Best Evidence Rule.docx

COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORP v. LAGMAN G.R. No. 165487 | July 13, 2011
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Santos applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in warehouse business (storing of palay). ○ Under the General Bonded Warehouse Act approval for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding company. Accordingly, petitioner Country Bankers Insurance Corporation issued Warehouse Bond No. 03304 through its agent, respondent Antonio Lagman. o Santos was the bond principal, Lagman was the surety and NFA was the obligee. In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos. o Lagman and other co-signors bound themselves solidarily liable to Country Bankers for any damages, prejudice, losses, costs, payments, advances and expenses of whatever kind and nature which it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond. Santos secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral. ○ Santos defaulted in his payment when the loan matured. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay P1,166,750.37. ○ Subsequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money against Lagman. Lagman: alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts. Trial court: declared Lagman and other co-signors, jointly and severally liable to pay Country Bankers relying on the indemnity agreement. Lagman anchors his defense on 2 arguments: 1) the 1989 Bonds have expired and 2) the 1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds by presenting a photocopy of the 1990 Bond. CA: rejected Country Banker’s argument that the 1989 bond were continuing held that the 1989 bonds were effective only for 1 year, as evidenced by the receipts on the payment of premiums.

prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non- production of the original instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals. CASE AT BAR Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are actually four duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond. Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals, Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990 Bond but could no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason enough for the nonavailability of his copy of the bond considering that he himself is a bondsman. Neither did he explain why he failed to secure the original from any of the 3 other custodians he mentioned in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original with the NFA Loan Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed to exert diligent efforts to produce the original. ISSUE #2: (Insurance Law) Whether the 1989 Bonds have expired and the 1990 Bond novates the 1989 Bonds. HELD: NO. It is continuing bond.

HELD: NO.

The 1989 Bonds have identical provisions and they state in very clear terms the effectivity of these bonds i.e. that the bond shall remain in force until cancelled by the Administrator of NFA. This provision in the bonds is in compliance with the second paragraph of Section 177 of Insurance Code, which specifies that a continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed expiration date, may be cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the Insurance Commissioner, and by the court. The clear import of these provisions is that the surety bonds in question cannot be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. Thus: In case of a continuing bond, the obligor shall pay the subsequent annual premium as it falls due until the contract of suretyship is cancelled by the obligee or by the Commissioner or by a court of competent jurisdiction, as the case may be.

Such copy is inadmissible. Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry.

Lagman, being a solidary debtor by virtue of the 1989 Bonds under the Indemnity Agreements, is liable for the entire obligation. Petition is GRANTED.

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v IMELDA “IMEE” MARCOSMANOTOC, et. al.

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ISSUE #1: Whether the photocopy of the 1990 bond should be admitted as proof.

GR No. 171701 | February 8, 2012 | Sereno, J. | Panaga FACTS: ●

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This case involves P200B of the Marcoses alleged illgotten wealth. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III. Four amended Complaints were filed imputing active participation and collaboration of other persons in the alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses. Petitioner presented and formally offered evidence1 against respondents. ○ Against Imee and Bongbong ■ Sworn statement and Deposition of one of the financial advisors of the late Marcos, Rolando Gapud2 ○ Against Imee for the alleged dollar salting with De Soleil Apparel and the media networks ■ Affidavits of witnesses ■ TSN taken during the PCGG hearing Against Irene and Gregorio ■ Articles of Incorporation, Memorandum of Agreement and Purchase Agreement between Pantranco and Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. Respondents objected to the offer on the ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule as they were unauthenticated, and that petitioner failed to provide a reason as to why the original documents could not be provided. Sandiganbayan admitted the evidence with some reservation: the documents were admitted as evidence but its evidentiary value shall be left to the determination of the Court. Respondents filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence contending that the documents presented were inadmissible in court. Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrers except one by Imelda. ○ Imelda – Her demurrer was denied because she admitted that she and her husband owned properties enumerated In the complaint, saying that it was lawfully acquired. However, her admission was deemed as prima facie case against her considering that the value of the properties were disproportionate to their lawful income ○ Imee and Bongbong – Their involvement was never established based on the witnesses presented, which none of them mentioned the siblings, nor the

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Photocopies of the documents

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Statements were taken in Hong Kong on various dates

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documentary evidence3 pinpoint any specific involvement of the two. ○ Irene and her husband Gregorio – The testimonies and documents presented4 were not enough to support petitioner’s allegations. ○ PEA-PTGWO – No evidence showing that Pantranco was illegally acquired since the documentary evidence presented were mere photocopies and affiants had not been presented as witnesses. Petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration insisting that there was a preponderance of evidence that respondents had connived with their parents as compulsory heirs of the late Marcos. It contends that these documents fall under the 3rd exception under the Rules on Evidence5 wherein these documents are public records in the custody of a public officer or are recorded in a public office. Since the documents were collected by PCGG, then it falls under such exception. PCGG’s record officer Magno testified that these documents had been gathered and taken into custody by the PCGG The court denied the motion, pointing out that it made its reservation in the assessment of the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence. It also stated that even if it included the testimonies of witnesses, these were not substantial to hold respondents liable

ISSUE: WON the granting of the demurrers to evidence was valid HELD: YES. Petitioner failed to observe the best evidence rule. It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its complaint through a preponderance of evidence. Failure to do so has made the Demurrer filed by the respondents valid. What should be proved are the contents of the documents and as such, the original documents must be presented. Since the submitted evidence were mere photocopies, the petitioner has violated the best evidence rule which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself.6 Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a reason as to why the originals were not presented nor did they present any compelling ground which would have the court admit the documents as

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Documents showed the interests of Imee in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, which she allegedly obtained through illegal means and to prove her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel 4

Said documents sought to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring the bus company Pantranco 5

Sec. 7, Rule 130. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. 6

Sec. 3(d) Rule 130. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office

secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.

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It cannot also say that said documents fall under Rule 7, Sec. 130 of the Rules. The fact that they were collected by the PCGG in its investigation does not make them per se public records. Even if there was a witness to that effect, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to the contents of the documents. Witnesses can only testify as to those facts which are of their personal knowledge. The affidavits submitted, although considered as public documents, if they are acknowledged by a notary public, are still classified as hearsay evidence. Affidavits are generally rejected unless affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify.

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The TSN may be a public document but what was presented was a mere photocopy. Under the Rules, when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, a photocopy of a public document is valid if it is a certified copy issued by the public officer who has custody. In this case, the TSN was not even a certified copy and was not even signed by the stenographer who took down the proceedings. REPUBLIC v. GIMENEZ TITLE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016 PONENTE: LEONEN, J. NOTES: Skipped demurrer and went straight to Best Evidence Rule; I did not include all the evidence kasi sobrang haba ng list; Please check codal for the provisions stated sa ruling. FACTS: ●

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The Republic (REP), through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan (SB). The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by Spouses as dummies, agents, or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos. During trial, the REP presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. After which the REP then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further evidence.” Accordingly, the SB gave the REP 30 days "to file its formal offer of evidence." The REP moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days, within which to file its formal offer of evidence." – GRANTED. The REP moved for an additional 15 days – GRANTED. No further extensions where asked. In a resolution, the SB noted that the REP failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, declared that REP waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence. Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the REP showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss don the ground of failure to prosecute.

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Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez's filing of the Motion to Dismiss, REP filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. ○ ANG DAMI MGA BES. Exhibits A – TT (A – Z, AA – TT). Basically it consist of several pieces of evidence presented to the court to prove that the spouse got ill-gotten wealth such as the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld On Compensation, Checking Statements Summary issued by the Banks, Checks, Certification proving that Gimenez worked with the Office of the President etc. In another resolution, the SB denied the REP's Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses' Motion to Dismiss: ○ REP failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length of time and to comply with the court's rules. The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the REP consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value. Petitioner argues that: ○ a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by petitioner; and ○ b) the documents it presented were public documents, and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the original documentary exhibits. Petitioner relies on the SB order that the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents to be presented and identified by the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, Petitioner claims that the exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG's functions prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of the official records of the PCGG: "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe RoaGimenez, her salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes' interests on various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds." On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner's documents are not "official issuances of the Philippine government." They are mostly notarized private documents. Petitioner's evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper. Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the SB did not err in holding that the majority of petitioner's documentary evidence has no probative value, considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.

ISSUE: Whether the SB erred in holding that petitioner REP waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez's Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence. HELD: YES. The evidence presented by petitioner before the SB deserves better treatment. RATIO: The nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule. Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule: the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus — But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original. Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed. Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent's loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court. Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified as either public or private under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for public documents in SEC. 23. - SEC. 30 Public v Private Document as Evidence: The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. In short: Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated. Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were certified true copies of audited financial

statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their admissibility in evidence. In this Case: ● Petitioner merely presented a memo attesting to the increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. ● While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available must be presented. ● The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements – Eh wala (nothing was presented), so it was not authenticated. ● Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commission's investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. (To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception). ● Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves. ● Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. (while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence). HOWEVER, the SC highlighted that the SB brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case. Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, it is clear that the SB did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The SB erred in ignoring petitioner's testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses. Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez's incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband's salaries and to their other lawful income or properties. Petitioner presented five witnesses, two of which were Atty. Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and Danilo Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the control of spouses Gimenezes. Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial evidence (Madami din). The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative weight is canonical. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. ● The SB should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where SC held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that: [I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.

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● A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state's policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action," it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case. Petition is GRANTED. HEIRS OF PARDON v. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ GR No. 170604 | September 2, 2013 | Bersamin, J. | Perez DOCTRINE: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document. FACTS: ●

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The children of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon. ○ They alleged that their parents were the registered owners of the subject parcel of land and that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as heirs. ○ However, they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT but the original copy on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was still intact. ○ The original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to Prodon subject to the right of repurchase. ○ They alleged that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the Deed of Sale did not exist. Prodon claimed that Maximo executed the Deed of Sale with right to repurchase. She had then become

the absolute owner of the property when Maximo failed to repurchase the property within 6 months from the date of execution of the Deed. ○ Prodon’s testimony has been confirmed by the Notarial Register and by the Primary Entry Book of the RD of Manila. During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the Deed could not be found in the files of the RD. The RTC ruled in favor of Prodon. ○ Although the Deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 130. ○ The execution and existence of the Deed has been adequately established by reliable and trustworthy evidences. ○ The original copy of the Deed of Sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to produce it before the court. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. ○ Before secondary evidence as to the contents of a document may be admitted in evidence, the existence of the document must first be proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss. ○ Maximo suffered from paralysis of half of his body and blindness due to cataract and was hospitalized more than once. This lends credence to the heirs’ assertion that their father was not physically able to personally execute the Deed. ○ The TCT had not been transferred in Prodon’s name. Also, from the sale in 1975 to 1996 when the case was finally filed, Prodon never tried to recover possession of the property nor had she shown that she ever paid Real Property Tax thereon. ○ The Notary Public who notarized the Deed testified that there has about 4 or 5 original copies of the said Deed. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. Prodon merely accounted for 3 original copies.

ISSUE: Whether the Best Evidence Rule should apply. HELD: NO. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. Despite the fact that the terms of the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the Best Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with, without being clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to be excluded. On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC’s mistake by likewise applying the Best Evidence Rule, except that the CA concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon had not

established the existence, execution, and loss of the original document as the prerequisites for the presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence Rule naturally led the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been admitted, but like the RTC, the CA did not state what excluded secondary evidence it was referring to. Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as prerequisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the “existence” and “execution” of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence. Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than the original document would have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed. The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) The existence or due execution of the original; (b) The loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) The absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering that: (a) The precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) There is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and, (c) As respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings. A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the loss or explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence of the Deed.

The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that the heirs preponderantly proved that the Deed of Sale with right to repurchase executed by Maximo did not exist in fact.