Fo B4 Public Hearing 4-8-04 Fdr- Tab 4- Suggested Questions For Condoleezza Rice 167

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NATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

PART I:CHRONOLOGY 1) The Clinton-Bush Transition. The incoming Bush NSC team that you led decided to keep Clarke and his core counterterrorism staff on. Around the transition, Clarke briefed Vice President-elect Cheney, Secretary of Statedesignate Powell, yourself, andHadley on al Qaeda. The briefing's PowerPoint slides include a mention ofal Qaeda "sleeper cells" in many countries, including the United States. The president-elect also received a CIA briefing at Blair House. Berger also passed along a -warning of his own, although accounts of this vary. Rice says Berger warned her only that she would be surprised by how much time she would spend on terrorism; Berger says he passed along a sharper warning, telling her that she would spend more time on terrorism in general and al Qaeda in particular than any other issue. a. What did Clarke tell you about al Qaeda during the transition? Did he warn of attacks or cells inside America? How did you respond to the briefing? b. What did the CIA tell you and the president about al Qaeda at the Blair House briefing? c. Did Clarke ever brief President Bush on terrorism? Did he ever ask to brief President Bush on terrorism? d. What message did your predecessor, Sandy Berger, pass along about terrorism in general or al Qaeda in particular? e. Did other outgoing NSC officials pass along any warnings? In The Age of Sacred Terror, two former Clinton counterterrorism officials report that Berger's deputy, Donald Kerrick, sent you and Hadley a memo that mentioned al Qaeda and warned, "We are going to be struck again." f. Did Clarke lose access, trust, or clout in the change of administrations? Did you consider bringing hi a replacement whom you thought you or your colleagues might have trusted more? g. On March 22, you wrote in the Washington Post, "No al Qaeda plan was turned over to the new administration." On January 25,2001, Clarke forwarded you a memo with several items for urgent action, attached to which was the 1998 Political-Military Plan Delenda and a December 2000 strategy paper. Why did you say that no plan had been turned over?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 2) Structural Changes in the Bush Administration. The Bush administration decided to have the CSG report to the Deputies Committee, chaired by Hadley, rather than directly to the principals. Clarke's deputy, Roger Cressey, told us that •when the NSC Front Office decided to have the CSG report to the deputies, Clarke said, "There goes our ability to get quick decisions." You and Hadley told us that this change -would improve policy coordination. Clarke would continue to attend Principals Committee and Deputies Committee meetings on terrorism, but with a less prominent role than he played in the Clinton-era Small Group. a. Did Clarke complain about the decision to place the CSG under the deputies? Or about his role at meetings of the Deputies Committee or Principals Committee? b. What sort of discussions did you have about the decision to place the CSG under the deputies, and with whom? Clarke told us he protested this change at the tune. c. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told us in January that the Deputies Committee process has not worked "speedily before or since" 9/11; he told us in our recent hearings that the deputies "weren't going fast enough." Were you concerned at the time that having the CSG report on terrorism issues to the deputies rather than straight up to the principals—as it had during the Clinton period—might slow down policy making or coordination? In retrospect, do you think that working through the deputies slowed things down? d. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card has told us that he liked the post-9/11 "war council" because it was smaller and more nimble than the full Principals Committee. How did that post-9/11 "war council" differ from tile Clinton-era Small Group? Did it make any difference to the development of pre-9/11 al Qaeda policy that there was no longer a terrorism Small Group? e. Did it take tune for the new NSC team to get up to speed? Terrorism had changed since the 1980s, from state-sponsored terrorism to the new Bin Ladin threat, but your Foreign Affairs piece stressed the former rather than the latter. Did the new NSC team grasp the nature of the threat? 3) The Early Months of the Bush Administration. On January 25, 2001, Clarke wrote to you to urgently ask for a principals-level review onal Qaeda to decide if it's a "first order threat" or something being overhyped by "chicken little " types like himself. Clarke listed two key deferred issues—helping the Northern Alliance and other covert aid—and three key new issues: tough early messages to Pakistan and the Taliban, significant FY02 budget growth to fund CIA operations against al Qaeda, and a response to the Cole. Clarke also attached his staffs September 1998 Plan Delenda and its December 2000 strategy paper. His office continued to ask for principals-level decisions on these issues, including in a February "100 Day Plan " that called for cabinet-level decisions within that timeframe on aid to the Northern Alliance, aid to Uzbekistan, CIA COMMISSION SENSITIVE 2

COMMISSION SENSITIVE funding, a standard for responsibility for the Cole, recon Predator flights in spring 2001, and a new NSPD (never drafted) on terrorist financing. In February, you told us the Bush administration tried to hold about two Principals Committee meetings per week. a. Did the Bush administration move quickly enough on aid to the Northern Alliance, in your view? b. Did Clarke get the decisions hi the timeframe he asked for? If not, did that have any substantive impact? c. Should the principals have met earlier? Clarke and his staff asked repeatedly for Principals Committee meetings on terrorism before 9/11. Why didn't the administration hold such a meeting until September 4? d. On what other subjects did the Bush administration hold Principals Committee meetings? How many Principals Committee meetings were held on China before 9/11 ? On Russia? On Iraq and the Gulf? On national missile defense? On the Israeli-Palestinian crisis? i. Were all of these meetings also preceded by a deputies-level review? ii. Were Principals Committee meetings on Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy—sorting through the Mitchell plan, the Tenet plan, and so on—operational? Or were they developing policy? If the Principals Committee could develop policy or handle operations on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, why couldn't it do likewise on al Qaeda? 4) The Question of the Cole. On October 12, 2000, a U.S. Navy destroyer called the Cole was attacked by suicide bombers off the coast of Yemen, killing 17 U.S. sailors. NSC counterterrorism officials pushed from October 2000 onward for a response, in both administrations. Meanwhile, the CIA offered hedged preliminary judgments about -whether al Qaeda had planned or ordered the attack. In January 2001, Clarke said that response should come at a time and place of America's choosing—but he continued urging you and Hadley to respond to the Cole throughout the pre-9/11 Bush period. On September 4, 2001, Clarke wrote you that the fact that the Cole was attacked in the Clinton administration did not mean that the Bush administration did not have a responsibility to respond. a. In March 2001, Roger Cressey of the NSC's counterterrorism staff wrote to Hadley about the Cole, telling him, "we know all we need to about who did the attack to make a policy decision." Why didn't the Bush administration respond militarily to the Cole? b. Did you think the standard of proof being used—by the CIA, the FBI, or implicitly by policymakers—for culpability for the Cole was too high?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE c. Did you have any question that al Qaeda was guilty? Did anyone else? Were there any other serious suspects? d. Did anyone push the CIA or FBI to produce a more definitive judgment? e. Was the Bush administration ever told bluntly by the CIA that al Qaeda had been responsible for the Cole attack—before 9/11 or after? Why did everyone just start saying after 9/11 that al Qaeda had been responsible? f. The Washington Post has reported that Vice President Cheney had the conclusion that al Qaeda was to blame "stated without hedge" in a briefing on February 9,2001; the NBC Nightly News reported on March 18 that the Bush administration had been told before 9/11 that al Qaeda was responsible for the Cole. Are these reports accurate? g. The Taliban had been warned repeatedly after 1998 that they could be struck for any future attacks on U.S. targets. What signal was sent to the Taliban and al Qaeda by the absence of a military strike after the Cole? 5) Military Planning. From the aftermath of the August 1998 embassy bombings onward, the Pentagon had been reviewing contingency plans for operations in Afghanistan known as Operation Infinite Resolve. These plans called for possible commando operations as -well as stepped-up airstrikes going beyond just cruise missiles. Usually, the Defense Department's key counterterrorism official was the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict— known in the military as SOLIC. a. You told us that the military response options available for the Cole were weak, "tit-for-tat" responses that might have actually emboldened al Qaeda. Were you concerned that the absence of a military response might have emboldened them even more? b. When did the Bush NSC first task the Pentagon to prepare new military options on al Qaeda? If you were dissatisfied with the off-the-shelf response options to the Cole, why didn't you immediately ask the Pentagon for new plans? c. The Bush NSC first let the Pentagon know it would be called upon to prepare new contingency plans in June and July 2001, when early drafts of the newNSPD were circulated. If the off-the-shelf options were inadequate, why didn't the Bush NSC ask for new options before June or July? An attack could have come at any time. d. Did the military options being contemplated differ radically from Operation Infinite Resolve? Was anyone talking about an invasion of Afghanistan, or just more airstrikes and possible commando operations— the sort of things described in the Infinite Resolve plans? e. When did the Bush administration nominate a new assistant secretary of defense for SOLIC? Why wasn't such an official in place in September 2001? Does this say anything about the Pentagon's priorities?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 6) Attempts to Kill Bin Ladin with Cruise Missiles. The Clinton administration tried repeatedly to get good enough information on Bin Ladin's whereabouts to consider killing him with cruise missiles. a. Your deputy, Steve Hadley, told us that the gap between sighting Bin Ladin and hitting him was too wide. Without getting into specific timeframes hi this open forum, did you agree that the gap was prohibitive? Or were cruise missiles still a useful weapon? b. Did the NSC push the CIA to get better intelligence on Bin Ladin's whereabouts? If so, how? 7) Afghanistan Policy Review. You have told us the administration decided to hold an overall review of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that counterterrorism policy was integrated into a wider regional strategy. Clarke disagreed at the time and recommended moving quickly ahead on a narrow agenda to pressure the Taliban and Pakistan to expel al Qaeda. On September 10, the deputies adopted a three-part strategy, starting with renewed diplomatic pressure and ending with covert action efforts to try to oust the Taliban's leadership. a. Was the review helpful or necessary? b. For the first three or four months of the administration, the al Qaeda issue was just not addressed, Clarke told us. Is that fair? c. Clarke told us hi our March hearings that the Bush administration saw terrorism as "important but not urgent." Is that fair? If not, what specific actions did you take that displayed urgency hi handling al Qaeda? d. Hadley told us he moved the review along as fast as he could. But Clarke and George Tenet's deputy, John McLaughlin, worried that the review was moving too slowly. And Armitage, a member of the Deputies Committee, told us that "we weren't going fast enough." Did the review move fast enough? e. Did holding the review slow down the formulation or implementation of measures against al Qaeda, including aid to the Northern Alliance? f. What made you think that you had seven months or so to conduct a policy review? Did the alarming spike in threat information hi spring/summer 2001 make you think that the review was moving too slowly? g. Did the final three-phase plan on the Taliban produced by the deputies depart hi important ways from previous policy? The first phase was mostly renewed diplomatic efforts. Please explain, and please be as specific as you can. h. Could we have ever fomented a coup to topple Mullah Omar? hi what timeframe? 8) Draft NSPD on al Qaeda. The NSC-produced draft of a presidential directive on al Qaeda—known as an NSPD—was first circulated to deputies in June 2001. Its objective was to eliminate al Qaeda as a threat over several years. It called for COMMISSION SENSITIVE 5

COMMISSION SENSITIVE more support for the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups, as -well as significantly more covert action funding. On September 4, the principals adopted this draft directive on al Qaeda, made a few minor changes, and sent it forward to President Bush to sign. a. Who wrote the draft NSPD? What was its origin—from you, Clarke, or someone else? b. White House Chief of Staff Card has said publicly that one of the first things President Bush did was to ask you to put together a plan on terrorism. What documentary evidence substantiates that request? c. What did the draft NSPD ask of the two agencies with the greatest ability to take the short-term fight to al Qaeda: the Pentagon and the CIA? d. Did the draft NSPD differ from previous ideas discussed by NSC counterterrorism staff? If so, how? Did it differ from Plan Delenda in September 1998 or its sequel in December 2000? Please be specific. e. Why did the NSPD call for eliminating al Qaeda "as a threat," rather than just calling for its outright elimination? Who suggested inserting that phrase? How does this goal differ from the December 2000 strategy paper's goal of reducing al Qaeda to a "rump group"? f. Did any deputies ever suggest a more modest goal for the NSPD, such as significantly eroding al Qaeda? Clarke reports this in his book. g. What was the timeframe for the plan? What made you think you had three or more years? h. Clarke wrote you on September 4 that, without money, the NSPD would be a hollow shell that the president would be better off not signing. Was there an adequate funding strategy to go along with the plan—not just for the CIA, but across the government? 9) The Predator. In fall 2000, the U.S. government flew pilotless drones over Afghanistan; CIA analysts say they probably spotted Bin Ladin twice. Clarke repeatedly urged you and Hadley to fly reconnaissance Predator missions again in spring 2001. But the CIA urged that Predator not fly additional recon missions lest it foul the U.S. capability to use the armed Predator then being developed. In April, according to a key NSC document, the deputies backed spring 2001 reconnaissance flights, although CIA disputes that this decision was reached. At the September 4 Principals Committee meeting, DCI Tenet -was urged to change his position, and he seems to have decided days before 9/11 to again back Predator reconnaissance flights. On another issue, the Pentagon and the CIA both seemed reluctant to have control of the armed Predator program. a. Why didn't Predator fly recon missions in the spring and summer of 2001 ? b. What difference would it have made if it had flown? c. Who was resisting additional recon flights in spring/summer 2001? Why? COMMISSION SENSITIVE 6

COMMISSION SENSITIVE d. Did the Deputies Committee decide on April 30,2001 to fly recon Predator missions in spring 2001, as the summary of the meeting's conclusions indicates? i. If so: why didn't the deputies' decision stick? If the deputies decided to fly recon Predator missions in April, why were the principals still arguing about recon flights on September 4? ii. If not: is the summary of conclusions wrong? How could that happen? e. How did you and Hadley try to resolve these disputes among the deputies? Did this drag on too long? f. Why didn't you impose a solution on the CIA and DOD early in the administration, as NSC counterterrorism staff urged in February 2001? Hadley sent the proposed solution back to Clarke without approving it. g. Could we have killed Bin Ladin with a cruise missile or another air platform if he'd been spotted by an unarmed Predator in the spring or summer of 2001? h. Could an armed Predator have been available before 9/11? Could a focused push from the principals or deputies have made more resources available that might have speeded the program? i. Could killing Bin Ladin in spring/summer 2001 have averted 9/11, or would it have not made a difference? 10) The Summer 2001 Alert. In late July, Clarke -warnedyou that NSC officials and intelligence analysts at State, CIA, and the Pentagon -were convinced that major terrorist attacks were probably imminent. He wrote that ongoing intelligence had reached a crescendo. On July 5, domestic agencies including the FBI and the FAA were briefed by the White House and issued alerts. The next day, the CIA told CSG participants that al Qaeda members "believe the upcoming attack -will be a 'spectacular,' qualitatively different from anything they have done to date." Policymakers were particularly worried about attacks on world leaders at a G-8 summit held in Genoa, Italy, and about Fourth of July celebrations. On July 27, Clarke "wrote you and Hadley that the crescendo had passed but urged them to keep readiness high during the August vacation. a. Did the NSC ever know about the Moussaoui arrest, the Phoenix memo, or the presence of the hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar inside the United States? Why not? i. What efforts did NSC officials make to get domestic terrorism information out of the FBI? Did you, Card, or Hadley ever contact Attorney General Ashcroft, FBI Director Freeh, Acting FBI Director Pickard, or other senior law enforcement officials to urge them to share information? ii. Why didn't the White House know what parts of the FBI and CIA knew? Didn't the CSG regularly assess information that was far less reliable than these three data points?

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b. c.

d.

e. f.

g.

h. i.

iii. Why didn't the CIA tell the FBI that Hazmi and Mihdhar were inside the United States until late August? Should this have been better coordinated? Could such a blunder occur today? iv. Would better information sharing—so that the White House, CIA, and FBI all pooled their information—have made a difference? v. Could a major national manhunt for Hazmi and Mihdhar have foiled the 9/11 plot—or perhaps stopped one of the hijackings? What would the Bush NSC have done if you'd known about these three data points? The NSC was concerned enough about aviation threats to bring the FAA into White House discussions of the threat in July; the G-8 summit hi Genoa put up air defenses and closed airspace due to terrorism concerns. Moreover, Chief of Staff Card—a former secretary of transportation—has told us that he was particularly concerned about the FAA's involvement. Did the administration push for additional airline security measures beyond the FAA advisories? Were other measures considered but not adopted? Was it sensible to have the CSG and not the principals running the alert? Are there any comparisons to the handling of the Millennium crisis? Would having cabinet-level officials running the alert have made a difference? Did you or President Bush ever ask whether the CIA and the FBI worked effectively together? Did you or the president ever ask whether mformation-sharing between CIA and FBI was as strong as possible? CIA's Counterterrorism Center briefed you, DCI Tenet, Clarke, and others hi late May 2001 on the alert and on al Qaeda. Clarke has said that Tenet was calling him around this tune period saying that the administration needed to take the threat more seriously, leading to a briefing designed to get the administration more engaged. What was the genesis of that May CIA briefing on terrorism? Did you ask for the briefing? Did Clarke? Did Tenet? Who called for bringing domestic agencies like the FAA in for briefings on the threat spike on July 5? You told us it was your idea; Chief of Staff Card says he was also involved. Clarke told us it was his idea and made no mention of your involvement. Could we have done anything differently in summer 2001 that might have averted 9/11? In retrospect, what did we spot hi June/July 2001? Was this the 9/11 plot, or something else?

11) The August 6,2001 PDB. On August 6, President Bush received a CIA briefing at his Crawford ranch that mentioned the possibility ofal Qaeda hijackings. a. What was said about hijackings hi the August 6,2001 PDB? Can you convey the thrust of the briefing for us today? Was the PDB analytic or keyed to recent intelligence? COMMISSION SENSITIVE 8

COMMISSION SENSITIVE b. How did the president respond to that briefing? c. How did you respond to that briefing? d. Did the president see other warnings in summer 2001 suggesting—as described by the Joint Inquiry—that a "spectacular," mass-casualty Bin Ladin attack was expected over the coming weeks? e. In February, you told us that the PDB arose out of a question from the president about the possibility of al Qaeda attacks in America. Recently, the CIA has told us there was no formal tasking but the president's questions were discussed at a PDB planning session. How did the August 6 PDB arise? 12) The September 4,2001 Principals' Committee Meeting. The principals seem to have approved the draft NSPD, agreed that armed Predators were needed but not ready, and held afar-ranging discussion about "whether CIA should have the armed Predator's trigger. a. What was decided on September 4,2001—about the draft NSPD, and about Predator? b. Did the principals give the guidance required to have the Predator program move forward? NSC counterterrorism officials told us that they left the meeting thinking the Bush administration was not going to move ahead on armed Predator. c. Should the principals have met on al Qaeda earlier than September 4? 13) Clarke's Frustrations. The day of the September 4 Principals Committee meeting, Clarke sent you a blunt personal note laying out his frustrations "with a bureaucracy that he saw as unwilling to move aggressively against al Qaeda. The note blasted DOD for its unwillingness to use force and CIA for trying to block Predator. Clarke also urged policymakers to imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead, at home and abroad, after a terrorist attack—and ask themselves -what they could have done sooner. a. What could have been done sooner—both in terms of policy development, and in handling the summer 2001 alert? Would it have made a difference on September 11? b. How did you respond to Clarke's fiery September 4 note? c. Were Clarke's concerns about the bureaucracy—especially the FBI, the Pentagon, and CIA's Directorate of Operations—well-founded? d. By September, Clarke was slated to shift out of his job as national coordinator to take a new post on cybersecurity. Why was he being reassigned? e. Clarke has told us he was glad to be shifting away from his old NSC counterterrorism role. On January 12,2004, he told us, "I'd come to the conclusion the administration wasn't serious about al Qaeda." Did you have any sense of this at the time? Wasn't Clarke's September 4 note a

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE strong sign he felt counterterrorism policy was on the wrong track? 14) The Day of 9/11. You were in your office when you heard of the first strike on September 11; our staffs understanding is that you then called President Bush and -went to your morning NSC staff meeting in the Situation Room. During that meeting, you were told of the second strike. You seem to have largely remained in the Situation Room until the Secret Service escorted you to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center around 9:50 a.m. (Team 8 note: Rice's prepared statement will probably address her activities from the day of 9/11. In addition, she has provided detailed accounts to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post and Evan Thomas o/Newsweek.) a. Our staffs understanding is that you spoke to President Bush before he entered the classroom hi Florida. Do you recall what you told him about the first strike on the World Trade Center? In interviews with Newsweek and Bob Woodward, you said that you had been told it was a commercial plane. Do you recall whether you relayed to the president that it was a commercial plane? b. You told Bob Woodward that when you heard a second plane had hit the World Trade Center, you immediately concluded it was a terrorist attack. Was that just your analytic judgment, or was it based on other intelligence? Were you expecting an attack after the summer 2001 threat spike? c. After the Twin Towers were hit, did you think that Washington might be a target? Did you think the second strike signaled the end of the attack? d. What were you doing between the time of the second strike (about 9:03 a.m.) and the tune of the strike on the Pentagon (9:37 a.m.)? What were others doing hi the Situation Room? What decisions were made, and by whom? e. A Situation Room log shows that a secure video teleconference was convened around 9:25 a.m. and continued throughout the day. Who decided to start this conference? Clarke says you and the vice president asked him to lead the conference. Why didn't you lead it? Were you involved hi it? What decisions were made in it? f. Who was in charge of White House response on the morning of 9/11 ? What decisions were made? By whom? What decisions did you make that morning? g. What was your understanding of the reported threat to Air Force One that morning? Was a threat to Air Force One reported to you and Vice President Cheney before or after you recommended against having President Bush return immediately to Washington? What did you ultimately learn about the reported threat and its origin, and when did you learn it? hi November 2001, you told Newsweek that you thought the threat might have been real; White House officials have now backed off this claim. COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10

COMMISSION SENSITIVE h. In interviews with Newsweek, you said that Secretary Rumsfeld asked Vice President Cheney for rules of engagement for planes that might have been hijacked. Our staffs understanding is that Secretary Rumsfeld was not initially involved in the decision to shoot down hijacked planes. What do you recall about how and when the issue of authority to shoot down commercial planes was first raised with the vice president? 15) Immediate Response: 9/11 to 9/20. In his book, Richard Clarke recounts meeting with you in Vice President Cheney's office soon after 9:00 a.m. on 9/11. Clarke writes that you told him, "You 're the crisis manager." Later, Clarke writes, he asked you whether you wanted to chair the Principals' meeting. Clarke quotes you as telling him, "No, you run it." President Bush chaired a series of NSC meetings from September 11 >13. The draft NSPD that the principals seem to have approved on September 4 became a part of the final version as signed by the president after 9/11, known as NSPD-9. On September 19, Clarke forwarded the new version to you. The NSPD now began with two new post-9/11 pages making it U.S. policy to eliminate terrorism as a threat to our way of life. The old draft NSPD on al Qaeda discussed on September 4 became Annex A of NSPD-9. a. On the morning of 9/11, did you confirm that Clarke was the crisis manager in the aftermath of the attacks? Did you also ask Clarke to run the Principals' video conference that took place that morning? b. At the NSC meeting on the evening of 9/11, had President Bush concluded that al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks? What were the specific issues covered in the meeting? What decisions were made? c. At the morning NSC meeting on September 12, President Bush says that the nation is at war with a "new and different" enemy. What did he mean by this? Did he mean that we were dealing with non-state-sponsored terrorists? How new was this enemy, given that it had already attacked two of our embassies as well as the Cole? d. During the NSC meeting on the afternoon of September 13, President Bush instructed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a military plan against the Taliban. Given that many warnings had already been issued to the Taliban, why did a plan have to be developed? Why didn't the military already have one? e. Why was the new section of the NSPD prepared? Who drafted it? Why did the old draft NSPD become an annex, rather than the body of the final presidential directive? 16) Camp David, Iraq, and the Immediate Response to 9/11. On page 32 of his book, Clarke recounts that on the evening of September 12, he left the video conferencing center and there, wandering alone around the Situation Room, was the president—whom Clarke says asked in an intimidating way for Clarke to find out if Saddam did this, to determine if Saddam was linked in any way. On COMMISSION SENSITIVE 11

COMMISSION SENSITIVE September 18, Paul Kurtz, a member of Clarke's staff, wrote a memo to yon on the subject that found only some anecdotal evidence of Iraqi links to al Qaeda and found no compelling evidence that Iraq planned or perpetrated the attacks. Clarke also alleges that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to attack Iraq; Clarke says he told the secretary that the enemy was al Qaeda, which was in Afghanistan. Clarke says that Rumsfeld replied that there weren 't any good targets in Afghanistan. From September 15-16, the president met with his principal advisers at Camp David. In Bush at War, Bob Woodward recounts that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz wanted to make Iraq a target in the first round in the war on terrorism. Your briefing book for the Camp David "war council" the weekend after 9/11 includes Pentagon briefing papers discussing Iraq options. a. Did President Bush demand that Clarke explore the possibility of an Iraq connection to 9/11? Did President Bush pull Clarke aside on September 12 to discuss this? b. Was the administration too focused—both before 9/11 and in the immediate aftermath of the attacks—on state-sponsored terrorism, rather than transnational jihadist terrorism? c. When the NSC reconvened in the afternoon of September 12, did Secretary Rumsfeld ask whether we should go against Iraq, not just al Qaeda? Why were senior policymakers thinking about attacking Iraq within hours of 9/11? d. At the Camp David meetings on September 15, did Secretary Rumsfeld— responding to Secretary Powell's comments that the coalition would dissolve if Iraq were attacked—say that if the coalition wouldn't tolerate attacks on Iraq, that argued for getting a different coalition? Bob Woodward has reported this scene. e. Did Rumsfeld ask if it was time to attack Iraq? Was Rumsfeld worried about the availability of good targets in Afghanistan? Did Wolfowitz argue for attacking Iraq? Did the Pentagon's briefing books suggest such options? f. At Camp David, did the president find some of the military's options unimaginative? Was he dissatisfied with military planning in general? (Bob Woodward has reported this, and we've heard similar complaints from administration officials.) g. Clarke complained to you at the time that he was not invited to Camp David. Should Clarke have been there? h. How did the president come down on the Iraq issue?

PART II: ISSUES

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 17) Priorities. The Bush administration took office -with a full agenda, including China, Russia, missile defense, Iraq, and a faltering Middle East peace process. In January 2000, when you were the main foreign policy adviser to the Bush campaign, you wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine that it "takes courage to set priorities because doing so is an admission that American foreign policy cannot be all things to all people... " You then listed five key priorities that a Bush administration would pursue. The top priority was strengthening the U.S. military. The fifth item on that list was "to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)." In Bush at War, Bob Woodward quotes the president as saying that before 9/11, he "didn 'tfeel that sense of urgency, and [his] blood was not nearly as boiling." a. How high a priority was terrorism for White House policymakers? How did that compare to China, Russia, missile defense, Iraq, the IsraeliPalestinian crisis, and efforts to strengthen the U.S. military—the subject you cited in Foreign Affairs as the top priority for a Bush administration? b. Did the president actually feel "that sense of urgency" about Bin Ladin and al Qaeda before 9/11? Did you? c. Was terrorism the #1 priority? i. If so, why did it receive only a partial reference in priority #5 of your Foreign Affairs article? ii. If terrorism was not the # 1 priority for the incoming administration, what was? Did terrorism rank above or below China, Russia, missile defense, strengthening the military, Iraq, and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis? d. Was terrorism the #1 national security threat the United States faced, in the view of the incoming administration? i. If terrorism wasn't the #1 threat, what was? ii. If terrorism was the #1 threat, should it have been the #1 priority? e. How much high-level time was devoted to terrorism hi the pre-9/11 administration? How did that compare to the time given to China, Russia, missile defense, Iraq, and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis? f. In your judgment, should terrorism have been a higher priority, compared to other urgent national security issues in a pre-9/11 era? g. President Bush made no major, dedicated public speech on al Qaeda before 9/11. Was a major speech on al Qaeda ever discussed? If al Qaeda was recognized as an urgent national security threat, would it have been sensible for the president to use his bully pulpit to discuss the threat? 18) Threat Assessment and the New Terrorism. Your Foreign Affairs article made no mention ofal Qaeda, Bin Ladin, or transnational terrorism—except for a brief reference to Russian concerns about Chechen terrorism. It does contain a few COMMISSION SENSITIVE 13

COMMISSION SENSITIVE references to state-sponsored terrorism, notably from Iran. A speech you were planning to deliver on September 11, 2001 noted that the United States needed to worry about terrorist bombs or sarin attacks on U.S. subways but asked "why not missile defenses as well? Why put deadbolt locks on your doors and stock up on cans of mace and then decide to leave your windows open?" a. Why did your Foreign Affairs article not mention al Qaeda or Bin Ladin? Why did you describe terrorism as a state-sponsored phenomenon and not allude to the rising threat of transnational terror? b. Which phenomenon was the incoming team more focused on: statesponsored terrorism or transnational jihadist terrorism? c. Was the emphasis on state-sponsored terrorism hi your Foreign Affairs article a holdover from your previous tenure hi public service? d. Your planned speech for September 11,2001 called for increased spending on missile defense, not counterterrorism. Which threat did the administration see as more urgent before 9/11: rogue states' missile capabilities, or mass-casualty attacks by al Qaeda? e. Did the USG focus enough on the possibility of terrorism at home before 9/11? Hadn't the Millennium plot amply demonstrated that this was a possibility? f. Did you ever discuss—with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, Attorney General Ashcroft, FBI Director Freeh, or other senior officials—the hints about Islamist terrorism at home^hat could be discerned from the 1993 World Trade Center plot, the 1993 New York City landmarks plot, or the Millennium alert? 19) Continuity Versus Change. NSC counterterrorism officials have told us that the draft presidential directive was broadly similar to a 1998 political-military plan called Delenda, written by Clarke after the 1998 embassy bombings. The pre-9/11 draft Bush administration plan also seems to have drawn upon a December 2000 strategy paper on al Qaeda that Clarke's staff prepared. Clarke has said publicly that he regards the draft NSPD as highly similar to these earlier documents. a. Do you concur? Did you see a sharp break in counterterrorism policy between the Clinton and Bush administrations? Please explain. b. What, specifically, were the differences between the draft NSPD as of September 4,2001 and the memo that Clarke sent you on January 25? c. What, specifically, were the differences between the draft NSPD and Plan Delenda? And the December 2000 strategy paper? d. Was policy development reactive or proactive? Was enough tune spent trying to look ahead and anticipate the enemy's moves? e. Did the two administrations differ operationally—in the way they responded to terrorist threats?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 20) Resources. In 1998, DCI Tenet wrote his staff that no resources were to be spared in what he called a declaration of war against al Qaeda. Yet NSC counterterrorism officials were continuing to fight for more CIA funding against al Qaeda as the new administration started. a. Did the USG ensure that it had enough resources to fight al Qaeda? Enough funding? Enough personnel? b. NSC counterterrorism staff have complained to us that the CIA wouldn't reprogram one dollar away from other programs—from translations to the Agency cafeteria—to al Qaeda. Did the NSC have particular problems with adding baseline funding to CIA efforts against al Qaeda? c. Did the NSC have particular problems with the FBI? Your predecessor as national security adviser, Sandy Berger, told our staff that FBI's counterterrorism resources rose 350 percent under the Clinton administration. As the Bush administration took office, did it feel that FBI funding was money well-spent? d. The Washington Post has reported, citing OMB figures, that President Bush's first budget spent $13.6 billion on counterterrorism efforts, compared to $12 billion hi the previous fiscal year. Should there have been a larger increase? e. The Washington Post also reports that President Bush's first budget included "somewhat higher gaps between what military commanders said they needed to combat terrorists and what they got." The Post adds that the Senate Armed Services Committee tried to fill that shortfall by diverting $600 million from national missile defense, leading Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to threaten a veto—a threat made on September 9, 2001. Is this right? If so, does it say anything about the administration's priorities that Secretary Rumsfeld would make such a move—five days after the administration's first Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda? f. We've heard complaints that Attorney General Ashcroft did not see terrorism as a priority before 9/11 and was unenthusiastic about increased FBI funding for terrorism. Is this accurate? 21) The Role of the National Counterterrorism Coordinator. In 1998, President Clinton signed PDD-62, creating a national counterterrorism coordinator—a role Clarke held from then until after 9/11. a. Did Clarke's position have enough clout to be effective? b. Did Clarke have the resources, staff, and access he needed to be effective? c. Why did you decide to spin some responsibilities away from the national coordinator—including some domestic defense issues such as cybersecurity and WMD consequence management? d. In recent days, Vice President Cheney has described Clarke as "out of the loop." Is this right?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 22) The Role of the CSG. The Clinton administration also formalized the role of the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), a body composed of assistant-secretarylevel officials from U.S. agencies. The CSG wore two hats: it assessed and responded to terrorist threats, and it served as the main working-level body running Counterterrorism policy. In the late Clinton administration, it -wound up reporting to a "Small Group" of cabinet-rank officials; in the pre-9/11 Bush administration, it reported to the Deputies Committee on which you sat, not to the Principals. a. Was the CSG a sufficiently high-ranking body to be effective? b. Should the CSG have reported to the deputies or the principals? Did the choice to have it report to deputies reflect a less than urgent approach to terrorism? You've seen Deputies Committees at work; were you concerned that putting the CSG under the deputies would slow decisionmaking on terrorism? 23) Airplanes as Terrorist Weapons. In 1996, Clarke was concerned that a plane might be used as a terrorist weapon to plunge into the Atlanta Olympics. In December 1998, the CSG worked as East Coast airports went on alert over CIA reports of "a possible hijacking of a U.S. commercial airliner at a New York airport by operatives of the Usama bin Ladin network." In March 2001, a CSG agenda mentioned "Alleged Bin Ladin Interest in Targeting U.S. Passenger Plane at Chicago Airport." Al Qaeda 's interest in hijackings was also described in historical terms in an August 6, 2001 PDB briefing that President Bush received in Crawford, Texas. a. Was the U.S. intelligence community sufficiently concerned with this threat? Were U.S. policymakers, including yourself? b. On the basis of what we knew at the time, should we have been better prepared hi September 2001 for possible al Qaeda hijackings? c. You said in a May 2002 press conference, "I don't think anybody could have predicted that... they would try to use an airplane as a missile." The congressional Joint Inquiry has reported at least 12 U.S. intelligence reports over seven years about this possibility. In your private interview with us, you backed off your May 2002 statement. Would you care to comment? i. Were you aware of earlier intelligence about planes as missiles? ii. If nobody could have imagined the threat of planes as missiles, why did Genoa close its airspace and install anti-aircraft batteries during the summer 2001 G-8 summit? iii. Even if it was tough to predict that terrorists could have used planes as missiles, wasn't it much easier to predict that al Qaeda terrorists could have staged more traditional hijackings? Wouldn't stopping a "regular" hijacking have also stopped a plane-as-missile operation?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 24) Consequence Management. On May 8, 2001, President Bush announced a new Office of National Preparedness for terrorism at FEMA, even as he proposed cutting FEMA's budget by $200 million, according to the Washington Post. He also announced that Vice President Cheney -would chair a government-wide review on managing the impact of a domestic terrorist attack; the president added that he would periodically chair NSC meetings to review the vice president's work We have no evidence that the vice president's review ever met, or that President Bush chaired any NSC meetings before 9/11 on consequence management. a. If the Cheney review was unveiled in May, should more have been done in this area before September? Was this process moving too slowly? Should it have been a more urgent priority? b. Did the president call for cutting $200 million from FEMA's budget? If so, why? 25) Afghanistan and Coercive Diplomacy. From 1998 up until 9/11, the State Department in both the Clinton and Bush administrations issued warnings to the Taliban that it would be held responsible for any future al Qaeda attacks on U.S. interests. a. Why did the deputies decide to have yet another round of diplomacy with the Taliban? Wasn't it clear by September 10,2001, when the deputies endorsed that new round, that diplomacy was never going to get the Taliban to hand over Bin Ladin? b. Was the U.S. government ready to strike in the event of another attack— that is, did the Pentagon have the plans ready, and were the policymakers ready to order them to go? 26) Pakistan. We heard in our March hearings about ongoing diplomatic efforts to get Pakistan to pressure the Taliban to hand Bin Ladin over so he could be brought to justice. You told us about personally upbraiding senior Pakistani officials before 9/11. And Pakistani efforts to go after senior al Qaeda leaders have grabbed headlines in recent weeks. a. Why couldn't Pakistan make the sort of efforts it's made in the past few weeks in the pre-9/11 period? b. Was Pakistan doing enough to help us fight al Qaeda before 9/11? 27) Saudi Arabia. Few topics are more controversial than Saudi Arabia and 9/11. We heard in our March hearings about the difficulties in working with the Saudis. a. Was our approach to the Saudis fundamentally misguided? Were they with us or against us? Did the Bush administration press them hard enough on Bin Ladin before 9/11?

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE b. Has the Bush administration ever discussed naming Saudi Arabia as a state sponsor of terrorism? c. Why were Saudi private citizens, including members of Bin Ladin's extended family, permitted to fly out of U.S. airspace shortly after 9/11? Who made that decision? d. Were any of these Saudi citizens thought to have any links to Usama Bin Ladin or al Qaeda? How did we know? e. Did the Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, ask the USG for permission to have that flight? If not Prince Bandar, which Saudi official asked for the flight? f. Did you sign off on the Saudi flight? Did the president? Who made the decision? When? With what type of consultation? 28) Terrorist Financing. In your Commission interview and in recent public statements, you've said that the Treasury Department added 24 people in spring 2001 and established a dedicated counterterrorist financing unit. This seems to refer to the Foreign Asset Tracking Center (FTAT) that Clarke had conceived of and secured funding for. It -was intended to be an all-source terrorist-finance fusion cell. Our staff has found that, on the eve of 9/11, funds had been appropriated for this effort, but no people had been hired, no clearances had been granted, and there was no secure facility in -which to work. Moreover, based on our staff's investigation, it was unlikely that the FT AT would have become operational in the future, due to Treasury resistance. a. In your first Commission interview, you referred to the administration's work on terrorist financing, indicating that Treasury had hired 24 people to work on terrorist financing. Were you aware that, while the money for those positions had been authorized, no people had been hired, no clearances had been granted, and there was no secure facility in which to work? 29) Commission Recommendations. We are considering a range of topics for making recommendations to fight the war on terrorism. We are interested in hearing your suggestions on these topics including defining our national strategy, using the instruments of policy more effectively, organizing our government, and living in a world of risk. Your views, particularly on the issues of national policy coordination that were the subject of today's hearing, would be most useful in helping us develop our recommendations.

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