Dh B1 Norad Briefings Fdr- Power Point 9-11 Excursion (aa 77 And Ua 93) 801

This Brief is Classified UNCLASSIFIED

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9/11 Excursion (AA77and UA93)

Mr. Pete Puhek, N-NC/AN Ops Research Analyst

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Facts and Assumptions for AA 77 Facts: • 0902 EOT • 0909 EOT • 0937 EOT

Second World Trade Tower (WTT) hit Battle Stations for the NORAD F-16s at Langley AFB AA77 hits the Pentagon

Assumptions (if a scramble order had been given after 2nd WTT hit): • 0910 EOT - Two F-16s takeoff from Langley AFB for NCR air patrol • 0925 EOT - F-16s on station over the NCR flying air patrol • The F-16s would have had 12 minutes of patrol time before AA77 hit • The F-16s carry radar and IR missiles and a gun • The air patrol is a box pattern (12 nm per side) centered on the White House • Hostile aircraft not squawking so transponder interrogation will not be done UNCLASSIFIED

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Box: 00001 Series: Copies: 1

Folder: 0001 Document: 25 Dana Hyde Files Pages: 1 ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: [NORAD Briefings and OIG Report] Document Date: Document Type: Briefing Slides Special Media: From: To: Subject:

NCR Notional Air Patrol Box

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 382 Withdrawn: 09-05-2008

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RETRIEVAL #: 382 00001 0001 25 System DocID: 4238

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Cueing to the F-16 Pilots? Help from the FAA? The FAA lost contact with AA77 when its transponder was turned off at 0851 EDT over West Virginia. The FAA at DCA located AA77 at 0933, but NEADS was not notified until 0936. NEADS did not have time to do anything about it Help from NEADS? NEADS never saw AA77, so no cueing was possible. The best NEADS could do would have been to make a radio call to "look over there" The theoretical best that could be achieved by the FAA and NEADS is the following chain: • 0933 - DCA FAA calls FAAWashington Center • 0936 - The FAA Washington Center calls NEADS There was at most 1.5 minutes for the F-16s • ???? - NEADS calls the F-16s to respond to respond • ???? - The F-16s respond before 0937.5 • 0937.5 - AA77 Impact

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WITH DRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Box: 00001 Series: Copies: 1

Folder: 0001 Document: 26 Dana Hyde Files Pages: 2 ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: [NORAD Briefings and OIG Report] Document Date: Document Type: Briefing Slides Special Media: From: To: Subject:

Most Optimistic Visual Sighting (page 5) and Tasks and Timelines (page 6)

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 382 Withdrawn: 09-05-2008

by:

RETRIEVAL #: 382 00001 0001 26 System DocID: 4239 -z c

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Facts and Assumptions for UA93 Facts: • 0946 EOT - Radar contact lost with UA93 • 1003 EOT - UA93 Crashes into Shanksville,PA Assumptions: • UA93 does not crash into Shanksville, PA • 1003 EOT - UA93 is flown directly to either Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, New York City, or Washington, DC • UA93 flies perfectly straight at 400 knots with no turns • The NORAD fighters will follow the same ROEs as AA77 • NORAD fighters are flying air patrol over NYC and DC UNCLASSIFIED

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Flight Path ofUA93 Until Loss of Radar Contact

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Detroit

New fork Philadelphia

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The Necessity of Cueing 00

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• The previous analysis of AA77 made it clear that relying on visual pickup of an airliner will most likely not provide enough time to respond • Even with every variable optimized, the only reason there may have been 2 minutes to respond is that AA77 made a 3-minute turn at the very end • The remainder of the UA93 analysis will assume cueing

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The Special Case of Pittsburgh New York City Pittsburgh

a\o ro o H U fs,

292 miles

80 miles^Crash Site

Washington, DC

• The above diagram shows that even with perfect cueing, there is no possible way that either the NYC or NCR air patrols could reach Pittsburgh in time to stop UA93 • At 400 knots, UA93 would hit Pittsburgh in 13 minutes • At Mach 1.4 with perfect cueing, it would still take the DC air patrol 15 minutes just to get to Pittsburgh • No further analysis will be done on Pittsburgh UNCLASSIFIED

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Protecting Philadelphia in

New York City

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Crash Site 109 miles hiladelphia

Washington, DC

Since New York City is closer to Philadelphia than Washington, DC, the NYC air patrol would be diverted to protect Philadelphia. This air patrol will be backfilled by Otis AFB

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Cueing Requirements • The analysis of AA77 demonstrated that once the NORAD fighters have intercepted a hostile, it still takes at least four minutes to receive the authority to shoot • Extra warning time is highly desired to keep the hostile at least five miles from densely populated targets (one minute will be the factor) • The intercept time must also be factored in. It requires 3.5 minutes to intercept from NYC and DC, 9.5 minutes for Philadelphia • If the hostile is traveling at 400 knots, then the bare minimum warning distance would be 60 nautical miles from NYC and DC, 100 for Philadelphia

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From Crash Site: Minimum Cueing Points

From Crash Site to Cue Point: • Washington: 8 minutes Philadelphia: 14 minutes New York City: 24 minutes

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Conclusion oo •<* en n to o H

Without timely cueing, fighters flying air patrols over dense airspaces probably will not be able to respond to fast hostiles If Washington, DC had been the target of UA93, cueing would have been required to respond in a timely manner within the rules of engagement at that time

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NCT0073949