Fo B5 Public Hearing 4-13-04 Fdr- Tab 6- Suggested Questions For Cofer Black And Tom Pickard 742

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR COFER BLACK AND TOM PICKARD* Designated Commissioners: John Lehman and Tim Roemer 1) Heightened Threat Period prior to 9/11. Our previous staff statement describes the atmosphere of heightened threat during the summer of 2001. a. b. c. d.

When did the heightened threat period begin? When were you most worried about an attack? When did the level of "chatter" die down? What were your thoughts and your agencies' views about the decrease in "chatter?" Did you think that the threat had subsided at that point or did it just plateau? Did analysts agree or disagree?

2) The Nature of the Threat. Within the intelligence community there seemed to be a general consensus that the threat from al Qaeda to U.S. interests was most prominent overseas during this period. a. Where did you and other law enforcement and intelligence community officials think that the U.S. was likely to be attacked? Was any credible threat reporting related to a possible attack within the United States? Which agencies were involved in the threat analysis? Did anyone seriously consider that the chatter was part of a denial and deception campaign? b. In retrospect, what do you think accounts for the understanding that the primary threat to U.S. interests was overseas? Was it based on any type of bias against the possibility of an attack occurring in the United States? Did the analysis adequately consider the threat of an attack within the United States? For Pickard: c. Did the FBI conduct any independent analysis to examine the extent of the threat and the likely location of attack? Did you request that FBI analysts conduct their own analysis during the summer of 2001 as to the extent of the threat and whether an attack might occur in the U.S. or overseas? If not, why not? For Black: d. What was the FBI's role in analyzing the threat? Was information developed by the FBI included in the information analyzed by the CIA/Counterterrorist Center (CTC)? 3) Communication on the Threat. The previous staff statement demonstrates that communication of threat information between the CIA and FBI during the summer of 2001 was inadequate given the heightened threat. * Questions can be directed to both witnesses unless otherwise indicated.

a. As of the summer of 2001, how complete an understanding did intelligence agencies, and in particular the FBI, have of al Qaeda's presence and activities within the United States? b. What coordination efforts were there between CTC and the FBI during the summer of 2001 to address the heightened levels of threat reporting? c. Many have discussed the problems caused by the domestic/foreign divide between CIA/FBI responsibilities. What steps did the FBI and CTC (Bin Ladin Station) take to ensure that there was a seamless handoff of responsibilities when threats/operations bridged the respective areas of responsibilities? d. What efforts did you make to ensure that the swap of FBI and CIA personnel at the headquarters level had the desired results, given that there are no MOUs in place describing their respective roles? e. During the summer of 2001, did you issue any special directives either to Headquarters or field personnel to ensure that you were kept abreast of important International Terrorism developments? f. Did you issue any directives to the FBI field offices/CIA stations during the summer of 2001, informing them of the heightened threat, and ordering them to take any specific action? g. Do you believe that the field offices/stations were adequately focused on international terrorism matters during that summer, and if not, why not? For Pickard: h. Dick Clarke has stated publicly that when he visited FBI field offices with Dale Watson prior to September 11, 2001, he received blank looks when he spoke about al Qaeda. Do you think that this is a fair criticism, and if not, why not? i. Former National Security Advisor Berger has testified that he did not receive information from the FBI, only assurances that they had the terrorist presence in the U.S. "covered." Is this a fair criticism? Did the FBI assure Berger that they had the presence covered, and did the FBI have this type of confidence that they had the al Qaeda threat "covered?" What do you believe were the factors behind any gaps in the FBI's understanding? j. While you were the Deputy Director and acting Director how did you ensure that the FBI field offices devoted adequate attention to International Terrorism matters? Did the field managers understand the extent of the terrorist threat within the U.S.? If not, why not? Did you encounter resistance from some field managers in efforts to ensure they were adequately focused on al Qaeda and International Terrorism? k. More generally, what deficiencies did you observe in the FBI's International Terrorism program while you were serving as either the Deputy Director or the acting Director of the FBI? What efforts did you make to address these deficiencies? How successful were your

efforts? What, in your opinion, was preventing the reforms from taking hold? For Black: 1. To what extent did the Intelligence Community consider the possibility of domestic attacks? m. What type of information did you receive from the FBI? To what extent did you receive information that the FBI had developed in its counter-terrorism investigations? Did the level of information shared differ, depending on whether it was a criminal or intelligence investigation? What do you believe were the factors behind any gaps in the FBI's understanding? n. More generally, what deficiencies did you observe in the FBI's International Terrorism program while you were serving as the head of the CTC? o. What efforts did you make in the CTC to improve your understanding of the al Qaeda threat within the United States, and how successful were you in these efforts? p. Most of the CIA's dedicated counterterrorism resources are at Headquarters. What impact did this have on your ability to ensure that counterterrorism efforts in the field were given enough attention when the field resources were not dedicated to counterterrorism work? q. How were the operational priorities of CTC and the Bin Ladin Station communicated to and enforced in the field? r. Everyone knew that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda worked on long planning cycles for attacks, some lasting many years. Yet the Bin Ladin Station seemed focused on short term, hoping for quick results types operations. How did you and the Bin Ladin Station attempt to address the long term planning cycle as opposed to merely jumping from threat to threat to threat? s. We heard evidence that if the Bin Ladin Station pushed too hard on a station regarding requested operations or actions, the stations complained to Jim Pavitt, the Deputy Director for Operations, and the Bin Ladin Station was forced to back off. Indeed, a witness has suggested that the dropping of the Hazmi and Mihdhar trail after they went to Bangkok was due to the Bin Ladin Station's unwillingness to pressure Bangkok to use resources to pick up the lost trail. What role did you play in ensuring that efforts directed by the Bin Ladin Station were viewed as high priority in the field? t. There is significant evidence that there were tensions regarding the assignment of FBI personnel to the Bin Ladin Station, particularly those who were supposedly to serve in a managerial or information sharing role. This was true even after these tensions contributed to the removal of one CIA manager. What, if anything, did you do to ensure that Agency personnel understood the respective roles of the detailees and that the detailees were part of a coordinated effort to benefit the U.S. Government's efforts against the counterterrorism threat?

u. One of the key components in the creation of the Bin Ladin station was its analytical unit that was supposed to provide the strategic analysis required to focus the station's efforts. Yet witnesses repeatedly indicated that the station's analytical unit was extremely weak—its work described as merely repeating what was already contained in Station cables weeks earlier. Were you aware of these problems prior to 9/11 ? If so, what if anything did you do to try and remedy the problems? v. A number of witnesses complained that the managers of the Bin Ladin Station were more concerned with briefing the Director regarding the latest threat as opposed to managing the Station's activities, including supervising operations, setting priorities, developing a strategy to deal with the threat from Bin Ladin. Did you provide guidance to or supervision of the Bin Ladin Station to ensure that it had an appropriate strategy and properly prioritized its efforts? w. In devising its counterterrorism strategies, including what has been described by Director of Central Intelligence Tenet as "The Plan," did the CTC adequately include other agencies such as the FBI, to ensure that the threat within the United States was adequately addressed? x. Was part of the CTC's role to ensure that other U.S. Government agencies, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Aviation Administration were aware of the threat and responding appropriately? If so, why do officials from the INS and FAA maintain that they were so out of the loop on these matters? 4) Phoenix EC, Moussaoui, al Hazmi, and al Mihdhar. a. Were you aware of Moussaoui's detention prior to September 11, 2001, and the FBI Minneapolis Office's concerns that he might have been part of a larger conspiracy? b. Were you aware that al Hazmi and al Mihdhar were in the country and that the FBI's New York Office began searching for them on August 23, 2001? c. If you were not aware of these incidents prior to September 11, why do you think these matters were not brought to your attention? Should they have been? d. If you had been aware of any of these matters prior to 9/11, would they have shaped your thinking as to whether an attack might occur within the U.S.? How would you have responded had you been aware of these matters prior to September 11, 2001? For Pickard: e. Do you believe that FBI Headquarters handled the Moussaoui investigation in an appropriate fashion prior to September 11,2001? What else should have been done, both to further the investigation and to alert other U.S. government agencies on the situation? f. Do you believe that FBI Headquarters handled the Phoenix EC in an appropriate fashion, and if not, what else should have been done?

g. Were you satisfied with the processes at the FBI to elevate information to your attention while you were the Deputy Director and Acting Director? For Black: h. When a CIA employee rediscovered the Kuala Lumpur traffic and the link of the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the Cole, who was responsible for ensuring that appropriate FBI employees had all the critical information? Who was responsible for bringing all the relevant parties to the table to discuss strategies and potential responses to this critical new information? i. There were occasions in the Hazmi/Mihdhar chronology when key information relating to the United States was not shared in a timely manner with the FBI—including visa information and information on travel to the United States. Who at the CIA had the responsibility to ensure that information of relevance to the FBI was promptly shared with the appropriate personnel? j. From what you now know, do you believe the FBI handled the search for al Hazmi and al Mihdhar in an appropriate fashion, particularly in terms of the resources and attention devoted to the search? Does it appear to you, from what you now know, that there was any sense of urgency in the search for these two individuals? If there was not, why not? 5) U.S. Government Response to Heightened Threat. a. How did your agency respond to the heightened threat? Who was directing your agency's response? To what extent was your agency's response coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies? b. To what extent was the Intelligence Community's response being driven by the policymakers? Did you attend a July 5, 2001 Counterterrorism Security Group meeting with representatives of the domestic law enforcement agencies? If not, did you send a briefer to this meeting? What was the purpose of the meeting? What directives or guidance was provided to the CTC and to the domestic law enforcement agencies? What actions did you take in response to this meeting? c. With the benefit of hindsight, what should the FBI/CTC have done differently during this period? d. With the benefit of hindsight, did you adequately convey to policy makers the seriousness of the threat and the necessity of a response? If so, do you believe that the policy makers took adequate action to address the threat? e. Did you think that senior White House officials were taking the threat seriously? Would more attention from the White House have made a difference in how the U.S. Government responded during the summer of2001?

f. Would the hands on approach that occurred during the Millennium crisis have shaken loose critical information, for example on al Hazmi and al Mihdhar, or on Moussaoui, during the summer of 2001? Could it have prevented the September 11,2001 attacks? For Pickard: g. How often did you meet with or brief NSC officials on the threat while you were serving as Acting Director? Did any FBI counterterrorism officials conduct such briefings? What mechanisms were in place to brief NSC officials? For Black: h. More generally, what actions did the CTC take in the summer of 2001 to respond to the possibility of an attack within the United States? Was this response coordinated with the FBI? What independent actions did the FBI take to respond to this threat? i. We have heard from some CTC staff that they were frustrated during the summer of 2001 that the Administration's Counterterrorism strategy was moving forward too slowly. This frustration was so great that one veteran counterterrorism officer told the Commission that he and a colleague considered resigning and going public with their concerns. Were you aware of this frustration? Did you share this frustration? If so, did you express your frustration to anyone? 6) Comparison to Millennium Response. The level of threat reporting prior to the Millennium appears to have been similar to that during the summer of 2001. We have learned that during the 1999period, the entire U.S. Government was mobilized to counter this threat, information sharing was extensive, and several terrorist plots were disrupted. a. Please compare the response during the summer of 2001 to the U.S. Government's response during the Millennium timeframe. In what ways did the responses in these two time frames differ? What accounts for any differences? b. To what extent did the Millennium experience shape the way you responded during the summer of threat? In other words, what lessons learned did you take from the Millennium experience that you applied to the summer of 2001 response? c. Do you believe that the U.S. Intelligence Community or the FBI was able to prevent terrorist attacks during the Millennium time frame as a result of these efforts? During the summer of threat as well? d. What was the role of the NSC and the White House in coordinating the U.S. Government's response during the Millennium time frame? Did the NSC or the White House issue any specific directives to the FBI for how to respond to the heightened threat?

For Pickard: e. What information did the FBI share with policymakers on international terrorism matters during the Millennium period? For Black: f. During the Millennium resources were surged to CTC to address the threat by, for example, conducting link analysis to identify particular individuals of concern. Was there any comparable surge of resources to CTC during the summer of threat? If not, why not? Ahmed Ressam was arrested in December 1999 attempting to cross from Canada into the United States. He later acknowledged to the FBI that he was planning to take part in an attack on the Los Angeles International Airport. He also provided valuable information on individuals associated with al Qaeda, and on al Qaeda training and modus operandi. a I

9/11 Classified Information

JHOW did

Ressam's arrest influence the U.S. Government's thinking about a possible attack by al Qaeda inside the United States? Was the Ressam arrest discussed in the Counterterrorism Security Group? 7) Department of Justice's Focus on International Terrorism. For Pickard: a. How high a priority was international terrorism for Attorney General Janet Reno? How would you describe her approach to international terrorism and what did you see as the problems with this approach? How often did you or other senior FBI officials brief her on international terrorism when you were Deputy Director? b. How did Attorney General Ashcroft's approach to international terrorism differ from that of Reno? How high a priority was international terrorism for Ashcroft? What were his top priorities prior to 9/11 and how did those differ from Reno's? c. Did the change in Presidential administrations have an impact on the FBI's Counterterrorism efforts prior to 9/11? d. How often did you meet with and/or brief Ashcroft when you were Deputy Director and then Acting Director? Did these briefings address international terrorism? e. Did you brief Attorney General Ashcroft about the heightened threat level during the summer of 2001 ? On how many occasions? What did you tell the Attorney General specifically about the threat? Did you convey a sense of urgency about the threats? What was his response to these briefings? f. Do you believe that Attorney General Ashcroft shared the Intelligence Community's sense of urgency about the potential threat of attacks during the summer of 2001 ? g. What was your reaction and response to the May 10, 2001 memo from AG Ashcroft outlining DOJ's budget guidance? What was your

reaction and response to the August 9,2001 memo from AG Ashcroft outlining Department priorities? h. What was Attorney General Ashcroft's reaction to the FBI's request in the summer of 2001 for additional International Terrorism resources? What efforts did you or other FBI officials make to persuade Attorney General Ashcroft of the need for these resources? 8) FBI Investigative Strategy in the Aftermath of the Attacks. For Pickard: a. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11,2001 attacks, what actions did the FBI take in an effort to prevent follow up attacks? To what extent were these actions driven primarily by the FBI's leadership? b. What guidance, instructions or directives did you receive from the Attorney General in this regard? To what extent were the FBI's actions in the immediate aftermath driven by the Department of Justice? c. What guidance, instructions or directives did you receive from the White House in this regard? To what extent were the FBI's actions in the immediate aftermath driven by the White House? d. Do you believe that the actions in the immediate aftermath, such as the numerous detentions, were instrumental in preventing any additional attacks? With hindsight, do you believe additional attacks or a "second wave" was underway in September, 2001? e. Did the FBI change its approach to counterterrorism intelligence investigations after the September 11 attacks, for example, by confronting subjects instead of simply conducting surveillance? Did any of the post-September 11 investigation of these subjects, lead to any of the so called "9/11 detainees?" f. Who issued the directive that all 9/11 detainees be "held until cleared" and when? What role did you play in overseeing the clearance of the 9-11 detainees? g. What intelligence benefit do you believe the 9/11 detentions provided? 9) FBI Reforms. For Pickard: a. Director Freeh has been critical of the decision to run the PENTTBOM investigation from Headquarters, arguing that the field offices should be responsible for investigations. Do you agree with this criticism? b. More generally, do you agree with the FBI's current effort to centralize its counterterrorism investigations and counterterrorism program? What are the problems with this approach? What are the benefits? c. More generally, do you believe that the U.S. Government's approach to the war on terror has or will prove to be an effective strategy to

combating terrorism? What problems have you observed in the current approach? What strengths? d. Do you believe that the current approach to combating terrorism takes adequate steps to ensure the protection of civil liberties? What problems have you observed with the current approach? 10) Saudi Flights. We have reviewed the records of six flights of Saudi citizens that departed the U.S. in the weeks after 9/11, beginning on 9/14/01 and ending on 9/24/01, including the so-called Bin Laden flight on September 20, in which several members of the Bin Ladin family departed the United States. Richard Clarke has stated that the FBI played a role in clearing these flights for departure, and the records do reflect that the FBI investigated the passengers on these flights, in varying degrees, before they departed. For Pickard: a. Can you tell us who from the FBI was involved in the decisions about how to screen these flights and whether they should be allowed to depart? 11) Twenty-Day Hold and Condor. Shortly after 9/11, the Justice Department urged the State Department to slow the issuance of visas to individuals from Muslim countries. At Justice's request, State delayed the issuance of visas to certain countries for twenty days. Justice then developed the Condor program under which individuals from certain countries would be subject to extra FBI and CIA background checks. This program was instituted in January 2002. For Pickard: a. What role did the FBI play in the development of these programs? It is our understanding that these programs led to significant backlogs of visa applications in the spring, summer and fall of 2002 because the FBI could not process the checks in a timely fashion. For Pickard: b. What do you know about this backlog? It is our understanding that Condor led to the denial of no visas and had no counterterrorism benefit, do you agree with that statement? 12) Counterterrorism Policy. These are follow-up questions from the March hearing. For Black: a. Without going into specific operations, were the CIA's efforts against Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in the first eight months of the Bush Administration effectively different from what it had been doing during the Clinton administration?

b. Specifically, how different was the Bush administration's covert action strategy developed before 9/11 from what the CIA had already been pursuing? c. If implemented before 9/11, how effective do you think this strategy would have been in reducing the terrorist threat?

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