9/11 Commission Questions For Aviation Security Hearings

QUESTIONS EOR MAY 22-23 HEARINGS ON AVIATION SECURITY

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QUESTIONS FOR MAY 22-23 HEARINGS ON AVIATION SECURITY PANEL ONE: WHERE WERE WE AS OF 9/11/01? 1. In the three months leading up to September 11, 2001, how would you characterize the relationship between the U.S. intelligence community on the one hand and the aviation security system on the other? How responsive was the intelligence community to information requests and needs from the aviation security system? What were the major obstacles to the flow of securityrelated intelligence information from the intelligence community to the various components of the aviation security system? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve this relationship?) 2. DOT Assistant Under Secretary for Intelligence Claudio Manno testified before the Joint Intelligence Inquiry in October of 2002 "Until the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), DOT distribution of threat information was severely limited because some of the information had to be disseminated without being protected from release into the public domain. Only the FAA had sufficient authority to share "sensitive security information" (SSI)." How did this limitation impact the aviation security system's ability to learn of terrorist threats to civil aviation up to September 11, 2001? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve this situation?) 3. What information lead to the issuance of the FAA security circular of June 22, 2001? Describe specifically the response of the aviation security system to the circular. In particular, what security-related actions were taken at Dulles, Logan and Newark airports? What, if any, changes occurred in these security procedures between the time of their employment and September 11? 4. Between June 22, 2001 and September 11, 2001, what did DOT and the FAA know about general and specific terrorist threats to civil aviation? About general and specific threats from al Qaeda? About potential threats from the individual 9/11 hijackers? MR. MAY: What did the airlines know about such threats? 5. In your view, what were the most significant threats to civil aviation as of September 10, 2001 ? How did the system of aviation security governance affect the system's response to those threats? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now?) 6. On September 10, 2001, how confident were you that the terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation could be effectively countered? How likely did you believe it to be: that terrorists would target U.S. civil aviation for attack? That the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities would successfully identify, apprehend or otherwise prevent such terrorists from gaining entrance into the U.S. or the U.S. civil aviation system? That profiling and other intelligence assets within the aviation security system itself would successfully identify, apprehend or otherwise prevent such terrorists from gaining entrance onto commercial aircraft? That the baggage and passenger screening system would prevent such terrorists from bringing on board explosives or weapons necessary to hijack a commercial aircraft? That the personnel and security procedures on board commercial aircraft would defeat terrorist hijacking attempts? (How would you change any of these assessments based on the current situation?) 1. As of September 11, 2001, what was the status of each of the following, first for the U.S. civil aviation system as a whole, and second, at Dulles, Logan and Newark airports: a. FAA security guidelines and security-related communications on civil aviation (including Security Directives, Emergency Amendments and Information Circulars)

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y^STIONS FOR MAY 22-23 HEARINGS ON AVIATION SECURITY

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b. Airport and air carrier security plans c. Computer-assisted passenger prescreening (CAPPS) system d. Checked baggage screening e. Passenger and carry-on baggage screening? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve these measures?) 8. As of September 11, 2001, what performance indicators were employed to measure the effectiveness of computer-assisted passenger prescreening, and the passenger, carry-on and checked baggage screening systems? What was the measured performance of these systems in the civil aviation security system as a whole, and specifically at Dulles, Logan and Newark airports, and at American and United airlines? What sanctions, if any, were imposed for any failures to meet performance requirements? What was the enforcement record on any such sanctions? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve these systems?) 9. What procedures were in place on September 11, 2001 to insure compliance by airports, airlines and contractors with FAA security policies and procedures? How well were these procedures implemented, and how was compliance measured? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve system compliance?) 10. With regard to the operation of the computer-assisted passenger prescreening system by American and United airlines between August (when the hijackers began purchasing their tickets) and September 11, 2001, was this system applied to: a. Passengers proceeding through airport screening b. Carry-on baggage of passengers proceeding through airport screening c. Checked baggage? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now?) 11. Very specifically, as of September 11, 2001 what was the status of box cutters and short knives within: a. FAA security guidelines b. Airport security plans for Dulles, Logan and Newark airports c. Primary air carrier security plans for Dulles, Logan and Newark airports? 12. What FAA, airport, airline, pilot and/or flight attendant regulations, guidelines, and/or training procedures were in place on September 11, 2001 for dealing with hijackers in general and suicide hijackers in particular? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve these measures?) 13. It has been reported that the hijacker pilots may have undertaken a series of surveillance flights on U.S. air carriers between May and August of 2001. What do we know about these flights? In

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STIONS FOR MAY 22-23 HEARINGS ON AVIATION SECURITY

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hindsight is there anything about their actions with respect to these flights that should have triggered closer scrutiny of these individuals? MR. MEAD: In testimony you gave to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on September 25, 2001, you stated that, "Under the current system, those charged with aviation security oversight (FAA) and those charged with providing the security (the airlines and airports) are themselves facing other priorities, missions, and, in some cases, competing economic pressures." Would you elaborate on the impact of the old system itself upon the system's security performance? Do you believe that the aviation system's governance problems were well known prior to September 11, 2001? If so, why were changes not made to correct the problems? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now?) 15. How did economic factors, including the de-regulation of civil aviation in the late 1970s, affect the performance of the aviation security system? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What effect are economic factors having today?) 16. What was the status of security clearances for airport security personnel at Dulles, Logan and Newark airports on September 11, 2001? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve this situation?) 17. What was the status of the federal air marshal program on September 11, 2001? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve this program?) 18. The General Accounting Office, the DOT Inspector General and others identified the performance of the airport security passenger and baggage screening system as a significant problem for many years prior to September 11, 2001. Why were these warnings evidently not acted upon? In other words, why was low screener performance tolerated for many years? 19. MR. MAY: From the airline perspective, how would you characterize the pre-September 11, 2001 performance of the federal aviation security system in each of the following respects: a. Sharing of threat information b. Issuance and enforcement of security guidelines c. Measurement of system performance? (What about after September 11: what is the situation now? What still needs to be done to improve this performance?) PANEL TWO: WHAT HAPPENED? 1. Published reports indicate that nine of the nineteen hijackers were selected for special security scrutiny prior to boarding the hijacked flights: six by the computer-assisted prescreening (CAPPS) system, two because of identification document irregularities, and one because he was traveling with one of the latter two. Are these reports accurate? Specifically, what triggered each selection? In each case, what was done as a result of the selection? Were the individuals detained, questioned, subjected to special screening, or subjected to any other special treatment? What were the results of any such actions? 2. What weapons did the 9/11 hijackers use, and how did the weapons get on board the aircraft? In the aftermath of the 9/11 hijackings there were published accounts of box cutters being found on board another commercial aircraft. Are those accounts accurate? Have you been able to rule out the introduction of the weapons used in the September 11, 2001 hijackings prior to the boarding of

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SSTIONS FOR MAY 22-23 HEARINGS ON AVIATION SECURITY

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the hijackers? 3. There were published reports that one of the flight attendants on board American Airlines Flight 11 phoned information that a gun had been fired on board that flight. What do we currently know about the source and accuracy of those reports? 4. In your opinion, was the introduction of the weapons onto the four hijacked flights a result of flaws in FAA regulations, air carrier security plans, screener performance, some combination of these, or some other factor (such as unauthorized access to the aircraft)? 5. What information do we have of any other hijackings which were planned in conjunction with the four 9/11 hijackings but which were not carried out? 6. Published accounts indicate that Boston flight controllers determined that American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked at 8:20 AM on September 11, 2001, and that two flight attendants telephoned American Airlines personnel with confirmation that a hijacking had occurred at 8:21 AM. However, these reports claim that NORAD was not notified of the hijacking until 8:40 AM, some nineteen or twenty minutes later. Are these reports accurate? If so, what was the cause of the delay in notification? Did the FAA, the flight controllers and the airline follow proper procedures? 7. With the benefit of hindsight, would the presence of sky marshals on the hijacked flights have prevented the September 11, 2001 hijackings? What about better designed FAA security guidelines and air carrier security plans? What about better-trained screeners? 8. Did your organization prepare an after-action analysis of precisely what happened on September 11, 2001? If so, please supply the Commission with a copy of such report and any supporting documents, and if the report or documents are classified, with an unclassified version. If not, why didn't you perform such an analysis? 9. Did flight controllers lose radar contact with any of the hijacked flights at any point? If so, why? PANEL THREE: WHERE ARE WE NOW? WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 1. Please describe how each of the following aspects of civil aviation security has changed since September 11, 2001, and how such changes address problems associated with the previous security system. Also indicate for each what remains to be done to optimize security performance: a. Federal security guidelines and security-related communications b. Airport and air carrier security plans c. Computer-assisted passenger prescreening (CAPPS) d. Checked baggage screening e. Passenger and carry-on baggage screening f. Air marshal program g. Security training for flight and cabin crews h. Flight deck intrusion and penetration resistance

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,£STIONS FOR MAY 22-23 HEARINGS ON AVIATION SECURITY

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i. Flight school security j. Anti-missile protection for airliners 2. What is the most current information available on deployment of explosives detection machines (compared to the goal of 1,100) and trace detection machines (versus 6,000 goal) for baggage screening? What percentage of all checked baggage is currently being screened (versus 100% goal)? 3. How do we currently measure success in the various components of the aviation security system? How should we measure it? More specifically, what do we currently know about the performance of the passenger and baggage screening system? 4. What is the status, and your evaluation, of the following specific aviation security laws or proposals: a. Arming of commercial air pilots b. Trusted Traveler program c. CAPPSII d. Biometric identification of passengers and airport employees e. Inspection of air cargo f. Criminal background checks on commercial airport employees? 5. According to the Congressional Research Service, for FY2003 TSA has received total appropriations of $5.18 billion, of which $4.52 billion, or 87 percent, has been allocated for aviation security functions mandated by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Furthermore, $3 billion, or 58 percent of the total, is being used for airport screening alone. In your view, does this represent an optimal prioritization, both among all transportation modes and within civil aviation security itself? If not, how should these priorities be re-ordered? 6. What is the status of the memoranda of agreement that TSA has been pursuing in order to facilitate cooperation and coordination with the various transportation modal agencies? 7. What is the status of the Transportation Security Oversight Board established by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)? Specifically, how is it progressing in fulfilling its mandates to facilitate the coordination and sharing of transportation-related intelligence information, and to develop a common database in support of this effort? 8. How should security, convenience and privacy concerns be balanced with respect to civil aviation? 9. Current law requires TSA to remain intact for two years but allows the agency to be restructured after that time. What, if any, restructuring options are currently being considered, and why? What restructuring options should be considered? 10. In April testimony to this Commission, Gerald Dillingham of the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified five long-term institutional challenges facing TSA and our national transportation security efforts:

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a. Developing a comprehensive risk management approach b. Ensuring that funding needs are identified and prioritized, and costs are controlled c. Establishing effective coordination among the many responsible public and private entities d. Ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels e. Implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers and security equipment. What is your evaluation of the GAO analysis? What is TSA currently doing to address each of these challenges? What more remains to be done? 11. The 2002 National Research Council report, Making the Nation Safer, declared, "the most critical need in the transportation sector is a systematic approach to security." More specifically, it called for development of "coherent, layered security systems for all transportation modes, particularly shipping containers and vehicles that contain large quantities of toxic or flammable materials." Finally, the NRC recommended that TSA "establish a strategic research and planning office attuned to but distinct from the agency's operational and enforcement responsibilities." What is your evaluation of these findings and recommendations, and what is TSA currently doing to address them? What more needs to be done? 12. The 2002 Hart-Rudman task force report, America - Still Unprepared, Still in Danger, includes among its "key" recommendations a charge to "Recalibrate the agenda for transportation security; the vulnerabilities are greater and the stakes are higher in the sea and land modes than in commercial aviation. Systems such as those used in the aviation sector, which start from the assumption that every passenger and every bag of luggage poses an equal risk, must give way to more intelligence-driven and layered security approaches that emphasize prescreening and monitoring based on risk criteria." What is your evaluation of these comments, and what is TSA currently doing to address them? What more needs to be done? 13. MR. STEELE: The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which was convened in the aftermath of the December 21, 1988 destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, issued its final report to the President in May of 1990. As Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security from 1990 to 1992, you had a key vantage point with regard to the reaction to and implementation of the Commission's recommendations. Please comment on the following findings and recommendations of the Commission, which would appear to have been relevant 11 years later on September 11, 2001. For each, please indicate what was done back in the early 1990s, and your assessment of what has been done thereafter, both before and after September 11, 2001: a. The Commission finds that the U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public. The system needs major reform. b. The Commission finds the Federal Aviation Administration to be a reactive agency preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats. c. The FAA should seek the assistance of the FBI in making a thorough assessment of the current and potential threat to the domestic air transportation system. d. The Congress should require criminal background checks for all airport facilities. The

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JESTIONS FOR MAY 22-23 HEARINGS ON AVIATION SECURITY

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legislation should identify certain criminal records that indicate a potential security risk and enable airport operators to deny employment on that basis. e. The FAA must begin to develop stronger security measures for controls over checked baggage, controls over persons with access to aircraft, testing of security systems, the use of modern x-ray equipment, and the prescreening of passengers. f. The FAA must take the lead in stressing the role of human factors in the security equation; training must be improved. 14. MR. HALL: In addition to your service as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, you served on the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which was created in August 1996 in the aftermath of the destruction of TWA Flight 800 and which made its report to the President in February 1997. Please comment on the following items contained in the report that would appear to be relevant to the events of September 11, 2001. Please indicate what impact each finding or recommendation had on the civil aviation security system before and after September 11,2001: a. Improvements in aviation security have been complicated because government and industry often found themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology and potential impacts on operations and passengers. Americans should not have to choose between enhanced security and efficient and affordable air travel. b. The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including screening personnel. c. The FAA should require criminal background checks for all screeners and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas. d. The FAA should complement technology with automated passenger profiling. e. The FAA should certify screening companies and improve screener performance. f. The FAA should aggressively test existing security systems.

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