66. Arms Control In South Asia

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^4=L * they have 5 heavy defence burden -- almost unbearable by both. The arms race therefore cannot be braked. It was hoped (prior to the end of cold war) - purely from the point of view of debt serving and other economics factors that the missile race will abate -- and probably would come to a halt after the end of the cold war - but both these aims of ACDA have not been realised and proliferation in going on with renewed frenzy. And this is in spite of some of the measures such as MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) - but su,ch measures are not very binding - and in some cases those who are the proponents of the Regime are also the sellers of the missile technology. This is a strange paradise. This short paper examines the efficacy of the ACDA - and what best can be done by Pakistan in view of the persistent Indian refusal to sign NPTA - and CTBT, which are yet other new means to brake arms frenzy in he subcontinent, and elsewhere.

There is no doubt that India has yielded some ground - and some confidence building measures have been arranged with Pakistan - but on the whole on the vital issues of missile and nuclear umbrella - India is adamant and have never agreed to zero sum game. Emporium Current Essays 285 Technology respects technology, and strength respects strength. J)r. A. Kalam, Indian Missile wizard. Indian stance to reject the CTBT is typically negative. India has stated that it would not sign the CTBT as drafted. India's Ambassador

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developed countries have already made ~""~^~~~~~""""~°~~"~ stunning cuts in their armed forces - and even nuclear assets. It is interesting to see what the ambassador had to say in support of her rejection of the CTBT (and thus nearly closing the door). She said" ... substantive disarmament provision in the treaty have been blocked by some delegates. Weak and woefully inadequate disarmament such as those contained in (the draft) cannot meet our concerns" Continuing with her lambaste she said" ... talk of new doctrines and targeting strategies being developed for nuclear weapons (which) are attracting consideration for the against chemical or biological attack" is a proof of that CTBT is not a disarmament measures.

Quoting George Perkovich - writing in the Arms Control Today Vol 26 No.'4 May-June 1996 PP-II-16 (while relating to the objections of the Indian ambassador) says "... These objections, combined with the transfer of nuclear weapon technology from China to Pakistan made India conclude that it cannot accept any restraints on its capability, of other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligations of eliminate their nuclear weapons." So here we are and this is the stubborn Indian stance. And how much stubborn India could be is clear from the fact that the only votes against the draft were India, Libya and S. Bhutan, which indicates the extent of international support to CTBT. It is interesting to see how inflexible India could be. In spite of its very best efforts at Geneva - the CTBT made a break through at New York as indicated above. "The treaty negotiations almost failed in Geneva not because of technical details or lack of effort on the part of diplomats. It was political differences between the five "declared" nuclear powers America, Russia Gt. Britain France and China -- and one threshold nuclear power that eventually made a formal circumvention of the disarmament conference necessary. India did not only criticise the lack of a time table for nuclear disarmament, it also objected to the fact that in the treaty its ratification was made precondition for the treaty to come into286 Emporium Current Essays Emporium Current Essays 287 effect. According to a German journal "the majority of the nuclear powers wanted to ensure that if they were going to tie their own hands, then the threshold nuclear nations of India, Pakistan and Israel would have to be in the same boat. They therefore insisted on a list of names. India however regarded this as intimidation. It argued that it was the part of the sovereign of every country to be able to freely decide whether or not to sign a treaty." Pakistan's attitude as usual was saner and accommodative and not obstructive like India. Having done this act of obstruction -- the Indian ambassador at Geneva Arundhati Ghose became at sort of a heroine in India as she never let her be intimidated by the American negotiator Stephen J. Ledogar, Till and she maintained that superpower's exclusive possession of nuclear weapons is a modern form of subjugation. From the above it is quite clear - that India has hegemonistic designs and always supports those actions which further those nefarious designs. In fact India does not want peace in the region and thinks that she is being discriminated by the superpowers. India has a massive missile and space programmes along with fabrication of launch vehicles - Thanks.to Dr. A Kalam - who incidentally got his initial training in USA. He has openly said that India can make any missile she wishes from short range tactical

missiles to ICBMs - and mind you that is in spite of the so called curbs by MTCR and other arms control measures, India openly flouts these. India does not admit itself to be a 'rogue' state - and calls both the 1974 - Pakharan Nuclear Explosion' - and the launching of 2300 km range missile - 'Agni' -- as 'technological testing'. And only recently there was evidence that India was getting ready for another explosion at Pokharan. This evidence had been gathered by a US satellite. And surely if India signs NPT and CTBT -- her wings are cut to some extend. India therefore will never sign these treaties. General De Gaule once said "Peace treaties are like a flower or a beautiful girl, these last as long as these last." Late President Nixon, a great peace negotiator has almost the same feeling which he expounded in his book (Real Peace). According to his considered opinion, many a meaningful treaty are just like items in the junkyard of history almost abardoned, neglected and unheeded for. So we have a ;'.n»nge predicament in Pakistan where our real enemy is terribly i'usive and at the same time has the military assets and infrastructure wh'ch we cannot match. There is a I yawning asymmetry both in the conventional and nuclear assets of India and Pakistan. Pakistan can never match India man for man, tank for tank or in the nuclear assets. Pakistan's only asset is perhaps the power to 'deter' and as Song as we can maintain this power - India will think twice to harm us. Pakistan's missile accepts are rudimentary I am talking of Half series - who have hardly any worthwhile guidance system. We have no satellites of our own - and our performance in other Emerging Technologies (ET) is not very encouraging either. And with the current Indo-Israeli nexus - India is going to become a real growth industry as far as defence hardware is concerned. India has already acquired Israeli UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) - and other sophisticated hardware for the update of their tanks and fighter aircraft. Some more items like the antimissile missile 'Allow' - may be in the pipeline. Under these rather harrowing conditions - it is but imperative that Pakistan must have the option of a nuclear umbrella -- or else Pakistan would never match wily India. There is no doubt that both India and Pakistan consume almost 3 to 6 per cent of GDP on defence which is not only burdensome - but which is. unbearable for the two poor cour'.ries. But then in matters of security economics hardly plays much part. It is the honourable survival which matters. Hence if India did not sign the CTBT purely on the grounds of preservation of self esteem - Pakistan's is equally cogent. The official stand being" ... We have always held that the real threat of (nuclear) proliferation in South Asia emanates from India which not

only has carried out a nuciear weapon test (in 1974) -- but is actively developing nuclear capable missiles. It's opposition"to the CTBT is essentially due to its political ambitions and technological considerations rather than a moralistic arguments about nuclear disarmament." From the above the following policy statement of Pakistan on the issue follows: "... Responding to the Indian position on the CTBT, Pakistan apparently made known its decision, the continued its nuclear development ... and declared that Pakistan cannot be oblivious of the threats posed to its security which are intensified by India's position on test ban treaty. We reserve the right to response adequately to any nuclear escalation by India. Regrettably CTBT brings no divided to South Asia." A little analysis would show that in both cases - in the case of NPT and CTBT -- our reaction is more reactive than basic which is mainly due to the nature of the threat perception. Otherwise who is not aware of the desolation and destruction which can be caused288 Emporium Current Essays by a nuclear attack - and if it is sufficiently intensive - it can cause what the environmentalist call 'Nuclear Winter*. In Ihe conditions of 'nuclear winter' no.form of life - man, animal or plant is possible. We therefore notwithstanding the option outlined above for arms control in South Asia might consider the havoc at Nagasaki and Hiroshima too and try to create an atmosphere of give and take as good neighbours rather than fly for each other throat. We have seen no peace in South Asia_ "since the partition -- for the last 50 years or so. I think we have never really tried for it. There is still time to do it. I wouid like to elaborate peace environments here - now that we are talking about real peace. "Peace is like a delicate plant. It has to be constantly tended and nurtured, if it is to survive ... if we •"

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and scores of smaller wars has nearly uprooted it time auu uga.... *,. has managed to survive, but is far from safe. It is not a grim burden but an inspiring challenge to build and sustain real peace. Given the alternative of suicidal war, we must not fail..." I am not advocating that we should take it lying down or lower our guard against India what I am advocating are the age old measures of confidence building and other artefact to reduce friction and near war atmosphere - which can best be resolved across a conference table. We have seen three were infractions (and perhaps suicidal for us in one case).

We usually play down the role of ACDA - but ACDA seems to have made considerable efforts in defusing the tension in South Asia -- but of course shorter than the acceptance of NPT and CTBT. Seme of the existing confidence building measures are: -4> Bilateral agreement on avoidance of air space violations, r otification of military exercises, and an- establishment of a communication link at the senior military level. =>

Agreement on not attack each other's nuclear assets and the

exchange cf the list of these facilities. => signatories of the

Pledging 01 both India and Pakistan as

Paris (1993) - CWC.(Chemical Weapons Convention), => Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) by

Offer of a i Nuclear

Pakistan - to which India of course remained opposed. :=> Besides the above senior officials of ACDA including the Director of ACDA have visited India to coax India - and Emporium Current Essays 289 impress upon India the benefits of non-proliferation and other arms control measures. Pakistan's stance as I have already said, is reactive. So let us see what the Indian stance really is. Giri Deshingkar while explaining Indian stance (See Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban) Edited by Dr. Eric Arnett -- Sipri 1996 says" ... Although the Indian Govt's view that NPT is highly discriminatory is correct, India should still relinquish the nuclear weapons option. This option has served no Indian interest. India has learned to live in a discriminatory world when it comes to economic, political and conventional military power. It can just as easily cope with an equal nuclear world while seeking to make it less unequal through means other than the possession of nuclear weapons... By rejecting incremental steps such as NPT, nuclear free zones and arms limitations -- India is not taking the world towards complete, universal nuclear disarmament. Such as argument is dismissed as woolly thinking by the current generation of opinion makers in India, who claim it does not accommodate the hard realities of international life ... Giving up the nuclear option while on the road to CTBT is clearly not in the cards. The next best step then is to tackle India's immediate fear: nuclear threats from Pakistan and China. While these threats have largely been manufactured to justify India's undeclared nuclear programme, in the minds of Indian opinion makers they are treated as real threats. At that level at least, the edge of the threats can be dulled by adopting confidence-building measures. Even among the policy makers, there are those who have been inclined to try confidence-building measures."

Pakistani response to Indian nuclearisation is more or less based on a declared policy of ambiguity which has been discussed here and there in this presentation. However, in terms of arms control Pakistan has shown more flexibility. The main worry of Pakistan like India is what will happen if the deterrence fails - and war fighting becomes inevitable. It is due to this contingency that the arms race is continuing unabated. There is no doubt that there is an open ended nuclear competition going on between India and Pakistan and the only key to reduce this "is to attempt to freeze the nuclear status quo, thereby putting an end the process of action and reaction that is propelling India and Pakistan towards nuclear arming, while at the same time seeking to address the underlying security concerns that have made this policy attractive ... "And again at the cost of some repetition I wouid quote recommendation of "maintaining these290 Emporium Current Essays restraints and adopting cautious mutual measures to reduce the momentum towards nuclear arming, even if they are relatively modest, could interrupt the escalatory pattern of provocation and reaction triggered by advances in either country's nuclear programme." Arms control - and proliferation are terribly complex issues especially in the case of Pakistan and India - and the options too are limited and not quite transparent. Here is my own assessment of the type of arms control if this can be negotiated and the set of option: 0 Creation of a strategic stability in the region. 0 Reduction in the cost of defence and thus making if cost effective and less burdensome. 0 Arms control a political imperative -- and not a military issue. 0 Arms control is the first important step in controlling nuclear proliferation. 0 Any arms control agreement must be based on equality and must ensure strategic stability. Neither party can feel secure unless both feel secure. 0 Arms control must restrict the rest of new missile technology which can destabilise strategic balance.

0 It must reduce/eliminate - and no just limit the nuclear arsenal. 0 It must discourage credible 'first strike' capability. And finally the arms control must ensure (after due verification) a true balance of power. Equality in numbers is important, but equality alone is not the sole criterion The important thing is that the competing sides must not have unequal military capability.