COMMISSION SENSITIVE PREVENTING FUTURE ATTACKS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR JOHN PISTOLE Designated Commissioners: Fred Fielding & Jamie Gorelick Background: John S. Pistole is Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counter Intelligence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He served in various field and headquarters assignments, all in the criminal field until April 2002 when he became Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI Counterterrorism Division in Washington. He became the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence on December 19, 2003. The Counterterrorism Division is responsible for the conduct of terrorism law enforcement and intelligence collection operations in the United States. The Counterintelligence Division is responsible for identifying and neutralizing national security threats to the US from foreign countries or entities to prevent penetration of US Government agencies and to prevent compromise of US critical national assets.
1. There have been four different FBI Executive Assistant Directors for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence in the 31 months since the attacks of September 11, 2001. What effect has this frequent turnover of the person in charge of the FBI's fight on terrorism had in carrying out the Counterterrorism mission? Has there been a significant turnover at senior supervisory levels below the Executive Assistant Director? 2. Our staff heard from FBI special agents in the field that supervisory agents in the Counterterrorism Division at headquarters lacked the necessary experience in Counterterrorism to guide their work. Do you agree? What have you done and what are you doing to address the issue of developing Counterterrorism expertise in FBI headquarters supervisory agents? 3. We understand that an Asset Vetting Unit has been established within the Counterterrorism Division, but as recently as January 2004 there were no personnel assigned to it. Are there now personnel assigned to it? What are your plans to improve asset validation? What is your level of staffing in the units of your Counterterrorism Division? Do you have the number of experienced agents and analysts you need to carry out your mission? 4. Our staff encountered evidence of resistance from special agents in the field offices to the running of the FBI's Counterterrorism program out of FBI Headquarters. Have you encountered resistance from FBI field offices to the Director's decisions that the FBI's Counterterrorism program will be run out of FBI Headquarters? What are some examples of this resistance? What effect has this resistance had on the ability of the FBI to carry out its Counterterrorism mission?
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 5. Our staff learned that in some field offices that FBI personnel officially assigned to work on counterterrorism continue to be pulled away to assist on criminal investigations. Have you encountered situations in which counterterrorism special agents have been pulled away to assist on criminal investigations? 6. We understand that a facility has been secured to house the new Terrorist Threat Integration Center with significant parts of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center and most of the headquarters component of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. We further understand that this move is to occur this summer, although details of the plans and the purpose behind it are less clear. What role does the FBI have in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center? To what extent will the FBI be a consumer for the Terrorist Threat Integration Center's products and to what extent will its products drive the FBI's investigation priorities and collection strategy? Can you describe for us in detail the plan to co-locate part of the Counterterrorism Division with the Counterterrorist Center and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center? hi particular, what is motivating this change, and what are the pros and cons of it? How will the field offices interact with this new entity? 7. Our staff heard from state and local law enforcement officials that the Joint Terrorism Task Forces are not really "joint" but rather FBI task forces with agency liaisons. Several state and local enforcement agencies have begun their own counterterrorism efforts, separate and apart from the FBI. Our staff was told that the FBI resented these initiatives and in some cases sought to impede their implementation. What are you doing to make the Joint Terrorism Task Forces more "joint?" What are you doing to work more collaboratively with state and local counterterrorism officials? What is your view of the state and local independent counterterrorism efforts to collect intelligence for their local needs as well as making such information available to the FBI and national level as appropriate via the Joint Terrorism Task Forces?
COMMISSION SENSITIVE