Election Law Cases.docx

ELECTION LAW CASES

POWER TO REGULATE ELECTION LAWS -

Macalintal v. COMELEC (July 10, 2003)

PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAWS -

Macquiling v. COMELEC (July 2, 2013) Millare v. Hon. Gironella

CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS -

Ysip v. Municipal Council of Cabiao (April 29, 1922) Violago Sr. v. COMELEC (October 4, 2011)

MAIN FEATURE OF ELECTION LAWS

1.

COMELEC Rules of Procedures, 1993

2.

COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

3.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9366

4.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9518

5.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9576

6.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9476

7.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9751

8.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9763

9.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9797

ELECTION LAWS:

U.S. v. Cueto (October 29, 1918)

1.

Omnibus Election Code, 1985

DEFINITION, BASIS AND NATURE OF ELECTION

2.

Republic Act No. 9369

3.

Republic Act No. 9006

4.

Republic Act No. 9225

5.

Republic Act No. 7941

6.

Republic Act No. 8189

7.

Republic Act No. 7166

8.

Republic Act No. 10366

9.

Republic Act No. 9189

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Rulloda v. COMELEC

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM -

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC

RECALL -

Claudio v. COMELEC (May 4, 2000) Mayor Angobung v. COMELEC (March 5, 1997)

ELECTION PERIOD VS. CAMPAIGN PERIOD -

Peralta v. COMELEC (March 11, 1978)

10. Republic Act No. 10367 11. Supreme Court decisions: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o.

SUFFRAGE AS A PRIVILEGE -

People v. Corral (January 31, 1936)

POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS -

Dimaporo v. COMELEC ( January 7, 1983)

FAILURE OF ELECTIONS -

Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC (July 31, 2000)

COMELEC RESOLUTIONS:

NOTES;

Term limits Dual citizens as candidates Premature campaigning Nuisance candidates Jurisdiction Rehearing Deemed resigned Campaign period Election period Substitution Withdrawal Residence Cancellation of registration Party-list Succession

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The rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are MANDATORY BEFORE the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after election, they are held to be DIRECTORY only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. Election: means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. Purpose of election: give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some questions of public interest.

POWER TO REGULATE ELECTION LAWS ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL, petitioner vs. COMELEC, HON. ALBERT ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA BONCODIN, Secretary of DBM, respondents FACTS: 1. Atty. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. 2. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189, which allows the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by executing an affidavit expressing the intention to return to the Philippines, is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. 3. Solicitor General: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; that the term "residence" has been understood to be synonymous with "domicile" under both Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one "domicile" but he can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other temporary; that Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile. ISSUES: A. WON Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.

B. WON Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. C. WON Section 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution. RULING: On petitioner’s legal standing: R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people. Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved. A. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act. Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his

host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law. As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behoves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through their debates in the constitutional convention. In the hearing of the Constitutional Commission, Fr. Bernas discussed the meaning of residence in Election Law, to wit: “’Residence’ in this provision refers to two residence qualifications: "residence" in the Philippines and ‘residence’ in the place where he will vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word ‘residence’ means domicile, but as far as residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile.” Constitutional Commission: “The reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could be inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is possible, then legislation can take care of the rest.” Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting. R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.

The intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the "qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote." It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents' domicile of origin. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise." To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain. As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as deterrence to noncompliance with his/her undertaking under the affidavit. The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad

who failed to return within three years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory; the privilege of absentee voting may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes. Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited in their application to particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the light of any constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. B. Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress. C. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body "except

those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law – the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAW CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner vs. COMELEC, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, and LINOG G. BALUA, respondents FACTS: 1. Respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favour. 2. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements: “I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen; I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.” 3. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of

4.

5.

6. 7.

candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USAAmerican."To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte. Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

ISSUE: WON the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualification to run for public office. COMELEC 1st Division: Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. “We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.” Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC en banc: agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification. However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises: By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No.

9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again. The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. “The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship." Supreme Court: The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,

Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

7. Judge Bernardino dismissed the election protest for lack of merit. He reasoned out that the election protest may not be availed of as a means of appealing the decision which declared Millare as disqualified as a candidate and which had already become final and executory, there having been no appeal taken from the same. ISSUE: WON the election protest was the proper action.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. Resolution: The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. ISIDRO MILLARE, petitioner vs. HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, HON. ADRIANO BERNARDINO, Acting Municipal Circuit Judge of Tayum, Abra, and ALFREDO ELVEÑA FACTS: 1. Petitioner Isidro Millare ran for the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Budac, Tayum, Abra, against private respondent Alfredo Elveña during the barangay election held on May 17, 1982 2. On May 10, 1982, Elveña filed in the Municipal Circuit Court of Tayum, Abra, a petition for the exclusion and disqualification of Millare, on the ground that he was not an actual resident of the said barangay for at least six months prior to the elections, as required by Section 7 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222. 3. At the hearing of the said petition, Millare failed to appear and, after receiving the evidence of Elveña, the respondent Municipal Circuit Judge of Tayum, Judge Adriano Bernardino, issued an order striking out Millare's name from the voters' list and declaring him disqualified to run as barangay captain of barangay Budac. (He received the notice the day before the election day). 4. Despite the declaration as to his disqualification, Millare ran just the same in the election held on May 17, 1982. It appears undisputed that he garnered more votes than Elveña. His votes, however, were not considered by the barangay board of tellers, they having been declared as stray. 5. The barangay board of canvassers proclaimed Elveña as the duly elected Barangay Captain of barangay Budac. He took his oath of office as such. 6. Millare did not appeal the orders disqualifying him from running as Barangay Captain. Instead, on May 20, 1982, Millare filed with the respondent Municipal Circuit Court Election Protest No. 49 against Elveña, praying for the annulment of the proclamation of Elveña and for a declaration that he (Millare) was the duly elected Barangay Captain of barangay Budac.

RULING: We have repeatedly ruled that "the purpose of election laws is to give effect to rather than frustrate, the will of the voters." Under the undisputed facts, Millare could not have appealed the order disqualifying him as a candidate before the election. The order denying his motion for reconsideration of the order dated May 13, 1982 in Election Case No. 48 was received by Millare only at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 1982, a Sunday, or only a few hours before the openingof the polling places. However, as to whether Millare should have appealed the said order of disqualification after election day, more particularly when his votes, which were more than those of his opponents, were not credited to him, they having been considered stray due to the aforementioned disqualification, was not plain nor certain enough as the proper course of action to take. The quandary in the mind of Millare as to what course of action to take after Elveña was proclaimed the winner despite his having received less votes than Millare was not helped any by the state of the law and of the applicable decisions on the matter. As aforesaid, there is no express legal provision or pertinent jurisprudence which indicates whether, under such a situation, Millare should have appealed the order of his disqualification, or file an election protest. Existing provisions seemingly indicate that the appropriate step to take is to file an election contest. The propriety of Millare's filing a separate election contest in lieu of appealing the order of disqualification in Election Case No. 48 could have been induced also by the need to raise issues in the election contest other than the sole question of the alleged non-residence of Millare in Barangay Budac; such as, the denial of due process consisting in the lack of opportunity to present evidence in his behalf, the propriety of declaring the votes cast in his favor as stray, and the refusal of Judge Bernardino to allow the reopening of the ballot boxes for a recanvassing of the votes. Whatever procedural misstep may have been committed in this regard may not override the paramount consideration of upholding the sovereign will of the people expressed through the democratic process of suffrage. Millare may not be faulted for sleeping on his rights. He had insisted on his qualification for the position he ran for, and took determined and seasonable steps to assert the same.

Millare was never afforded the chance to prove that he was an actual resident of Barangay Budac (where, according to him, he has been residing for the last twenty years in a big house of strong materials) for at least six months prior to the elections, and as such qualified to run for the position of Barangay Captain thereof. The least that he is entitled to is to be given that chance, if only to give satisfaction to those who voted for him.

the latter belatedly filed his Brief in violation of the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs. 8. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with COMELEC en banc, but the latter denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that petitioner failed to file a verified motion in violation of Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s electoral protest and in denying his motion for reconsideration. RULING: YES. The Court finds no justifiable reason why the COMELEC 2nd Division hastily dismissed petitioner's election protest. Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly filing his Preliminary Conference Brief.

CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. petitioner, vs . COMELEC IN ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA, respondents. FACTS: 1. Herein petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Private respondent was proclaimed the winner. 2. On May 21, 2010, petitioner Violago filed a Petition with the COMELEC questioning the proclamation of private respondent on the following grounds: (1) massive vote-buying; (2) intimidation and harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) non-appreciation by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines of valid votes cast during the said election; and, (5) irregularities due to non-observance of the guidelines set by the COMELEC. 3. On June 15, 2010, private respondent filed her Answer with Motion to Set for Hearing Affirmative Defenses in the Nature of a Motion to Dismiss for Being Insufficient in Form and Substance. 4. Thereafter, on July 16, 2010, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order setting the preliminary conference on August 12, 2010 and directing the parties to file their Preliminary Conference Briefs at least one (1) day before the scheduled conference. 5. Petitioner, however, filed his brief on the day of the scheduled preliminary conference. He likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference on the ground that he did not receive any notice and only came to know of it when he inquired with the COMELEC a day before the scheduled conference. 6. Subsequently, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear during the actual conference on August 12, 2010. On even date, private respondent's counsel moved for the dismissal of the case. 7. On August 12, 2010, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed petitioner's protest on the ground that

While it may be argued that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of the scheduled conference a day prior to the date set through means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC, the fact remains that, unlike his opponent, he was not given sufficient time to thoroughly prepare for the said conference. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the outright dismissal of the protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules on the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. Thus, the COMELEC 2nd Division committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's protest. An election contest, unlike any other civil action, is clothed with public interest. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC.