Draft 9/11 Commission Questions For Aviation Security Hearings

QUESTIONS FOR 5/22-23 HEARINGS

Draft

MAY 21,2003

Panel on "State of the System: Civil Aviation Security on September 11th" 2 PM, Thursday, May 22, 2003 Primary Questions for Panel: Prior to September 11, 2001, what did the U.S. aviation security system know about terrorist threats to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the system respond to any such information in their possession? What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11, 2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations? What was known of the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured? TESTIMONY GOALS FOR PANEL

WITNESSES

JANE GARVEY (FAA ADMINSTRATOR FROM (1997-2002) 1) With respect to hijackings, what was the aviation security system designed to detect and prevent, and how was this decided? 2) Have the witness explain the agency's approach/philosophy to priority setting/management of aviation security vis-a-vis competing FAA missions and priorities. 3) Have the witness explain what intelligence information she had about threats to the aviation security system prior to 9/11 and what actions she took in response. KENNETH MEAD (Then and Current Inspector General of DOT) 1) Have the witness explain the specific weaknesses in the aviation security system leading up to 9/11. 2) Have the witness explain why weakness in the aviation security system was and is such a persistent problem. 3) Receive the witness' critique of management methods and mindset with respect to aviation security. JAMES MAY (Current Executive Director of the Airlines' lobbying wing: Air Transport Authority—Was not in the job on 9/11/2001) 1) Have the witness describe the airlines' view of the industry's role in aviation security policy setting and implementation. 2) Have the witness explain the airlines' philosophy about aviation security's priority in the industry's mix of missions and by what standards the industry determines what security measures are and are not appropriate (i.e. cost/benefit and bottom line considerations). 3) Have the witness explain what the airlines knew with respect to the performance of their security systems on 9/11?

BOGDAN DZAKOVIC (FAA/DHS "Red Team" Member and whistleblower) 1) Obtain the witness' views about the culture of indifference toward security problems in the FAA. 2) Have the witness explain why he felt he had to be a whistleblower rather than go through the customary channels. 3) Have the witness share field personnel's perspective on the quality of the aviation security system and leadership.

Jane Garvey, former FAA Administrator 1. When you came to the FAA as administrator what was your assessment of the Aviation Security System and its effectiveness? By what means and what criteria did the agency measure effectiveness? What did you see as the security system's biggest strengths and weaknesses? 2. When you received audit reports citing weakness in the security system or recommendations for corrective action from the Inspector General, the GAO or other sources, what was the process for responding to the warnings and considering the recommendations? What criteria were used in determining whether to implement specific suggestions? 3. How specifically did the FAA weigh security in relation to competing agendas relative to its mission, including cost containment? What was the organizational attitude in the FAA with respect to security vis-a-vis other priorities when you arrived? What was your philosophy on this point and how was that implemented? 4. What was the process by which you received aviation security threat assessments and alerts? From what agencies and internal personnel did you receive this information and how did you receive it? 5. What exactly did you know about the nature and timing of terrorist threats, both general and specific, prior to September 11, 2001? About threats from al Qaeda? Threats from the individual hijackers? What actions did you take in response to this information? 6. Where were you when the hijacking took place on September 11, when and how were you notified, and what did you do? Were your actions and responses following the incident guided by any prepared protocol, or were your required to respond spontaneously? 7. After September 11, what steps did the FAA take to ascertain the facts about how precisely the aviation security system functioned with respect to the hijackings? What analytical, corrective and disciplinary actions were taken in response? 8. hi a hijack situation, please explain your understanding of the division of responsibilities between FAA and NORAD. What protocols or procedures govern FAA's response to hijackings? Were those followed on September 11, 2001? 9. Published accounts indicate that Boston flight controllers determined that American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked as early as 8:13 a.m., and that two flight attendants telephoned American Airlines personnel with confirmation that a hijacking occurred at 8:21 a.m. Yet according to the FAA official timeline,

NORAD was not notified until 8:40 am. Are these reports accurate? If so, what was the cause of the delay in notification? 10. Published accounts also indicate that American Airlines Flight 77 turned off course around 0855. By that time the fate of American Airlines 11 was known and United Airlines Flight 175 was declared to be hijacked. Why was not American Airlines Flight 77 immediately declared to be hijacked? Why did it take until 9:24 am to notify NORAD? 11. There are reports that an executive summary exists describing activity in the FAA Command Center on September 11, and containing an indication that a gun was used in one of the hijackings. What can you tell us about these reports, and specifically about the FAA's information about the use of a gun in one or more of the hijackings? 12. Because of time constraints, please supply the Commission with a written response to the following question. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which was created in August 1996 in the aftermath of the destruction of TWA Flight 800 and made its report to the President in February 1997. Please comment on the following items contained in the report that would appear to be relevant to the events of September 11, 2001. Please indicate what impact each finding or recommendation had on the civil aviation security system before and after September 11, 2001: a. Improvements in aviation security have been complicated because government and industry often found themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology and potential impacts on operations and passengers. Americans should not have to choose between enhanced securities and efficient and affordable air travel. b. The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including screening personnel. c. The FAA should require criminal background checks for all screeners and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas. d. The FAA should complement technology with automated passenger profiling. e. The FAA should certify screening companies and improve screener performance. / The FAA should aggressively test existing security systems. 13. James May's written testimony on behalf of ATA indicates that FAA provided the airlines with no specific, credible information about hijackings during all of 2001 up to and including September 11, that you issued no relevant Security Directives, that you conducted no general industry threat briefings and that you communicated no relevant information through secure transmission units. What is your response to

these comments? If they are accurate, why didn't FAA think it necessary to take any of these steps? 14. ATA's written testimony states that, "the FAA mandated metal-detection walk-through systems were designed and tested to detect metallic items about the size of a small handgun or larger. The pre-9/11 screening system was not designed to detect or prohibit these types of small items [i.e. box-cutters], and we have no information indicating they were identified in the actual 9/11 screening of the terrorists." What is your response to these comments?

Kenneth Mead, DOT Inspector General 1. Over the past 17 years you have audited aviation security under the auspices of the GAO and as DOT Inspector General. Please elaborate on the impact of economic and other non-security pressures on policy setting and the quality of the security system as of September 11, 2001? Do you believe that the aviation system's governance problems were well known prior to September 11,2001? If so, why do you believe changes were not made to correct the problems? How would you describe the Department of Transportation and the FAA's responsiveness to security audits, alerts and recommendations? 2. What was the Department's formal process for addressing problems you raised and for considering the corrective actions you recommended? Would they provide you with updates and records of decision records or was it more informal? 3. Prior to September 11, 2001, what performance indicators were employed by the FAA and DOT IG to measure the effectiveness of the passenger screening system, and what did they indicate about the quality of the systems in place at Dulles, Logan and Newark airports, and at American and United airlines? 4. What consequences resulted from any failures to meet performance requirements? In your judgment, were any such penalties effective in improving system performance? 5. What procedures were in place on September 11, 2001 to insure compliance by airports, airlines and contractors with FAA security policies and procedures? How effective were these procedures? 6. In your view, did you make any recommendations as Inspector General that the FAA did not implement or insufficiently implemented, that if adopted, would likely have stopped the hijackings from occurring? 7. What were the biggest weaknesses you identified in the aviation security system prior to September 11, 2001? What were the most serious threats to that system? 8. How can the cost of improving security at our nation's airports through the acquisition of new or additional screening equipment, modifications to airport structures to accommodate new security procedures, and the fortification to airport perimeters and access to secure areas be balanced against tight budget constraints?

James May, Air Transport Association (airlines) 1. From the airline perspective, how would you characterize the pre-September 11, 2001 performance of the aviation security system in general and the baggage and passenger screening system in particular? What methods did you use to evaluate and improve this performance? 2. What did the airlines know about the terrorist threat to civil aviation in the 3month period leading up to 9/11? What specific steps did you take in response to such threats? In your testimony, you indicate that the FAA provided the airlines with no specific, credible threat information about hijackings during all 2001 prior to September 11. Based on what you now know, do you believe this was more because the FAA did not receive such information from the intelligence community, did not adequately transmit what it knew to the airlines, or some combination of the two? 3. How did economic factors affect the civil aviation security system prior to September 11, 2001? How did the airlines balance economic and security interests within that system? What role did economic factors play in creating the system you called "prevent or defer" rather than "prevent and detect"? Would you describe the differences between these two approaches? 4. Very specifically, what was the status of box cutters at each of the airport security checkpoints that the hijackers passed through on September 11,2001? You state in your testimony that box-cutters were a "restricted item" in Checkpoint Operations Guides. Was this the case at all of the checkpoints the hijackers passed through? You further indicate that the screening systems in place on 9/11 were "not designed to detect or prohibit these types of small items." Under these circumstances, how were box-cutters to be identified and kept off an aircraft pursuant to the Checkpoint Operations Guides? 5. Published reports indicate that at least nine of the nineteen hijackers were selected for special security scrutiny prior to boarding the hijacked flights: six by the computer-assisted prescreening (CAPPS) system, two because of identification document irregularities, and one because he was traveling with one of the latter two. Are these reports accurate? Specifically, what triggered each selection? In each case, what was done as a result of the selection? 6. Please describe the roles of ATA and the individual airlines, as of September 11, 2001, with respect to aviation security rulemaking, policy development and implementation. 7. Do you believe it is reasonable to conclude that, considering the security systems in place on September 11, 2001, the hijackings on that day should have been prevented? Why, or why not?

8. You testified, "The airline industry has long been on record advocating that, over time, the TSA security system evolve to focus more intensively on looking at people rather than searching solely for things," and you mentioned the so-called CAPPS II program TSA is developing. What is your current evaluation of TSA's work in this regard? Do you have any recommendations for the design of the new system? How will CAPPS n be better than the original system which was in place on 9/11? Do you believe the new system will be able to alleviate your passengers' concerns about both security and privacy? 9. For the record, please supply the Commission with a description of the "new and improved training programs for crew members," you referred to in your testimony.

Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA/TSA whistleblower 1. For most government employees, the decision to become a whistleblower is a significant one. What made you reach that decision? 2. As an experienced field security inspector, Federal Air Marshal, and member of the "Red Team," you have seen the aviation security system from varying viewpoints. How would you describe the culture within FAA as to the importance of civil aviation security compared to other missions? What are the steps that you would take to make the traveling public safer? 3. Where do you believe the aviation security system broke down to enable the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to succeed? 4. How would you compare the security system we have today to what we had prior to September 11,2001?

QUESTIONS FOR 5/22-23 HEARINGS

Draft

MAY 21, 2003

Panel on "State of the System: Civil Aviation Security on September 11th" 2 PM, Thursday, May 22, 2003 Primary Questions for Panel: Prior to September 11, 2001, what did the U.S. aviation security system know about terrorist threats to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the system respond to any such information in their possession? What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11, 2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations? What was known of the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured? TESTIMONY GOALS FOR PANEL

WITNESSES

JANE GARVEY (FAA ADMINSTRATOR FROM (1997-2002) 1) With respect to hijackings, what was the aviation security system designed to detect and prevent, and how was this decided? 2) Have the witness explain the agency's approach/philosophy to priority setting/management of aviation security vis-a-vis competing FAA missions and priorities. 3) Have the witness explain what intelligence information she had about threats to the aviation security system prior to 9/11 and what actions she took in response. KENNETH MEAD (Then and Current Inspector General of DOT) 1) Have the witness explain the specific weaknesses in the aviation security system leading up to 9/11. 2) Have the witness explain why weakness in the aviation security system was and is such a persistent problem. 3) Receive the witness' critique of management methods and mindset with respect to aviation security. JAMES MAY (Current Executive Director of the Airlines' lobbying wing: Air Transport Authority—Was not in the job on 9/11/2001) 1) Have the witness describe the airlines' view of the industry's role in aviation security policy setting and implementation. 2) Have the witness explain the airlines' philosophy about aviation security's priority in the industry's mix of missions and by what standards the industry determines what security measures are and are not appropriate (i.e. cost/benefit and bottom line considerations). 3) Have the witness explain what the airlines knew with respect to the performance of their security systems on 9/11?

BOGDAN DZAKOVIC (FAA/DHS "Red Team" Member and whistleblower) 1) Obtain the witness' views about the culture of indifference toward security problems in the FAA. 2) Have the witness explain why he felt he had to be a whistleblower rather than go through the customary channels. 3) Have the witness share field personnel's perspective on the quality of the aviation security system and leadership.