Document (1).docx

ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001, when he was forced to vacate the presidency by people power and then VP Arroyo succeeded him in office. He was charged, in eight cases filed with the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in office, among them plunder, for allegedly having amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or less. He moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No. 7080, otherwise called the Anti-Plunder Law, is void for being vague and overbroad. ISSUE: Whether R.A. 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad. RULING: NO. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. The court has discerned nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse the petitioner in his defense. The elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts.

MULLANE v. CENTRAL HANOVER TRUST FACTS: A trust company in New York which had exclusive management and control of a common trust fund established by it under Sec. 100-c of the New York Banking Law petitioned under that section for a judicial settlement of accounts which would be binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth therein upon everyone having any interest in the common fund or in any participating trust. In this common fund, the trust company had invested assets of numerous small trusts of which it was trustee and of which some of the beneficiaries were residents, and some nonresidents of the State. The only notice of this petition given the beneficiaries was by publication in a local newspaper pursuant to the said section of the law. The petitioners contend that such publication was short of the requirement for due process. ISSUE: Whether the publication of the judicial settlement is adequate to afford due process. RULING: NO. The right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest. The court overrules the constitutional objections to published notice insofar as they are urged on behalf of any beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the trustee. As to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence, however, notice by publication stands on a different footing. Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that, within the limits of practicability, notice must be such as is reasonable calculated to reach interested parties. Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency. CSC v. LUCAS FACTS: Linatok, an assistant information officer at the Agricultural Information Division of the Department of Agriculture, filed a complaint against Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct. Lucas bent down to reach for his shoe and Linatok felt that Lucas’ hand was touching her thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. She admonished him but he repeated the act. As a consequence, she hit Lucas—who suddenly shouted at her and told her to never return to that place again, all the while shoving her towards the door causing her to stumble. The DA found him of simple misconduct, and upon appeal to the CSC, he was found of grave misconduct, imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. ISSUE: Whether Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct. RULING: NO. Lucas was charged by the DA of simple misconduct. He cannot be convicted of grave misconduct if he was not informed of the same. It is a basic requirement of due process that a person must be duly informed of the charges

against him, and that a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. CSC v. LEDESMA FACTS: Ledesma has been with the Bureau of Immigration from more than 32 years. A complaint was executed against her because she did not return their passports upon the complainant’s filing for an Emigrant Certificate Clearance. The passports were allegedly in her custody. After investigation, she was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which meted Ledesma with the penalties of dismissal, disqualification from re-entry into the service, and forfeiture of all benefits and emoluments. The CSC dismissed Ledesma’s appeal. The CA ruled that taking into consideration that she has already spent more than 30 years of service, it must be surmised that she did not act with corrupt intention or had a willful intent to violate the law or established rules. Thus, she must only be guilty of simple misconduct. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the judgment of the petitioner and downgrading the offense committed by respondent. RULING: The CA did not err in downgrading the offense. Such decision by the CA did not constitute a violation of a constitutional right because the CA did a thorough evaluation of the facts and found that the elements to make misconduct grave is not established by substantial evidence. The Court has, on several instances, overturned charges of grave misconduct where the circumstances showed that the respondent only committed simple misconduct. A simple change in the verdict, when the circumstances dictate such.