Saudi Arabia’s internal security and stability; second, to prevent the repression of Iraq’s Sunnis by newly dominant Shiites; and, third, to limit the regional influence of a potentially hostile Iran.80 Saudi Arabia’s longer term interests include ensuring that the revival of Iraq’s oil industry does not threaten Saudi preeminence and preferences in global energy markets and that Iraq does not re-emerge as a strategic military threat to the Arab Gulf states. SDI 2008

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Uniqueness – Oil Prices High US Oil prices high now CNNMoney 2008 [“Oil price surges to new high near $146,” CNNMoney, July 11, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/07/11/oil.surge.ap/index.html, Liu]

Oil prices set a new record near $146 a barrel Friday, boosted by concerns over possible disruption of tight global supplies amid tensions over Iran's launch of test missiles and the threatened renewal of oil-related violence in Nigeria. By midday in Europe, light, sweet crude for August delivery was up US$3.53 on the day at US$145.18 a barrel in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Earlier in the session, it hit a new trading high of US$145.98 before retreating. The contract rose US$5.60 in the overnight floor session to US$141.65 a barrel -- after losing nearly US$10 on Monday and Tuesday and then gaining a penny on Wednesday. In London, August Brent crude was up US$3.34 to US$145.37 a barrel on the ICE Futures exchange. "There's always a fear premium in pricing. The tensions

in Iran and the threat of supply disruption will help support oil prices," said Jeff Brown, managing director of FACTS Global Energy in Singapore.

Oil Prices Are High Now—Low Supply and High demand AFP 08(http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iULbqz7a_RWOvuo-LtKNAkNzTERw, Agence France-Presse is the oldest news agency in the world, and one of the three largest with Associated Press and Reuters, Wang)

World oil prices jumped close to record heights on Tuesday as the dollar slumped to an all-time low against the euro, and amid ongoing supply tensions including a strike in Brazil. New York's main oil contract, light sweet crude for August delivery, gained 1.21 dollars to 146.39 dollars a barrel. That was close to the record high of 147.27 that was struck last Friday. London's Brent North Sea oil for August gained 1.36 dollars to 145.31 dollars. Brent had jumped to an all-time high of 147.50 on Friday. "Oil prices were higher (on Tuesday), with the dollar resuming its decline against major currencies on downbeat sentiment over US financial markets after the US government's reassurance to rescue Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae failed to boost investor confidence," said Sucden analyst Andrey Kryuchenkov. In the foreign exchange market, the euro surged to a life-time high of 1.6038 dollars on mounting investor fears about the stormy US economic outlook, dealers said. That beat the previous peak of 1.6019 set on April 22. World equity markets and the dollar fell heavily on scepticism that a dramatic weekend US government rescue of the two mortgage giants would contain the ongoing crisis in American finance, analysts said. Added to the gloom, California-based IndyMac bank was taken over by federal regulators over the weekend as it fell into insolvency. The weakening US currency stimulates demand for dollar-

"Overall, the long run uptrend in oil remains in tact, underpinned by persistent supply fears and geopolitical jitters," Kryuchenkov added. "Also, commodities in general are still performing relatively well on strong interest from investors, inflation concerns and the weak dollar." The price of crude oil has more than doubled over the past 12 months to strike record levels above 147 dollars per barrel last Friday, lifted by stubborn fears about tightening global energy supplies and fierce demand. The market has found solid support from ongoing jitters about crude output from key producers Iran and Nigeria. A five-day strike by oil workers in denominated raw materials like oil, which become cheaper for foreign buyers.

Brazil against state-run Petrobras was meanwhile expected to exacerbate supply concerns, dealers said. Petrobras said output was cut seven percent as the strike affected offshore platforms in the Campos basin, which provides 82 percent of the firm's daily 1.8-million-barrel output. Brazil is the world's 12th largest crude

Oil has enjoyed a record-breaking 2008 after smashing through 100 dollars per barrel at the start of the year. Sky-high prices have sparked protests around the world amid fears for economic growth. producer.

Oil Prices Stays High—supply threats are the reason Associated Press 08 (http://www.kdbc.com/Global/story.asp?S=8675554&nav=menu608_2_5, the world's oldest and largest newsgathering organization, Wang) Filling up your car has never cost more. AAA's daily fuel-gauge reports show the national price of a gallon of regular this morning remains at a record high of just under $4.11. That's a dollar, 6 cents higher than a year ago. No relief is in sight from overseas. Oil is holding above $145 a barrel in Asia today, in what commodity strategist David Moore says is a "fundamentally tight" oil market. Supply threats from Iran, Nigeria and now a strike in Brazil are keeping the price in record territory. Even so, some analysts are looking for a price drop later this year as demand backs off. Moore says Americans are starting to drive less and he thinks the price will slide by about $8 a barrel by the fourth quarter.

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Link – Alterative Energy Reduces Energy Dependence (1/2) Shift to renewables collapses US reliance on oil Goldman, BrightSource Energy In.C Chairman and Founder, May 2008 [Arnold, “Renewable Energy and Beyond,” http://energy08.tau.ac.il/media/goldman.pdf] Large scale adoption of solar and other renewable technologies, coupled with the implementation of strong regulations encouraging the conversion of transportation systems to plug-in hybrid and electric vehicle technology, will reduce the demand of fossil fuel significantly. The price of fossil fuel would drop to much lower levels and materially reduce the balance of payment deficit, and economic drain on many economies. These economic benefits attained by the substitution of renewable energy should find some way of positively entering into the renewable energy pricing system. Link – The use of alternative energy reduces dependence on foreign oil CATO 2004 [“CATO Handbook on Policy,” CATO, December 4, 2004, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb_109-45.pdf, page 448, Liu] Proponents of renewable energy subsidies have offered multiple justifications for government intervention to promote those technologies. The most popular argument at the moment is that government must promote alternatives to fossil fuels if we’re ever to reduce our dependence on oil imports and our vulnerability to events in the Middle East. There is a germ of truth here. As noted above, there is simply not enough domestic oil available to meet current demand, so if we’re serious about promoting energy independence, we must find alternative energy sources to meet current needs. The fundamental problem, however, is that only 2 percent of America’s oil consumption goes to electricity generation—most oil is used as transportation fuel and feedstock for various chemicals, plastics, and lubricants. Renewable energy, however, is primarily dedicated to electricity production. Accordingly, even if the market for renewables were to grow substantially, it would not reduce oil consumption, or oil imports, very much if at all. The two fuels compete in entirely different markets. The exception is ethanol and various other biofuels, which are discussed below.

Increasing alternative energy reduces oil dependence South China Morning Post, 2004 [“World must avoid falling hostage to oil dependence” , May 31, lexis, Ricardo Saenz ] Following the horrific attacks by terrorists claiming al-Qaeda links in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, officials there were quick to say that oil supplies will not be disrupted. Nonetheless, the world's oil-consuming nations will likely be reassessing their dependence on oil from an increasingly unstable country and stepping up efforts to diversify sources for the fuel. An equally urgent, but less likely response, would be to examine the international addiction to oil and to reduce dependence by investing in alternatives.

Shift to renewables reduces US energy dependence LASHOFF, senior scientist @ Natural Resources Defense Council, 2006 and Conservation”, June 22, lexis]

[Dan, “Energy Efficiency

To answer this multifaceted challenge of energy security we must pursue solutions that will tackle the core of the problem - our demand for oil - and make new policy commitments, such as the Enhanced Energy Security Act (S.2747), that will offer lasting relief to consumers and clean, renewable energy alternatives. Scaling back our appetite for oil is essential to safeguarding our national security, economy and environment.

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Link – Alterative Energy Reduces Energy Dependence (2/2) Link - Alternative energy leads to energy independence- Brazil proves Reel, Washing post foreign service, 2006 [ Monte, “Brazil’s road to energy independence”, August 20, Ricardo Saenz ] SAO PAULO, Brazil -- Record oil prices have made the world's energy landscape a darkly foreboding place this year, inhospitable to optimism and celebration. Except in Brazil. It has been something of a banner year here, full of milestones. The government predicts that for the first time in its history, Brazil will achieve energy equilibrium, exporting as much oil as it imports. The production of sugar cane-based ethanol is expected to reach an all-time high. And just three years after the introduction here of flex-fuel vehicles -- cars that run on either ethanol or gasoline -- several major automakers predict that such vehicles will represent 100 percent of their production by the end of the year, eliminating gas-only models. Sugar cane-based ethanol is one reason why the government predicts that for the first time in its history, Brazil will export as much oil as it imports. Link - Various forms of alternative energy will cause a decrease in foreign oil use . Renewable Energy Today, 2004 [Renewable Energy Today, “Groups Say Renewables Will Help Solve U.S. Oil Dependency”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0OXD/is_2004_Oct_27/ai_n6272431/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1,Oct 27 , Ricardo Saenz] The Sustainable Energy Coalition (SEC) recently announced that 23 business, environmental and energy policy organizations sent a letter to President Bush earlier

"reconsider the nation's energy policies in light of oil prices now surpassing $50/barrel and natural gas prices at 40-year highs [and to] institute an energy policy that moves the nation away from dangerous over-reliance on petroleum." this week urging him to

According to SEC, the organizations, all member groups of the coalition, suggested that "the nation's short-term goal should be to begin reducing overall consumption of oil," while its mid-term goal "should be to further reduce demand for domestic sources of oil and dramatically curtail, if not eliminate, most oil imports," and its long-term goal "should be to discontinue its use of oil for all but a few high-priority purposes...."

"...[S]olar thermal systems and geothermal heat-pumps as well as direct geothermal heating technologies coupled with the cross-section of renewable electric technologies could displace much of the oil and natural gas consumed in residential and smaller commercial space heating," said the groups in the letter. "...[W]hat little oil used for electricity that cannot be displaced through energy efficiency measures can be eliminated through expanded use of biomass, geothermal, hydroelectric, solar and wind technologies achieved through a national Renewable Portfolio/Energy Standard of 20 percent or higher by 2020."

Increasing renewable energy reduce dependence on the importing of oil Goldemberg, Sao Paulo Institute of electronics and energy, 2004

(José, “The case for renewable energies”, http://teenet.tei.or.th/Knowledge/Paper/case_for_renewable.pdf, February, Page 10, Ricardo Saenz )

To reduce such dependence is a high priority in many countries, particularly in oil importing developing countries which frequently spend a large fraction of the foreign currency earnings in oil imports. Just to give an example oil imports consume one half of all export earnings in Barbados and this situation is widespread among oil poor countries. To increase the share of indigenous renewably energy in their system is an important step in solving this problem.

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Link – Saudi Relations (1/2) Oil is key to sustaining the US-Saudi alliance Patterson, NCR Senior staff writer, 10/19/2001 [Margot, "The politics of oil: U.S.-Saudi relationship shows cheap fuel comes at a price - World - United States/Saudi Arabia,"http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_44_37/ai_79965473/print?tag=artBody;col1] Call it a marriage of convenience or an unholy alliance, the relationship between the world's most powerful democracy and a repressive monarchy almost as severe as the Taliban could grow even stronger in the wake of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. Those attacks are calling new attention to the costs and benefits of the alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

At the heart of the alliance is oil -- Saudi Arabia's possession of it, the United States' reliance on it and the perceived need to defend U.S. access to it. Throw into the mix billions of dollars in lucrative arms sales the United States has made to Saudi Arabia, a sophisticated regional command center the U.S. military built in Saudi Arabia, and the American public's enthusiasm for cheap oil, and you have some understanding of what holds together this otherwise international odd couple.

Oil is the centerpiece of US-Saudi relations Telhami, UMD (University of Maryland) Peace and Development Professor, Brookings Senior Fellow, and Hill, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Program Fellow, December 2002 [Shibley and Fiona, "Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and Its Oil," Foreign Affairs, lexis] Finally, Saudi Arabia has a trump card that Russia does not: spare production capacity. Morse and Richard rightly acknowledge that the kingdom's extra reserves, to be used only as a last resort during a crisis in the oil market, make "policymakers elsewhere beholden to Riyadh for energy security" and form "the centerpiece of the U.S.-Saudi relationship." Russia, on the other hand, produces and exports at maximum capacity and is likely to continue to do so -- a fact that has begun to generate some anxiety domestically. To make matters worse, a recent Russian government energy report indicates that if current oilextraction levels continue and new technologies do not bring additional reserves into production, Russia can expect to have depleted its current reserves by 2040. This is a sobering conclusion for an economy that remains heavily dependent on energy revenues and subsidies. ON GUARD IN THE GULF U.S. strategic priorities supply a second reason why Saudi Arabia will remain important to the United States. For half a century, the United States has made Persian Gulf oil a primary security interest, and this emphasis is unlikely to dissipate in this decade. The conventional view of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is that American strategy and military posture are based primarily on ensuring an uninterrupted flow of oil at reasonable prices. But, as U.S. government documents declassified over the last several years show, the strategy has also focused on preventing hostile forces from seizing and establishing control of Persian Gulf petroleum. From 1949 to the present, American planners have worried that a hostile state may gain too much wealth and power by controlling the dominant share of the world's oil supply -- and thus become more threatening to the United States. U.S. policy toward the region has thus sought the "denial" of oil to enemies while assuring its flow to the West.

Oil is key to US-Saudi relations Morse, Former International Energy Policy Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and Richard, Investment Fund Manager (in EU, Russia and Central Asia), April 2002 [Edward, James, "The battle for energy dominance," foreign affairs, lexis]

Saudi spare capacity is the energy equivalent of nuclear weapons, a powerful deterrent against those who try to challenge Saudi leadership and Saudi goals. It is also the centerpiece of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The United States relies on that capacity as the cornerstone of its oil policy. That arrangement was fine as long as U.S. protection meant Riyadh would not "blackmail" Washington -- an assumption that is more difficult to accept after September 11. Saudi Arabia's OPEC partners must also cooperate with the kingdom in part to prevent Riyadh from producing a glut and having prices collapse; spare capacity also serves to pressure key non-OPEC producers to cooperate with Saudi Arabia when necessary. But unlike the nuclear deterrent, the Saudi weapon is actively used when required. The kingdom has periodically (and brutally) demonstrated that it can use its spare capacity to destroy exports from countries challenging its market share. This tactic is the weapon that Saudi Arabia could use if Moscow ignores Riyadh's requests for cooperation.

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Link – Saudi Relations (2/2) Saudi Arabia opposes any substantial changes in energy policy, especially changes aimed at reducing CO2 emissions or oil imports Roberts 04 (Paul, Columnist @ Harper's, The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World, p. 286-7) Because energy is critical to national power, producers have traditionally enjoyed close ties to national governments, and thus have been able to shape national energy policies. Whereas the United States might otherwise regard Saudi Arabia, with its antiWestern attitudes and its links to terrorist elements, as a legitimate political enemy, the kingdom's vast oil reserves and especially its enormous surplus capacity have for decades ensured that Washington would overlook such criminal behavior. As one political analyst told me, "the fact that a U.S. president can call up the Saudis and say, 'Something major is going to happen tomorrow and we desperately need you to pump more oil to reassure the market' has given the Saudis a level of access in Washington that is pretty much unparalleled." Such influence isn't likely to diminish anytime soon. Because hydrocarbons will play a central role in any transitional energy economy, and because producers alone have the capital and resources to build the next energy infrastructure, they will also have considerable say in when and how quickly we move to a new energy economy. In fact, many oil-producing states have worked assiduously to prevent any change, either by trying to keep prices low (not always successfully) or by attacking competing energy sources. The Saudis, for example, have gone so far as to file

complaints with the World Trade Organization claiming that European programs to cut CO2 emissions unfairly constrain the Saudi oil trade. "We are against any policy that unfairly discriminates against oil," one top Saudi oil official told me bluntly. "We want to keep oil the fuel of choice."

Oil dominates the US-Saudi relationship Teslik 5/16/08 (Lee Hudson, Assistant Editor @ Council on Foreign Relations, "A Complicated Alliance," http://www.cfr.org/publication/16255/complicated_alliance.html?breadcrumb=%2F)

Seventy-five years ago this month, California’s Standard Oil Company closed a deal with the finance minister of Saudi Arabia, a country the United States had only officially recognized two years earlier. The agreement granted the oil firm an exploration contract and initiated a multifaceted and sometimes thorny bilateral economic relationship. Today, oil still dominates U.S.-Saudi ties, which went on display May 16 when President Bush met Saudi’s King Abdullah. But the fairly straightforward buy-sell dynamic between the world’s leading importer and leading exporter of crude is increasingly complicated by a host of other issues, from security cooperation to currency concerns.

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse 1NC C. Impact – 1. Relations key to Saudi security and prevent a collapse – they rely on US assistance Russell, Contemporary Conflict Center Co-Director, Senior Lecturer, Strategic Insights Editor, September 2002 [James, "Deconstructing the U.S.-Saudi Partnership?," 'http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asp]

The SAAF depend upon U.S. equipment to defend them and would depend more broadly on U.S. assistance in any major contingency that threatened the Kingdom. Altering the U.S.-Saudi relationship in such a way that would disrupt the foreign military sales and advisory relationship through USMTM and OPM-SANG would make most of Saudi Arabia's U.S. equipment useless in a matter of months, leaving the Kingdom virtually defenseless against an armed attack. And, if this scenario included American movement away from its commitment to the Kingdom's security, the vulnerability of the Kingdom would only be further compounded. It is difficult to see how such a situation would contribute to regional security.

2. Saudi collapse triggers Mid-east war, global terrorism and global economic collapse Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily editor, 5/22/2002, [Gregory, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, "The Kingdom at a Crossroads," lexis] Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia's problems have become the problems of virtually the entire Muslim ummah (nation), and are perhaps the real core of the schism between Western and Muslim societies. The danger exists that the Saudi leadership could still collapse in the near future and the integrity of the Saudi State could come into question. The problems in Saudi Arabia -decades in the making -- are at the geopolitical heart of Islam, thus affecting most of the Muslim world and the relationship between Islamic societies and the West. The phenomena of Osama bin Laden's worldwide terrorism network, the radical Islamist anti-state activities under Sudan's Dr Hassan al-Turabi, the related and parallel evolution of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the direction of the Chechen rebellion, and so on, all owe much to the evolving problems in Saudi Arabia as well as to the radical clerics in Iran. Not even Saudi Arabia's leadership has acknowledged the extent of the crisis, although privately many leading Saudi princes have admitted the prospect of an imminent collapse of the House of Sa'ud. Saudi Arabia's problems have an immediate bearing on whether major war occurs between Israel and its neighbors, and whether Saudi Arabia survives with its present form of government. They are therefore critical to the global economy and global strategic

stability.

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Reform Link / AT: Collapse Inevitable (1/2) US Saudi relations are key to Saudi instability – sparks reforms to prevent economic collapse Cordesman, CSIS Middle East Program Co-Director, Strategy Chair, 2/1/2004 [Anthony, "Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi relationship," http://www.saudi-americanforum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htm] 3. The US and Saudi Arabia have a common interest in the long-term internal stability of Saudi Arabia. This, however, requires more than counterterrorism. Saudi Arabia’s population explosion is having a major impact on its economy. The US Census Bureau estimates that Saudi Arabia’s population has climbed from 6 million in 1970 to 22 million in 2004. Even if birth rates decline significantly in future years, it is expected to rise to 31 million in 2010, 42 million in 2020, and 55 million in 2030. The number of young Saudis between 15 and 24 years of age will nearly double from 3.6 million in 2000 to 6.3 million in 2025. This is in a society where the government estimates that unemployment for native Saudi males is already 12%, and many experts privately estimate that real and disguised unemployment is in excess of 20%. These demographic pressures are so severe that Saudi Arabia is no longer “oil wealthy” in the sense that its present economy can provide for its people. The doubling of Saudi Arabia’s population and worldwide cuts in real oil prices have reduced its per capita earnings from petroleum exports from $24,000 in 1980 to $2,300 in 2002. Although Saudi Arabia had

high oil earnings in 2003, it has faced nearly two decades of major budget and trade deficits, and its government debt is nearly 100% of its GNP. It no longer can provide social services, modernize and expand its infrastructure, and diversify its economy without major economic reform and foreign investment. Such reform and investment is critical to Saudi internal stability, but it requires US support.

Reforms are key to prevent a crisis – the impact is terrorism and regime stability Moss, Transatlantic Institute (Brussels) Middle Eastern Studies Senior Fellow, and Krieger, Newsweek Middle East Correspondent, 8/15/2007 ["A tipping point in saudi arabia," http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0815/p09s02-coop.html?page=2]

This unlikely reformer, who has unofficially led the kingdom since King Fahd's stroke in 1995, has propelled the country through a radical transformation. From accession to the World Trade Organization to the billion-dollar overhaul of the educational system to increased criticism of the religious "police" who enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law, the closed kingdom is beginning to crack open. 'The oil boom is over'

These reforms come at a critical time. Saudi Arabia is barreling toward an economic and social crisis if it does not act fast. Almost 75 percent of Saudi citizens are under age 30 and youth unemployment is approaching 30 percent – a potential breeding ground for terrorists and regime dissidents. Current high oil prices are not enough to paper over the economic ravages of the past two decades. "The oil boom is over and will not return," then-Crown Prince Abdullah said in his address to the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1998. "All of us must get used to a different lifestyle." [Editor's note: The original version did not give the year in which Abdullah made this statement.

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Reform Link / AT: Collapse Inevitable (2/2) No Saudi collapse now – reforms solve short-term instability, but changes can be upset quickly Middle East Times, staff writer, 7/21/2007 ["Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah Gamble – And Success," http://www.metimes.com/Editorial/2008/07/21/saudi_arabias_king_abdullah_gamble_and_success/2865/]

The Saudi monarch took a gamble last week while in Spain and it paid off handsomely. The king's investment in the threeday interfaith dialogue conference which brought together representatives of the three monolithic faiths – Christianity, Islam and Judaism – and included a number of Asian religions, as well, was two-fold. First was the financial aspect of the operation; flying some 200 delegates and about 100 members of the media from around the world to Madrid. In the greater scope of things, this represents a mere drop of oil in the barrel – now being sold at over $136. The second investment on the part of the Saudi king was on a more personal level: the king, for the first time, openly met with representatives of the Jewish faith, including an Israeli, although he was registered as a U.S. citizen, given he holds dual citizenship. This is the real investment King Abdulla is making. Putting his reputation on the line, overtly calling for dialogue with the "Kafirs" – Christians, Jews and other non-Muslims – at a time when he recently faced a campaign of terror conducted by al-Qaida in his own country that largely caught Saudi security forces off guard. The kingdom has since then managed to win the upper hand against the fanatics, as far as one can judge victory in such murky situations. Abdallah and his security forces, with technical assistance from the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany have put together a highly trained anti-terrorist unit that has proven its worth. Now, the Saudi king, after being on the defensive for several long and murderous months moved on to the offensive with a good track record. With his interfaith conference initiative Abdallah moves into the next stage, beyond the offensive, into the pre-emptive. By addressing the issue of religions as the source of some of today's reasons for violence, the king has moved onto the right track. To his detractors who critique the fact that the conference was held in Spain rather than Saudi Arabia, it should be said that ideally it would have made more sense to hold the meeting in the desert kingdom, but that would be waving red flags in front of the fundamentalists and fanatical bulls. The time may yet come when such meetings can take place, but perhaps now was too early. The clash of religions goes back several millennia, it would be a mistake to even imagine that it can be resolved in a matter of days, months, or even years. At best we are looking at a couple of generations.

High oil prices good – spark Saudi reform and liberalization ISN Security Watch, staff writer, 12/12/2007 [“.Saudi Arabia's economic liberalization,” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18454] According to conventional wisdom, high oil prices would render economic reform in oil-rich countries a poor chance of successwith increases in state income lessening the pressure for such change.In a time of sky-high oil prices, Saudi Arabia proves that conventional wisdom sometimes misses the mark.Saudi oil export revenues constituted a meager US$34.3 billion in 1998, but rose to US$46.8 billion in 1999 and US$65.5 billion in 2002. SABB, one of the kingdom's largest banks, projects oil revenues of US$165 billion this year. Even though the Saudi state has thus gradually gained access to a greatly increased volume of external rent, it has somewhat paradoxically loosened its tight grip on the economy, opened up its markets for privatization and foreign investment and actively strengthened its private sector. Non-oil portions of the private sector have grown more significantly in the last six years than oil-based. Export of non-oil-based products increased at a rate of 20 percent annually between 2000 and 2006.The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the many agencies that note the new Saudi business climate, in which diversification and privatization seem to be paramount. The improved business climate is illustrated clearly by incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) related to the Saudi gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), a common macroeconomic indicator of business activity. The numbers from the World Investment Report from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) released in mid-October reveals a baffling development in this regard. Inward flow of FDI as a percentage of the GFCF increased from a level of 1 percent in the period 1990-2000 to 4.5 percent in 2001, 24.0 percent in 2005, and a staggering 32.1 percent in 2006. Not only is that more than any other Gulf country, including the United Arab Emirates, it turns Saudi Arabia into the top FDI recipient of the Arab world with a staggering US$18 billion. The ripple of liberalizationThe rise

of incoming FDI is most likely related to the extensive economic liberalization in the kingdom that began in 2000. Nevertheless,according to Dr F Gregory Gause of the University of Vermont, an expert on Saudi Arabia,it is hard to disentangle the effects of Saudi economic reforms from the upward trajectory of oil prices. "In the end, I am sure that the oil price increase has more to do with the economic boom in Saudi Arabia than any policy steps," Gause told ISN Security Watch. "However, it is interesting that, during this boom, private sector growth is exceeding state sector growth rates. That is at least one indication that the private sector in Saudi Arabia is more developed and sophisticated than it was during the oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s."

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Oil Prices Link (1/2) Energy independence causes Saudi collapse and Mid-East instability Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/28/2007 [Robert, "The politics of cheap oil," http://www.petroleumworld.com/SF07012801.htm] A long period of cheap petroleum could result in instability in key countries in the Middle East. This runs directly counter to the neocon gospel. If the U.S. could, magically, be energy independent, Friedman and his fellow travelers claim that global crude prices will collapse. That will mean, according to Friedman, that the rulers of repressive oil-rich countries would be forced to "open up their economies and their schools and liberate their women." He might be right. Or he could be disastrously wrong. And if that instability does occur, A.F. Alhajji, an energy economist and professor of economics at Ohio Northern University, says "the West cannot turn a blind eye to such conflicts." Indeed, the U.S. could not stay on the sidelines if a key ally

like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait were to get embroiled in a nasty internal conflict due to an economic crisis caused by low prices. Just to drive that point home, Gaffney and Woolsey and their ilk love to bash the Saudis. Would they be happier, if, thanks to their push for energy independence and cheap oil, Saudi Arabia's king, Abdullah, who is a moderate and a staunch ally of the U.S., were to be deposed and replaced by a group of Wahhabi clerics who hate the U.S. as well as everything modern?

High prices prevent a Saudi collapse – revenue is key to placate anti-regime radicals Yetiv, Old Dominion University political Science Professor, 2/6/2008 [Steve, “Why the Saudis aren't lifting a finger to ease oil prices,” Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0206/p09s01-coop.html]

high prices are partly due to speculation in oil markets as well as to the dollar's decline, and not because oil is lacking. Saudi Arabia's reluctance to address sustained high oil prices, even in the face of a potential recession, represents an important break with past Saudi oil policy. Another explanation for no action could be that the Saudis may not want to look an oil horse in the mouth. Saudi Arabia's young population has nearly tripled since 1980, while oil export revenues in real terms have fallen by around one-quarter (despite recent increases). Each Saudi gets 72 percent less in trickle-down money today than in 1980. The nation needs oil export revenues to maintain high levels of subsidies (for food, fuel, you name it) to sustain the population and to build massive infrastructure. Those funds help soothe a population that suffers from 13 percent unemployment. It also helps buy off Wahhabi radicals and antiregime elements who work against the royal family. Oil producers say that

That may be true, but the high price, whatever the cause, remains a big problem.

Oil price collapse causes Saudi instability Bremmer, Eurasia Group President, World Policy Institute Senior Fellow, February 2007 [Ian, "In the right direction," http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_87/ai_n27119321/print?tag=artBody;col1]

A state's relative prosperity determines its baseline for stability. If North Korea suddenly struck oil, it would become more stable at every point along the curve, because it would have more resources with which to artificially reinforce stability at every given level of openness. If oil prices suddenly crashed to $20 per barrel, Saudi Arabia would become considerably less stable. But the basic relationship between stability and openness (the shape of the curve) remains the same whether the entire curve is rising or falling.

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Oil Prices Link (2/2) High oil prices key to stability—disruptions destroy regional stability. Litvin, Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Critical Resource Director, and Foulkes, Critical Resource Associate, 6/13/2008. [Daniel, Rob, “Oil - paying the political price,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7446932.stm]

high prices have helped the governments and regimes of various oil-rich countries not just to advance their foreign policy agendas, but also to maintain their political legitimacy at home, for example through major domestic welfare programmes. For this reason President Chavez of Venezuela, Prime Minister Putin of Russia and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia all might find their domestic power bases under threat if oil price fell back to, say, the $20-$30 per barrel level of the early 2000s. Many western nations would welcome a change in leadership in all three countries, but internal political disruption in any of them also might contribute to regional and global instability in the short term. For example,

Saudi oil revenue is key to solve instability – checks social unrest Maugeri, MIT World Economic Laboratory Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Association Senior Fellow, 12/15/2003 [Leonardo, "Comment: Time to debunk mythical links between oil and politics," http://www.ogj.com/articles/save_screen.cfm?ARTICLE_ID=194360] This policy has few alternatives, particularly for the great Persian Gulf producers, since their economics remain heavily oil-based while their demography has dramatically changed. Countries such as Saudi Arabia have doubled their population in 12 years. Sixty percent of the gulf countries' population is less than 21 years old. This demographic explosion has created expectations and frustrations to which stagnant and monocultural economies cannot give a credible answer. Only sustained oil revenues allow these countries to temper social unrest by preserving huge social assistance programs. Gulf countries' oil revenues are already much lower today than 20 years ago, and cheap oil prices mean a dramatic dip in per capita oil income. Therefore, frustration and violent revolt may erupt whenever the minimum needs for living are endangered by decreasing oil prices, particularly among people who already live in poverty and cannot permit themselves the luxury of hoping for a different future. Clearly, fundamentalism today— like socialist pan-Arabism of yesterday—is finding fertile ground in these hopeless people. Indeed, this is the cause of its strength and its diffusion.

Saudi oil revenue is key to stability – the plan causes a crisis Morse, Former International Energy Policy Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and Richard, Investment Fund Manager (in EU, Russia and Central Asia), April 2002 [Edward, James, "The battle for energy dominance," foreign affairs, lexis] One of the hidden aspects of the relationship is the Saudi dependence on the United States for providing an expanding market. Although Asian demand for oil is expected to grow dramatically in coming decades, no other economy rivals that of the United States for the growth of its oil imports. Over the past decade, the increase in the U.S. share of the oil market, in terms of trade, was higher than the total oil consumption in any other country, save Japan and China. The U.S. increase in imports accounts for more than a third of the total increase in oil trade and more than half of the total increase in OPEC's production during the 1990s. This fact, together with the fall in U.S. oil production, means that the United States will remain the single most important force in the oil market. The hope of Saudi Arabia and OPEC for an increased market and for greater market share is uniquely dependent on growth in U.S. demand. Hence it is not for security alone that Riyadh depends on the United States but for the very economic basis of the Saudi regime, which relies almost entirely on oil for revenue.

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Economy Scenario ( ). Economy A. Saudi instability collapses the global economy – destabilizes energy markets David, John Hopkins Political Science Professor, 1999 [Steven, “Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars,” Foreign Affairs, lexis]

Saudi Arabia suffers from the fact that the various threats to domestic peace all reinforce one another. The bad economy intensifies religious extremism, which in turn exacerbates divisions in the armed forces. The catalyst for civil war can therefore come from one of several different sources. A power struggle in the royal family over succession to the throne, squabbles over shares of an ever-shrinking economic pie, or disenchantment in the military with the royal family's selfish behavior could all set off a major conflagration. In a Saudi civil war, the oil fields will be a likely battle site, as belligerents seek the revenue and international recognition that As the above suggests,

come with control of petroleum. For either side to cripple oil production would not be difficult. The real risk lies not with the onshore oil wells themselves, which are spread over a 100-by-300 mile area, but in the country's dependence on only a few critical processing sites. Destruction of these facilities would paralyze production and take at least six months to repair. If unconventional weapons such as biological agents were used in the oil fields, production could be delayed for several more months until workers were convinced it was safe to return. Stanching the flow of Saudi oil would devastate the United States

and much of the world community. Global demand for oil (especially in Asia) will increase in the coming decades, while non-Persian Gulf supplies are expected to diminish. A crisis in the planet's largest oil producer, with reserves estimated at 25 percent of the world's total, would have a massive and protracted impact on the price and availability of oil worldwide. As the disruptions of 1973 and 1979 showed, the mere threat of diminished oil supply can

cause panic buying, national hysteria, gas lines, and infighting. Prices for oil shot up 400 percent in 1973, 150 percent in 1979, and 50 percent (in just 15 days) in 1990. The oil shocks of the 1970s threw the United States into recession, causing spiraling inflation and a decline in savings rates that plagues the U.S. economy even now. Trillions of dollars were lost worldwide. And all this occurred at a time when the United States was less dependent on foreign petroleum than it is now. Cutting the Saudi pipeline today would cause a severe worldwide recession or

depression. Short of physical attack, it is the gravest threat imaginable to American interests.

B. Global economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction Bearden, U.S. Army (Retired), 2000 [T.E., LTC, U.S. Army, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm, June 24]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is

rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades. to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed,

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Economy EXTN Saudi collapse causes oil spikes Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, assistant professor of public affairs at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, associate professor of government at Dartmouth University, 2007 [“Energy Alarmism: The Myths That Make Americans Worry about Oil,” April 5, 2007, http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa589.pdf, page 15, Liu] In the second scenario, the global economy and with it American national interests could be harmed by large-scale instability in Saudi Arabia: civil disorder could trigger strikes in the oil industry or attacks on oil facilities. Although intrastate violence in another oil producer might temporarily affect global oil supply, as it did in Venezuela in 2002–03, other countries could make up the gap in output. But a major civil war in Saudi Arabia could disrupt enough of the world’s oil supply that other

producers could not expand output sufficiently to make up for the disrupted Saudi share. That disruption would impose a significant cost on the United States—enough cost that U.S. foreign policy decision-makers should consider this scenario a serious threat.

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Economy – AT: Case Solves Energy independence does not solve – Saudi relations are key to prevent global economic collapse from price spikes Aarts, Amsterdam University International Relations Lecturer, and Rijsingen, Amsterdam University International Relations Grad Students, 2007 [Paul and Machteld, "Beijing's Rising Star in the Gulf Region," http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/p.w.h.aarts/bestanden/Paul%20Aarts%20and%20Machtheld%20van%20Rinsingen.pdf] Also from an oil supply perspective a hands-off attitude would be unwise. Even if the United States were to reduce its

oil imports from Saudi Arabia or were to refrain from using Saudi oil altogether, it would still be in Washington’s best interest to preserve friendly relations with Riyadh. Why is that? By far the most important motive for the United States not to neglect the Saudis is the unique position of Saudi Arabia as the world’s only “swing producer”: the country retains the single largest spare production capacity of all oil producers.47 This means that the world market – and the world’s largest oil consumer in the first place – has a major interest in a cooperative Saudi government. Although it has declined in recent years, the national spare capacity allows the Saudis, for now and for the near future, to “control” the oil market to such an extent that they can fix or at least contain serious disturbances (but not control prices, as is often suggested). It takes them just a few days to gear up production or to ratchet things back down.48 It is hardly imaginable that a serious disruption of the Saudi oil supply (and its at-tendant rise in oil prices) would be without consequences to the A– even if the Americans would stop using Saudi oil altogether.

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Relations Good – Saudi Collapse – Anti-Americanism Impact Saudi regime change leads to anti-american regime Aarts, Amsterdam University International Relations Lecturer, and Rijsingen, Amsterdam University International Relations Grad Students, 2007 [Paul and Machteld, "Beijing's Rising Star in the Gulf Region," http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/p.w.h.aarts/bestanden/Paul%20Aarts%20and%20Machtheld%20van%20Rinsingen.pdf] A third motive might be termed “fear of the alternative.” The economic and security situations of the Kingdom nurture plenty of worries, not to mention the uncertainties and possible problems over the succession to King Abdullah. Nevertheless, the Al Saud remain in control of plenty of “capital” – economic, religious, political and symbolic. It is, moreover, in the best interests of the United States to see that the current regime stays in power. Washington simply cannot afford to witness regime change in Riyadh (let alone contribute to it). As recent history has shown, radical domestic political changes in oil-producing countries often lead to suppressed output, whether the change is “antiAmerican” (as in Iran) or “pro- American” (as was the case after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union). It is rather difficult to imagine a situation where a radically different Saudi regime willingly cuts all its oil exports and orders its citizens to tighten their belts for more than one month or so.51

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Relations Good – Dollar 1NC C. Impact – 1. US-Saudi relations are key to prevent an OPEC dollar shift – this would collapse the global economy Freeman, Middle East Policy Council President, 9/17/2004 [Chas, "Securing US Energy in a Changing World," http://www.mepc.org/forums_chcs/37.asp] The second matter, far more grave in many ways, is the demonstration of the end of some aspects of the special relationship with Saudi Arabia; the end of the discounts and the end of the Saudi emphasis on primacy in the American market signals because there's another issue you didn't mention, which we will get into, and that is the defense of the dollar by the Saudis. Twice within OPEC, other members, Iran in particular, have moved to eliminate the dollar as the unit of account for the oil trade.

Were this to occur in the current context of massive U.S. budget, balance of trade, and balance of payments deficits, the results could be absolutely devastating for the global economy and to our own. The reason the Saudis defended the dollar on the two previous occasions was not economic analysis but political affinity for the United States. Question: if that affinity is no longer there, will they play that role? This is a large issue, with people like Paul Volcker saying there is a very substantial danger within the next five years of some sort of dollar collapse. This is not a minor matter.

2. Global economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction Bearden, U.S. Army (Retired), 2000 [T.E., LTC, U.S. Army, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm, June 24]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is

rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades. to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed,

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Relations Good – Dollar – Euro Shift EXTN Saudi relations are key to prevent an OPEC Euro shift – this is key to prevent economic collapse Islam, the Observer staff writer, 2/23/2003 [Faisal, "when will we buy oil in euros?" http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/feb/23/oilandpetrol.theeuro] So there is a huge list of potential winners from a move to price oil in euros, but movement remains slow. 'At various points in time since the early 1970s, oil producers have discussed this, especially in periods when the dollar has been weak. Opinions have tended to be wide-ranging, depending on the strategic and trade alliances certain members have with particular trade blocs,' said Yarjani.

That was an elliptical reference to the overwhelming influence of Saudi Arabia, whose government is the staunchest ally of the US within Opec. 'The Saudis are holding the line on oil prices in Opec and should they, for example, go along with the rest of the Opec people in demanding that oil be priced in euros, that would deal a very heavy blow to the American economy,' Youssef Ibrahim, of the influential US Council on Foreign Relations, told CNN. Last year the former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia told a committee of the US Congress: 'One of the major things the Saudis

have historically done, in part out of friendship with the United States, is to insist that oil continues to be priced in dollars. Therefore, the US Treasury can print money and buy oil, which is an advantage no other country has. With the emergence of other currencies and with strains in the relationship, I wonder whether there will not again be, as there have been in the past, people in Saudi Arabia who raise the question of why they should be so kind to the United States.'

Saudi Arabia is the key to prevent a OPEC euro shift Teslik, CFR Associate Editor, 12/7/2007 [Lee Hudson, "Considering the PetroEuro," http://www.cfr.org/publication/14988/considering_the_petroeuro.html]

The pressing question, then, is whether OPEC will switch. Here, expert opinion is mixed. Pressure from Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s heavyweight, seems likely to keep any immediate switch at bay. Two Lehman Brothers economists write on the website of the Financial Times that Riyadh’s stockpile of petrodollars binds its prospects to the health of the currency. Still, it seems all but certain that more oil states will follow Iran’s lead in diversifying their holdings away from the dollar. Riyadh has substantial support (Bloomberg) in defending the dollar, but Nigeria and Angola, two of Africa’s major oil exporters, are

making new efforts to diversify their currency reserves.

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Relations Good – Dollar – Economic Collapse EXTN OPEC euro shift destroys the dollar and investor confidence Teslik, CFR Associate Editor, 12/7/2007 [Lee Hudson, "Considering the PetroEuro," http://www.cfr.org/publication/14988/considering_the_petroeuro.html]

If oil were priced in euros, what would the effect be? On the surface, possibly not much, experts say. “Whether they’re selling in dollars or euros, they can make their currency conversions,” says Peter J. Robertson, vice chairman of Chevron Corporation, in an interview with CFR.org. The fact that major currencies are easily exchanged means that oil producers don’t sustain any immediate monetary loss by accepting payment in one currency or another. Yet a currency switch could bring a slew of more subtle changes. First, there is the psychological impact. Robertson says a shift would send a clear signal that oil producers

“didn’t have as much confidence in the future of the United States”—a sentiment that could deeply undermine investor confidence. This, in turn, could further hamper the strength of the dollar. As Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister says “the mere mention that the OPEC countries are studying the issue of the dollar is itself going to have an impact,” adding that a dollar collapse could take a severe toll on OPEC (UK Telegraph) economies. Indeed, several of the main oil-exporting nations would be among the most vulnerable parties, globally, should the dollar’s value decline. Having accepted dollars in payment for years, countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have compiled massive dollar reserves (Economist), rivaling those held by China. They have a compelling interest in keeping those dollar piles as valuable as possible. Other countries, including Iran, have already diversified away (Gulf News) from the dollar, which explains the sharp differences of opinion within OPEC.

OPEC Euro shift would collapse the dollar Conway, Telegraph (UK) staff writer, 11/18/2007 [Edmund, " Saudi minister warns of dollar collapse," http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2007/11/17/cndollar117.xml]

The dollar could collapse if Opec officially admits considering changing the pricing of oil into alternative currencies such as the euro, the Saudi Arabian foreign minister has warned. Prince Saud Al-Faisal was overheard ruling out a proposal from Iran and Venezuela to discuss pricing crude in a private meeting at the oil cartel's conference. In an embarrassing blunder at the meeting in Riyadh, ministers' microphones were not cut off during a key closed meeting, and Prince Al-Faisal was heard saying: "My feeling is that the mere mention that the Opec countries are studying the issue of the dollar is itself going to have an impact that endangers the interests of the countries. "There will be journalists who will seize on this point and we don't want the dollar to collapse instead of doing something good for Opec."

Euro shift dooms the economy – perception is key Robertson, Chevron Vice Chairman, 12/7/2007 [Peter, "Robertson: Prospects for Future Oil Production ," http://www.cfr.org/publication/14901/] But in terms of the producers, whether they’re selling in dollars or euros, they can make their currency conversions—I know there’s risk attached to that, but I’m not sure it would change dramatically. Geopolitically, for the United States… Well it’s probably more psychological than anything else, but it clearly would send a signal that at least that part of the world—the oil-producing part of the world—didn’t have as much confidence in the future of the United States and the U.S. dollar than they did have. But that would be psychology, it seems to me—which often turns out to at least have short-

term effects.

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Relations Good – Dollar – AT: China Alt. Cause China won’t sell off the dollar Setser, CFR Geoeconomics Fellow, 11/12/2007 [Brad, "Setser: Understanding the Falling Dollar," http://www.cfr.org/publication/14781/] But in my mind, so long as China resists more rapid appreciation of the renminbi [China’s currency] versus the dollar, it’s rather difficult for China to diversify in any meaningful way against the dollar. If China really started to diversify away from the dollar, I think it’s a big enough player that it would put downward additional pressure on the dollar. So long as China itself pegs to the dollar or manages its currency primarily against the dollar—technically China has a crawling peg, and it’s clear from a range of economic analysis that it’s crawling mostly against the dollar, not against a true currency basket—then if it puts pressure against the dollar, it’s also putting pressure against its own currency. And given current economic conditions in China, I’m not sure that’s something China wants to do. So that’s a meaningful constraint on China’s ability to change its portfolio. But I would note that since maintaining the current value of the renminbi versus the dollar requires China buy a lot of dollars, not just hold onto its existing stock of dollars, means that keeping the dollar from falling and keeping the value of China’s current dollar holdings constant, means that China has to continually increase its exposure.

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Relations Good – Middle East Stability 1NC C. Impact – 1. US-Saudi relations are critical to prevent escalation of Mid-East instability Russell, Contemporary Conflict Center Co-Director, Senior Lecturer, Strategic Insights Editor, September 2002 [James, "Deconstructing the U.S.-Saudi Partnership?," 'http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asp]

As a lynchpin of U.S. security strategy and policy in the Persian Gulf for over 50 years, Washington's relationship with Riyadh and the House of Al Saud has been a foundation of stability amidst the region's currents of instability. However bad things may have been in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, southern Lebanon or any number of other situations, the U.S.-Saudi relationship provided all concerned with a degree of assurance that events would not spin completely out of control. But this relationship is now under more pressure than at any time in recent memory. Various commentators have suggested that the partnership should be restructured to reflect what is described as a fundamentally adversarial relationship.[1] The inference from such arguments is that a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship no longer serves U.S. strategic interests. Much of the commentary on the U.S.-Saudi relationship focuses on supposed broad policy incongruence between the two countries. The two countries are said to differ in their approach to terrorism, religion, pluralism, human rights, the Arab-Israeli conflict, possible military action against Iraq, and Saudi Arabia's role and importance in world oil markets. Often left out from this commentary are the ongoing activities between the two countries that helped preserve regional security and stability over the decades, which stemmed in part from a shared strategic vision. While the term has become de rigueur of late, the United States could not have pursued its policy of "dual containment" during the 1990s without Saudi support. While many critics have emphasized that the policy had negligible impact on Iran, the policy of containment helped prevent Saddam Hussein from seriously disrupting regional peace and security during the 1990s. The Iraqi military remains hamstrung by a decade of sanctions, and WMD breakout was certainly made more difficult during the UNSCOM era. Suggestions that the U.S.-Saudi relationship needs to be altered often ignore the organizations that have been created to manage this partnership - organizations that reflect a depth and complexity in Saudi-American relations that is generally unappreciated. In and of themselves, these entities and their activities do not justify preserving the status quo, but they do suggest that the

U.S.-Saudi security partnership could be deconstructed only with great difficulty and with dramatic and unforeseen consequences for regional security.

2. Mid-East instability results in global nuclear war Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, 2002 [John, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace, March, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm] Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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Relations Good – Middle East Stability – Link EXTN Saudi government key to regional stability and counter-terrorism – gradual reforms solve now Lalwani, New America Foundation Policy Analyst, 8/7/2007 [Sameer, "Beyond Arms Sales: Whither the US-Saudi Relationship?," http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/002269.php]

The Saudi government has also emerged as what we have hoped of other players in the region--a responsible stakeholder with a significant capacity to move agendas. Its leadership on the Arab-Israeli conflict can be traced back to 2002 with the launch of the Arab Peace Initiative but in the past year, it has taken on a more active role facilitating dialogue with Hezbollah leaders in December of 2006 (despite Saudi being a Sunni state and Hezbollah a Shiite organization), brokering the Mecca deal for a Fatah-Hamas unity government earlier this year in the face of a failed Quartet policy to isolate Hamas, re-launching the Arab peace initiative with Syria present at the summit, and now as Clayton Swisher has detailed, indicating support for the fall conference that President Bush has called. And contrary to the popular belief of oil windfalls recklessly squandered, there is good evidence to suggest Saudi's constructive investments in the rest of the region affords it considerably political leverage. Dr. Steffen Hertog has analyzed the most current regional economic data that reveals a marked increase in cross-border investment by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in the Middle East. As a result, he concludes the GCC, with Saudi as the most pivotal heavyweight, are poised to play a key stabilizing role in the region (particularly Syria and Lebanon) that would certainly be in America's interest: With its emerging role as the dominant economic hub of the region, the GCC arguably is a potential anchor of stability in the Arab world. Relatively weak in military terms, it has a vested interest in political calm, as it can then flex its economic muscle. At a time in which American hegemony has become of questionable value even to its "moderate" allies,

the GCC might be willing to play a more assertive role based on its economic resources. Needless to say, no amount of Gulf capital can buy stability amid a mess of epic proportions, as in Iraq (although Gulf money has been helping significantly to shore up the economy of the war-wrecked country). Still, the "soft power" of Gulf capital is not an academic point. As more and more GCC money is channeled into Syria, for example, Gulf political influence there is bound to increase. Its regime in rather dire economic straits, Syria will be increasingly reluctant to alienate Gulf governments--which are not capable of micromanaging the investment decisions of their business classes but can certainly use their moral suasion to indicate which investment destination is not palatable. Similarly, Gulf FDI imparts considerable soft

power in Lebanon, where it will play an important role in reconstruction. When Congress is ready to trade in petty ad hominems for a constructive approach to dealing with the Saudi Arabia of the 21st century, they ought to consult New America fellow Afshin Molavi and Georgetown professor Jean-Francois Seznec, who in their recent article in Foreign Policy, sketch the beginnings of a role the US and EU can play in ushering Saudi Arabia into the modern era and influencing the trajectory of their economy, and as a result their society: Here's where Europe and the United States can step in. Europe and the United States should embrace Saudi Arabia's newfound economic openness with strategic investments and trade agreements aimed at bolstering the Kingdom's manufacturing and industrial capacity, creating jobs for the country's growing middle class. By doing this, Washington and Brussels will be supporting the civil service and merchants who favor modernization and contributing to the marginalization of Salafists. A growing, industrializing economy will provide a virtuous loop that reinforces education reform as more Saudis seek the skills to compete. Issue number one on the minds of many Saudis--nearly two thirds of whom are under 30--is unemployment. If the civil service, the merchants, and the reform-minded king can create new jobs, their new alliance will gain the legitimacy of success. Part of the king's jobs strategy includes the creation of six massive new special economic zones (essentially free-trade zones) that will provide much-needed diversification to an economy still dominated by oil. It will also contribute to the "backdoor" modernization that takes place as middle classes grow and economies become interlinked with the world. The zones are seeking joint ventures in research and high technology from the United States and the European Union, and the zones are also expected to be a freer environment socially as well. A modernizing, moderate Saudi Arabia could be a lodestar for an Islamic world in turmoil. For most of modern Saudi history, the Kingdom has simply poured fuel on the burning oils of the Muslim world. Getting its own house in order by empowering the forces of modernization is a positive first step. But Europe and the United States need to realize that

they have an important role to play in writing the country's next chapter

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Relations Good – Middle East Stability – Oil Link Saudi oil revenue is critical to stabilize the Mid-East, prevent escalation in Iraq and Israel-Palestine – any drop off in oil profits causes Saudi Arabia to withdrawal from this strategy Stratfor, 6/2/2008 ["Oil and the Saudi Peace Offensive," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/oil_and_saudi_peace_offensive]

The Saudis are engaged in a massive maneuver to try to pacify the region, if not forever, then for at least as long as oil prices are high. The Saudis are quietly encouraging the Syrian-Israeli peace talks along with the Turks, and one of the reasons for Syrian participation is undoubtedly assurances of Saudi investments in Syria and Lebanon from which Damascus can benefit. The Saudis also are encouraging Israeli-Palestinian talks, and there is, we suspect, Saudi pressure on Hamas to be

more cooperative in those talks. The Saudis have no interest in an Israeli-Syrian or Israeli-Hezbollah conflict right now that might destabilize the region. Finally, the Saudis have had enough of the war in Iraq. They do not want increased Iranian power in Iraq. They do not want to see the Sunnis marginalized. They do not want to see al Qaeda dominating the Iraqi Sunnis. They have influence with the Iraqi Sunnis, and money buys even more. Ever since 2003, with the exception of the Kurdish region, the development of Iraqi oil has been stalled. Iraqis of all factions are aware of how much money they’ve lost because of their civil war. This is a lever that the Saudis can use in encouraging some sort of peace in Iraq. It is not that Saudi Arabia has become pacifist by any means. Nor are they expecting (or, frankly, interested in) lasting peace. They are interested in assuring sufficient stability over the coming months and years so they can concentrate on making money from oil. To do this they need to carry out a complex maneuver. They need to refocus their own religious conservatives against the Shia. They need to hem in Iran, the main Shiite power. They need to reposition themselves politically in the United States, the country that ultimately guarantees Saudi national security. And they need to at least lower the temperature in Middle Eastern conflicts or, better still, forge peace treaties. The Saudis don’t care if these treaties are permanent, but neither would they object if they were. Like any state, Saudi Arabia has interests to pursue; these interests change over time, but right now is the time for stability. Later is later. It is therefore no surprise that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited Riyadh for talks this weekend. The discussions weren’t theological in nature. Mubarak shares with the Saudis an interest in an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Mubarak fears the spread of Hamas’ ideas back into Egypt and he wants the radical Palestinian group kept in its Gaza box. A large cache of weapons uncovered in the Sinai last week, including surface to air missiles, is as much a threat to Egypt as to Israel. Mubarak has been in no position to conclude such an agreement, even though he has tried to broker it. The Saudis have the financial muscle to make it happen. Clearly the Egyptians and Saudis have much to discuss.

We are not at the dawn of a new age in the Middle East. We are in a period where one country has become politically powerful because of mushrooming wealth, and wants to use that power to make more wealth. A lasting peace is not likely in the Middle East. But increased stability is possible, and while interfaith dialogue does not strike us as a vehicle to this end, hundreds of millions in oil revenue does. Peace has been made on weaker foundations.

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Relations Good – Middle East Stability – AT: Alt. Cause US-Saudi relations solves alt. causes – spurs regional integration Russell, Contemporary Conflict Center Co-Director, Senior Lecturer, Strategic Insights Editor, September 2002 [James, "Deconstructing the U.S.-Saudi Partnership?," 'http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/middleEast2.asp] But the relationship at this level holds enormous potential for the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship and the region as a whole. Saudi Arabia is the dominant country politically on the peninsula, and all the Gulf States cast a watchful eye on

Riyadh. Saudi Arabia's role in the region and its well-developed security relationship with the United States make it possible to one day foresee an integrated regional defense architecture including all the Gulf States under U.S. and Saudi leadership. U.S. and Saudi air forces might in the future operate together using a coalition operations space within the combined air operations center at Prince Sultan Air Base. Perhaps officers from other Gulf Cooperation Council militaries could join together with Saudi and U.S. counterparts in this facility to coordinate joint and combined air defense efforts across the theater. If U.S.-Saudi operational cooperation can be established at PSAB, it could provide a model that could be replicated in other Gulf States, leading to activities that would promote mutual confidence and collective security. While regional military integration among friendly coalition partners may today seem a remote scenario, the scenario is at least plausible if Saudi

Arabia and the United States lead the way. Regional security integration will surely never flourish without positive U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations.

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Relations Good – Terrorism ( ). Terrorism A. US-Saudi coop is key to prevent terrorism – influence and intel Cordesman, CSIS Middle East Program Co-Director, Strategy Chair, 2/1/2004 [Anthony, "Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi relationship," http://www.saudi-americanforum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htm] 1. Both the US and Saudi Arabia now face a common threat from terrorism, both in terms of internal and regional threats. Saudi Arabia may have been slow to recognize how serious this threat is, but since the terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in May 2003, it has become clear that it is as real for Saudis as it is for Americans. It is also clear that dealing with terrorism

requires close cooperation between the two countries, that Saudi Arabia needs US assistance in modernizing many aspects of its internal security operations, and that the US needs Saudi cooperation in reducing the flow of money to terrorists and their ability to manipulate Islamic causes. Furthermore, it is clear that political, social, and economic forces are at work where this cooperation will have to go on for years – if not decades – after Bin Laden and Al Qaida have ceased to be a threat.

B. Terrorism results in extinction – new technology pose unique threats PACOTTI 2003 [SALON.COM, March 31, http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/03/31/knowledge/index.html/ ttate]

Advances in biotech, chemistry, and other fields are expanding the power of individuals to cause harm, and this has many people worried. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, writing for The Futurist, gave this warning in 1999: "Technological advances threaten to outdo anything terrorists have done before; superterrorism has the potential to eradicate civilization as we know it." Schweitzer and Dorsch are so alarmed that they go on to say, "Civil A similar trend has appeared in proposed solutions to high-tech terrorist threats.

liberties are important for a democratic society; the time has arrived, however, to reconfigure some aspects of democracy, given the violence that is on the doorstep." The Sept. 11 attacks have obviously added credence to their opinions. In 1999, they recommended an expanded role for the CIA, "greater government intervention" in Americans' lives, and the "honorable deed" of "whistle-blowing" -- proposals that went from fringe ideas to policy options and talk-show banter in less than a year. Taken together, their proposals aim to gather information from companies and individuals and feed that information into government agencies. A network of cameras positioned on street corners would nicely complement their vision of America during the 21st century. If

after Sept. 11 and the anthrax scare these still sound like wacky Orwellian ideas to you, imagine how they will sound the day a terrorist opens a jar of Ebola-AIDS spores on Capitol Hill. As Sun Microsystems' chief scientist, Bill Joy, warned: "We have yet to come to terms with the fact that the most compelling 21st-century technologies -robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology -- pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Specifically, robots, engineered organisms, and nanobots share a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate. A bomb is blown up only once -but one bot can become many, and quickly get out of control." Joy calls the new threats "knowledge-enabled mass destruction." To cause great harm to millions of people, an extreme person will need only dangerous knowledge, which itself will move through the biosphere, encoded as matter, and flit from place to place as easily as dangerous ideas now travel between our minds. In the information age, dangerous knowledge can be copied and disseminated at light speed, and it threatens everyone. Therefore, Joy's perfectly reasonable conclusion is that we should relinquish "certain kinds of knowledge." He says that it is time to reconsider the open, unrestrained

unlimited development of knowledge henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, long-held pursuit of knowledge that has been the foundation of science for 300 years. " Despite the strong historical precedents, if open access to and

beliefs."

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Relations Good – Terrorism EXTN (1/2) US-Saudi ties are critical to counter-terrorism Lalwani, New America Foundation Policy Analyst, 8/7/2007 [Sameer, "Beyond Arms Sales: Whither the US-Saudi Relationship?," http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/002269.php] With Saudi Arabia cultivating strong ties with China, and to a lesser extent with India, members of Congress and their advisors need to start taking a step beyond puerile tirades on the House floor, to asking themselves what we lose--in terms of security

cooperation and a potential ally to help us regain some credibility in the Middle East--if Saudi Arabia continues to turn eastward. And in terms of fighting extremism, the government has a vested interest in doing so. Saudi officials are well aware that al Qaeda's endgame, after the US eventually withdraws from Iraq, is to topple the "near enemy", and simply regime self-preservation will motivate the government to cooperate with the US to fight al Qaeda. And because they have to deal with the effects of Iraqi blowback, the Saudis have introduced novel approaches to fight terrorism at home and abroad waging a war of ideas

through intensive de-radicalization programs and countering jihadist websites, methodologies we could stand to learn from through further counterterrorism cooperation.

US-Saudi coop is key to prevent terrorism – Saudi is the key influence Cordesman, CSIS Middle East Program Co-Director, Strategy Chair, 2/1/2004 [Anthony, "Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi relationship," http://www.saudi-americanforum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htm] 7. Both nations need to cooperate to counter the forces of Islamic extremism. Saudi Arabia is still the custodian of

Islam’s two most important holy places. It is still a symbol of Islam, as well as Arab rule, to many people outside as well as inside Saudi Arabia. The idea of Mecca and Medina ever coming under the control of Islamic radicals is truly frightening. At the same time, if Saudi Arabia shifts its Islamic assistance overseas to support moderate and progressive Islam, it can have a major impact outside its territory.

U.S. Saudi Relationship Strong-Saudi Cooperation With U.S. in Counter Terrorism Operation Business Wire, 2008 Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on the President's Trip to the Middle East, Business Wire, May 7, 2008 Wednesday 9:41 PM GMT, Taylor Second, there are -- we have been -- we don't talk a lot about it publicly, but we have been working very closely with the Saudis in terms of counterterrorism cooperation with threats inside Saudi Arabia. They -- as you may think back a number of years, there was a very serious al Qaeda threat inside of Saudi Arabia; a lot of attacks had occurred against innocent civilians. That is largely reduced. And Saudi Arabia has been very active against an al Qaeda threat inside Saudi Arabia. We have been very active in supporting that in a number of different ways -- much closer, I think, cooperation than we've ever had in the past. That's obviously something that was very important to the Saudis, and I think if you talk to them, they will acknowledge the role that we have played. Third, I think it's no accident that, first, as Crown Prince and now as King, King Abdallah has refreshed his plan for Middle East peace, which is the basis for, as I said earlier, the prospect that a Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation can be in the context of a broader Israeli-Arab reconciliation. I think he did that for his own reasons. He thought it was best for his country, but he certainly did it with our encouragement.

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Relations Good – Terrorism EXTN (2/2) US-Saudi relations key to prevent Saudi radicalization – the impact is terrorism Telhami, UMD (University of Maryland) Peace and Development Professor, Brookings Senior Fellow, and Hill, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Program Fellow, December 2002 [Shibley and Fiona, "Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and Its Oil," Foreign Affairs, lexis] And finally, the key role that Saudi Arabia plays psychologically and symbolically in the lives of Muslims worldwide cannot be underestimated. It is one thing to have radical nonstate groups that advocate and employ violence against the United States; it would be a very different matter to have a radical government employ the pulpit of Mecca, where millions come every year on pilgrimage, to set a hostile tone in the name of Islam. This prospect alone -- which seems quite realistic in Rouleau's portrait of "the most rigorous theocracy in the Islamic world," where Islamic radicals "have called into

question the very legitimacy of the al Saud dynasty" -- should be enough to convince Americans that a close U.S.Saudi relationship is in their best interest.

Us – Saudi Relations are key to Iraq war and Terrorism BBC, 2007 [ “Saudi foreign minister, US's Rice, US defence secretary hold news conference” , August 1, lexis, Ricardo Saenz ] "We discussed the current developments in Iraq; we expressed our concern over the continuation of current security and political deterioration which lead to bad consequences not only in Iraq but to the stability and security of the whole region," Prince Saud said. He reiterated the keenness of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to support the regional and International efforts to achieve the security and stability of Iraq, its sovereignty independence and Unity of its territories. "The success of such efforts can be achieved through social justice and the National Unity among all Iraqis. The Iraqi Government assumes great and historic responsibility to reach the goals far from foreign interventions. The issue of foreign intervention was a major discussion point in the meetings of Iraq's neighbouring countries and also in the Sharm el-Shaykh International Convention on Iraq. We are looking for tangible results of the plans and programmes agreed upon in these meetings," he added. "We discussed the Lebanese Crises and the continuation of tension despite major economic and political support for Lebanon and the extensive Arab League and International efforts to resolve the Lebanese crises. We urged all Lebanese parties to resort to rationality and wisdom and give the priority to national interest as well as resolve their political issues through dialogue and national constitutions to preserve the unity stability and development of Lebanon free from foreign intervention which does not seek prosperity for Lebanon and its people," he said.

"We discussed the regional nuclear file and the importance of Gulf region and the Mid-East to be free from nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction reiterating from our side the solution of the current conflict with diplomacy far from acceleration of tension." Prince Saud expressed the satisfaction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the joint Saudi-US cooperation in countering terrorism and fighting this malicious phenomenon and the importance of the continuation of joint cooperation until terrorism is uprooted.

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Relations Good – Israel-Palestine ( ). The Peace Process A. Saudi-US coop is key to the Israel-Palestine peace process Cordesman, CSIS Middle East Program Co-Director, Strategy Chair, 2/1/2004 [Anthony, "Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi relationship," http://www.saudi-americanforum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF_Item_Of_Interest_2004_02_01.htm] 9. Cooperation is needed to support the Arab-Israeli peace process. If there is ever to be an Arab-Israeli peace

settlement, or if the current Israeli-Palestinian War is to be contained, both the US and Saudi Arabia need to work together as much as possible to push the peace process forward and reduce support for violent extremism on both sides. The US and Saudi Arabia will never share common objectives or perceptions until there is a just, secure, and lasting peace, but it is clear that the present level of Saudi support and cooperation is far better than indifference or hostility, or what would occur if political evolution was replaced with revolution.

B. A successful peace process is critical to prevent Mid-East conflict, chemical biological and nuclear escalation Berger, Jerusalem CBS News Radio Correspondent, 7/19/2007 [Robert, "War or Peace? The Middle East at the Crossroads" www.lawac.org/speech/2006-07/BERGER,%20Robert%202007.pdf] I’m often asked whether Hamas really believes it can destroy Israel. After all, Israel is a regional superpower with the most modern weapons and Hamas is basically armed with light

Hamas does believe it can destroy Israel and, in fact, it has seen its strength multiplied now over the years. Twenty years ago, Palestinians were throwing stones; today they have suicide bombers, rockets and anti-tank missiles. They’re heavily arming and it’s quite possible that there’s going to be a major confrontation on Israel’s southern border involving a strengthened Hamas. It’s going to be able to pose a very serious challenge to Israel, just as Hezbollah did last summer when a 34 day assault by the most powerful army in the Middle East could not dislodge Hezbollah, couldn’t beat them. weapons. But when you believe that a supreme power is behind you and on your side—in this case Allah— you believe anything is possible.

Now we’re seeing the Lebanonization of Gaza. After Israel abandoned the border with Gaza and Egypt joined the Gaza pullout now Hamas is bringing in tons of weapons—explosives, rockets, anti-tank missiles—which caused Israel a lot of problems in Lebanon last year. According to the Israeli army they’re digging bunkers deep underground to withstand a future Israeli assault. Further, they now have weapons that can hit the city of Ashkdan, which has a major power plant. The situation is so serious that the army has drawn up a plan to evacuate much of southern Israel in the event of a future conflict much like I was describing in the beginning when northern Israel, during last year’s war, was largely evacuated.

What you have now is an Islamic axis – Hamas in Israel’s southern back yard and Hezbollah in Israel’s northern back yard, backed ominously by a growing powerful regional superpower named Iran. Hezbollah and Hamas can pretty much destabilize the region at will. If Hezbollah decides today to start firing rockets over the border into Israel we’re going to have another major war in the Middle East, and you always have the danger, that if Hezbollah gets involved you’re going to get Syria involved and ultimately Iran. Now, the scariest thing about what going on is the fact that Iran is now seeking nuclear weapons. In late 2005, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad threatened to wipe Israel off the map. Since then there have been alarm bells in Israel about the threat from Iran. Iran is now considered Israel’s greatest strategic threat despite what’s going on with Hezbollah and Hamas. Israeli officials have made two things clear: One, Israel cannot allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and two, if sanctions fail there is a military option. I repeat – there is a military option. That raises the specter of an Israeli preemptive strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities. This happened once before back in 1981 when Israel knocked out Iraq’s nuclear reactor – Saddam Hussein’s reactor. It was an incredible feat really; there were eight F-16 fighter jets crossing 1400 miles round trip, refueling in midair, flying low over Saudi Arabia and Jordan to avoid radar detection and pulling off this preemptive strike without a hitch—an incredible military feat. But today the situation is much more complicated. Iran’s nuclear facilities are spread out all over the country, they are fortified deep underground in concrete, Iran is further away than Iraq and, therefore, Israel would like to see America knock out Iran’s nuclear facilities. America has superpower capabilities, it has aircraft carriers, B-52 carpet bombers, and bunker busters. But after the mid-term elections here in the U.S., Israel came to the realization that America probably is not going to do it. Bush doesn’t have the backing from Congress and America is too bogged down in Iraq. Hence, we have a real possibility that Israel might go it alone. Does Israel have the capability to knock out Iran’s nuclear facilities? I want to read a quote from Prime Minister Olmert who thought he was speaking off the record in an interview and he said, “It is impossible perhaps to destroy the entire nuclear program but it would be possible to damage it in such a way that it would be a set back years. It would take ten days and a thousand tomahawk cruise missiles.” I think that’s a very broad hint. The Israeli Defense Minister, former defense minister Shail Mofaz, had a scarier scenario. He said the only way to knock out Iran’s nuclear facilities would be with tactical nuclear weapons. So, we have a growing danger of a nuclear confrontation now in the Middle East with Israel the only nuclear power and Iran, dangerously, becoming a nuclear power. If Israel does preempt there’s going to be a major Middle East war because Iran says it will hit back and it has the capability to do so. Iran has the Shahab 3 ballistic missile which can hit anywhere in Israel and also carry chemical and biological weapons. So, we’re looking at a situation where there is a possibility of a non-conventional war in the not too distant future.

There’s also the possibility that Syria, Iran’s ally, could get involved. They also have ballistic missiles that can carry chemical and biological weapons. Israel’s soft underbelly is the ballistic missile. They can’t stop the rockets from Hezbollah; they can’t stop Hamas’ rockets. We’re not talking about rockets now, we’re talking about ballistic missiles – things that can carry giant warheads. While Israel has improved its missile defense capabilities, it’s believed that a shower of ballistic missiles could cause a lot of damage to the Jewish state. The current situation is that Israel and the United States have agreed to see where things stand at the end of the year with regard to sanctions on Iran. I think everyone here knows that sanctions are not going to stop Iran. Iran has made it clear that it’s not going to stop, and that it has a national right to develop this nuclear program. So, what’s been happening is that Iran has been using negotiations with a reluctant West to buy time and as these negotiations drag on Iran is getting closer to what the Israelis call the point of no return. That means the point

according to Israeli and U.S. intelligence that could come within three years. I think 2008 is likely to be a crucial year with regard to war and peace in the Middle East. when Iran has the capability, the technology, the know-how, and the materials to build a nuclear weapon. And

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Relations Good – Israel-Palestine – Link EXTN US – Saudi Relations are key to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian deal and preventing Iranian nuclear conflict. Christian Science Monitor, 2008 [“Bush drills for middle east deals” January 8, lexis, Ricardo Saenz ] Israel's concern for its security, of course, is understandable. Attacks on its civilians are all too real or possible from bomb-lobbing militant groups backed by Iran: Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hizbullah in Lebanon. And Iran is still capable of creating a missile and nuclear threat, even if it has apparently hit the pause button in making an atomic bomb, as US intelligence claims. But the US must set its own path in deciding whether Iran's influence can really be eliminated or simply contained. After all, Iran is a regional giant in population, oil wealth, and potential for meddling. With the Iran question as the real substance of the trip, Bush's talks with the main US

Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, are critical. His Jan. 14 visit to the oil kingdom will be a key step toward a Middle East peace. Unlike Bush, Saudi's royal Sunni rulers actually talk to Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite the fears of the dominant Sunni Arabs in the region toward Iran's Shiite and Persian revolutionaries. In a surprise to the US, Mr. Ahmadinejad attended last month's meeting of the once anti-Iran Arab club, the Gulf Cooperation Council. He was then invited by the Saudi king to visit Mecca. Such a welcome mat for Iran, however, may simply be a traditional Saudi tactic of keeping one's enemy close. That differs from the US stand of keeping Iran contained and Israel's wish to see the Iranian threat removed. If Bush's intent is to simply shore up the Arab alliance against Iran, he'll need to adopt their diplomatic subtlety. And he'll need to recognize that Arab states are not united in their concerns and tactics toward Iran. Some want American military equipment for defense against Iran. Others want a strong Sunni role in Iraq's government to prevent Iran's influence there. Instead of US leadership in the Middle East, the time may be ripe for US followership, especially after Bush's mishandling of Iraq. And a Saudi-US alliance is also critical for final hammering of an Israeli-Palestinian deal. That pact is necessary for success in Bush's longer-range agenda of more freedom and democracy in the region. It doesn't hurt that he'll speak of that goal again in a speech during his stop in the United Arab Emirates.But as he has now learned, the region first needs to deal with Iran and other radical Islamists in Iraq and elsewhere, as well as Palestinian aspirations for an independent state of their own. Firm progress on those issues would be some of the best legacies to leave the next US president.

U.S. Saudi Relationship Key- Saudi Support Critical to Peace in the Middle East Business Wire, 2008 Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on the President's Trip to the Middle East, Business Wire, May 7, 2008 Wednesday 9:41 PM GMT, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4204938268&format=GNBFI &sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4204938271&cisb=22_T4204938270&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi =7924&docNo=7, Taylor

Obviously coming to celebrate Israel's 60th anniversary is both symbolism and substance -- symbolism because it is obviously a landmark event in the history of Israel, but also substance because it shows the President's and the United States' continuing commitment to the security of Israel. He's obviously not just going to Israel and returning home. He will have an opportunity to visit Saudi Arabia, which will be a crucial actor both in supporting President Abbas in terms of whatever decisions he makes in the context of the negotiations, and also being part of a process which we hope will occur, which is that any Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation will be in the context of a broader reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world. And obviously Saudi Arabia is critical to that. US-Saudi relations key to peace deal Richter, Times staff writer, 6/8/2008 [Paul, "Oil inflames U.S.-Saudi ties," lexis] Even without the passage of punitive legislation this year, diplomatic efforts could suffer if the Saudis react badly to the American outcry, Saunders said. One that could be affected is Bush's insistence on a Mideast peace pact by the time he leaves office in January. "You couldn't have any real expectation of [a peace deal] if the Saudis are seriously alienated from the U.S.," Saunders said.

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Relations Good – Proliferation ( ). Saudi Prolif A. US-Saudi relations are critical to prevent cascading proliferation – key to a credible deterrent policy McInnis, Center for Strategic Studies International Security Program Research associate, Summer 2005 [Kathleen, ““Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/05summer/index.cfm?id=162]

“[w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” One major challenge to the nonproliferation regime appearing on the strategic horizon is the A recent UN report recently warned that

likely development of an Iranian nuclear capability, which could spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Middle Eastern region. With this in mind, can U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities help bolster the security of U.S. allies against the threats posed by Iranian nuclear proliferation? In addition to deterring its own adversaries, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has in the past played a vital but often overlooked role of reassuring U.S. allies against their adversaries. This assurance was a key tool in preventing nuclear proliferation among allies in the European and Asian theaters during the Cold War, despite the threat posed by the nuclear capabilities of their enemies. In today’s security environment, assurance remains an important policy objective for the U.S. arsenal. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review states that “U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners.... This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances.” Will this strategy work in practice? In the Asian theater, extended deterrence has been effective, and the United States possesses some decent options for ensuring its effectiveness in the future. The long-standing commitment of the United States to the survival of democratic states in the region, reinforced by security treaties with Japan and South Korea, has created a great deal of U.S. political credibility in the region. This political credibility, combined with U.S. military capabilities, could be employed to deter the North Korean threat and assure U.S. allies in the region, thereby reducing the chance that they will respond to Pyongyang by building their own nuclear weapons program. The U.S. political commitment to its allies in Asia has been and remains robust, bolstered by the U.S. troop presence in Japan and South Korea for the past 50 years. This remains true despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Asian theater. Furthermore, should allies begin to doubt U.S. nuclear assurances, steps can be taken to reinforce the policy’s credibility. As such, despite the major challenges presented by Pyongyang’s nuclear declaration in February 2005, it is reasonably likely that East Asian allies will continue to choose to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella well into the future rather than set off a regional nuclear domino effect. U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagement than to Washington’s well-established partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous relations. As then–Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, “Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in

the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerging in an already volatile Middle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities, including the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key “nuclear dominos” in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, decide that U.S. security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the region, creating a uniquely dangerous situation. terms of deterrence and defense.” One such challenge is

B. Cascading proliferation leads to global nuclear conflict Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, SURVIVAL, Fall,2002, p. 87-90 In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shootouts will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

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Relations Good – Proliferation EXTN US-Saudi relations are key to prevent Saudi proliferation – US security blanket Levi 03 (Michael, Science and Technology Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies @ Brookings, “Would the Saudis Go Nuclear?,” http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/levi20030602.htm)

Why would Riyadh want nukes now? Because of a potentially dangerous confluence of events. The rapidly progressing nuclear program of traditional rival Iran has no doubt spooked the Saudi leadership. Last fall, dissidents revealed the existence of a covert Iranian uranium-enrichment program, forcing analysts to drastically revise down their estimates of how long it might take Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Reacting to that development, Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently wrote that "Saudi Arabia is the state most likely to proliferate in response to an Iranian nuclear threat" because, he argued, the Saudis fear a nuclear-armed Iran could have designs on Saudi Arabia, a Sunni monarchy that is home to a large number of oppressed Shia. After all, Tehran has for years allegedly supported Shia terrorist groups operating in Saudi Arabia and was blamed by many analysts for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. Holding back the Saudi nuclear program, of course, has been the kingdom's relationship with the United States. Though America has never signed a formal treaty with Riyadh, since World War II the United States has made clear by its actions—most notably, by protecting Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf war—and by informal guarantees given to Saudi leaders by American officials that it will protect the monarchy from outside threats. Since the September 11 attacks, though, that relationship has grown increasingly frail. When a RAND analyst last summer told the Defense Policy Board, then chaired by Richard Perle, that Saudi Arabia was "the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent" in the Middle East, he not only raised hackles in Riyadh, he reflected the opinion of many close to the Bush administration. R. James Woolsey, former CIA director and White House confidant, was even more emphatic in a speech last November, referring to "the barbarics [sic], the Saudi royal family." The recent decision by Washington to pull most of its forces out of Saudi Arabia, reducing its deployment from 5,000 to 400 personnel and moving its operations to Qatar, has added facts on the ground to the rhetorical barrage. This recent decline in U.S.-Saudi relations can hardly make the Saudi royal family feel secure. Suddenly removing the U.S. security blanket just as regional rivalries are intensifying could push the Saudis into the nuclear club. That's a scary prospect, particularly when you consider the possibility of Islamists overthrowing the monarchy. Instead, the United States should be careful to maintain Saudi Arabia's confidence even as the two nations inevitably drift apart. The United States might even extend an explicit security guarantee to the Saudis, the kind of formal treaty it gave Europe to keep it non-nuclear during the cold war-and the kind of formal arrangement Washington and Riyadh have never signed before. Such a formal deal could raise anti-American sentiment in the desert kingdom. But the alternative might be worse.

Saudi nuclear proliferation ensures conflict escalation in the Middle East Morning Star 9/19/03 (lexis)

A strategy paper, which is allegedly being considered at the highest levels in Riyadh, suggests either acquiring a nuclear capability as a deterrent or entering an alliance with an existing nuclear power. CND chairwoman Kate Hudson said: "The war on Iraq has created greater instability in the Middle East. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia will further destabilise the area and could lead to a new nuclear arms race.

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Relations Good – Hegemony ( ). Hegemony A. Relations are key to US hegemony – Saudi Arabia is key to US power projection Bronson, former CFR Middle East and Gulf Studies director, 6 [Rachel, Chicago Council on Global Affairs programs and studies VP, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia, 252-3] Still, Saudi Arabia's geography continues to prove useful to American military planners and Saudi leaders continue to make it available. In October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was largely conducted by Americans at Prince Sultan Air Base. The U.S. Air Force relied on Saudi airspace to conduct its missions, and the former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Robert Jordan, recalls a "high degree of cooperation" between the two countries. Although Saudi leaders publicly opposed Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the kingdom supported American military activity to a far greater extent than was publicly acknowledged. In the initial phases of the fighting, Americans operated from at least three Saudi air bases, launched refueling tankers, F-16 fighter jets, and sophisticated intelligence-gathering flights from Saudi soil, and relied on cheap Saudi fuel.9 Saudi Arabia's strategic location continues to prove valuable to American planners. The United States simply cannot easily operate in Central Asia, South Asia, Iraq, or the Persian Gulf without Saudi support. Iraq is still years away from serving as a viable alternative.

B. The impact is global nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, policy analyst at RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring ‘95 Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's

major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Oil Dependence Good – Mid-East Stability Turn – Mid-East Stability A. Energy independence causes Mid-East conflict – US shift creates a power vacuum, foreign powers fight for influence Westhawk, Former Global Research Director, Former US Marine Corps officer, 1/2/2008, "Could the U.S. walk away from the Persian Gulf?," http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/01/could-us-walk-away-from-persian-gulf.html Or would it? Even if the U.S. managed to reduce its crude oil imports from the Persian Gulf to zero, historian Walter Russell Mead argues that it would be dangerous for the U.S. to walk away from the region. While we can imagine

America’s reliance on Persian Gulf oil dropping away, the dependence of China, India, Japan, Europe, and others to the Persian Gulf will remain high and rising. If the U.S. walks away from the Persian Gulf leaving a security vacuum, other powers will have step in, as Mr. Mead describes: The end of America's ability to safeguard the Gulf and the trade routes around it would be enormously damaging--and not just to us. Defense budgets would grow dramatically in every major power center, and Middle Eastern politics would be further destabilized, as every country sought political influence in Middle Eastern countries to ensure access to oil in the resulting free for all. The potential for conflict and chaos is real. A world of insecure and suspicious great powers engaged in military competition over vital interests would not be a safe or happy place. Every ship that China builds to protect the increasing numbers of supertankers needed to bring oil from the Middle East to China in years ahead would also be a threat to Japan's oil security--as well as to the oil security of India and Taiwan. European cooperation would likely be undermined as well, as countries sought to make their best deals with Russia, the Gulf states and other oil rich neighbors like Algeria.

B. Mid-East instability results in global nuclear war Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, 2002 [John, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace, March, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm] Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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Oil Dependence Good – Mid-East Stability EXTN US presence is key to Mid-East stability Mead, CFR Senior Fellow, 1/1/2008 [Walter Russell, "Why We're in the Gulf," http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110011063] For the past few centuries, a global economic and political system has been slowly taking shape under first British and then American leadership. As a vital element of that system, the leading global power--with help from allies and other parties--

maintains the security of world trade over the seas and air while also ensuring that international economic transactions take place in an orderly way. Thanks to the American umbrella, Germany, Japan, China, Korea and India do not need to maintain the military strength to project forces into the Middle East to defend their access to energy. Nor must each country's navy protect the supertankers carrying oil and liquefied national gas (LNG).

For this system to work, the Americans must prevent any power from dominating the Persian Gulf while retaining the ability to protect the safe passage of ships through its waters. The Soviets had to be kept out during the Cold War, and the security and independence of the oil sheikdoms had to be protected from ambitious Arab leaders like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and Iraq's Saddam Hussein. During the Cold War Americans forged alliances with Turkey, Israel and (until 1979) Iran, three nonArab states that had their own reasons for opposing both the Soviets and any pan-Arab state.

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Oil Dependence Good – Proliferation Turn – Proliferation A. Energy independence causes global prolif – causes arms races from US withdrawal Westhawk, Former Global Research Director, Former US Marine Corps officer, 1/2/2008, "Could the U.S. walk away from the Persian Gulf?," http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/01/could-us-walk-away-from-persian-gulf.html Finally, a concerted American campaign to eliminate its dependence on Persian Gulf energy supplies might spark a global arms race, even if the U.S. pledged to keep the U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain forever. From China’s or India’s or Europe’s perspective, if the U.S. actually did achieve economic independence from the Persian Gulf, the U.S. would then have

the option of walking away from the region at any time. It is that option that the other powers would have to prepare for.

B. Cascading proliferation leads to global nuclear conflict Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, SURVIVAL, Fall,2002, p. 87-90 In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shootouts will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

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Oil Dependence Good – Protectionism Turn – Protectionism A. Energy independence results in isolationism and protectionism Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 3/7/2008 [Robert, "‘Gusher of Lies'," http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/books/chapters/first-chapter-gusher-oflies.html?ref=books&pagewanted=all]

America’s future when it comes to energy — as well its future in politics, trade, and the environment — lies in accepting the reality of an increasingly interdependent world. Obtaining the energy that the U.S. will need in future decades requires American politicians, diplomats, and businesspeople to be actively engaged with the energy-producing countries of the world, particularly the Arab and Islamic producers. Obtaining the country’s future energy supplies means that the U.S. must embrace the global market while also acknowledging the practical limits on the ability of wind power and solar power to displace large amounts of the electricity that’s now generated by fossil fuels and nuclear reactors. The rhetoric about the need for energy independence continues largely because the American public is woefully ignorant about the fundamentals of energy and the energy business. It appears that voters respond to the phrase, in part, because it has become a type of code that stands for foreign policy isolationism — the idea being that if only the U.S. didn’t buy oil from the Arab and Islamic countries, then all would be better. The

rhetoric of energy independence provides political cover for protectionist trade policies, which have inevitably led to ever larger subsidies for politically connected domestic energy producers, the corn ethanol industry being the most obvious example. But going it alone with regard to energy will not provide energy security or any other type of security. Energy independence, at its root, means protectionism and isolationism, both of which are in direct opposition to America’s long-term interests in the Persian Gulf and globally. Once you move past the hype and the overblown rhetoric, there’s little or no justification for the push to make America energy-independent. And that’s the purpose of this book: to debunk the concept of energy independence and show that none of the alternative or renewable energy sources now being hyped — corn ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, wind power, solar power, coal-to-liquids, and so on — will free America from imported fuels.

America’s appetite is simply too large and the global market is too sophisticated and too integrated for the U.S. to simply secede.

B. Protectionism causes extinction – causes global nuclear conflict and economic collapse Miller and Elwood, International Society for Individual Liberty, 1988 [http://www.free-market.net/resources/lit/free-trade-protectionism.html ] TRADE WARS: BOTH SIDES LOSE When the government of Country "A" puts up trade barriers against the goods of Country "B", the government of Country "B" will naturally retaliate by erecting trade barriers against the goods of Country "A". The result? A trade war in which both sides lose. But all too often a depressed economy is not the only negative

WHEN GOODS DON'T CROSS BORDERS, ARMIES OFTEN DO History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars: Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when outcome of a trade war . . .

restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets. British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports - a major factor leading to the American Civil War. In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I. In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover

ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other

The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II. THE #1 DANGER TO WORLD governments had retaliated by passing similar laws.

PEACE The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 1945-1970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can

we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age? "What generates war is the economic philosophy of nationalism: embargoes, trade and foreign exchange controls, monetary devaluation, etc. The philosophy of protectionism is a philosophy of war." Ludwig von Mises

THE SOLUTION: FREE TRADE A century and a half ago French economist and statesman Frederic Bastiat presented the practical case for free trade: "It is always beneficial," he said, "for a nation to specialize in what it can produce best and then trade with others to acquire goods at costs lower than it would take to produce them at home." In the 20th century, journalist Frank Chodorov made a similar observation: "Society thrives on trade simply because trade makes specialization possible, and specialization increases output, and increased output reduces the cost in toil for the satisfactions men live by. That being so, the market place is a most humane institution." WHAT CAN YOU DO? Silence gives consent, and there should be no consent to the current waves of restrictive trade or capital control legislation being passed. If you agree that free trade is an essential ingredient in maintaining world peace, and that it is important to your future, we suggest that you inform the political leaders in your country of your concern regarding their interference with free trade. Send them a copy of this pamphlet. We also suggest that you write letters to editors in the media and send this pamphlet to them. Discuss this issue with your friends and warn them of the danger of current "protectionist" trends. Check on how the issue is being taught in the schools. Widespread public understanding of this issue, followed by citizen action, is the only solution. Free trade is too important an issue to leave in the hands of politicians. "For thousands of years, the tireless effort of productive men and women has been spent trying to reduce the distance between communities of the world by

the slothful and incompetent protectionist has endlessly sought to erect barriers in order to prohibit competition - thus, effectively moving communities farther apart. When trade is cut off entirely, the real producers may as well be on different planets. The protectionist represents the worst in humanity: fear of change, fear of challenge, and the jealous envy of genius. The protectionist is not against the use of every kind of force, even warfare, to crush his rival. If mankind is to survive, then these primeval fears must be defeated." reducing the costs of commerce and trade. "Over the same span of history,

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Oil Dependence Good – Chinese Rise Turn – China A. Cheap oil leads to a Chinese rise – causes a surge of growth from increased consumption Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/28/2007 [Robert, "The politics of cheap oil," http://www.petroleumworld.com/SF07012801.htm]

Cheaper oil will mean higher consumption in developing countries like China and India. The Chinese government has repeatedly increased the price of gasoline in an effort to slow that country's insatiable thirst for oil. Cheaper crude would reduce China's oil import bills and thereby allow greater consumption with little cost. If they Chinese decide to allow the yuan to float against the dollar, then their oil becomes even cheaper. And that would allow the Chinese economy to grow even faster growth that will further fuel China's rise as a global power.

B. Chinese rise results in global conflict Hoge, Foreign Affairs Editor, International Relations Expert, August 2004 [James, "A global power shift in the making," http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701facomment83401/james-f-hoge-jr/a-globalpower-shift-in-the-making.html?mode=print]

Major shifts of power between states, not to mention regions, occur infrequently and are rarely peaceful. In the early twentieth century, the imperial order and the aspiring states of Germany and Japan failed to adjust to each other. The conflict that resulted devastated large parts of the globe. Today, the transformation of the international system will be even bigger and will require the assimilation of markedly different political and cultural traditions. This time, the populous states of Asia are the aspirants seeking to play a greater role. Like Japan and Germany back then, these rising powers are nationalistic, seek redress of past grievances, and want to claim their place in the sun. Asia's growing economic power is translating into greater political and military power, thus increasing the potential damage of conflicts. Within the region, the flash points for hostilities -- Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and divided Kashmir -- have defied peaceful resolution. Any of them could explode into large-scale warfare that would make the current Middle East confrontations seem like police operations. In short, the stakes in Asia are huge and will challenge the West's adaptability.

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Oil Dependence Good – Iraq Turn – Iraq A. Oil independence dooms Iraq – US oil revenues are key to building infrastructure and stability Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 2/3/2006 [Robert, "The Problem with Cutting US Oil Imports from the Middle East," http://joun.leb.net/bryce02032006.html] For instance, if the U.S. quit buying oil from the Middle East it would be bad for Iraq. Real bad. You see, American energy companies have been among the biggest buyers of Iraqi crude ever since the start of the Second Iraq War. U.S. companies are now buying about half of Iraq's daily crude output about 500,000 barrels and they're shipping it to their refineries in America. In fact, among the bigger buyers of Iraq's heavy sour crude is Exxon Mobil, which refines lots of Iraqi crude at its massive Baytown refinery in Bush's home state. In November alone, according to the Energy Information Administration, that refinery turned some 5.6 million barrels of Iraqi crude into about 200 million gallons of motor fuel that was then used by American consumers. And if the U.S. stops buying Iraq's crude, then that country's fledgling government which is barely clinging to life as it

is -- wouldn't have the cash to pay for the reconstruction programs needed to get its economy back up and running. Without reliable revenue, the Iraqis will probably need more help from U.S. taxpayers to help with the rebuilding. Is Bush going to ask Congress for more money to rebuild Iraq just so we can end our dependence on Middle East oil? It doesn't seem likely.

B. The impact is escalation and global nuclear war Jerome Corsi, Ph.D from HArvard in political science, 1/8/2007, "War with Iran is imminent," http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=53669 If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war, much as World Wars I and II began.

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Oil Dependence Good – Iraq EXTN Ending oil dependence doms Iraq – US loses Kuwaiti support, key to military Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 2/3/2006 [Robert, "The Problem with Cutting US Oil Imports from the Middle East," http://joun.leb.net/bryce02032006.html] And if the younger Bush means to stop the flow of our energy dollars to Kuwait, then he's forgetting America's strategic relationship with that country. Without the Kuwaitis, the U.S. military would not have a staging area for the thousands of G.I.'s going into and out of Iraq. Without Kuwait, the U.S. would lose a key logistical base. Hundreds of trucks per day carry

supplies from Kuwait to American soldiers in Iraq. Without the Kuwaitis' refineries, U.S. troops in Mesopotamia would lose a reliable supplier of motor fuel. Without motor fuel, American soldiers would be patrolling Baghdad and Tikrit on foot.

Energy independence dooms Iraq stability – high prices key to their economy Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/28/2007 [Robert, "The politics of cheap oil," http://www.petroleumworld.com/SF07012801.htm]

Lower prices would further damage Iraq's economy. Amid the torrent of bad news in Iraq, higher oil prices have been among the few positive news developments, allowing the country to amass sizable funds for the rebuilding effort. Iraq's oil output has plummeted since Bush and the neocons rushed to invade the country in March 2003. But that falling output has been offset, at least partially, by higher prices. And given that Iraq will for good or ill be America's colonial possession in the Persian Gulf for the foreseeable future, higher oil prices are far better than lower prices.

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Oil Dependence Good – Turns Case Cheap oil prices dooms the plan – short-circuits the shift to renewables and increase GHG emissions Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/28/2007 [Robert, "The politics of cheap oil," http://www.petroleumworld.com/SF07012801.htm]

Cheap crude would short-circuit the push for greater automotive fuel efficiency. American motorists who've become accustomed to $3 per-gallon gasoline have, of late, been buying more fuel-efficient vehicles. If crude (and therefore, gasoline) prices continue to fall, they will happily return to their Hummers, big pickups, and SUVs. And that will, once again, set up a scenario that will allow foreign automakers like Toyota, Nissan and Honda to capture even larger shares of the auto industry when gasoline prices rise again, and they will. Cheap crude will short-circuit the push for renewable energy. We've seen this before. The surge in oil prices that occurred after the 1973 oil embargo didn't last. As prices softened, so, too, did the interest in solar power, wind power and other technologies. The best hope for the renewable energy sector is a sustained period of high prices for fossil

fuels of all types, from coal to natural gas. Low-cost oil would increase emissions of greenhouse gases. One can argue all day about what's causing global warming. But if policymakers want to embrace Kyoto or other anti-warming initiatives, cheap oil is the last thing they should want.

Cheap oil re-entrenches energy dependence – collapses domestic production Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/28/2007 [Robert, "The politics of cheap oil," http://www.petroleumworld.com/SF07012801.htm]

A collapse in oil prices would mean a collapse in America's domestic oil production. We've seen this movie before, too. In the early 1980s, Dallas and Houston were in a frenzy fueled by high-priced oil and a river of cheap money provided by crooked savings and loan operators. Everyone was convinced that high prices were here to stay. That illusion ended with the oil price crash of 1986 , which, by the way, was largely precipitated by unrestricted production from Saudi Arabia. The crash resulted in bankruptcies from Midland to Tulsa. Idle drilling rigs were cut up and sold for scrap. Skilled oilfield workers left the industry for good. Cheap oil increases America's reliance on foreign oil. Back in 1985, when America's domestic oil production was on the upswing, OPEC countries supplied 41 percent of America's imported oil. By 1990, with domestic production decimated, OPEC's share had climbed to 60 percent. If a stint of low crude prices persists, the U.S. domestic oil industry will, once again, fall on hard times. That will mean foreign producers, who generally have lower production

costs, will be able to gain market share at the expense of domestic producers.

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Oil Dependence Good – Dependence Inevitable Energy dependence inevitable – shift to renewables cannot solve overwhelming reliance on oil Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 3/7/2008 [Robert, "‘Gusher of Lies'," http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/books/chapters/first-chapter-gusher-oflies.html?ref=books&pagewanted=all] This book focuses on the need to acknowledge, and deal with, the difference between rhetoric and reality. The reality is that the world — and the energy business in particular — is becoming ever more interdependent. And this interdependence will likely only accelerate in the years to come as new supplies of fossil fuel become more difficult to find and more expensive to produce. While alternative and renewable forms of energy will make minor contributions to America’s overall energy mix, they cannot provide enough new supplies to supplant the new global energy paradigm, one in which every type of fossil fuel — crude oil, natural gas, diesel fuel, gasoline, coal, and uranium — gets traded and shipped in an ever

more sophisticated global market. Regardless of the ongoing fears about oil shortages, global warming, conflict in the Persian Gulf, and terrorism, the plain, unavoidable truth is that the U.S., along with nearly every other country on the planet is married to fossil fuels. And that fact will not change in the foreseeable future, meaning the next 30 to 50 years. That means that the U.S. and the other countries of the world will continue to need oil and gas from the Persian Gulf and other regions. Given those facts, the U.S. needs to accept the reality of energy interdependence.

US energy dependence inevitable Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/13/2008 [Robert, "5 Myths about breaking our foreign oil habit," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011002452_pf.html] So we're woven in with the rest of the world -- and going to stay that way. Today, in addition to gasoline imports, the United States is buying crude oil from Angola, jet fuel from South Korea, natural gas from Trinidad, coal from Colombia and uranium from Australia. Those imports show that the global energy market is just that: global. Anyone who argues that the United States will be more secure by going it alone on energy hasn't done the homework.

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Oil Dependence Good – AT: Mid-East Dependence US is not reliant on Persian Gulf oil Walter Russell Mead, CFR Senior Fellow, 1227/2007, "Why We're in the Gulf," http://www.cfr.org/publication/15139/why_were_in_the_gulf.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F18%2Fenergy_security

The U.S. today depends on the Middle East for only a small portion of its energy supplies. Still the world’s third largest oil producer and holding large coal reserves, America is significantly less dependent on foreign energy sources than the other great economies. Imports account for 35% of U.S. energy consumption versus 56% for the European Union and 80% for Japan. Nearly half the oil and all the natural gas imported by the U.S. comes from the Western Hemisphere; sub-Saharan Africa supplies most of the balance. Only 17% of U.S. oil imports and less than 0.5% of our natural gas come from the Persian Gulf; 80% of Japan’s imports come from the Gulf, and by 2015 70% of China’s oil will come from the same source.

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Oil Dependence Good – AT: Price Spikes (1/2) Impact inevitable – global economy prevents insulation from energy spikes Richard D. Sokolsky, National Defense University Senior Research Fellow ,February 2003, “The United States and the Persian Gulf,” http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2003/Persian_Gulf/Persian.pdf The secondary effects of energy supply and price discontinuities are also important. In a global economy, no one is insulated from the consequences of energy disruptions or price spikes, even if the results are not felt directly. Major U.S. trading partners are far more dependent on Gulf oil than the United States. Unreliable or excessively costly energy supplies would depress demand for our exports and increase the cost of imports. If demand were suppressed, U.S. exporters, who account for more than 10 percent of gross domestic product, 20 percent of the goods the country produces, and some 12 million American jobs, would feel the results. In the case of higher prices for imports, American consumers buying everything from Japanese electronic goods to French wines would suffer the consequences. What is therefore relevant when assessing the importance of the Gulf to the national interest is not how much oil the United States gets from the region but the extent to which the entire global economy relies on the energy that comes from this fragile part of the world. It is particularly important to understand this reality in light of the attention that has been given to the potential of hydrocarbon deposits elsewhere.

Energy independence does not solve price shocks – global market checks Mead, CFR Senior Fellow, 1/1/2008 [Walter Russell, "Why We're in the Gulf," http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110011063] While U.S. import needs are projected to grow significantly, U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf energy is not, thanks largely to expected production increases in the Western Hemisphere and sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. energy imports from the Persian Gulf are expected to remain below 20% of total consumption. The oil market, of course, is global, and if something were to happen to

the Middle Eastern supplies, prices would rise world-wide, and the U.S. economy would be seriously disrupted. But domestic supply is not the key to American interest in the Gulf.

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Oil Dependence Good – AT: Price Spikes (2/2) No shocks – global energy market is resilient Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 3/7/2008 [Robert, "‘Gusher of Lies'," http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/books/chapters/first-chapter-gusher-oflies.html?ref=books&pagewanted=all] Indeed, America is getting much of the energy it needs because it can rely on the strength of an ever-more-resilient global energy market. In 2005, the U.S. bought crude oil from 41 different countries, jet fuel from 26 countries, and gasoline from 46. In 2006, it imported coal from 11 different countries and natural gas from 6 others. American consumers in some border states rely on electricity imported from Mexico and Canada. Tens of millions of Americans get electricity from nuclear power reactors that are fueled by foreign uranium. In 2006, the U.S. imported the radioactive element from 8 different countries.

Impact inevitable – even if the US has energy independence, global markets mean it would still be hurt by oil shocks Tahmassebi, Energy-Trends Inc., President, December 2002 [Cyrus H., "Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and Its Oil," Foreign Affairs, lexis] As Morse and Richard explain, Saudi Arabia is eager to retain a dominant position in the United States because of the latter's market size, growth potential, and stability. The U.S. markets also provide diversity, and Riyadh has a political interest in remaining America's biggest oil supplier. Nevertheless, even if the United States imported no Saudi oil, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which an interruption of Saudi supply would not have an impact on U.S. markets. Given oil's

fungibility and the integrated nature of world oil markets, a severe interruption in Saudi Arabia is likely to have virtually the same price impact whether or not America imports Saudi oil. The United States will therefore continue to defend Saudi Arabia and the flow of its oil to world markets, even if it one day imports much less Saudi oil. It might be much more difficult, however, to explain the U.S. intervention to the American public if little or no Saudi oil were imported.

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Oil Dependence Good – AT: Price Spikes – AT: Saudi No risk of Saudi oil shocks Bremmer, Eurasia Group President, World Policy Institute Senior Fellow, 2004 [Ian, "the Saudi Paradox," CIAO] Yet the instability many fear in Saudi Arabia remains beyond the horizon. Allow- ing always for the unpredictable in a jittery region, the fears that a terrorist attack on the Saudi oil industry might nevertheless seriously disrupt output are overstated. A near-term takeover of the country by Wah- habi radicals, the puritanical Islamic sect that has deep roots in the kingdom, appears as unlikely. The concern that Saudi production is vulnerable to attacks on oil workers or infra- structure is understandable. The kidnapping of foreign contract workers and the terror attacks on a variety of targets within the kingdom has abetted fears that the Saudi oil industry is at risk. Expatriates are indeed leaving Saudi Arabia, but Aramco—the na- tional oil company—does not need them to maintain current levels of production. Arab engineers with world-class engineering skills already fill Aramco’s technical staff. Even if the foreign exodus intensifies, it is unlikely to affect output. Not only does an ample supply of tech- nically qualified personnel ensure steady oil output, but there are also redundancies in the oil transport infrastructure. There is enough spare pipeline capacity to allow Saudi engineers to bypass damage to one pipeline, or even a pipeline group, without missing a beat in production. And Saudi oil facilities are more effectively protected than in neighboring Iraq, where infrastructure sabotage remains a serious problem. As many as 30,000 guards protect Saudi Ara- bia’s oil infrastructure at any given moment, while high-technology surveillance, aircraft patrols, and anti-aircraft installations defend key locations. Moreover, to inflict truly devastating damage on Saudi Arabia’s refinery capacity, terrorists would have to do more than blow up random bits of pipeline. Abqaiq, the world’s largest oil-processing complex, is simply too large a target to be crippled by anything less than a hijacked Boeing 747, a formidable logistical challenge for any ter- rorist group. 

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Oil Dependence Good – AT: Terrorism Oil dependence does not further terrorism Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/13/2008 [Robert, "5 Myths about breaking our foreign oil habit," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011002452_pf.html] But the hype doesn't match reality. Remember, the two largest suppliers of crude to the U.S. market are Canada and Mexico -- neither exactly known as a belligerent terrorist haven. Moreover, terrorism is an ancient tactic that predates the oil era. It does not depend on petrodollars. And even small amounts of money can underwrite spectacular plots; as the 9/11 Commission Report noted, "The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack." G.I. Wilson, a retired Marine Corps colonel who has fought in Iraq and written extensively on terrorism and asymmetric warfare, calls the conflation of oil and terrorism a "contrivance." Support for terrorism "doesn't come from oil," he says. "It comes from drugs, crime,

human trafficking and the weapons trade."

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Oil Dependence Good – AT: Petro-States Petrostates inevitable – US shift does not solve global oil demand Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 1/13/2008 [Robert, "5 Myths about breaking our foreign oil habit," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011002452_pf.html] Fans of energy independence argue that if the United States stops buying foreign energy, it will deny funds to petro-states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Hugo Ch¿vez's Venezuela. But the world marketplace doesn't work like that. Oil is a global commodity. Its price is set globally, not locally. Oil buyers are always seeking the lowest-cost supplier. So any Saudi crude being loaded at the Red Sea port of Yanbu that doesn't get purchased by a refinery in Corpus Christi or Houston will

instead wind up in Singapore or Shanghai. 4 Energy independence will mean reform in the Muslim world. The most vocal proponent of this one is New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman, who argues that the United States should build "a wall of energy independence" around itself and thereby lower global oil prices: "Shrink the oil revenue and they will have to open up their economies and their schools and liberate their women so that their people can compete. It is that simple." When the petro-states are effectively bankrupt, Friedman argues, we'll see "political and economic reform from Algeria to Iran." If only it were that easy. Between about 1986 and 2000, oil prices generally stayed below $20 per barrel; by the end of 1998, they were as low as $11 per barrel. As Alan Reynolds pointed out in May 2005 in the conservative National Review Online, this

prolonged period of "cheap oil did nothing to promote economic or political liberty in Algeria, Iran, or anywhere else. This theory has been tested -- and it failed completely."

Saudi oil revenue fund inevitable Geddes, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment (FREE) Executive Vice President, 2/10/2005 [Pete, "examining our oil dependence," http://www.commonsblog.org/archives/000328.php]

Even if we successfully reduced demand by, say, 10 percent, the effect on the number of barrels of Saudi oil consumed would likely be minimal. Why? Again, because the Saudis are the world’s low-cost producer. If demand for oil drops, they will be the last ones pumping.

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Oil Dependence Good – AT: Iran US energy dependence does not affect Iran Bryce, Institute for Energy Research Fellow, 2/20/2008 [Robert, "The Impossible Dream of Energy Independence," http://www.reason.com/news/show/125027.html] S. Fred Singer [of the Science and Environmental Policy Project] came up with the best analogy. He described the global oil market like a big bathtub. All the oil production is dumped into one bathtub and all consumers have straws sucking oil out. [For all economic purposes] it’s like we’re all sucking from the same common pool. To say you are not gonna buy Saudi oil, or Algerian oil—it’s crazy. For example, the U.S. hasn’t purchased a dime of Iranian oil—except for a small amount in the early ‘90s, but for the most part no Iranian oil since 1979. And that hasn’t stopped Iran from supporting Hezbollah.

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AT: Saudi Relations (1/2) Relations low - Saudi shifting from US now Bronson, CFR Middle East Studies Director, 5/21/2006 [Rachel, "5 myths about us-saudi relations," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/19/AR2006051901758_pf.html]

It's more complex than that. Growing oil demand from China, India and the developing world means that others are pursuing closer ties with the kingdom. Chinese President Hu Jintao flew from Washington to Riyadh in April, despite Bush administration protests that China was "locking up long-term oil deals" with oil-rich countries. Last year, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the foreign minister, stated that Saudi Arabia and China now have a "strategic relationship," because Saudi Arabia is the largest supplier of crude to China. Of course, Beijing will not replace Washington as the Saudis' key global partner. But growing oil demand elsewhere radically alters the options at Saudi Arabia's disposal.

No Link – Saudi relations resilient, oil not key Bronson 06 (http://www.cfr.org/publication/10728/, Rachel Bronson, Former Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Wang)

There’s more to it than that. Oil is, of course, critical to U.S.-Saudi ties—it can hardly be otherwise for the world’s largest consumer and largest producer. But Washington’s relationship with Riyadh more closely resembles its friendly ties to oil-poor Middle Eastern states such as Jordan, Egypt and Israel than its traditionally hostile relations with oil-rich states such as Libya and Iran. Deep oil reserves have never translated into easy relations with the United States. A major reason for the close ties between the two nations was their common Cold War fight against communism. Both countries worried about the Soviet Union, and that solidified their oil and defense interests, and minimized differences. In hindsight, by supporting religious zealots in the battle against communism, the two countries contributed to the rise of radical Islamic movements. Saudi relations low – oil no longer guides the relationship Associated Press, 6/30/2008 ["State editorial roundup," Lexis] Last week's oil conference in Saudi Arabia marked a turning point in U.S.-Saudi relations, raising doubts about whether the oil-for-security formula still guides this longtime alliance. With skyrocketing oil prices endangering U.S. economic stability, Saudi Arabia refused to increase production beyond a token amount. Saudi and U.S. officials bickered about whether the current price spike is because of market speculation or producers' greed. The brusque departure of U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman from the conference underscored the growing frustrations on both sides. If oil pricing and production were the only considerations, this squabbling wouldn't be so troublesome. But it culminates years

of roller-coaster relations strained by the 9/11 attacks and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which the kingdom opposed. Ongoing talk about a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities has prompted the kingdom to distance itself further from Washington. The U.S. has failed to deliver what the Saudis value most: security and stability. Iran's power and influence is growing, and the Saudis increasingly see Washington as part of the problem, not the solution. Former Ambassador James Oberwetter says the Saudis don't like being cast as spoilers or saviors of the U.S. economy. "They must be puzzled why they're being asked to produce more and more oil while we have taken steps to actually reduce our own exploration," he says. Anticipating today's crunch, the Saudis have invested nearly $100 billion to increase production capacity. Soon, they'll be able to pump 1.5 million additional barrels per day. But with China and India demanding more oil, there's no guarantee the United States will be the beneficiary. The kingdom's sympathies could well be guided by the tenor in Washington. Its rulers hear the anti-Saudi rhetoric in

Congress when they request multibillion-dollar arms purchases.

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AT: Saudi Relations (2/2) US-Saudi relations are collapsing now – high oil prices, Iraq, and China fill-in Richter, Times staff writer, 6/8/2008 [Paul, "Oil inflames U.S.-Saudi ties," lexis] For decades, Saudi Arabia worked with its dominant customer, the United States, to keep world oil markets stable and advance common political goals. But the surging price of oil, which soared more than $10 a barrel Friday to a record-high $138.54, has made it plain that those days are over. New forces, including a weak dollar and an oil-thirsty Asia, have blunted the United States' leverage and

helped sour the two countries' relationship. As gasoline prices have risen, the White House has unsuccessfully exhorted the Saudis to step up production, and Congress has threatened retaliation. But the situation now is a far cry from the days when the U.S. economy dominated the direction of the petroleum market. "That gave us leverage," said Greg Priddy, an oil analyst at the Eurasia Group, a New York-based risk assessment firm. "There's

certainly a perception that the power equation has changed." The weakening of the economic relationship comes when the vital U.S.-Saudi security relationship also has been fraying. In the 1980s, the U.S.-Saudi bond that kept oil prices low was credited with helping weaken the Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War. And it helped keep markets stable after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. But the Saudi government has been dismayed by the consequences of the war in Iraq and by what it sees as a weak Bush

administration commitment to the Palestinians. The relationship is shaping up as a political issue for the fall campaign, certainly among congressional candidates and perhaps among presidential candidates. With a 20-million-barrel-per-day habit, the U.S. remains the world's largest oil customer, even though its daily consumption over the years has dropped from one-third of total daily production to one-fourth. But the U.S. can no longer guarantee on its own that producers will have the markets they need for their oil. Nor can the Saudis, alone, ramp up production in sufficient amounts to stabilize prices. China and other Asian nations now use about 17 million barrels a day. That's up more than 20% since 2003, and booming growth is expected to continue. With the shift in buying power, the Saudis are cultivating important Chinese customers, analysts say. Saudi Arabia recently contributed $50 million for Chinese earthquake relief, and King Abdullah has visited China. "The relationship is clearly developing rapidly," said Paul J. Saunders, who served in the State Department under President Bush and is executive director of the Nixon Center think tank. Saunders believes that China may be buying more Saudi oil than the United States in less than a decade. That sets up "a real possibility that China will have more leverage in dealing with Saudi Arabia than we do," he said. The Saudis helped the United States for years as "doves" within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries on the issue of oil prices. They were willing to moderately increase production, fearing that high prices could cause the United States and others to seek alternate supplies or cut consumption, as happened in the 1980s in reaction to the oil price shocks of the 1970s. But attitudes have been shifting. Many believe the Saudis have grown more interested in conserving their supplies for later generations, and confident that if U.S. consumption drops, the economies of China, India and others will take up the slack. By the end of 2007, it was also apparent that the Saudis no longer believed they could substantially affect prices by increasing production. Now, Saudi oil experts believe that the price run-up is due to such factors as investor speculation, the weak dollar and limited output from such key producers as Iraq, Iran and Venezuela. "They see themselves as having lost control of the market," Priddy said.

The weakening of the economic ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia comes when the Saudi government has increasingly sought to distance itself politically from Washington. Even as the United States has tried to forge a coalition of Persian Gulf states to counter Iran, Saudi officials have grown skeptical about a security alliance with Washington. Instead, leaders of the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab kingdom worry that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has weakened their security and fret about the Shiite Muslim domination of Iraq. Stephen Hadley, the national security advisor, recently acknowledged to reporters that the war has been a "stress" on the relationship. Meanwhile, the Saudis, making use of the added economic clout fueled by soaring oil prices, are trying to forge a new leadership role in the Muslim world. They have participated, if often invisibly, in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to stabilize Lebanon.

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AT: Saudi Collapse No Saudi collapse Bronson, CFR Middle East Studies Director, 5/21/2006 [Rachel, "5 myths about us-saudi relations," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/19/AR2006051901758_pf.html]

Not likely. Since the Saudi monarchy's earliest days, observers have anticipated its demise. However, it has shown a remarkable ability to overcome such challenges as palace infighting, assassination and incapacitated leaders. There are still many sons of kingdom founder Abdel Aziz waiting in an orderly queue for their chance to reign. This hardly means the Saudi rulers will have an easy time of it. Osama bin Laden has made toppling the House of Saud one of his key goals, and there have been a series of al-Qaeda attacks since May 2003. Also, Saudi Arabia faces demographic challenges: Sixty percent of the population is younger than 25, and jobs for them are scarce. Meanwhile, insurgent fighters eventually will return from Iraq, trained and determined, and the Sunni-Shiite battles of Iraq can easily spill into Saudi Arabia, where Shiites make up 10 to 15 percent of the population. But the cleavages common before a revolution are not visible in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is now

aggressively pursuing terrorists on its soil, and reform-minded Saudis view King Abdullah as an ally. Washington would be better off planning on the royal family enduring. It's also the best chance Washington has to realize its oil and counterterrorism goals -- and avoid alternatives that could be worse.

No Saudi coup – elites have placated Isalmists Bremmer, Eurasia Group President, World Policy Institute Senior Fellow, 2004 [Ian, "the Saudi Paradox," CIAO] How Serious Are the Risks of Implosion?  Recent events have quickened the concern that the Saudi regime might collapse from within. It is worth recalling that scarcely anybody in intelligence or in academia foresaw the scale of the Iranian crisis of 1978–79, and the latent strength of the ayatollahs. Might not Saudi Arabia produce the next Islamic revolution? Not this year. A look at the differences between Iran in 1979 and Saudi Arabia today is instructive. The security services permeate Saudi society more broadly and deeply than the Shah’s Savak penetrated Iran in the late 1970s. And unlike the Shah, the Saudi royal family has co-opted the radicals. There is currently enough royal money flow-ing through traditional tribal patronage net- works to buy loyalty. Perhaps more impor- tantly, the Saudi royals have essentially handed over education and cultural policy to influential Wahhabi clerics. This “unholy alliance” irks the United States and may ultimately destabilize the country but, so far, this system has worked as the royals in- tended. In Teheran during the late 1970s, the Shah actively alienated Shiite mullahs with his globalizing policies and aggressive secularism. By contrast, Saudi clerics are allowed enough freedom and influence to blunt serious Islamist challenges to the monarchy, at least for now.

Saudi economic slowdown now – global economy spillover Bourland, 2008, Bob Bourland, Impacts of the Weak Global Economy, Sursis, April 3, 2008, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/ioi/080403-bourland-economy.html , Taylor Non-oil exports are the other main economic route through which a weakening global economy can affect Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom’s main non-oil exports are petrochemicals and plastics. Prices of both have started to fall owing to slowing demand growth as well as a large increase in global production capacity. However, prices of petrochemical and plastic products remain well above their long-term average and low feedstock costs means that Saudi producers can comfortably cope with lower prices. As non-oil exports only account for around 10 percent of total exports, we feel that the impact on the Kingdom’s economy through this channel will be manageable.

Financial spillovers from the weakening US economy have been more prominent. Most directly, the exchange rate peg to the US dollar has compelled the central bank, SAMA, to follow the Fed in reducing interest rates. Since September the reverse repo rate (the rate SAMA pays for deposits) has been cut on six separate occasions by a total of 275 basis points. This has contributed to money supply growth and is not what a central bank would normally do in an economy facing rising inflation. It has also brought into question the viability of the exchange rate peg and encouraged speculation about a revaluation.

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AT: Euro Shift No Euro shift – Saudi Arabia has strategic interests to sustain the dollar Robison, Lehman Brothers Energy Research analyst, 10/24/2007 [Adam, "Insight: Saudi Arabia holds key to oil and dollar link," http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=oil+dollar&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=071024000540&ct=0&nclick_check=1] But betting on a break in the peg may be premature. Inflation remains modest in comparison to Saudi Arabia's neighbours, most of which have inflation in the vicinity of 10 per cent. Additionally, the components driving the jump in inflation - food and rents - are unlikely to be significantly affected by a shift in exchange rate regime, the former driven by global agricultural demand and the latter by the influx of foreign workers into the country. Finally, Saudi Arabia will not want to jeopardise its FDI inflows (Like China, Saudi Arabia's peg to a weak dollar makes it a cheap investment destination versus other emerging markets whose currencies have already appreciated). As a result, we expect

any break with the currency peg would likely be measured and managed, with a relatively insignificant impact on the dollar. While the Saudis may break their dollar peg as the US Fed eases monetary policy, they are unlikely to re-price oil in other currencies and break their "dollar alliance" with Washington.

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AT: Euro Shift – PetroEuro Good – Economy Turn – Economy A. Dollar collapse good – creates economic stimulus, causing critical manufacturing growth Blecker, American University Economics Professor, EPI Research Associate, 5/30/2003 [Robert, "The benefits of a lower dollar," http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_may03bp_lowerdollar] The current decline

in the dollar will provide a much-needed stimulus to the U.S. economy. The falling dollar will bring to the internationally competitive U.S. manufacturing sector, which has suffered disastrous consequenceslost jobs, reduced profits, and decreased investment as a result of the dollar's overvaluation for the past several years. However, although the dollar has come down significantly from its peak in February 2002, it has not yet fallen nearly enough to reverse the damage caused by its high value since the late especially welcome relief

1990s. In spite of its recent fall, the dollar has still not lost most of the value it has gained since 1995 compared to the euro and other major currencies. Moreover, the dollar has not fallen compared to the currencies of the developing nations that now account for more than half of the U.S. trade deficit. Some of these nations, especially China, maintain fixed exchange rates and intervene heavily to prevent the type of market-driven adjustment that is now occurring between the dollar and the euro. As a result, relying on financial markets to bring the dollar down is not enough. More active management of the dollar's declineincluding cooperation with major U.S. trading partners and action to end foreign manipulation of currency valuesis vital to ensure that the dollar falls in a comprehensive and sustainable fashion.

The high value of the dollar since the late 1990s has acted like a massive tax on U.S. exports and a huge subsidy to U.S. imports. As a result, although U.S. manufacturing firms have made substantial investments in new technologies and U.S. manufacturing workers have vastly increased their productivity, these achievements have not paid off in the face of foreign products that have been selling at deep, artificial discounts created by the overvalued dollar. Specifically, the overvalued dollar has resulted in: * About 740,000 lost jobs in the manufacturing sector by 2002—more than one-quarter of the 2.6 million jobs lost in manufacturing since 1998. * A decrease of nearly $100 billion in the annual profits of U.S. manufacturing companies by 2002. * A fall in investment in the domestic manufacturing sector by over $40 billion annually as of 2002, representing a loss of 25% of U.S. manufacturing investment. Thus far, the dollar has reversed only part of its 34% rise in overall value (in "real," inflation-adjusted terms, compared with most global currencies) between mid-1995 and early 2002. As of May 2003, the dollar is still 24% higher overall than it was at its low point in July 1995.1 Moreover, the dollar's behavior in the last few years has varied significantly between two different groups of currencies: * Compared with other "major" currencies (the Japanese yen, British pound, the euro and its predecessors, and a few others2), the dollar has fallen 16% since February 2002, after rising by 51% between April 1995 and February 2002; thus the dollar has lost only about a third of the value it gained in the late 1990s relative to those currencies. * Other important U.S. trading partners, such as China and other developing nations, have fixed or managed exchange rates that do not respond to the market forces that have generated the recent decline in the dollar vis-á-vis the major currencies. The dollar has continued to rise relative to these other currencies, which belong to countries that now account for nearly half of total U.S. trade (and more than half of the trade deficit).

With the U.S. economy still struggling to recover nearly two years after the recession of 2001 officially ended, with the trade deficit still at record levels, and with global currency markets already forcing a downward adjustment in the U.S. exchange rate, the need to reconsider the U.S. Treasury's "strong dollar policy" has never been more clear. Although some Bush Administration officials have recently signaled a greater openness to market-driven reductions in the value of the dollar, much more needs to be done by the U.S. government—both alone and in collaboration with U.S. trading partners—to ensure a stable adjustment of the dollar to a more realistic level while promoting

a recovery of growth in the global economy.

B. Global economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction Bearden, U.S. Army (Retired), 2000 [T.E., LTC, U.S. Army, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm, June 24]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is

rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades. to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed,

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AT: Euro Shift – PetroEuro Good – Economy EXTN (1/2) Weak dollar good – key to US trade and manufacturing Blecker, American University Economics Professor, EPI Research Associate, 5/30/2003 [Robert, "The benefits of a lower dollar," http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_may03bp_lowerdollar] The rise of the dollar since 1995 has had a devastating effect on U.S. trade performance, especially in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for the vast majority of U.S. trade.13 A high dollar makes U.S.-produced goods less competitive compared with foreign-produced goods, putting U.S. exports at a disadvantage while encouraging imports into the U.S. market. As Table 2 shows, the growth rate of nonagricultural exports (mostly manufactures) was cut in half across 1996-2002 (the period of a rising dollar) compared with 1990-95 (a period of a gradually falling dollar, as shown previously in Figure 1).14 The growth rate of nonpetroleum imports (also mostly manufactures) increased over the same time frame.

Strong dollar dooms employment Blecker, American University Economics Professor, EPI Research Associate, 5/30/2003 [Robert, "The benefits of a lower dollar," http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_may03bp_lowerdollar] Job losses caused by dollar overvaluation Slower export growth combined with accelerated import growth implied that foreign trade had a negative net effect on U.S. employment during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Most of these negative employment effects were felt in the manufacturing sector, which produces the vast majority of the traded goods and services in the U.S. economy.15 Indeed, although overall U.S. employment rose rapidly in the economic boom of the late 1990s, hours of manufacturing workers peaked in the fourth quarter of 1997, the number of manufacturing jobs peaked in the second quarter of 1998, and both trended downward thereafter (as shown in Figure 3), even though the recession did not begin until 2001.16 A large part of this falling trend in manufacturing employment since the late 1990s can be attributed to the rising trend in the dollar since 1995. According to estimates, for each 1.0% rise in the real value of the dollar, the hours of labor employed in manufacturing fall by 0.13% and the number of workers employed falls by 0.12%.17 Since the dollar rose by 33.5% between the second quarter of 1995 (when the dollar was at its lowest level) and the first quarter of 2002 (when the dollar peaked), the increased value of the dollar caused U.S. manufacturing workers' hours to fall by 4.4% and the number of jobs to decrease by 4.0%. These losses in hours and jobs attributed to the value of the dollar are beyond any effects of productivity growth and the business cycle downturn, i.e., the recession and slow recovery.

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AT: Euro Shift – PetroEuro Good – Economy EXTN (2/2) Strong dollar dooms US competitiveness Blecker, American University Economics Professor, EPI Research Associate, 5/30/2003 [Robert, "The benefits of a lower dollar," http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_may03bp_lowerdollar] By weakening U.S. manufacturing as a whole, the high dollar has had devastating consequences for business profits and manufacturing jobs. Starting in mid-1997, when the dollar's rise accelerated (see Figure 1), domestic manufacturers ceased to benefit from the economic boom that continued for three subsequent years in most of the U.S. economy. As Figure 4 shows, manufacturing profits began to rebound during the economic recovery of the mid-1990s, but then peaked and tumbled in mid-1997 —three years before overall economic growth slowed down in the second half of 2000 and four years before the recession of 2001.20 This premature decline in manufacturing profits in the midst of an overall economic boom coincided with the dollar's accelerated rise during the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. Figure 4 also shows that the cyclical fluctuations in manufacturing profits are virtually a mirror image of the value of the dollar, i.e., manufacturing profits and the real dollar index have generally moved in opposite directions throughout the past two decades. The inverse relationship between the dollar and profits is no coincidence. On the one hand, a higher dollar brings down import prices and forces domestic firms that compete with imports to either cut price-cost margins or lose sales volume (or both). As Figure 5 shows, import prices began to fall immediately after the dollar started to rise in 1995 and have trended downward ever since. On the other hand, a higher dollar also makes U.S. exports less competitive abroad and compels exporting firms to either lower their dollar prices or suffer reduced export volumes. Either way, exporting firms lose profits.20 Thus, whether manufacturing firms compete with imports or sell in export markets, their profits are cut by an overvalued currency. Because firms that are not making profits cannot continue to employ U.S. workers, the drop in profits ultimately hurts everyone in industries that are open to foreign competition.

Weak dollar key to spark investment in manufacturing Blecker, American University Economics Professor, EPI Research Associate, 5/30/2003 [Robert, "The benefits of a lower dollar," http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_may03bp_lowerdollar] In addition to its negative impact on domestic employment and profitability, the overvalued dollar also hurt the domestic manufacturing sector by decreasing investment in new plants, equipment, and software (i.e., capital expenditures).22 Since decreased investment in real, productive assets threatens the long-term viability of U.S. manufacturers, and their ability to create jobs in the future, this negative effect of the high dollar is especially alarming. The appreciation of the dollar diminishes investment in domestic manufacturing for two reasons. First, domestic firms that either produce for export or compete with imports are likely to perceive a reduced need for production facilities in the United States when they have to compete with foreign goods that have become cheaper in dollar terms; as a result, customers switch to foreignproduced goods. For this reason, a high dollar causes both exporting and import-competing firms to reduce their planned investment at U.S. plant locations. Second, there are indirect effects of dollar appreciation on investment through the reduced profits of domestic manufacturing firms (as discussed earlier). Business firms rely on the cash flow out of current profits to finance investment, either internally (through retained earnings) or by attracting outside funds (since bank and bondholder willingness to lend depends on firms' financial health). Thus, reduced profits curtail the ability of firms to finance their investment and can result in the cancellation or delay of already planned capital expenditures.23 Investment in U.S. domestic manufacturing was reduced by $42.7 billion in 2002 as a result of the post-1995 appreciation of the dollar, based on an estimate that combines the two effects discussed above.24 To put this number in perspective, note that $42.7 billion is equivalent to 24.5% of the actual level of investment in manufacturing of $174.3 billion in 2001 at current prices (sectoral investment data for 2002 were not available as of this writing). With capital expenditures thus reduced by nearly onequarter as a result of the rise in the dollar, domestic manufacturers will find it difficult to keep up with new technologies and to maintain the pace of productivity growth that they were able to achieve in the 1990s unless the overvaluation of the dollar is soon reversed. Such a reversal will require the dollar to fall further, and in relation to more currencies, than it has fallen to date.

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