G04 Evid April 24.docx

1 PEOPLE v. EBET G.R. No. 181635 | November 15, 2010 | J. Peralta FACTS: ● EBET was charged with crime of Robbery with Homicide. ● Prosecution: presented the testimonies of Evelyn and Joan Parcasio, testifying as to the ff facts: ○ On the day of the incident, 3 men entered the house of sps. Parcasio. ○ The wife (Evelyn) recognized one of them to be appellant EBET, having been a constant visitor of her husband. ○ EBET was seen holding a knife and standing at the door of the house. The 2 other men wielded a knife to Evelyn and their daughter, Joan, looking for the husband (Gabriel). ○ Evelyn heard her husband shout for her and her daughter to run, which they did. Thereafter, a gunshot was heard. ○ Joan returned to the house after hearing the gunshot. It was then that the men robbed her belongings. ○ When the men left the premises, Evelyn saw her husband bleeding to death due to multiple stab wounds. The husband eventually died. ● Defense: presented EBET’s own testimony claiming that he was in another neighboring house butchering a pig, at the time of incident. ● Trial Court: found EBET guilty giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. CA: affirmed. ● EBET argues that (1) prosecution witnesses failed to positively identify him; (2) the testimony of Joan during the trial was contrary to her earlier statement in the police blotter wherein she denied knowing the identity of the perpetrator; and (3) the trial court, in rejecting the defense of alibi, simply adopted the general principle of alibi as a defense, being inherently weak, but failed to point out any inconsistencies and falsities to his testimony. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. - NO HELD: (1)

The testimonies of the witnesses clearly showed that the EBET was categorically identified as one of the men who took part in the perpetration of the crime.

During the trial, the witnessed positively identified EBET by pinpointing him when asked to identify one of the perpetrators. The SC found the testimonies of Evelyn and Joan Parcasio are truthworthy, honest and straightforward. Prosecution's testimonies have not been assailed. No motive was advanced by the defense why the witnesses will falsely testify and implicate the accused in the commission of such a heinous crime. When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Denial, like alibi is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime.

(2) The incomplete entry in the police blotter must not overcome the positive and categorical identification of appellant as one of the perpetrators. The culprits, including EBET, were still on the loose when the police blotter was made. This explains the reason why Joan, still distraught over the sudden and unexpected death of her father, hesitated to divulge the identity of appellant as one of the perpetrators of the gory killing of her father. Notwithstanding the entry in the police blotter, Evelyn and Joan Parcasio, on the day after the crime was committed, executed their respective sworn statements, positively identifying EBET as one of the culprits. Thus, clearly, it is only the incomplete police blotter that appears to be inconsistent. However, the said inconsistency has been cured by the sworn statements and the testimonies given in open court. (3) There is no merit to the defense of denial and alibi presented by EBET. EBET failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be physically present at the place where the crime had taken place and when the crime was being committed. For alibi to prosper, it must strictly meet the requirements of time and place. SC has always upheld that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. ANTONIO LEJANO et. al. v. PEOPLE DOCTRINE: Rule 133, Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. FACTS: (long because of the witness testimony which is important because it was the basis for conviction of the accused-appellants) · In 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters were killed at their home in Paranaque · The suspects were arrested, some of whom gave detailed confessions. o The court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged · In 1995, NBI announced that it had solved the crime and presented star witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers. o She pointed to several persons namely: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits and police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. o The public prosecutors filed an Information for Rape with Homicide relying on Alfaro’s testimony. · RTC tried 7 of the accused (Ventura and Filart were at large) · Prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. o Other witnesses: medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies, security guards of the Subdivision

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where the victims resided, former laundrywoman of the Webb household, and Biong’s ex-gf and Lauro Vizcondo, Estrellita’s husband. Alfaro's testimony o Alfaro drove with boyfriend Estrada to Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: the accused-appellants in this case. o Webb approached and requested her to relay a message to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela’s house o Upon reaching their destination, Alfaro approached Carmela’s house. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. o The group had another shabu session. After sometime, they drove back. Carmela was at their garden and told the Alfaro that she had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked o Alfaro waited for Carmela to leave and trailed her where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group and relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. They went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, and Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the night. o After sometime, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot ito Carmela’s house for the third time. They arrived before midnight. o When they arrived, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. o Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes’ car and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the screen door of the kitchen for them. o As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. As she was leaving, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer looking for something. Alfaro walked to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. o After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag. When she asked him

what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She did not find any. o While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise. Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her o Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame. o They all rode in their cars and drove away. The convoy of cars went to a house at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmela. o At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house · Defense presented the testimonies of the accused: o Some denied any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place o Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented alibi. o Presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony. · RTC: found all the accused guilty as charged o Impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. o Thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense o Compared to Alfaro’s testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. · CA: affirmed · Webb filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.

· However, NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. o Trial record shows that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief 2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in committing the crime HELD: 1. NO. Alfaro’s testimony cannot be relied upon since some facts narrated provided no logic as to the natural course of things that should have occured. The accusedappellants cannot be convicted through such faulty proof. Ø Suspicious Details Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminals. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at NBI offices. When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. WHY WOULD ALFARO’S TESTIMONY BE UNRELIABLE? The Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them. The police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. It would not be too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents. The NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. Ø Quality of the testimony Her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help expose a lies which has an abundant presence in this case. 1) Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice the gang-rape of Carmela. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

2) Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home? 3) When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela. 4) According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see. 5) Alfaro went out of the house and quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies. Positive identification must meet at least two criteria: 1) the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold and 2) the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims. Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony. 2. YES Ø Webb’s U.S. Alibi Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) the second immigration check; and (d) alibi versus positive identification; and e) a documented alibi. a.

The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money. Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets. Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party b. The two immigration checks Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through. On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. c. The second immigration checks As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry. When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila RTC and CA are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated. But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. This was proven by the evidence that Webb presented.

up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime. After the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused. They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time. VERGARA v. PEOPLE TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [G.R. No. 160328. February 04, 2005] NOTE: BP 22, Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. FACTS: ●

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● Ø Effect of Webb’s alibi to others Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall. OTHER ARGUMENT: Ø The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela. When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.

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● Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come

Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR) granted Perpetual Garments Corporation (PERPETUAL) a continuing credit line in the amount of P750,000.00. The parties agreed that for each availment from the line, PERPETUAL would execute a promissory note and issue postdated checks corresponding to the amount of the loan. Petitioner, in her capacity as Vice President and General Manager of PERPETUAL, signed the credit agreement and all the postdated checks. One of the checks issued and signed by petitioner was Check No. 019972 for P150,000.00. When deposited on December 15, 1988, the check was dishonored for insuffiency of funds. On the same month, LIVECOR verbally informed petitioner of the dishonor of the check. On April 1, 1991, LIVECOR charged petitioner with violation of BP 22. The prosecution claims that petitioner failed to pay the full amount of Check No. 019972 or to make arrangements for its full payment within 5 days from notice of dishonor thereof in December 1988. Although petitioner made cash and check payments after the dishonor, the same were treated by LIVECOR as continuing payments of the outstanding loan. The payments were applied first to the interests and penalties while the rest were applied to the principal, pursuant to the terms of the agreement. As of February 29, 1992, PERPETUALs total outstanding loan is P610,656.95. Petitioner averred that she cannot be charged with violation of BP 22 because she replaced Check No.

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019972 on May 25, 1989, with 6 checks, each for P25,000.00 or for the total amount of P150,000.00. She claimed that from the time of dishonor up to March 1992, PERPETUAL paid LIVECOR P542,000.00 thus covering the full amount of the dishonored check. On June 10, 1992, the trial court rendered decision finding petitioner guilty of violating BP 22. CA affirmed RTC decision, hence the appeal.

ISSUE(S): WON petitioner was properly notified of the dishonor, thus providing prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit? HELD: NO RATIO: 1.

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7.

To hold petitioner liable for violation of BP 22, it is not enough that she issued the check that was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must also be shown beyond reasonable doubt that she knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check was issued. The prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment within five banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. Even assuming that petitioner was properly notified of the dishonor, still, the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds would not arise. There is more credence to petitioners allegation that she replaced the bounced check with 6 checks, each for P25,000.00, or a total of P150,000.00. For more than 2 years after the dishonor, LIVECOR accepted the payments made by PERPETUAL without complain. In addition, it appears that it has been the practice of LIVECOR to allow its client to redeem the dishonored checks and replace them with new ones. testimonies do not categorically prove exactly when petitioner received the notice of dishonor. Hence, there was no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of BP 22 would start and end. In Danao v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that: “if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of the checks was ever presented during the trial. As found by the trial court itself, (t)he evidence however is not clear when Macasieb (private complainant) made the demands. There is no proof of the date when DANAO received the demand letter (Exh. F).Obviously, in the instant case, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the presumption or prima facie evidence of knowledge by the petitioner of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the times she issued the checks did not arise.”

8.

The presumption that the issuer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received notice of dishonor and that within 5 banking days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The prosecution is burdened to prove these acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption. 9. At any rate, even if the P25,000.00 dishonored check be excluded from the P423,365.00 payments made by petitioner, the remaining balance thereof is still more than the P150,000.00 dishonored check subject of the instant case. The records show that she paid P423,354.00 to LIVECOR from Dec. 1988 to April 1, 1991. 10. Although petitioner has not yet fully paid the loan, it cannot be denied that the previous payments fully covered the value of the dishonored check. It would be unjust to penalize her for the issuance of said check which has been satisfied 2 years prior to the filing of the criminal charge against her PEOPLE v. DONALDO PADILLA G.R. No. 172603 | August 24, 2007 | Carpio-Morales, J. DOCTRINE: Even when the defense evidence is weak, the prosecution should not lean thereon but must stand and rely on the strength and merits of its own evidence. FACTS: Donaldo Padilla was charged before the RTC of Las Piñas for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). Version of the Prosecution: ● The Las Piñas police conducted a surveillance for 2 weeks of the residence of Malou Padilla (spouse of Donaldo) for alleged drug trafficking. ● Armed with a search warrant, SPO2 Mabini Rosale and Police Inspector Virgilio Pelaez, with the other operatives, proceeded to the house. They noticed a Nissan Altima car speeding away. ○ They were informed by the Padillas’ helper that the couple was on board the said car. ● In coordination with the president of the homeowners’ association, the policemen proceeded to search the Padilla residence. ○ They recovered aluminum foils and suspected shabu tubes. ● While the policemen were still at the Padilla residence, the security guard of the village informed them via radio that persons on board a red Toyota car wanted to go to the Padilla residence. ● When the policemen arrived at the village gate, they asked the driver, Jose Hidalgo, Jr., why he was going to the Padilla residence and the latter replied that he had an important transaction. ● The policemen heard sounds from the trunk, prompting them to inquire from Hidalgo what they were. ○ Hidalgo opened the trunk and at that instant, Donaldo readily handed over to the policemen a blue plastic bag, saying: “Ito ang hinahanap niyo.” ● After taking the photograph of Donaldo while he was inside the trunk, SPO2 Rosale opened the plastic bag which has 3 heat-sealed transparent packets and 1 self-sealing packet all containing suspected shabu.

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The policemen at once arrested Donaldo. The items inside the 4 packets were tested in the PNP Crime Laboratory. The test yielded positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

Version of the Defense: ● After Donaldo, his brother Luis, and Hidalgo attended a party at their cousin’s house, they brought Donaldo home. ● When they arrived at the gate of the village at around 4AM, they were stopped by the security guard because their car has no village sticker. ● Donaldo informed the guard that he would just be brought home. ● The guard informed Donaldo that there were policemen in his house who were armed with a search warrant against his wife, and advised him to just wait at the gate as the policemen were on their way. ● When the policemen arrived, Donaldo asked for the search warrant. The policemen replied that it was in the possession of their companions who remained at his residence. ● Without permission, the police started searching the car but found nothing. ● As Donaldo was contacting his wife, the policemen told him that all of them would go to where she was, which they did. ● When Malou asked for the search warrant, the policemen showed her “bulky” documents. ● When asked if they found anything in their house, the policemen claimed that they found shabu paraphernalia, which they never showed. ● The policemen invited Donaldo, Malou, Donaldo’s brother and Hidalgo to the police station. ● Col. Alcantara, who was supposedly the commanding officer of the raiding team, informed Donaldo that they found evidence against him and offered him to settle the matter for P200,000. ● As Donaldo could not produce the amount, Col. Alcantara asked him to choose who among them would be charged. Donaldo volunteered himself. The others were thus released hours later. RTC convicted Donaldo. ● It found unbelievable Donaldo’s claim that the charge against him came about because he could not raise the amount demanded by Col. Alcantara. It was not even shown that the latter was charged for the alleged attempt to extort money from Donaldo. ● It also found the defense witnesses Luis Padilla and security guard Romeo Placido to be biased. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has established Donaldo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. - NO. RULING: In convicting Donaldo, the CA relied, in the main, on the weakness of the evidence for the defense, focusing on the following: ● How unavailing Donaldo’s claim of extortion by the police officers is in light of a failure to show that they were charged administratively; ● The bias of defense witnesses Luis and Placido; and ● The untruthfulness of Donaldo’s claim that he was the only one charged, given that the Information itself charged him and Hidalgo.

The SC finds the tale of the prosecution not to be in accordance with human nature and the experience of mankind. ● It would be absurd for Donaldo to go back to his house hours after allegedly escaping from the raiding team, to thus risk being arrested when, chances were, the police officers would be, as they were, still waiting for him. ● Assuming that Donaldo did attempt to go back and that he was carrying 400 grams of shabu, it would also be absurd for him not to flee again after being informed by the guard that his house was being searched by the police and that the latter were on their way to the gate. ● If indeed Donaldo was hiding in the trunk, it would also be absurd for him to create noises that would arouse the curiosity of the police. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, particularly if the evidence for the prosecution is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And where the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to overcome this presumption, the judgment of conviction must be set aside. The prosecution’s failure to present the search warrant, the photograph of Donaldo allegedly taken while he was inside the trunk, and the seizure receipt showing that crystalline substance was indeed recovered from Donaldo, as well as the policemen’s service of and implementation of the alleged search warrant at an unholy hour further weakened their case. Also, the CA’s finding that Donaldo’s claim that he was the only one charge is belied by the Information which also charged Hidalgo is not exactly accurate. The Information shows Donaldo was the only one charged. Hidalgo, whose whereabouts were unknown, was, merely alleged to have conspired with Donaldo. Even assuming arguendo that the defense evidence is weak, the prosecution should not lean thereon but must stand and rely on the strength and merits of its own evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge the onus of establishing prima facie Donaldo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the defense did not even have to present evidence, the burden of evidence not having shifted to it. Donaldo is ACQUITTED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO G.R. No. 155733 | January 27, 2006 | J. Corona

FACTS: The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado and Lucio Campo, but were never married. Five other children were born to the couple who are full-blood siblings of Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had another son with another man (Ramon Osorio) named Luis Delgado. Josefa Delgado died on September 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives. Sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. Petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a

baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as an unmarried woman. They never had any children but took into their home Guillermina and Nanie. They were never legally adopted but was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. Guillermina was alleged to be the illegitimate child of Guillermo with another woman. Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not mean that no marriage transpired and that Guillermina was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child and such right had prescribed upon the death of Guillermo. They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, they presented the following pieces of evidence: 1. Certificate of Identity dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia; 2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947; 3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself swore to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado. Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila. This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate halfblood relative Josefa Delgado. Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors, the motion was granted. The RTC ruled that petitioner and her co-claimants are entitled to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado and declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado. Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto. As the estates of both decedents have not as yet been settled, a single administrator was appointed in the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa. LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION were issued to CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of P500,000.00. Upon appeal in the CA said court reversed the decision. ISSUE: W/N the marriage between (1) Guillermo and Josefa and between (2) Felisa and Ramon are proven? HELD: The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx (aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses." Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman. We are not persuaded. First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners. Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage. Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation. Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary. Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado). All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. (additional issue: As to who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado) Since Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his halfblood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children. The SC ruled that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. The court ruled that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia- Intervenor Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect. Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases: (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative

father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any judicial action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. Therefore the right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia.

DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES v. RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC G.R. NO. 147039 January 27, 2006 FACTS: Respondent Radio Mindanao Network contracted with DBP Pool and Provident Insurance Corp each under a Fire Insurance Policy. When respondent’s radio station in Bacolod was razed by fire, their claims under both insurance policies were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an expected risk excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d), to wit: 6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following consequences, namely: (c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or not), civil war. (d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was caused by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA). Hence, respondent was constrained to file a civil case against petitioner and Provident for recovery of insurance benefits.. RTC: in favor of respondent. The only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if the fire was due to the intentional act committed by the members of the NPA, are the testimonies of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their testimonies were limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted and in the course of the investigation they were informed by bystanders that "heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in (sic) it and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting "Mabuhay ang NPA". The persons whom they investigated and actually saw the burning of the station were not presented as witnesses. The documentary evidence particularly Exhibits "5" and "5-C" do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning were members of the NPA. Exhibit "5-B" which is a letter released by the NPA merely mentions some dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the media in Bacolod. There was no mention there of any threat on media facilities.

CA: Affirmed RTC. MR denied. To recapitulate, defendants-appellants presented the following to support its claim, to wit: police blotter of the burning of DYHB, certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated National Police, Bacolod City regarding the incident, letter of alleged NPA members Celso Magsilang claiming responsibility for the burning of DYHB, fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988, and the testimonies of Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SFO III Leonardo Rochas. We examined carefully the report on the police blotter of the burning of DYHB, the certification issued by the Integrated National Police of Bacolod City and the fire investigation report prepared by SFO III Rochas and there We found that none of them categorically stated that the 20 armed men which burned DYHB were members of the CPP/NPA. The said documents simply stated that the said armed men were ‘believed’ to be or ‘suspected’ of being members of the said group. Even SFO III Rochas admitted that he was not sure that the said armed men were members of the CPP-NPA. In fact the only person who seems to be so sure that that the CPPNPA had a hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres. However, though We found him to be persuasive in his testimony regarding how he came to arrive at his opinion, We cannot nevertheless admit his testimony as conclusive proof that the CPP-NPA was really involved in the incident considering that he admitted that he did not personally see the armed men even as he tried to pursue them. Note that when Lt. Col. Torres was presented as witness, he was presented as an ordinary witness only and not an expert witness. Hence, his opinion on the identity or membership of the armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible in evidence. Anent the letter of a certain Celso Magsilang, who claims to be a member of NPA-NIROC, being an admission of person which is not a party to the present action, is likewise inadmissible in evidence under Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The reason being that an admission is competent only when the declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the action. Hence this petition by petitioner DBP Pool. Petitioner assails the factual finding of both the trial court and the CA that its evidence failed to support its allegation that the loss was caused by an excepted risk, i.e., members of the CPP/NPA caused the fire. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it held that there were no sufficient evidence showing that the approximately 20 armed men who caused the fire at respondent’s property were members of the CPP-NPA - NO. HELD: Both the trial court and the CA were correct in ruling that petitioner failed to prove that the loss was caused by an excepted risk. The Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling or exceptional reasons. On weight and sufficiency:

Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis-àvis the other evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted that there is a need for additional convincing proof, viz.: The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of the fire was the intentional burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio facilities shouted "Mabuhay ang NPA" does not furnish logical conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that their act was an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be submitted. Defendants failed to discharge their responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk excluded. While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA. Rather, it was stated in the police blotter that: "a group of persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA … more or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA," while the certification from the Bacolod Police station stated that "… some 20 or more armed men believed to be members of the New People’s Army NPA," and the fire investigation report concluded that "(I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed men suspected to be members of the CPP/NPA where (sic) the ones responsible …" All these documents show that indeed, the "suspected" executor of the fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof. Other issues: 1. On res gestae Petitioner: evidence on record established the identity of the author of the damage; Reports of witnesses that the bystanders they interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA as an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae. SC: Not convinced. While it may concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders’ statements while they were making their investigations during and after the fire. It is

reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote. At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were made may be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered. 2. On burden of proof Petitioner: Private respondent is responsible for proving that the cause of the damage/loss is covered by the insurance policy, as stipulated in the insurance policy. SC: The "burden of proof" contemplated by the aforesaid provision actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward). As applied in this case, it refers to the duty of the insured to show that the loss or damage is covered by the policy. The foregoing clause notwithstanding, the burden of proof still rests upon petitioner to prove that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk in order to escape any liability under the contract. Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden of proof never parts. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e. an "avoidance" of the claim. Particularly, in insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils or hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up. If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability. Consequently, it is sufficient for private respondent to prove the fact of damage or loss. Once respondent makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to petitioner to controvert respondent’s prima facie case. In this case, since petitioner alleged an excepted risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to petitioner to prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has sufficiently proven that the damage or loss

was caused by an excepted risk does the burden of evidence shift back to respondent who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why such excepted risk does not release petitioner from any liability. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed to discharge its primordial burden of proving that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk.

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE FACTS: 1. In 2013, the Pork Barrel Scam arose -- the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate. 2. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles. 3. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent. 4. Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. 5. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money. 6. A certain Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads: 32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x. 7. The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada, one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and Ong. 8. Ong supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 9. Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events and was asked to affirm these statements made 10. In a letter addressed to Chief Justice Sereno, Ong meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the

decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles. 11. Ong surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. 12. As to the Kevlar helmet cases, Ong said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. 13. Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet LimNapoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was fixed through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan 14. Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio over members of the judiciary and members of the legal. 15. Court En Banc required respondent to submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. a. Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula. 16. On Sula's statement, Ong points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether Ong is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. a. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. 17. As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, Ong said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. Ong stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit. 18.This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by Ong, hence the case was redocketed. 19. The case was then placed under Justice Angelina SandovalGutierrez, a retired Member of this Court. a. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. That he was in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business activities. b. In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help her. c. When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is Ong d. Benhur further testified that he kept ledgers showing that Napoles spent a total of P100M in the Snadiganbayan when she gave various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case and

to Ong in particular after which, she was already confident that she would be acquitted. 20. Sula’s testimonies were also examined by Justice Sandoval. a. She agreed to the the testimony of Benhur Luy 21. In his defense, Ong denied that he ever met Napoles prior to or during the pendency of the Kevlar case he also denied that he received any money from Napoles 22. ustice Sandoval-Gutierrez evaluated and concluded that the testimonies of Benhur Luy and Marina Sula 23. Ong did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula and he failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. 24. Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez then recommended that Ong be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of dismissal. ISSUE: WON the credibility of the testimonies of Luy and Sula as to the conduct of Ong should be given weight for his dimissal? [YES] RULING: We concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles. Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. Caneda v. Alaan ruling: Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. In this case, Ong’s acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.

Previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court. In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted Ong did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.

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The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows: SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits Xxx Basically, the testimonies were insufficient for the dismissal of Ong, rather, the basis was his conduct

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After PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene while PO2 Noble introduced him as a policeman and arrested Marcelino. ○ Through a frisk, PO2 Noble was able to confiscate the metal container that contained another sachet of which crstalline substance. ○ PO2 Noble wrote “MCC-RNN Oct. 9, 2004” on both plastic sachets SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of the Sps Collado where they found the other accused gathered around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia. A chemistry report on all the seized items yielded positive results for methylamphetamine hydcohloride (AKA Shabu)

RTC convicted all the accused of their respective crimes. It also ordered all the shabu and paraphernalia be turned over and delivered immediately to the PDEA for proper disposition. CA affirmed the RTC with modifications.

PEOPLE v. COLLADO GR No. 185719 | June 17, 2013 | J. Del Castillo | Tet Valeza DOCTRINE Mere allegations and self-serving statements will not overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties accorded to police officers. There must be a showing of clear and convincing evidence to successfully rebut this presumption. FACTS ●

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Sps Marcelino and Myra Collado were charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den, dive or resort. ○ Marcelino was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs Other appellants (Cipriano, Latario, Ranada, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang) were charged with possession of drug paraphernalia

Version of the Prosecution: ● PO2 Noble received information that Sps Collado were engaged in selling shabu. ● PO2 Noble, SPO2 Cruz and PO1 Bitbit conducted a surveillance on the couple’s residence. After confirming the reported activities, SPO2 Cruz looked for an asset who could introduce them to the Sps in the ensuing buy-bust operation. ● A buy-bust operation team was formed and after coordinating with the PDEA as evidenced by a preoperation report, the team proceeded to the residence of the Sps. Collado ● PO2 Noble was introduced to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. ○ When Noble was handing over the marked money to Marcelino, he motioned that the money be given to Myra. ○ After she accepted the money, Marcelino took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave it to PO2 Noble.

ISSUE WON the buy-bust operation conducted was valid. HELD Yes, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the police officers involved in this case. ● The arrest conducted on the appellants was an in flagrante delicto arrest and is a valid warrantless arrest. ○ Assuming arguendo however that the arrest was invalid, they can no longer question its validity because they did not object to it before arraignment. ● Appellant also claim that Noble tried to extort money from them in exchange for dropping the drug charges against them. ○ People v. Capalad: To substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty ○ Marcelino’s claim of extortion is not substantiated by other convincing evidence. ● Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Sec 21 of RA 9165 specifically the fact that the confiscated drugs were not photographer and inventoried. ○ Court has consistently ruled that the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecution’s cause provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved. ○ In this case, PO2 Noble, after apprehending Marcelino and confiscating the sachets of shabu immediately placed his markings on them. KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA v. PEOPLE GR No. 210760 January 16, 2015 | Wenceslao FACTS:

· This is a case involving a crime of theft committed by Kyle Zabala. · Zabala is a jeepney driver who earns P200-P4000 per day on an alternate day basis. He is also a mechanic. · Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at the Manila City Hall. It is through his job that he was able to save P68,000 which was allegedly stolen by Zabala. · Alas and Zabala are neighbors in Del Monte, Bulacan. They treat each other as kumpares. o He would ask Zabala, who is also a mechanic, to repair his vehicle. o Also, Alas allowed Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repairs of his vehicle. · On June 18, 2007, at about 4am, Alas left his house for work and when he returned at around 11PM, he discovered that his money amounting to P68,000 in an envelope kept inside his closet was missing. · During that time, there were only 5 persons living in their house: Alas, his parents, his 9 year-old son and his aunt. · He asked his parents and aunt but they did not know where he kept the money. · On the other hand, a witness named Marilyn Piñon (girlfiriend of Zabala for 5 months, break na sila now haha) testified that in the same day she and Zabala were together at a store owned by the latter which was six to seven steps from Alas’ house. o She then saw Zabala climb the fense and scale the tree in front of the complainant’s house and enter the house. o When he returned to the store, Piñon noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket, which he later found to be a plentiful of money. o They subsequently went to Greenhills where Zabala bough 2 Nokia mobile phones which cost P8500 each. · For Zabala’s defense, he testified that he was driving a friend on the day the theft was committed and that Piñon was just an acquaintance and not his girlfriend. (shet, ate girl dineny ka) · RTC convicted Zabala with the crime of theft. He appealed to the CA attributing grave error to RTC’s conviction. · CA ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant through circumstantial evidence.

· This is but a recognition of the reality that in certain instances, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime, it is not always possible to obtain direct evidence. · Bacolod v. People: The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. xxx Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which “goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which if proved, may tend by inference to established a fact in issue.” · The Rules of Court recognizes circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction under Section 4, Rule 133. (a) If there is more than one circumstance (b) The facts form which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. · Lozano v. People: Circumstantial evidence must constitute a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the other. It must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the crime. APPLICATION: The prosecution in this case, failed to establish that petitioner is guilty of theft by circumstantial evidence. They failed to establish the corpus delicti. (1) Nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas where the money amounting to P68000 was allegedly kept. (2) Evidence presented is insufficient to determine without a reasonable doubt that the money was lost due to felonious taking. Piñon’s testimony was insufficient to establish this reasonable doubt. (3) Piñon’s testimony fails to establish that Zabala’s pocket indeed contained the stolen money, as she never actually saw what’s inside the pocket. She never really testified that the money stolen was used to pay for the mobile phones. (4) The prosecution failed to prove or even allege that it was impossible for some other person to have committed a crime of theft against Alas. Alas himself admitted that there were other persons inside the house but no one was ever presented to prove their whereabouts. This foregoing failed to establish and prove the rule circumstantial evidence cases that the evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime. This failure of the prosecution leads the Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to establish that culpability could ony belong to Zabla and not to some other person. HE MUST BE ACQUITTED. AGILE MARITIME RESOURCES v. SIADOR

ISSUE/S: W/N the guilt of Zabala was proved beyond reasonable doubt which is sufficient to convict him? NO. HELD/RATIO: SC reversed RTC and CA. The Court agreed with Zabala and found that the evidence presented below does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to convict petitioner pf theft. Thus, he must be acquitted. DISCUSSION: {Evid issue} The case is largely based on circumstantial evidence. It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction and that direct evidence is not always necessary. [DOCTRINE]

Facts: Dennis Siador, son of Apolinario Siador, entered into a 7-month contract of employment as ordinary seaman on board a vessel owned by Agile Maritime. Apolinario filed a complaint for death benefits, damages and attorney’s fees against the Agile for the death of Dennis who fell from the vessel and who died in the high seas while the vessel was cruising towards Japan. The body of Dennis was never recovered. Apolinario claimed that Dennis’ employment was governed by the POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and supplemented by the International Transport Workers Federation-Total Crew Cost (ITFTCC) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Under the POEA-SEC, in case of death of a seafarer, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to US$50,000,00 ITF-TCC CBA, on the other hand, US$60,000.00 to the immediate next of kin of the seafarer who lost his life. As the sole heir of Dennis, Apolinario prayed for the upgraded death benefits under the ITF-TCC CBA. AGILE MARITIME: did not deny that the incident happened. Based on the “Master’s Statement on S.A.R. Operation for Mr. Dennis Siador”(Master’s Statement). a. They claimed that another seaman saw Dennis jump overboard. The manoverboard alarm was sounded. b. The captain immediately ordered a life ring thrown into the water and put into motion the vessel’s man-overboard maneuver c. Another seaman saw Dennis floating on his back, making no effort to swim towards the life ring. d. He then saw Dennis sink in the water and disappear from sight despite the effort to rescue him by a team led by the Chief Officer. The rescue was called off after the temperature dropped. Agile notified Apolinario of Dennis’ death. Apolinario demanded death benefits and damages. Agile refused. This refusal led to the filing of the complaint. LABOR ARBITER/Affirmed by NLRC: dismissed the complaint found that Dennis — saddled by heavy personal and psychological problems — took his own life by jumping overboard. 1.

CA: It reversed the labor tribunal’s dismissal of the complaint and awarded Apolinario death benefits from the CBA a. It sustained Apolinario’s position that prior to his death, Dennis had been suffering from mental instability, and therefore could not be considered to have intentionally taken his life. b. It cited the personal accounts of the Filipino crew members on Dennis’ unusual behavior days before the incident, which narrated that Dennis appeared to be very disturbed, anxious, depressed and restless. c. These personal accounts are contained in the “Statement on Mr. Dennis Siador” (Crewmembers’ Statement) that the Master of the vessel, prepared on the very day the incident happened; the Filipino crew members affirmed the statement through their signatures. d. CA opined that without the report of Dennis’ previous unusual behavior, it would have been safe to presume that he willfully took his life, but the report on record cannot be disregarded.

ISSUE: Whether there is “ample and convincing evidence” showing that Dennis took his own life and that his death was not caused by his mental problems. HELD: NO BURDEN OF PROOF · Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. o As a claimant for death benefits, Apolinario has the burden of proving that the seafarer’s death (1) is work-related; and (2) happened during the term of the employment contract. · Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this burden of proof. · In the usual course, such proof would have rendered the petitioners automatically liable, except that the same provision of the POEA-SEC allows an exemption from liability for death benefits if the employer can successfully prove that the seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. · That the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act is a matter of defense that the employer has to prove. In legal parlance, the employer carries the burden of proof to establish its claim that it should not be held liable. · Whether it is the employer or the seafarer, the quantum of proof necessary to discharge their respective burdens is substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. · Since Apolinario has initially discharged his burden of proof, the petitioners, in order to avoid liability, must similarly establish their defense. If the petitioners are able to establish their defense by substantial evidence, the burden now rests on Apolinario to overcome the employer’s defense. In other words, the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer’s heirs. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE · In the present case, the LA, NLRC and the CA uniformly found that Dennis jumped from the ship. · Petitioners also cited the following personal circumstances that may have driven Dennis to do what he did: his dysfunctional family; the death of his mother; the bitter parting with his father; and his disappointment with his sister whose medical education he supported, only to learn that she got married and did not even invite him to the wedding · Based on these facts and the legal presumption of sanity, we conclude that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it affirmed the LA’s dismissal of the complaint; we hold that the seafarer’s death was due to his willful act, as the employer posited and proved. · With the company’s discharge of the burden to prove its defense, the burden of evidence shifted to Apolinario to rebut the petitioners’ case. · By holding that willfulness “could not be presumed” from Dennis’ act of jumping overboard, we observe that CA cluttered its appreciation of the evidence,

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contrary to the rules on the burden of proof and the burden of evidence that must be observed since the issue before the CA was not the intrinsic correctness of the NLRC’s ruling but the existence of grave abuse of discretion Since the burden of evidence was shifted to Apolinario, the reversal of the NLRC’s ruling could only be premised on Apolinario’s successful proof by substantial evidence of Dennis’ insanity or mental illness. The CA, however, instead of proceeding in this manner, imposed the burden of evidence on the petitioners on the ground that “willfulness could not be presumed when Dennis jumped overboard.” By doing so, the CA acted as if the petition before it was part of an appellate process rather than an independent civil action of certiorari that is limited to questions of grave abuse of discretion.

APOLINARIO FAILED TO PROVE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE · According to Apolinario, the statements describing Dennis’ actuations can only point to the conclusion that Dennis was already mentally disturbed a few days before he plunged into the ocean and drowned. Since Dennis was no longer in his right mind, his act of jumping into the open sea cannot be considered willful on his part. · The employer also showed by substantial evidence what prompted Dennis to act as he did, without any contrary evidence submitted by Apolinario to dispute the employer’s evidence. SHIFT IN THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF INSANITY · Since the POEA-SEC requires the employer to prove not only that the death is directly attributable to the seafarer himself but also that the seafarer willfully caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counter-defense. · Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of the seafarer (his jump into the open sea), the insanity or mental illness required to be proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his senses; in other words, there must be sufficient proof to negate voluntariness. · But Dennis’ strange behavior cannot be the basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion because portions of the Crewmembers’ Statement itself rendered the basis for a finding of insanity insufficient. · To recall, a few hours before the accident, Filipino crew members approached Dennis to ask him if anything was wrong with him and Dennis simply replied that everything was in order. No proof was ever adduced as well showing that whatever personal problems Dennis had were enough to negate the voluntariness he showed in stepping overboard. · Apolinario’s complaint must be dismissed not because of doubt but because of the insufficiency of his evidence to support his claim of insanity.

CANDELARIA v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 209386 | 8 December 2014 |PERLAS-BERNABE J.

Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The circumstances proved must be: 1) consistent with each other, 2) consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, 3) at the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. FACTS 1. In the morning of 23 Aug. 2006: Viron Transit Corp. ordered 14, 000 liters of diesel fuel allegedly worth P497,000 from Unioil, owned by Jessielyn Lao. 2. Mel Candelaria, a truck driver employed by Lao, was dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel. 3. At around 5 pm, Viron informed Lao through a phone call that it had not yet received its order. 4. Lao discovered that Candelaria, together with his helper Mario Romano (also a Unioil employee), left the premises at 12:50 pm of the same day on board a lorry truck to deliver Viron’s diesel fuel. 5. When Lao called Candelaria, she did not receive any response. 6. At around 6 pm, Romano returned alone to Unioil’s office and reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him. This prompted Lao to report the incident to the Anti Carnapping Section of the Manila Police District and to Camp Crame. 7. After a few days, NBI agents found the abandoned truck in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel fuel. 8. Lao filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Candelaria. 9. Candelaria demurred to the prosecution’s evidence. · He argued that there was no direct evidence that linked him to the commission of the crime as Lao had no personal knowledge as to what actually happened to the diesel fuel. · Moreover, the information relayed by Romana is considered hearsay due to his untimely demise. 10. RTC convicted Candelaria of Qualified Theft. It ordered Candelaria to indemnify Lao P497,000 as the value of the stolen diesel fuel. 11. CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. It ruled that a finding of guilt need not always be based on direct evidence, but may also be based on circumstantial evidence, or “evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.” However, it modified the amount which Candelaria was directed to indemnify Lao to P14,000 in the absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel fuel was indeed worth P497,000. ISSUE Whether Candelaria is guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft based on circumstantial evidence. – YES. HELD

DOCTRINE:

The RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances in this case, as duly established by the prosecution’s evidence, amply justify Candelaria’s conviction. These circumstances are: (a) Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao’s Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to Viron; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises on the same day onboard the lorry truck containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5 pm of the same day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed to reply to Lao’s phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil since then. Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed under Candelaria’s custody and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive reason to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial, which, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be concocted. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not synonymous with guilt, unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience, especially when taken together with all the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case. The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing stolen. To prove the value of the stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated “estimate.” In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. The value of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be considered as a matter of public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice. While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the uncorroborated testimony of Lao, to prove that the value of the diesel fuel stolen is P497,000, the Court – taking judicial notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in August 2006 is within the range of P37.60 to P37.86 per liter – nonetheless remains satisfied that such amount must be sustained.