Arms Control

Aristotle (384–322 BC) not as means to an end but as choice-worthy in themselves. Their perceived importance for human well-being involves a reconsideration of central issues of Aristotelian virtue ethics and its guiding concept of the good life, as well as an analysis of features essential for functioning as a human being. For the most part, such reconceptions attempt to integrate sociocultural pluralism, involving a multiplicity of competing ideas of the good life. Such pluralism requires a conception of politics as basically deliberative, since reasoned social and political decision-making depends on creating joint convictions in areas of the contingent. This process depends on a rhetorical culture as a constitutive element of political culture. Since Aristotle’s Rhetoric represents a synthesis of conceptual frameworks necessary for understanding the functioning of rhetorical culture, he provides a paradigm for developing a theory of political deliberative argumentation under pluralist sociopolitical conditions. Under the title of ‘topoi,’ Aristotle’s heuristic for systematically exploring and presenting whatever is potentially convincing has entered theories of (legal) argumentation (Pe0 relman 1969) and social science\ political science research (Hennis 1977). Even authors with a critical distance from neo Aristotelianism nonetheless adopt Aristotle’s rhetorical heritage by discussing notions of deliberative democracy or politics. The scope and rigor of Aristotle’s thought will no doubt continue to inspire generations of social scientists. See also: Aristotelian Social Thought; Causation: Physical, Mental, and Social; Citizenship: Political; Counterfactual Reasoning: Public Policy Aspects; Counterfactual Reasoning, Qualitative: Philosophical Aspects; Democracy; Democracy: Normative Theory; Ethics and Values; Idealization, Abstraction, and Ideal Types; Identity and Identification: Philosophical Aspects; Individualism versus Collectivism: Philosophical Aspects; Knowledge (Explicit and Implicit): Philosophical Aspects; Knowledge Representation; Meaning and Rule-following: Philosophical Aspects; Models, Metaphors, Narrative, and Rhetoric: Philosophical Aspects; Person and Self: Philosophical Aspects; Personal Identity: Philosophical Aspects; Policy History: State and Economy; Power: Political; Practical Reasoning: Philosophical Aspects; Responsibility: Philosophical Aspects; Rhetoric; Rhetorical Analysis; State and Society; State: Anthropological Aspects; State Formation; States and Civilizations, Archaeology of; Truth, Verification, Verisimilitude, and Evidence: Philosophical Aspects; Virtue Ethics

Bibliography Arendt H 1958 The Human Condition. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

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Aristotle 1926\1965 The Loeb Classical Library, Greek Authors, 17 Vols. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Barnes J, Schofield M, Sorabji R (eds.) 1975\79 Articles on Aristotle I–III. Duckworth, London Edmondson R 1984 Rhetoric in Sociology. Macmillan, London Flashar E 1983 Aq eltere Akademie, Aristoteles—Peripatos. In: Flaschar E (ed.) Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike. Schwabe, Basel Gadamer H G 1975 Truth and Method, 2nd edn. Sheed and Ward, London Guthrie W K C 1990 A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. VI: Aristotle. An Encounter. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Hennis W 1977 Politik und Praktische Philosophie. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart Keyt D, Miller F D (eds.) 1991 A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Blackwell, Oxford, UK MacIntyre A 1985 After Virtue. Duckworth, London Perelman Ch 1969 The New Rhetoric. A Treatise in Argumentation. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN Ricoeur P 1992 Oneself as Another. University of Chicago Press, London Totok W 1997 Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. Klostermann, Frankfurt, Germany, Vol. 1, pp. 359–466 Wo% rner M 1990 Das Ethische in der Rhetorik des Aristoteles. Alber, Freiburg\Munich, Germany

M. Wo$ rner

Arms Control Arms control, a term popularized in the early 1960s, may be defined as the effort, between and among countries, to negotiate binding limitations on the number and types of armaments or armed forces, on their deployment and disposition, or on the use of particular types of armaments. It also includes measures designed to reduce the danger of accidental nuclear war and to alleviate concerns about surprise attack. Although the two terms are often used interchangeably, it is distinct from disarmament, which has the more ambitious objective of seeking to eliminate, also by international agreement, the means by which countries wage war (Blacker and Duffy 1984). The goal of eliminating war extends far back in history, but in modern times disarmament came into focus with the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907. These and subsequent efforts met with what can only be termed limited success. Schelling and Halperin, in their seminal work, Strategy and Arms Control, first published in 1961, listed three objectives for arms control: to reduce the likelihood of war; to limit the extent of damage should war occur; and to reduce expenditures on military forces. As US and Soviet weapons arsenals mushroomed during the Cold War and each country spent liberally to keep pace with the other militarily, later analysts tended to offer less sweeping goals. These

Arms Control included reducing the number of nuclear weapons and redirecting the arms race into areas less likely to threaten the stability of the international system. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to expectations, both at the expert level and among publics more broadly, that the sudden cessation of the superpower arms race would create opportunities for radical reductions in the nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals of the major powers. Although the leading industrialized countries have taken some steps in that direction—US armed forces, measured in terms of total numbers, have declined by one-third since 1990—progress in eliminating the nuclear-weapons stockpiles of the US and Russia has proven to be an elusive goal. To compound the problem, the number of nuclear-armed states has actually grown in recent years as India and Pakistan, in a series of highly publicized weapons tests in 1998, announced their arrival as full-fledged nuclear powers. The means to deliver these weapons, as well as chemical and biological agents, across hundreds (and even thousands) of miles has also spread as countries such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran continue to invest heavily in programs to develop and deploy long-range ballistic missiles. Arms control, particularly between the US and the Soviet Union, aroused controversy from the outset. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by representatives of the US, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in 1963, provoked sharp debate when US president John F. Kennedy submitted this arms control ‘first’ for Senate approval. Some critics saw the treaty, which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons above ground, under water, and in space, as unenforceable. These and other concerns notwithstanding, the treaty eventually was ratified and fears of Soviet noncompliance proved to be unfounded. More favorably received in the US was the United Nations-sponsored Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which sought to restrict the size of the ‘nuclear club’ by inducing non-nuclear weapons states to renounce the acquisition of such weapons in exchange for a commitment (among other pledges) on the part of the nuclear-weapons countries to reduce their own arsenals. The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, was renegotiated in 1995, at which time the signatory states agreed to extend the treaty’s provisions for an unlimited period of time. Conspicuous by their absence as states-parties to the NPT are the two newest declared nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, as well as Israel, which is believed to possess a small but sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons. The NPT was critically important in facilitating the start of bilateral US–Soviet negotiations in 1969 to limit central strategic forces. Known by the acronym SALT, for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the negotiations resulted in two arms-control agreements in 1972. The first and more important was the

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, by which the two countries agreed to limit the number of ABM sites and thus not deploy nationwide defensive systems to protect their homelands against nuclear-missile attack. The second accord was a 5-year freeze on the construction of long-range land- and sea-based ballistic missile ‘launchers’ (underground silos and submarine missile tubes, respectively). The so-called Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons was a temporary measure to slow the competition in offensive weaponry, pending negotiation of a more permanent and restrictive treaty (Newhouse 1973). The second phase of the negotiations, lasting from 1972 to 1979, led to the signing of several agreements, including an accord further limiting US and Soviet ABM deployments and the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which restricts the yields of underground nuclear weapons tests. The most important agreement concluded during this period was the 1979 SALT II treaty, a lengthy and complex document that attempted to extend and refine many of the provisions of the 1972 Interim Agreement (Talbott 1979). The US Senate never ratified the treaty, however, largely because of the dramatic deterioration in superpower relations that began during the abbreviated administration of President Gerald Ford and accelerated during the term of his White House successor, Jimmy Carter. Despite the ambiguous legal status of the treaty following the failure to obtain its ratification, both the US and the Soviet Union abided by most of its provisions well into the 1980s. Negotiations on US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, renamed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) by President Ronald Reagan, resumed in the summer of 1982. Through the remainder of Reagan’s presidency, the two sides reached consensus on many key points, including the desirability of 50 percent reductions in long-range nuclear forces and the need for intrusive, on-site inspections to prevent cheating. Among the issues not resolved was how to construct the preferred relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. In a dramatic reversal of its earlier negotiating position, the US now favored the rapid development and deployment of nationwide defensive systems, as shown by its sponsorship of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), first outlined by Reagan in March 1983 in a nationally televised address (Fitzgerald 2000, Nolan 1989). The Soviet Union was sharply critical of SDI and resisted the conclusion of any new agreement to reduce strategic offensive weapons, pending a commitment by the US to abide by the terms of the ABM treaty, narrowly interpreted, through at least the end of the century. The rise to power of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 signaled a fundamentally new phase in arms control. One of Gorbachev’s most important foreign policy objectives was to curtail sharply the political rivalry between the USSR and the 749

Arms Control West by, among other steps, delimiting their military competition. The first major result of this policy was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, concluded in 1987, which eliminated all US and Soviet land-based nuclear missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. This was followed in 1990 by a treaty to reduce conventional forces in Europe (CFE), signed by 22 member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact. At about the same time, US and Soviet negotiators completed work on the long-awaited START treaty, and in July 1991, President George Bush traveled to Moscow to join Gorbachev in signing the accord. Less than 6 months later, Gorbachev—the architect of the most ambitious reform program in the 74 year history of the Soviet Union—resigned as president and the USSR ceased to exist. At a hastily called summit meeting in June 1992, Bush and Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin agreed to press for early ratification of the START treaty. They also pledged to conclude a second and more ambitious agreement to reduce US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals by up to two-thirds within a decade and to eliminate all multiple-warhead landbased missiles. Some 2 weeks before the inauguration of Bill Clinton as US president in January 1993, the two sides made good on their promise and concluded the START II treaty. As relations between the US and Russia deteriorated during the second half of the 1990s, the treaty itself languished; although finally ratified by both sides, nearly a decade after its signing most of the agreement’s provisions still had not been implemented. The US–Russian arms-control agenda has also been complicated by the confused, and confusing, nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, four of the country’s now independent republics, including Russia, found themselves in possession of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of long-range delivery systems. Under pressure from Russia and the West, in May 1992 the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine promised to abide by the terms of the 1991 START I agreement and to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. With financial and technical assistance from the US, all nuclear warheads and their associated missile systems deployed on Belarusian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian territory eventually were disarmed and dismantled. The denuclearization of the three former Soviet republics constitutes the most important—and perhaps the only unambiguous—arms control success story of the 1990s. The abrupt end of Soviet rule gave rise to a second kind of security problem for which policymakers everywhere were ill prepared. The frequency and intensity of ethnically and religiously inspired conflicts in such heretofore remote parts of the former USSR as Tajikistan and the southern Caucasus increased dramatically following the collapse of central authority in 750

Moscow. The breakdown of political control in these and proximate regions, coupled with the extreme poverty that afflicted many of the people caught in the fighting, served both to prolong these struggles and to frustrate diplomatic efforts to contain them. In addition, the unraveling of the Soviet Union’s alliance relationships left a number of countries politically orphaned and therefore less secure. This too served to increase regional instability. It also encouraged some states—North Korea being a case in point—to seek to develop nuclear weapons of their own despite the determined opposition of the major powers, especially the US. At the start of the twenty-first century the most important challenge to arms control, however, is the prospective change in the relationship between longrange, offensive nuclear forces and weapons designed to defend against them. For the last 40 years, what Philip Green characterized in the mid-1960s as the deadly logic of nuclear deterrence helped preserve the uneasy truce between Washington and Moscow. In its simplest form, deterrence held that no rational leadership in possession of nuclear weapons would ever intentionally authorize their use against a nucleararmed adversary because of the near-certain knowledge that the victim of such an attack would retaliate in kind. With effectively no ability to ward off or deflect such a retaliatory strike, the would-be aggressor would thus be deterred from initiating a nuclear exchange in the first place (Brodie 1965, Schelling 1960). As the capacity to build nuclear weapons spreads to countries other than the so-called great powers, interest in acquiring the means to defend against their possible use has grown, particularly in the US. Even a comparatively modest system of active defenses—one designed to defeat a handful of incoming ballistic missile warheads launched from whatever quarter— arouses concern, however, because of the latent ability of such a system to expand and improve over time. The larger and more robust a system of national missile defense becomes, the better it will be at defending against more complex threats. The more able it becomes, in other words, the more threatening it will seem to the more established nuclear powers, including Russia and China, for whom the unchallenged ability to retaliate with overwhelming force constitutes the bedrock of their security (Wilkening 2000). According to the classic tenets of arms control, the large-scale deployment of strategic defensive systems could therefore erode stability and increase the likelihood of war. It is probably not beyond human ingenuity to design and construct a ‘mixed’ strategic environment that allows for a modicum of defense while preserving nuclear deterrence in its essentials. Given the understandable urge to escape the persistent threat of nuclear annihilation, it seems safe to assume that governments will persist in their efforts to square this

Aron, Raymond (1905–83) strategic circle. Policymakers everywhere would do well to remember, however, that nuclear deterrence, for all its flaws, has kept the peace for half a century, and that any attempt to replace it with something else is likely to entail serious risks and potentially enormous costs. See also: Conflict and War, Archaeology of; Conflict\Consensus; Geopolitics; Military and Politics; Military Geography; Military History; War: Causes and Patterns

Bibliography Blacker C D, Duffy G (eds.) 1984 International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements, 2nd edn. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA Brodie B 1965 Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Fitzgerald F 2000 Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War. Simon & Schuster, New York Green P 1966 Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence. Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH Newhouse J 1973 Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, 1st edn. Harper & Row, New York Nolan J E 1989 Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy. Basic Books, New York Schelling T C 1960 The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Schelling T C, Halperin M H 1961 Strategy and Arms Control. Twentieth Century Fund, New York Talbott S 1979 Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II, 1st edn. Harper & Row, New York Wilkening D 2000 Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

C. D. Blacker Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Aron, Raymond (1905–83) The life and works of Raymond Aron coincide with the period of conflicts generated by ideologies. Born in 1905, twelve years before the Bolshevik Revolution, he died in 1983, in the middle of the European missile crisis, the last event of the Cold War before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

1. Chronology Raymond Aron was born on March 14, 1905 in Paris into a family of Jewish origin, completely integrated into patriotic and republican society. A brilliant student, he went to the Ecole Normale Supe! rieure, where he became friends with Sartre and Nizan, and then went on to the AgreT gation de Philosophie. Germany in the 1930s revealed to him the violence of history, and drew him into a critical attitude and a

personal approach which made him unique among the French intellectuals of the twentieth century. In the tradition of Montesquieu, Constant, Tocqueville, and Elie Hale! vy, he is the most eminent representative of liberal thinkers in France in the twentieth century. From 1930 to 1933, Aron stayed in Cologne and in Berlin. The rise of Nazism led him to break with the socialism and pacifism of his youth. Reading Max Weber and the phenomenologists—particularly Husserl and Heidegger whom he introduced in France—took him away from the idealism and positivism which at that time dominated the French academic philosophy. The doctoral thesis he defended in 1938 dealt with the philosophy of history; it created a scandal in the French university by using epistemological doubt to criticise positivism in the field of social sciences. Called up in 1939, Aron answered General de Gaulle’s call in June 1940 and reached London, where he edited the review La France Libre until the Liberation. The Second World War represented a major upheaval, with the quadruple shock of defeat, exile, dismissal from the university following the status of Jews as applied by Vichy, and finally of genocide. During the Cold War, Aron identified himself, with Andre! Malraux as one of the few well known intellectuals to oppose the attraction of communism in France and to participate in the Congress for Cultural Freedom, created to contain Soviet influence throughout the world. As a result this isolated him completely. He pursued a double career up to his death in 1983, first as a university professor, at the Sorbonne and later at the Colle' ge de France, after an interim period at the Ecole des Hautes E; tudes, and second as a journalist, at Combat, then at Figaro (1947–77) and finally at L’Express (1977–83). He was faithful to the choice of vocation he had made in the 1930s, to be a committed witness trying to reflect on history and politics as they happened. He was fully recognized outside France where he was held by academics and politicians to be an interlocutor of the first order. At the end of his life, Aron became reconciled with French intellectuals, at the same time as they were converted to the fight against totalitarianism following the disclosures on the Gulag by Solzhenitsyn as well as with the general public which welcomed enthusiastically his MeT moires (Aron 1983). He died on October 17, 1983 in Paris.

2. Works and Beliefs Aron defines his works as: a thought on the twentieth century, in the light of Marxism, and an attempt to throw light on all areas of modern society: economics, social relations, class relationships, political systems, relationships between nations, and ideological discussions.

Freeing himself from the traditional separations between disciplines, his thoughts have covered many 751

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences

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