Dh B1 Norad Briefings Fdr- 3-5-02 Dod Ig Report- Response To Pentagon Terrorist Attack 802

INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE Mid-Atlantic Field Office 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 712 Arlington, Virginia 22202-4306

WAR - 5 2002 MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR THROUGH DEPUTY DIRECTOR SUBJECT: Response to Pentagon Terrorist Attack

The purpose of this memorandum is multifaceted. It is to document the successes and lessons learned for other senior managers should such a horrific event transpire in the future and provide suggestions, which I believe would enhance our operational response. RESPONSE BACKGROUND: As you are aware when the Pentagon was. attacked on September 11, 2001, there were several decisions, which were made during the initial hours that impacted the role this agency would play in the overall investigative process. With no codified or defined "mission responsibility" relative to terrorism investigations, the organization was not initially looked upon as first responders to the incident. Thus the other Federal law enforcement agencies and some of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs), established Command Posts in the affected area and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), assistance was not initially sought out. This caused me to make several decisions at the outset relative as to where I felt our personnel could provide the most comprehensive support to the other Federal, state and local law enforcement organizations. It should be noted that during the onset of the events, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (AS AC), and myself were on temporary duty (TDY), from the immediate area. With me being approximately 2 hours from Washington, DC and the ASAC overseas, the daily operations were handled by a Resident Agent in Charge (RAC), who had several years of supervisory experience. Once learning of the events, I immediately returned to the metropolitan area. Because of telecommunication difficulties (all cell sites were initially overloaded), I was unable to determine the status of my personnel. After establishing telephonic contact, I was informed that all personr assigned to the office were told to leave the area for their residences until further notic1 was also briefed that we had personnel who responded to the Pentagon to "render assistance" and could not be contacted. Recognizing the delicacies involved and the severity of the situation, I instructed the RAC to recall all law enforcement personnel the office including personnel from my various Resident Agencies and Posts of Duty whereby they could be deployed as the situation dictated. An additional factor imp? on my ability to return expeditiously was related to no emergency vehicle equipmer being installed in my Government vehicle and a significant amount of traffic on the highways following the initial attacks.

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It should also be noted that while enroute to the area, I was also able to make telephonic contact with supervisory personnel from the various MCIO's and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who we have predominantly worked with during the regular course of our duties. It was agreed that our assistance was needed and that I should report to the Command Post area. Upon arrival to the area, I met with representatives from the FBI and it was decided that our assistance was needed to establish an alternate Command Post in the area. The site which I selected with personnel from the Defense Protective Service was located at the Naval Annex (FOB II). Upon establishment of this Command Post with representatives from the FBI and MCIOs, the initial canvassing teams were deployed for the purpose of conducting interviews in the immediate vicinity. In addition to this Command Post, I instructed a RAC and a Group Manager to establish an additional Command Post at our office to respond to requests as needed from the site where I was located and/or from other DCIS elements. This post was also involved with the scheduling of personnel for various tours of duty since we were operating in a 24 hour mode. For purposes of this memorandum, I will focus my comments relative to issues, which I confronted. Once we were able to reconstitute our manpower during the initial hours, it was decided by senior FBI officials that any response would consist of an FBI agent and an agent from one of the MCIOs. Though these instructions were not looked upon with "favor" by some non-FBI personnel, I fully concurred with them. With statutory authority for the investigation of terrorist acts, and recognizing the necessity to implement a seamless operation, it was imperative that any and all investigative activity be conducted in a coordinated fashion. I briefed this requirement to all personnel from the various MCIO, since initially I was the only Defense Criminal Investigative Organization (DCIO), supervisor present. Despite instances of personnel wanting to respond to the Pentagon to render recovery assistance, and their insistence that assistance was needed, my coordination with senior FBI officials resulted in the determination that the individuals assigned to the interview Command Post could best be used at that location. The environment at the Pentagon was unstable and it was felt that sufficient resources were in place to handle the situation. The "self reporting" to the Pentagon site was considered problematic by all supervisory personnel involved in this operation. As you can recognize, the initial combined decisions by myself and several other law enforcement supervisors did not set well with some personnel. To further complicate matters, to my chagrin there were indications that some FBI personnel were operating outside the "spirit of cooperation" and independently conducting investigative activity without the presence of DCIO personnel. Though some might indicate that this was the norm, it was not and I discussed this situation with the on-site FBI supervisor. In my opinion, the magnitude of the situation demanded that we not become embroiled in jurisdictional battles or organizational "chest pounding." Consequently, I insisted that our personnel operate in a professional manner and that any disagreements be resolved by myself and not in an open forum. Despite these minor problems, this Command Post operated in a 24 hour configuration for approximately 4 days following the attack. As a result of several critical preliminary interviews, substantive information was developed which was provided to overall law enforcement command authorities that was deemed significant to the investigation.

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When it was recognized that the Command Post at FOB II had served its purpose, it was closed and resources were redeployed to assist at the Pentagon. With the MCIOs having already established a Command Post, at that location, it was decided that DCIS would provide an asset to manage its resources from their location. The function of this post was to attend various operational meetings and supervise personnel that were engaged in Evidence Recovery. Initially, I made the decision to personally man this post because of the fluid nature in which matters were transpiring and the decisions which needed to be made through interaction with senior law enforcement officials from various agencies. In addition, DCIS was asked to provide support to the Joint Operations Center (JOC), which served as a de-confliction site for all agencies with resources at the Pentagon. In short order the numerous responses between the JOC and the Pentagon site, which required my presence proved to be overwhelming. On the advice of my managers, which were operating from the Command Post that I had previously established at our office, I ultimately closed it, and redeployed these managers to the Pentagon site to assist me with supervising our personnel. Within days following this decision, the ASAC was able to return from abroad and assist with several operational functions. Consultations with supervisory FBI officials at the Pentagon site resulted in a determination that since each ofthe DCIOs had personnel engaged in human remains recovery, the bulk of DCIS resources along with remaining DCIO personnel should be deployed to the North Parking lot area. This site was chosen to serve as a staging location for debris, which was being removed from the Pentagon. At this location, personnel from various local, state and Federal law enforcement agencies were tasked to "sift through" the debris for items of evidentiary value. Within 1 week of operation, it was determined that more resources were needed for this task. When presented with the task of obtaining additional resources, through coordination with our Headquarters and the successful coordination by the Headquarters with the Inspector General (IG) community, we were able to provide sufficient personnel for the task. Within 2 weeks of operation, this task was accomplished through the "yeomen's" efforts of all personnel involved. OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES: There were several areas, which impacted our initial involvement in this massive undertaking. These included the following: •

There were no organizational Concept of Operations (CONOPS), as to what role DCIS should play in an incident of this nature. This coupled with the fact that prior to the incident, DCIS was not actively engaged in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), as the MCIOs were (though to a minimal degree), clouded the view for agencies that historically had a role. This was only overcome because of the excellent working relationships, which have been developed within our area of responsibility and their cognizance that we could and should play a role in this investigation.

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•

Telecommunications impairments were abundant during the operation. Notwithstanding the fact that during the initial phase of the incident the cell sites were overloaded, the Field Office did not have sufficient cell phones during the course of the operation and some personnel had to use personal cell phones. (Note: In consultation with an official involved in recovery efforts in New York City, I was informed that agents only form of communication during the initial hours at that location were 2 way pagers because of the overload and the fact that many numerous agencies repeaters were located on one of the twin towers).

•

Personnel were unfamiliar with the Incident Command System (ICS), which is utilized by all local, state and Federal law enforcement agencies that historically provide first responder assistance and support. During the course of our involvement at this incident, I developed a protocol (Enclosure # 1), for your consideration. Further, I have obtained a copy of the Trenton Police Departments "Local Response to Terrorist Threats" (Enclosure #2), which contains various operational plans for law enforcement agencies to consider. I have reviewed this material and opine it contains information, which once modified would be beneficial in its adoption by our field elements.

•

Initially, support personnel were not integrated into the overall operations. Consequently, various administrative tasks were accomplished by law enforcement personnel. As stated above, with the integration of an ICS, administrative personnel who have developed skills in various software packages and handling a myriad of administrative duties would be in a position to provide support. This would free agents for other duties.

•

There were not adequate and/or sufficient clothing items for personnel involved in the operations. This was alleviated to some degree within 72 hours.

RECOMMENDATIONS: •

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Development of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), by the DCIOs, whereby various roles and responsibilities are depicted. DCIS role in the investigation of incidents involving weapons of mass destruction be it from a technology transfer and/or cyber crime response should be contained in the CONOPS. All field managers should receive training in the Incident Control System, which is utilized by various law enforcement and public safety agencies. Each Field Office should be required to establish an Emergency Mobilization Plan that establishes responsibilities, administrative actions and procedures in the event of partial or full mobilization. Decisions relative to how field elements should be deployed would be articulated in this plan. Upon establishment the plans should be tested for their effectiveness. All personnel should be reminded of the need to adhere to instructions delineated by supervisory personnel. In an unstable fluid environment such as terrorist

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attacks, it is paramount that personnel not "free lance" and adhere to all instructions. Further, all recall rosters should be checked on a frequent basis for accuracy. • Obtain a "Pin" number for all senior HQ DCIS Officials, SACs and ASACs through the National Telecommunications Command Authority, which will allow priority status during the event of an emergency. • Obtain sufficient funding for each agent to have a pager and cell phone. • Provide training to all personnel relative to responses to Biological and Chemical Agents. • Obtain requisite funding for all vehicles to be outfitted with requisite emergency response equipment. • Obtain proper clothing items for all assigned personnel (suggested 3 day supply). • Obtain sufficient training for identified personnel assigned to each of the various Field Offices to properly deal with evidence recovery operations. • Field Offices SACs should ensure that an ASAC is located in the office when the SAC is TOY or on leave. • It is imperative that all SACs and ASACs establish effective liaison relationships with key officials prior to an incident. This enhances DCIS' abilities not to be been seen as a non-player in the arena, but one with assets capable of providing a significant impact. CONCLUSION: As is the case with most incidents, the men and women of this organization demonstrated their abilities to make a difference in several areas. Despite never before being required to respond to such an asymmetric attack, and with minimal prior guidance relative to our role and responsibility, they showed their abilities to be resilient. It goes without saying that despite the numerous challenges, the personnel involved in this undertaken performed phenomenally well. Over 3,000 human remain parts and evidence was recovered from the Pentagon site. DCIS personnel along with other elements of the Office of Inspector General were integrally involved in the operation at all levels of this recovery effort. Albert Einstein has been quoted as saying "today's problems can not be solved with the same thinking that created them." No truer words have been spoken as it relates to preparing for the next event. It is my hope that the information which I have provided is considered for implementation where warranted.

Joseph A. McMillan Special Agent in Charge Enclosures cc: ASAC Harris RAC Amato RAC Alexander GM Gershman GM Gillum

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May 10, 2002

Health Care DoD Medical Support to the Federal Response Plan (D-2002-087)

__ Quality

Department of Defense __, Office of the Inspector General Integrity

Accountability

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Additional Copies To obtain additional copies of this evaluation report, visit the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Home Page at www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports or contact the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit of the Audit Followup and Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax (703) 604-8932. Suggestions for Future Evaluations To suggest ideas for or to request future evaluations, contact the Audit Followup and Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8940 (DSN 664-8940) or fax (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to: OAIG-AUD (ATTN: AFTS Evaluation Suggestions) Inspector General of the Department of Defense 400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801) Arlington, VA 22202-4704 Defense Hotline To report fraud, waste, or abuse, contact the Defense Hotline by calling (800) 424-9098; by sending an electronic message to [email protected]; or by writing to the Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900. The identity of each writer and caller is fully protected.

Acronyms DOMS FEMA FRP HHS OASD(HA) RFA WTC

Director of Military Support Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Response Plan Health and Human Services Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) Request for Federal Assistance World Trade Center

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