Admin Midterm Case Digest Compilation.docx

PART IV ELECTION PERIOD ROBERT F. ONG VS. MARIA TERESITA HERRERA-MARTINEZ One Liner: The appointment referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil Service Law; if appointment is for elective position under the Local Government Code, it is not a violation. Facts: Councilor Saturnino Herrera who represented the Third District of Manila died while his term was not yet finished. This left the position open for the appointment of a qualified replacement from the same political party where he belonged. Thus, Petitioner Robert F. Ong assails the appointment and assumption of duties as Councilor in the City Council of Manila of respondent Ma. Teresita Herrera-Martinez. (basically, both of them were appointed but through different ways and they are questioning each other's appointment) Petitioner's appointment: Petitioner, who was a defeated candidate of the Liberal Party, on the strength of an indorsement by the Treasurer of the said party in the district was appointed on February 9, 1989 as member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) by the Secretary of Local Government. In a regular session, the City Council moved to exclude petitioner and the other appointees from the session hall (ouch). Respondent's appointment: Nine out of the eleven incumbent LP Councilors in the City Council endorsed the appointment of respondent per their resolution. This resolution was forwarded to the Ofice of the Chairman of the Liberal Party, Manila Chapter. On March 1, 1989, aforesaid Chairman, in turn, nominated respondent for appointment per his letter - nomination to President Corazon Aquino thru the Secretary of Local Government. Senate President Jovito Salonga as National Head of the Liberal Party was furnished with a copy of this letter - nomination. President Salonga, in turn, nominated respondent to Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of Local Government pursuant to Section 50 of the Local Government Code. On March 17, 1989, Secretary Santos, acting for the President, issued an appointment to respondent. Then on March 21, 1989, the first session day after respondent's appointment, the City Council, by a vote of twenty-four members in favor with no member opposing, recognized her as member of said Council. Respondent thus assumed and performed her duties as Councilor for the Third District of Manila until the restraining order of the Court issued on April 20, 1989 was received by respondent. Petitioner's contention: The Secretary of the Department of Local Government, in appointing respondent Martinez on March 17, 1989, violated the election ban on appointments under Res. No. 2054 of the Comelec dated December 7, 1988 since her appointment was not cleared for exemption from the election ban.

Issue: W/N the appointment of Martinez during election period is a violation of the election ban on appointments Ruling: 1. SUB-ISSUE (skip if not asked) Martinez' appointment followed proper procedure (sorry Ong, it was legit) Based on the Liberal Party's own rules, Martinez was rightfully chosen by the Party President Salonga. Acting on the solid recommendation of the LP hierarchy, from the district level up to the national level, the Secretary of Local Government correspondingly issued the letterappointment to respondent Martinez. The minutes of said session reveal that twenty-four (24) councilors voted to accept the appointment of respondent and not a single member objected to or opposed the acceptance. Right then and there, the Presiding Oficer announced the acceptance of respondent's appointment and the Chair directed the Secretariat to include her name as a new member of the City Council. Meanwhile, Ong's appointment was not. Ong was formally excluded from sessions and not recognized. As a conclusive conirmation of the non-recognition of petitioner’s defective appointment, the Secretary of Local Government recalled the former’s appointment in his letter of March 17, 1989. Reason cited for recall was that he was not appointed by the appropriate leader of the Liberal Party. 2. MAIN ISSUE: Election ban does not apply; vacant position is ELECTIVE one under Local Government Code Both petitioner and respondent have invoked the election ban imposed under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The election ban covered the period from February 11 to March 27, 1989 by reason of the Barangay election held on March 28, 1989. Cited provision: Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code provides thus: "(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. - During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employees , whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election. The aforequoted provision does not apply to both assailed appointments because of the following reason: The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is governed by the Local Government Code while the appointment referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil Service Law. For having satisfied the formal requisites and procedure for appointment as Councilor, which is an official position outside the contemplation of the election ban, respondent's appointment is declared valid.

PEOPLE V REYES One Liner: 1. Maniego could not be charged with failing to secure the approval of the COMELEC when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the subject were yet inexistent; 2. Before the effectivity of these rules, it cannot be said that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, was already enforceable. Facts: Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection District II, Bureau of Customs, Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued MICP Customs Personnel Order No. 21-92 dated January 10, 1992 assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Ofice of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. The actual transfer of Ebio was made on January 14, 1992. (DATE IMPORTANT) On May 4, 1992, Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections. COMELEC filed on May 6, 1995 an information with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg 881. Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992 (IMPORTANT DATE; JUST ONE FRICKIN DAY LATER), the date of effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. RTC granted motion to quash. Issue: W/N Maniego can be punished for transferring Ebio during election when the COMELEC's IRR implementing such transfer ban has not yet been effective Ruling: No, he cannot. SC affirms RTC "Sec. 261. Prohibited acts. — The following shall be guilty of any election offense: xxx xxx xxx (h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. — Any public oficial who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any oficer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval ofthe Commission :" The Constitution has fixed the election period for all elections to commence ninety (90) days before the day of election and end thirty (30) days thereafter, unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the COMELEC.

Prescinding from this predicate, two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations. Here, COMELEC designated January 12, 1992 to June 10, 1992 as the election period. Transfer of complainant Ebio on January 14, 1992 was made during the election period but Maniego is not liable. Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a government oficer or employee during the election period. It allows transfer subject to approval of COMELEC. The instructions on how to obtain such approval is in the COMELEC Resolution. Nonetheless, it was only in Resolution No. 2333 which took effect on January 15, 1992 that COMELEC promulgated the necessary rules on how to get its approval on the transfer, ORCEO V COMELEC One Liner: Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. Facts: Resolution No. 8714, promulgated by the COMELEC, contains the implementing rules and regulations of Sec. 32 and Section 33 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166 . Section 1 of Resolution No. 8714 prohibits an unauthorized person from bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including all public buildings, streets, parks, and private vehicles or public conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, during the election period. Under Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714, the term "firearm" includes "airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real." Hence, airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are included in the gun ban during the election period from January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010 (MAIN ISSUE OF CASE). Petitioner's contention: COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in including "airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations" in the deinition of "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714, since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that mentions "airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations." He asserts that the intendment of R.A. No. 7166 is that the term "firearm" refers to real firearm in its common and ordinary usage. ISSUE: whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term "irearm" in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714 Ruling:

COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in this case. Petitioner contends that under R.A. No. 7166, the term "firearm" connotes real irearm. Moreover, R.A. No. 7166 does not mention airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations. Hence, its implementing rules and regulations contained in Resolution No. 8714 should not include airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the deinition of the term "firearm." Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law . Evidently, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to issue the implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. Under this broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport irearms or other deadly weapons, as well as the deinition of "irearms," among others. These details are left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and expertise on election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In its Comment, the COMELEC, represented by the Ofice of the Solicitor General, states that the COMELEC's intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term "firearm" and their resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun, which is sought to be averted. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections this year. The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period is a reasonable restriction, the objective ofwhich is to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. However, the Court excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns from the term "firearm" under Resolution No. 8714, because they are not subject to any regulation, unlike airsoft guns (Any person who desires to possess an airsoft rile/pistol needs a license from the PNP. A license to possess an airsoft gun, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.) GALLARDO VS. TABAMO, JR. January 29, 1993 218 SCRA 253 ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVEZ, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYAN, PRIMO NAVARRO and NOEL NAVARRO, petitioners, vs. HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, respondents. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners seek to prohibit, restrain and enjoin respondent Judge Tabamo from continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer’s suit. At the time of filing both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. Petitioners Arevalo, Echavez, Aranas, and Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer, and provincial budget officer of Camiguin. Their copetitioners Rambuyon, Primo and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other hand, the private respondent was the incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional district of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections and the Regional Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X. FACTS: On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project. The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment. On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.

Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov. Antonio R. Gallardo were both candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the positions of congressmen and governor, respectively, of Camiguin. They belonged to opposing political factions and were in a bitter electoral battle. On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections, Cong. Romualdo filed a petition docketed as Special Civil Action No. 465 before the RTC of Camiguin presided by Judge Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Budget Officer as respondents. In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to prohibit and restrain the respondents from undertaking and/or pursuing certain public works projects and from disbursing, releasing, and/ or spending public funds for said projects, allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881); that the public works projects were commenced without the approved detailed engineering plans and specification and corresponding program of works; that the expenditures of the 20% development fund for projects other than for maintenance violated the Local Government Code; that locally funded projects had been pursued without the provincial budget having been first approved, and reviewed by the Department of Budget and Management; and that the illegal prosecution of the said public works projects requiring massive outlay or public funds during the election period was done maliciously and intentionally to corrupt voters and induce them to support the candidacy of Gov. Gallardo and his ticket in the May 11, 1992 elections. The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment. On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court. The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election

Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read: "SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — xxx xxx xxx (b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. — xxx xxx xxx (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for: (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following: xxx xxx xxx (w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. — During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before aspecial election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any publicworks, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph, or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds." Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial court is for the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of elections. ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465 due to the alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)? RULING: The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage -- the citizenry’s vital weapon in

effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability. Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the following powers: "1) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders. The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure. 2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing.” Resolution No. 2332 of the COMELEC, promulgated on 2 January 1992, implementing the aforesaid paragraphs (v) and (w) of Section 261 and fixing the duration of the 45-day ban for purposes of the synchronized elections from 27 March 1992 to 11 May 1922. Under the present law, however, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or hiring of new employees or the creation or filling up of new positions in any government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government owned or controlled corporations, is banned during the period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before a special election if made without the prior authority of the Commission on Elections. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the partylist system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy.

Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority. The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis their resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465 The present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission on Elections broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rulemaking power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. One Liner: Under the present law, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or hiring of new employees or the creation or filing up of new positions in any government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, is banned during the period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before a special election if made without the prior authority of the Commission on Elections. A violation thereof constitutes an election offense. BAGUMBAYAN-VNP v COMELEC One Liner: It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample discretion to administer the elections, but certainly, its constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." Facts: Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition before this court to compel respondent Commission on Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail security feature. For the 2016 National and Local Elections, the Commission on Elections has opted to use the Vote-Counting Machine. The votecounting machine is a "paper-based automated election system." It has a VVPAT functionality in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine. Petitioners: Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections unlawfully neglected to perform its legal duty of fully implementing our election laws, specifically Republic Act No. 8436, Section 6(e), (f), and (n), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. Petitioners seek to compel the Commission on Elections to have the vote-counting machine issue receipts once a person has voted. The VVPAT "will ensure transparency and reduce any attempt to alter the results of the elections." COMELEC:

The poll body has decided against printing the receipt because it might be used for vote buying and that it would result in the vote-counting process being extended from six to seven hours since it takes about 13 seconds to print a receipt, meaning each machine would have to run for that long for the receipts. Bautista said another "big concern" is that "there might be losing candidates who might question the results, basically instructing their supporters that when the machine prints out the receipt, regardless of what the receipt says, they will say that it's not correct." Issue: whether the Commission on Elections may be compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to enable the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections Ruling: Petition granted. Through a writ of mandamus, the courts "compel the performance of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent" by operation of his or her office, trust, or station. The inaction of the Commission on Elections in utilizing the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting machines fails to fulill the duty required under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system to have the capability of providing a voterveriied paper audit trail. Based on the technical specifications during the bidding, the current vote-counting machines should meet the minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT. However, the Commission on Elections' act of rendering inoperative this feature runs contrary to why the law required this feature in the irst place. Under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, it is considered a policy of the state that the votes relect the genuine will of the People. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections. The law is clear. A "voter veriied paper audit trail" requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. There appears to be no room for further interpretation of a "voter verified paper audit trail." The paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical ballot, because there may be instances where the machine may translate the ballot differently, or the voter inadvertently spoils his or her ballot. In Maliksi v. Commission on Elections , the losing mayoralty candidate questioned the result of the elections. Upon inspection of the physical ballots, several votes were invalidated due to the presence of double-

shading. However, when the digital printouts of the ballots were checked, the questioned ballots only had single shade. The physical ballots were tampered to invalidate several votes. The situation in Maliksi could have been avoided if the Commission on Elections utilized the paper audit trail feature of the voting machines. The VVPAT ensures that the candidates selected by the voter in his or her ballot are the candidates voted upon and recorded by the votecounting machine. The voter himself or herself verifies the accuracy of the vote. In instances of Random Manual Audit and election protests, the VVPAT becomes the best source of raw data for votes. It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample discretion to administer the elections, but certainly, its constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." The Commission is not given the constitutional competence to amend or modify the law it is sworn to uphold. Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is law. Should there be policy objections to it, the remedy is to have Congress amend it. The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to assuage its fears regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures. The Commission on Elections has the power to choose the appropriate procedure in order to enforce the VVPAT requirement under the law, and balance it with the constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. EJERCITO V COMELEC Topic: Campaign Expenses Facts: 



Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC against (Petitioner) Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. The petition alleges two causes of action: (1) Ejercito, during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna the “Orange Card.” Given that the “Orange Card” could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs, it qualifies as a material consideration in convincing the voters to cast their votes for Ejercito’s favor in clear violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code; (2) Under Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the aggregate amount that a candidate may spend for election campaign shall be “P3.00 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy”







The Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to P4,576,566.00. However, for television campaign commercials alone, Ejercito already spent P23,730,784. Even assuming that Ejercito was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still paid the sum of P16,611,549. Hence, Ejercito committed an election offense under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code On May 17, 2013, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna. Based on the Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’ 471,209 votes. The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed for the dismissal of the petition which was improperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for election offenses, thus, the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar. Also, San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, that he (Ejercito) was previously convicted or declared by final judgment for being guilty of, or found by the COMELEC of having committed, the punishable acts under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Ejercito likewise asserted that the petition questioning his qualification was rendered moot and academic by his proclamation as the duly-elected Provincial Governor of Laguna for the term 2013-2016.



The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. While the division rejected the first cause of action for failure to substantiate the same, it found that Ejercito had accepted donations of PhP 20,197,170.25 and PhP 3,366,195.05 from Scenema Concept International, Inc. (SCI) in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBN’s Channel 2. Even assuming that the actual cost of both advertising contracts only amounted to PhP12,818,470.56, it nevertheless supports the finding that Ejercito exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00 which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68 (c) and concurrently an election offense pursuant to Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.



The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito. One ground for disqualification listed in Section 68 is spending in an election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law. Hence, COMELEC has

jurisdiction over the petition. 

As to Ejercito’s assertion that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that the filing of an election offense and the factual determination on the existence of probable cause are required before a disqualification case based on Section 68 of the OEC may proceed, the COMELEC En Banc cited Lanot vs. Comelec which declared that each of the acts listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC has two aspects – electoral and criminal. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation.



Meanwhile, Vice-Governor Hernandez was sworn in as the Governor of Laguna

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THIRD PARTIES ARE INCLUDED IN THE ELECTION SPENDING LIMIT SET UNDER THE LAW. YES. SC RULING: The Court shall rule on Ejercito's proposition that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations He vigorously asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution made by third parties in favor of the candidates, while the limit set by law, as appearing in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to election expenditures of candidates. We deny. Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus: SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. — The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows: (a) For candidates — Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and (b) For political parties — Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. 119 Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166. These provisions, which are merely amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned, read:

SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. — No candidate shall spend for his election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he led his candidacy: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, That where the land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate. SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties. — A duly accredited political party may spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates an aggregate amount not exceeding the equivalent of one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered therein. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters, or committees of such political party shall be included in the computation of the total expenditures of the political party. Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as expenses of their respective individual candidates and subject to limitation under Section 100 of this Code. SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures. — No person, except the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer, shall make any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any candidate or political party. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate or the treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such candidate or political party. The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the Commission signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the party and showing the expenditures so authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis supplied) The focal query is: "the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate " and "except the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer" found in Sections 100 and 103, respectively, of the OEC? Do these provisions exclude from the allowable election expenditures the contributions of third parties made with the consent of the candidate? The Court holds not. When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would lead to absurdity, impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory construction may be resorted to such as the legislative history of the law for the purpose of solving doubt, and that courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws on the same subject matter in order to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the law. Looking back, it could be found that Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the

OEC are substantially lifted from P.D. No. 1296, as amended. Sections 51, 52 and 54 of which specifically provide: Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. — No candidate shall spend for his election campaign an amount more than the salary or the equivalent of the total emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred by the candidate, his contributors and supporters, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, That, where the land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate. In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they shall not spend more than sixty thousand pesos for their election campaign. Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties, groups or aggrupations. — A political party, group or aggrupation may not spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates an aggregate amount more than the equivalent of fty centavos for every voter currently registered therein: Provided, That expenses incurred by such political party, group or aggrupation not duly registered with the Commission and/or not presenting or supporting a complete list of candidates shall be considered as expenses of its candidates and subject to the limitation under Section 51 of this Code. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters or committees of a political party, group or aggrupation shall be included in the computation of the total expenditures of the political party, group or aggrupation. (Emphasis supplied) Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures. — No person, except the candidate or any person authorized by him or the treasurer of a political party, group or aggrupation, shall make any expenditure in support of, or in opposition to any candidate or political party, group or aggrupation. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate of the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation shall be considered as expenditure of such candidate or political party, group or aggrupation. The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the Commission, signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation and showing the expenditure so authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis supplied) Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388 (otherwise known as the "Election Code of 1971") was enacted. Sections 41 and 42 of which are relevant, to quote: Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of Candidates. — No candidate shall spend for his election campaign more than the total amount of salary for the full term attached to the office for which he is a candidate. Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of Political Parties and Other Non- political Organizations. — No political party as de ned in this

Code shall spend for the election of its candidates an aggregate amount more than the equivalent of one peso for every voter currently registered throughout the country in case of a regular election, or in the constituency in which the election shall be held in case of a special election which is not held in conjunction with a regular election. Any other organization not connected with any political party, campaigning for or against a candidate, or for or against a political party shall not spend more than a total amount of five thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied) Much earlier, Section 12 (G) of R.A. No. 6132, which implemented the resolution of both Houses of Congress calling for a constitutional convention, explicitly stated: Section 12. Regulations of Election Spending and Propaganda. — The following provisions shall govern election spending and propaganda in the election provided for in this Act: xxx xxx xxx ( G ) All candidates and all other persons making or receiving expenditures, contributions or donations which in their totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further or oppose the candidacy of any candidate, shall le a statement of all such expenditures and contributions made or received on such dates and with such details as the Commission on Elections shall prescribe by rules. The total expenditures made by a candidate, or by any other person with the knowledge and consent of the candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied) In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said, therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate limit of the former's election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase "those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate" is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or donated in the candidate's behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should We.) There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate's allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters' rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law's concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution. Indeed, to rule

otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PETITIONER VS. HON. DOLORES ESPAÑOL, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 149164-73 TOPIC: Prosecution of election offenses FACTS: In the 1998 elections in Cawit, Cavite, Lakas municipal mayor candidate Florentino Bautista filed a complaint for vote-buying against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor. The Law Department of the COMELEC filed an information for vote-buying in the RTC. Bautista’s witnesses in the vote-buying case were then charged with vote-selling. They were filed informations for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code in the RTC. Respondents in the vote-selling case appealed the resolution of the provincial prosecutor to the COMELEC, contending that the COMELEC had the exclusive power to conduct the preliminary investigation of their cases as well as the power to review recommendations of the investigating officers. In the meantime, proceedings against the accused in the vote-selling case were suspended in the RTC. The COMELEC Law Department issued a resolution recommending that the resolution of the provincial prosecutor finding probable cause in the vote-selling case be declared null and void. The COMELEC cited Sec. 28 (4) of R.A. No. 6646 or (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) which exempted from criminal prosecution persons guilty of votebuying or vote-selling who voluntarily give information and willingly testify on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding. The COMELEC en banc subsequently approved the recommendation of the Law Department. With this, the COMELEC Law Department filed the motion to dismiss with the public prosecutor. However, the prosecutor opposed said motion on the ground that Sec. 28 applied to vote-buying and not to vote-selling, which was the crime charged on the accused. a) Petitioner’s Arguments – (COMELEC – Won) The prosecution of election offenses is under its sole control. Any delegation of its authority to the Provincial or City Prosecutor to prosecute election cases may be revoked or withdrawn by it, expressly or impliedly, at any stage of the proceedings in the RTC. b) Respondent’s Arguments – (Judge Español – Lost) The COMELEC Resolution nullifying the provincial prosecutor’s finding of probable cause was approved only by four of the seven members of the petitioner sitting en banc. As such, this could not have validly revoked the earlier resolution denying the appeal of the accused in the vote-selling case which was approved by unanimous vote of the Commission Members sitting en banc. The respondent judge contended that the COMELEC should have reinvestigated the votebuying and vote-selling cases to determine whether the respondents in the vote-selling case were exempt from prosecution therefrom.

The respondent judge averred that under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, both the vote-buyer and the vote-seller must be charged, investigated and prosecuted. She contended that vote-buyers cannot be exempt from criminal liability for vote-buying because there can be no vote-buying without someone selling his vote. Preliminary investigations of the charges for vote-buying and vote-selling must be jointly conducted. The judge also argued that Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is contrary to Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, which does not allow the petitioner to withdraw its deputation of Provincial or City Prosecutors. ISSUES: 1. Whether the accused are exempt from criminal prosecution under RA 6646 2. Whether there is no need for an en banc resolution revoking the authority of the provincial prosecutor from handling the cases filed in court FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court: The trial court ruled that COMELEC had no absolute power to grant exemptions under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648. The trial court also held that the issue of whether or not the accused are exempt from prosecution and consequent conviction for vote-buying is a matter addressed to the Court and not to the petitioner. FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals: N/A, brought to SC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court RULING: The petition is granted. Rule: 1. Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 governs the prosecution of the crimes of vote-buying and vote-selling, thus:

2.

SECTION 28. Prosecution of Vote-buying and Vote-selling. — The presentation of a complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter's acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legal officers, under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Section 5, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that: SEC. 5. Quorum; Votes Required. — (a) When sitting en banc,four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.

Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The COMELEC may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government. In Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, all Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or their respective assistants are given continuing authority as its deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner or its duly authorized representatives. Application: 1. Yes, they are exempt. By voluntarily offering to give information on violations of Section 261(a) and (b) and testify against the culprits, one opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself is a party to any violation of the law. In exchange for his testimony, the law gives him immunity from investigation and prosecution for any offense in Section 261 (a) and (b) with reference to which his information is given. He is, therefore, assured that his testimony cannot be used by the prosecutors and any authorities in any respect, and that his testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on him. The testimony of a voluntary witness in accord with his sworn statement operates as a pardon for the criminal charges to which it relates. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is mandated to conduct a preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same. The general rule is that the COMELEC must investigate, charge and prosecute all those committing election offenses without any discrimination to ensure a clean, orderly and speedy elections. A joint preliminary investigation thereof must be conducted and the appropriate Information filed in court against all the offenders. To enable the COMELEC to comply with its mandate to investigate and prosecute those committing election offenses, it has been vested with authority under the last paragraph of Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6648 to exempt those who have committed election offenses under Section 261 (a) and (b) but volunteer to give informations and testify on any violation of said law in any official investigation or proceeding with reference to which his information and testimony is given. The law is an immunity statute which grants transactional immunity to volunteers from investigation and prosecution for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The immunity statute seeks a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate demands of government to encourage citizens, including law violators themselves, to testify against law violators.

2.

No, there is no need for an en banc resolution for the COMELEC to revoke authority of the provincial prosecutor. The respondent has failed to cite any COMELEC rule which requires the unanimous votes of all its Commissioners sitting en banc for the reversal or revocation of a prior resolution approved by unanimous vote. In this case, COMELEC Resolution No. 00-2453 was approved by four of the seven Commissioners of the petitioner, three of whom were on official leave. Irrefragably, the said resolution of the petitioner giving due course to the appeal of the respondents-appellants in I.S. No. 199-1087 was a valid reversal of COMELEC Resolution No. 00-1378 which initially denied the said appeal of the respondents-appellants. The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the need for prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are subject to its authority, control and supervision in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the petitioner itself. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the petitioner, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the petitioner. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the petitioner, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by the petitioner are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the petitioner in relation to election cases such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute. Otherwise, the only option of such provincial or city prosecutor is to seek relief from the petitioner as its deputy. Conclusion: The prosecution of election offenses is under the sole control of the COMELEC, who can revoke its delegated authority at any stage in the proceedings. THIRD DIVISION [A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009. March 5, 1996.] ALBERTO NALDOZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JUAN LAVILLES, JR., respondent. FACTS: Alberto Naldoza was the barangay chairman of Brgy. Kirayan, Tacas, Miagao, Iloilo. He ran for re-election in the May 8, 1994 elections. Spouses Flame and spouses Piedad accused him of vote-buying. The Chief of Police of Miagao with whom the charge was lodged, filed two separate complaints against Naldoza for violation of Section 21, Article XII of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881). Both cases were assigned to respondent judge's court. Respondent examined the private complainants and adopted the transcript of the question-and-answer type of examination conducted by the Chief of Police and sworn to by the parties. Judge Lavilles found probable cause to believe that Naldoza committed the crime, so he issued warrants for the arrest in the 2 criminal cases, fixing the bail at P10,000.00 in each case. Complainant was then arrested and detained.

The Judge ordered that Naldoza appear before the court and submit counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses within 10 days from receipt of copy of the complaints and affidavits of prosecution witnesses [Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended]. Naldoza filed a motion to quash the complaint and to lift the warrants on the ground that the preliminary investigation was irregularly conducted and the warrants improperly issued, denying him due process. The motion was denied by Lavilles and referred the cases to the COMELEC for further proceedings but however reconsidered this referral and instead remanded the cases to the Chief of Police of Miagao, Iloilo with instructions to file it directly with the provincial prosecutor. The warrants of arrest were lifted and Naldoza's release was ordered. Naldoza filed an administrative complaint with the CHR, protesting the irregularity in the conduct of preliminary investigation, the improper issuance of the warrants of arrest, and for ignorance of law. CHR recommended that an administrative complaint be filed against respondent for issuance of an unjust interlocutory order and ignorance of law which resulted in the arrest and incarceration of complainant Alberto Naldoza. This was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator. ISSUES: 1. Was there irregularity in the preliminary investigation? Yes. 2. Were the warrants of arrest properly issued? Yes. Respondent’s arguments: - There was no irregularity in the preliminary investigation because vote-buying is punishable by a penalty of imprisonment of not less than 1 year but not more than 6 years (Sec. 264, Omnibus Election Code), and pursuant to RA No. 7691 the jurisdiction of MTCs was expanded, such that the said offense is now within its exclusive jurisdiction. - The certification of affidavits of complaining witnesses was not necessary because their testimonies were reduced in writing and signed under oath - There was no improper issuance of the warrants of arrest, because he examined the witnesses and conducted searching questions before issuing the warrants and the necessity of placing complainant under arrest is a matter addressed to judicial discretion. -He is not liable for ignorance of law. The complaint which commenced Criminal Cases Nos. 1726 and 1727 was filed on May 10, 1994, barely 45 days after the passage of the aforementioned COMELEC Resolution. It would hardly be fair, respondent continued, to expect him to be immediately aware of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2695. Findings of the Office of the Court Administrator (which the SC agreed with): - An examination of COMELEC Resolution No. 2695 shows that it applies only to preliminary examination by the Chief of Police or his duly authorized PNP representative, of violations of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; it presupposes warrantless arrest of respondent by the arresting officer or policeman. It basically underscores that all persons apprehended for violations of the election bans and the Omnibus Election Code are subject to preliminary investigation and the process for taking a respondent’s statement requiring an affidavit of the arresting officer. It also states that the Chief

of Police shall file the complaint with the nearest provincial/city prosecutor for purpose of preliminary investigation at the earliest possible time for the said violations, supported by the affidavits.

respondent's actuations in conducting the preliminary investigation and in ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest against complainant, a fine of P5,000.00 is deemed proper under the circumstances.

- Since the complainant was not under detention when the complaint was filed before the Chief of Police, the regular court procedure as in the Rules of Court should apply and not COMELEC Resolution No. 2695. Thus, despite respondent's admission that he was not aware of said COMELEC Resolution, his lack of knowledge and non-compliance therewith should not be taken against him as a manifestation of culpability for gross ignorance of the law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. is ordered to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act in the future will subject him to a more severe penalty. SO ORDERED.

- pursuant to Sections 265 and 267 of the OEB the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code; and RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The metropolitan or municipal trial court, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any election offense under the Code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264 OEB), it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases, as and exception to the general provisions of BP Blg. 129, as amended. The amendment of BP Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. - The OCA concluded that: It appears from the foregoing account that respondent's actuations are tainted with irregularities beginning from the moment that he took cognizance of the case and issued warrant of arrest. Sections 265 and 268 OEB directs the COMELEC to conduct the preliminary investigation and the Regional Trial Court to hear the cases. Respondent contradicted his assertion that the cases fall under his jurisdiction when he subsequently ordered complainant to file his counter-affidavit for preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 112 of Rules of Court. On the other hand, we believe that he was appraised of the fact that he has no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the cases when he ordered their referral to the COMELEC. We submit that, at this juncture, respondent should have ordered the release of complainant in deference to the findings of the COMELEC, and, in view of the fact, that the warrant of arrest was erroneously issued by a court acting without its jurisdiction. RULING: A judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the factual basis of the complaint and the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have greater faith in the administration of justice if judges are not cursorily excused of apparent deficiency in the analysis of the facts of the case and in the grasp of the legal principles. For service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end. A member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments because the learning process in law never ceases. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that a fine equivalent to one month's salary be imposed on respondent. Considering, however, that there was no malice or evil intent in

OLIVER O. LOZANO , petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER ON ELECTIONS and JEJOMAR C. BINAY, respondents NB: Petitioner Oliver L. Lozano filed these two special civil actions for certiorari, namely: G.R. No. 94521 which seeks the review of the undated order 1 of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac denying the motion for her voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification in SPC No. 88-040, entitled "Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs. Mayor Jejomar C. Binay"; and G.R. No. 94626 which prays for a reversal of the en banc resolution 2 promulgated by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on August 7, 1990 3 dismissing the disqualification petition and criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Mayor Jejomar C. Binay in connection with the January 18, 1988 local elections, and its minute resolution of August 15, 1990 denying due course to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Facts:

Prior to the January 18, 1988 local elections, petitioner and Bernadette Agcorpa, a registered voter of Makati, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against then candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of municipal funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa. Disqualification case was assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC composed of Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac, as presiding officer, and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and Magdara B. Dimaampao, as members. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioners Yorac and Africa. Petitioner also prayed that the disqualification petition be referred for consideration en banc. Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for inhibition. On August 10, 1988, the COMELEC en banc denied the prayer that the case be heard en banc, ruling that "no substantial reason exists why this case should be taken en banc; and considering finally that the case is set for hearing by the Second Division. " Petitioner filed another motion praying that the disqualification case be heard and decided en banc invoking therein COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Instead of issuing a formal resolution, respondent COMELEC authorized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to reply to petitioner's counsel. The Law Department submitted its investigation report recommending that criminal charges be filed against respondent Binay for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner filed a motion praying that the disqualification case be, resolved jointly with the investigation report of the Law Department. Petitioner filed a third motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of Commissioner Yorac for having issued a previous memorandum addressed to the chairman and members of respondent commission expressing her opinion that Binay should first be convicted by the regular courts of the offense of vote buying before he could be disqualified.

In its aforestated August 7, 1990 resolution which is herein assailed, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition for disqualification and the criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Binay. The aforesaid resolution of August 7, 1990 dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 1990, on the ground that "pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling of the Commission is one of the prohibited pleadings, and therefore not allowed under the Rules." Issue: Whether or not the petition for disqualification should be granted Ruling: No. Petition in G.R. No. 94626 is likewise devoid of merit Respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for disqualification and in holding that respondent Binay is not guilty of vote buying, ruled as follows: "It would therefore appear from the evidence submitted by the petitioners themselves that the giver, if any, of the Christmas gifts which were received by the witnesses for the petitioners was in fact, the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Jejomar C. Binay. The presence of respondent Binay, if at all true at the time the gifts were distributed by the Municipality of Makati to the recipients of the Christmas gifts, was incidental. It did not make respondent Binay as the 'giver' of those Christmas gifts. Nor did the giving of such gifts by the Municipal Government of Makati influence the recipients to vote for respondent Binay considering that the affiants themselves who testi􀀼ed for the petitioners admitted and were aware that the gift packages came from the Municipality of Makati and not from respondent Jejomar C. Binay. “ "There is one aspect of this case which somehow lends credence to respondent Binay's claim that the instant petition is a political harassment. It is noted by the commission that while the criminal indictment against respondent Binay is for alleged violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioners did not implead as party respondents the affiants who received the Christmas packages apparently in exchange for their votes. The law on 'vote buying' [Section 261(a) supra] also penalizes 'vote-buying' and 'vote-selling', then the present indictment should have been pursued against both respondent Binay and against the affiants, against the former for buying votes and against the latter for selling their votes." We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas season is not refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to influence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift giving that respondent was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote-buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence or, at least,

strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying. We are convinced that the evidence presented, as well as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant such finding. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, and the same is true under the present one, this Court cannot review the factual findings of the Commission on Elections absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its decision, order or resolution. The charge against respondent Binay for alleged malversation of public funds should be threshed out and adjudicated in the appropriate proceeding and forum having jurisdiction over the same. Consequently, it was properly dismissed by the Commission on Elections. BERNARDO v ABALOS Facts: Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against respondents for vote buying in violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section 68 of the OEC. Petitioners claimed that Abalos, Sr., and his son respondent Benjamin "Benhur" C. Abalos, Jr., candidate for City Mayor of the same city in the May 11, 1998 elections, conspiring with other respondents sponsored, arranged and conducted an all-expense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of said city. During the whole-day affair, the background music loudly and repeatedly played over the sound system was the political jingle advertisement of respondent candidate. Some of the participants wore T-shirts with the name of candidate Benhur" Abalos, Jr.," printed in over-sized colored letters. Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech wherein he offered and promised the Mandaluyong City public school teachers and employees a hazard pay of P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of P3,000.00 which they will get by the end of the month. The offers and promises and the acceptance of said monetary increase of allowances is in violation of the prohibition against vote-buying and vote-selling. COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution dismissing the complaint "for insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case”. Issue: Whether or not the petition would prosper. NO Ruling: Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus: Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed: d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; Petitioners directly elevated to this Court the questioned Resolution without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioners' failure to file the required motion for reconsideration

utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission..” Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari. In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC cited a valid reason for dismissing petitioners' complaint against private respondents for vote buying. The COMELEC found that the evidence of the respondents have "more probative value and believable than the evidence of the complainants;" and that the evidence submitted by petitioners are "mere self-serving statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recording and a photograph." Moreover, Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 provides: SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-buying and Vote-selling. The representation of a complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voters acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legal officers, under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. No supporting affidavits were submitted by the complaining witnesses to sustain their charge of vote buying and in such absence shows the frailty of petitioners' complaint. Dispositive: dismissed PEOPLE VS. BAYONA Topic: Election Offenses as Mala Prohibita One Liner: Election offenses are Mala Prohibita, therefore conviction only requires that the act prohibited is committed regardless of intent. Facts: The defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling place when Desiderio (Representative of Department of Interior supervising the elections) took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. According to defendant he should not be guilty (of Carrying firearms within fifty meters from a polling place) because he was only walking along a public road where he had the right to be when he was arrested, and even if it be conceded that went inside the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty, because he was called by a friend and merely approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election . Solicitor General argues that defendant should not be held liable because: 1. since the Government does not especially construct buildings for electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever building there may be available, and all election precincts are

within fifty meters from some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd, because members of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that prohibition and could not use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; that people living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within their own residences on registration and election days 2. if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in question should only be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G. R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20, 1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the candidacy of anyone, but no the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him. Issue: Is the defendant guilty of an election offense? YES Ruling: The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, BUT when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters. The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p. 169. ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of

election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms. If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not proved that he tried to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.

Fuentes was found guilty by the CFI for violation of Sec. 416 of the Election Law. He was found carrying a revolver within 50 meters of the polling place. Fuentes contends that he was a special agent of the Philippine Constabulary and was in possession of the revolver only after he has taken it from de Martin, who had no license therefor. Furthermore, he denies knowledge of the existence of the polling place near the place where he parked his motor car. That he had merely stopped his car in front of the municipal building with the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag the revolver. Lastly, he avers that he was 63 meters away from the polling precinct.

This prompted the petitioners to file with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course, however, this was denied by the COMELEC. Hence, they proceeded to the SC. They raised 2 main arguments: 1. Sec. 70 of RA 7160 which allows the recall through initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional as the (a) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate recall proceedings and (b) it violated the right of the elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. 2. Resolution no. 1 has suffered numerous defect, the most fatal was the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly. The SC granted the petition that the selective notices to members of the PRAC violated the due process, hence the the enactment of Resolution no. 1 is flawed. In lieu with this pronouncement, the mayor of Dinalupihan once again sent notice of session to the members of the PRAC. They convened once more, and passed a resolution calling for the recall. Garcia now presses for the resolution of the constitutionality of sec. 70 of RA 7160?

Issue: Whether or not the lack of intent on the part of Fuentes can be appreciated for his acquittal?

Issue: WON sec. 70 of RA 7160 which allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall of elective officials is unconstitutional?

Ruling:

Ruling: NO Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people’s prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. There is nothing in the constitution that will suggest that the people have the sole and and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding. The Congress is given the power to ascertain effective mechanism to conduct such. The legislative in adopting the provision seeks to diminish the difficulty in initiating recall thru direct action of the people and to cut down in its expenses. Furthermore, the initiation by the PRAC is still considered as an initiation by the people albeit through their representatives.

PP VS FUENTES Facts:

No. The intent of Fuentes in carrying the revolver within the prohibited distance from the polling place is immaterial. The evidence adduced with clarity his offense. Evidences: 1. Defendant was only 10 or 12 meters away from the polling place when found and the municipal building could not be seen therefrom; 2. At the time of his arrest, he was employed as a chauffeur by a senator of the district; 3. De Martin, to whom he got the revolver, was not arrested by him nor did he cause de Martin’s persecution. He was, likewise, not presented as a witness in this case. 4. Major Agdamag was not the provincial commander of Capiz; and 5. The Court took notice that with the intelligence of Fuentes and the nature of his employment, it is inconceivable that he does not know the location of the polling place. GARCIA VS CA Facts: Garcia was the elected governor of the Province of Bataan. On July 1, 1993 some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRAC) to initiate the recall of Garcia. They cited the sole ground of loss of confidence. In lieu with this Resolution no. 1 was passed.

JUAN VS PEOPLE GR 132378 JANUARY 18, 2000 FACTS: "Petitioners Rogelio Juan, Barangay Chairman and Pedro de Jesus, Delfin Carreon, and Antonio Galguerra, Barangay Kagawads, of Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City, were separately accused in Criminal Cases Q-96-64564 to 66, for violation of Section 261-(o) of the Omnibus Election Code, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, National Capital Judicial Region, Quezon City. Barangay Chairman Juan, and Bgy. Kagawad De Jesus were charged [with] willful and unlawful use of VHF radio transceiver, an equipment or apparatus owned by the barangay government of Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City, for election campaign or for partisan political

activity. And Barangay Kagawads Carreon and Galguerra were charged with willful and unlawful use of a tricycle owned by the same barangay government in their political campaigns. "Rodolfo Cayubit and Ricardo Galguerra, representing themselves as "witnesses/private complainants," assisted by Atty. Leonides S. Bernabe, Jr., representing himself as "Private Prosecutor," filed a "Motion for Removal from Office," dated December 5, 1996, for the removal of said local elective officials, to which herein petitioners filed their comment, on the ground that movants have no legal standing in court, and neither was the public prosecutor notified of the motion to which he did not conform, and therefore, said motion should be expunged or stricken out from the records, or peremptorily denied. "In a Manifestation and Comment to the accused-petitioners comment, the COMELEC prosecutor stated that he "conforms" with the subject motion of private complainants, hence, respectfully submit[s] the same for the ruling of the court, followed by a Supplement to Motion for Removal from Office, dated February 28, 1997, to which petitioners also filed their opposition. "On April 3, 1997, respondent court issued an Order, directing the "xxx immediate suspension from office of all the accused xxx for a period of sixty (60) days from service of this Order." ISSUE: WON the RTC have jurisdiction over violations of the Election Code. RULING: Petitioners insist that the RTC did not have the jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases filed against them, because the penalty for the offenses charged did not exceed six years. The argument does not persuade. It is evident from Section 32, BP 129, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7691, that the jurisdiction of first-level courts -- the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts -- does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provision of law are cognizable by regional trial courts. Petitioners were charged with violating Section 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code. Under Section 268 of the said Code, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of the Code, "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote." "As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that RA 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of

B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception." Clearly then, regional trial courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. LANOT VS COMELEC G.R. No. 164858 November 16, 2006 FACTS: On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot ("Lanot"), Vener Obispo ("Obispo"), Roberto Peralta ("Peralta"), Reynaldo dela Paz ("dela Paz"), Edilberto Yamat ("Yamat"), and Ram Alan Cruz ("Cruz") (collectively, "petitioners"), filed a petition for disqualification8 under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May 2004 elections. The case was docketed as SPA (NCR-RED) No. C04-008. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him. In his Answer filed on 29 March 2004,9 Eusebio denied petitioners’ allegations and branded the petition as a harassment case. Eusebio further stated that petitioners’ evidence are merely fabricated. Director Ladra conducted hearings on 2, 5 and 7 April 2004 where she received the parties’ documentary and testimonial evidence. Petitioners submitted their memorandum10 on 15 April 2004, while Eusebio submitted his memorandum11 on 16 April 2004. Ruling of Regional Director: Consequently, pursuant to Section 68 (a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code, respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO shall be DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor, Pasig City for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Ruling of the COMELEC: Affirmed RD’s decision. On 9 May 2004, Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration [16] of the resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On Election Day itself, Chairman Abalos issued the first of the three questioned COMELEC issuances. In a memorandum, Chairman Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the COMELEC First Division's 5 May 2004 resolution due to Eusebio's motion for reconsideration. On 11 May 2004, the day after the elections, petitioners Lanot, Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion to suspend the counting and canvassing of votes and the proclamation of the winning mayoral candidate for Pasig City. The COMELEC En Banc partially denied the motion on the same day. Eusebio had 119,693 votes while Lanot had 108,941 votes. Eusebio was proclaimed as Pasig City Mayor on 23 May 2004 based on the 21 May 2004 Order.

On 6 August 2004, Lanot filed a motion to annul Eusebio's proclamation and to order his proclamation instead. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a pre/campaign offense committed by Eusebio. RULING: There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities are committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is “Whether Eusebio who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003 was a “candidate” when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. Under Section 11 RA 8436, Eusebio became a “candidate” for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 24 March 2004 the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436 Eusebio clearly$ did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a “candidate” one who has filed his certificate of candidacy during the commission of the questioned acts. PENERA vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 181613. September 11, 2009 Topic: Campaign period Facts: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed a Petition for Disqualification against Penera. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 — a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007 — Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Attached to the Petition were the Affidavits of individuals who witnessed the said incident. COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution which disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for engaging in premature campaigning, in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration maintaining that she did not make any admission on the factual matters stated in the appealed resolution. Penera also contended that the pictures and Affidavits submitted by Andanar should not have been given any credence. The pictures were mere photocopies of the originals and lacked the proper authentication, while the Affidavits were taken ex parte, which would almost always make them incomplete and inaccurate. Issue: Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period. (YES) Ruling: The questions of fact Penera is raising only questions of fact. We do not find any reason to pass upon the same, as this Court is not a trier of facts.

it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanar's evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March 2007, participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived * their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers. In view of the foregoing admissions by Penera and her witnesses, Penera cannot now be allowed to adopt a conflicting position. The questions of law The dissenting opinion, however, raises the legal issue that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term "candidate", as a result of which, premature campaigning may no longer be committed. Under Section 79 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties". On 10 February 2007, Republic Act No. 9369 took effect. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 amended Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 and renumbered the same as the new Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436. The pertinent portions of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. In view of the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the Dissenting Opinion argues that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code can not be applied to the present case since while a person may have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not be considered a candidate until the start of the campaign period. The court disagrees. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. It is the filing by the person of his/her COC through which he/she explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. It is such declaration which would color the subsequent acts of said person to be election campaigning or partisan political activities as described under Section 79 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. It bears to point out that, at this point, no politician has yet submitted his/her COC. Penera should be disqualified from holding office as Mayor of Sta. Monica for having committed premature campaigning when, right after she filed her COC, but still a day before the start of the campaign period, she took part in a motorcade, which consisted of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles laden with multi-colored balloons that went around several barangays of Sta. Monica, and gave away candies to the crowd. Succession

The well-established principle is that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. Considering Penera's disqualification from holding office as Mayor of Sta. Monica, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as Mayor. Dispositive: Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. And hereby DECLARED that the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is the rightful successor to said office. PENERA vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 181613. September 25, 2009 Topic: Campaign period FACTS: Penera filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court's Decision of 11 September 2009 (Decision). The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified". In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. ISSUE: Whether the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. (YES) RULING: The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus: AcHEaS xxx xxx xxx For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence. The Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369. In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states — . . . Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, . . . . In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads — ASaTHc . . . Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period . . . . (Emphasis supplied) Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed. The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period". Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy". Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period". DISPOSITIVE: The court GRANTED petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera's Motion for Reconsideration and SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009. Ejercito vs COMELEC Topics: Authorized expenses and Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (There was nothing really on Statement of Contributions and Expenditures in the case I don’t know why) Facts: Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the COMELEC against (Petitioner) Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. The petition alleges two causes of action: (1) Ejercito, during the campaign

period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna the “Orange Card.” Given that the “Orange Card” could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs, it qualifies as a material consideration in convincing the voters to cast their votes for Ejercito’s favor in clear violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code; (2) Under Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the aggregate amount that a candidate may spend for election campaign shall be “P3.00 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy” The Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to P4,576,566.00. However, for television campaign commercials alone, Ejercito already spent P23,730,784. Even assuming that Ejercito was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still paid the sum of P16,611,549. Hence, Ejercito committed an election offense under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code On May 17, 2013, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna. Based on the Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’ 471,209 votes. The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito. While the division rejected the first cause of action for failure to substantiate the same, it found that Ejercito had accepted donations of PhP 20,197,170.25 and PhP 3,366,195.05 from Scenema Concept International, Inc. (SCI) in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBN’s Channel 2. Even assuming that the actual cost of both advertising contracts only amounted to PhP12,818,470.56, it nevertheless supports the finding that Ejercito exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00 which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68 (c) and concurrently an election offense pursuant to Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito. One ground for disqualification listed in Section 68 is spending in an election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law. Hence, COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition. Issue: 1. Did ER Ejercito exceed the allowable campaign expenses? 2. Did the disqualification of Ejercito violate the right to free expression? Ruling: 1. YES. One His defense was that he did not consent to the political ads; that someone did it for him. But in the contract of advertisement, there’s a part where the candidate

2.

consents or agrees to the contract. Ejercito claimed that it was a fake signature. Comelec did not believe him (because it was only brought up in the petition for certiorari) and disqualified him for exceeding the allowable expense. ABS CBN or any network has a contract and are required to report it to Comelec. No. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with “deep pockets” and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution. Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government.

Pertinent Provision: RA 7166, Section 13 Section 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. The agreement amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows: (a)For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and VicePresident; and for other candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and (b)For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. PILAR VS COMELEC One-liner: The law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and

expenditures. COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration. COMELEC en banc also denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issue: WON a petitioner Pilar’s withdrawal of his COC excuses him from filing his statement of contributions and expenditures. Ruling: Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy." Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited or unlawful, and what expenditures are or lawful. Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions. These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions. These statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.

It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "if a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact." Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. ADIONG VS COMELEC One-liner: The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. Facts: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347. It provides: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda: (a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof. Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides: Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful: (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code on lawful election propaganda and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being

a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas." Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. Ruling: The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away. We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National Press Club v. Commission on Elections and its companion cases underscores how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of election campaign activities and indefensible repression committed in the name of free and honest elections. In the National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements. The gray area is rather wide and we have to go on a case to case basis.

There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section

1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land.

The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs which concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political change. The big number of candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all voters cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public does not know who are aspiring to be elected to public office.

In the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case. Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do. The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom. This is delegation running riot. Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance. Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, . . . while under section 1, Article XIII thereof "The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or

There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. Our review of the validity of the challenged regulation includes its effects in today's particular circumstances. We are constrained to rule against the COMELEC prohibition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS COMELEC Facts: On february 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of san sebastian cathedral of bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “ibasura rh law” referring to the reproductive health law of 2012 or republic act no. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “conscience vote” and lists candidates as either “(anti-rh)/ team buhay” or “(pro-rh)/team patay”. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the Rh law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “team patay,” while those who voted against it form “team buhay”: Team buhay Team patay estrada, jv angara, juan edgardo honasan, gregorio casiño, teddy magsaysay, mitos cayetano, alan peter pimentel, koko enrile, jackie trillanes, antonio escudero, francis villar, cynthia hontiveros, risa *party list legarda, loren Party list buhay, gabriela, akbayan, bayan muna, anak pawis party list ang pamilya Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as election officer of Bacolod city, issued a notice to remove campaign materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, otherwise, Comelec will be constrained to file an election offense against the petitioners. Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

ISSUES: 1.

2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD: 1. No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.” Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech. 2. No. Respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides: Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2 (7) of the Constitution as follows: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. Based on the enumeration made on acts that may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only affects candidates. Section 9 of the Fair Election Act on the posting of campaign materials only mentions "parties" and "candidates". Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006 on "Lawful Election Propaganda" also states that these are "allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . ." Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation. The tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate or political party. There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, defines an "election campaign" as follows: xxx xxx xxx (b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include: (1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate; (2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office; (4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or (5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate. The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy to a

public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article. True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be "designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office." In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression. 3. Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. 4. Content-based regulation. The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.” Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post

the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights. 5. Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. 6. No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech. Doctrine of benevolent neutrality With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.” 1 UTAK VS COMELEC TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of campaign materials on PUV and public terminals, captive-audience doctrine DOCTRINE: The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity. FACTS:

On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides: SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is unlawful: xxxx (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof. (g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following: xxxx 5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not; 6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like. The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules. Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals. The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them. Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public

utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense. The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate. The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause. A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: 1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; 2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under the captive-audience doctrine. The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided.

A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. Lehman’s case not applicable The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses, “ although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of commercial venture.” In the same way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles. In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses. Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties. Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is

that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate. As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials. GMA Network, Inc. et al petitioners vs. COMELEC, respondent. G.R. Nos. 205357, 205374, 205592, 205852, and 206360. September 2, 2014 TOPIC: Airtime limit on political ads FACTS: During the 2013 elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9615 which changed the limit on broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions from a per station to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. ABS-CBN, GMA, and other owners/operators of radio and television networks, as well as the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) questioned the provisions of the COMELEC resolution. c) Petitioner’s Arguments – (GMA et al. – Won) Petitioners contended that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.

Petitioners posit that Section 9 (a) of the assailed Resolution provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for a proper computation of "aggregate total" airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby defeating the intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006. Also, Section 9 (a) is a cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost impossible burden on broadcast mass media of monitoring a candidate's or political party's aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur administrative and criminal liability. Petitioner-intervenor Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano also argued that there should be empirical data to support the need to change the computation of airtime limits from a per station basis to a per candidate basis. d) Respondent’s Arguments – (COMELEC – Lost) Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the playing field between candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without much. The COMELEC gave its own understanding of the import of the legislative deliberations on the adoption of R.A. No. 9006 by saying that the legislative history of the law clearly shows that Congress intended to impose the per candidate or political party aggregate total airtime limits on political advertisements and election propaganda. This is evidenced by the dropping of the "per day per station" language embodied in both versions of the House of Representatives and Senate bills in favour of the "each candidate" and "not more than" limitations now found in Section 6 of R.A. 9006. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 is constitutional FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court: N/A FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals: N/A RULING: The petition was partially granted. Rule: RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act provides: 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. — All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC: xxx xxx xxx 6.2 (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation. b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation. Application:

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 is unconstitutional. It appears that the COMELEC did not have any other basis for coming up with a new manner of determining allowable time limits except its own idea as to what should be the maximum number of minutes based on its exercise of discretion as to how to level the playing field. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting "aggregate" basis in the determination of allowable airtime. The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. The legislative intent is to allow airtime on a “per station basis.” This is further buttressed by the fact that the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed the previous provision, Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited direct political advertisements. Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates. The media’s role is to provide the means by which the political exercise becomes an interactive process. All of these would be undermined and frustrated with the kind of regulation that the COMELEC came up with. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes against the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press. Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy. Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest. Based on GMA’s analysis of the regulation, a candidate will only 81.81 seconds per day of TV exposure allotment for him to utilize his 120 minutes of political advertisements during the whole 88-day campaign period. If a candidate loads all of his 81.81 seconds per day in one network, he will have barely three 30-second advertising spots. Under the restrictive aggregate airtime limits in the New Rules, the three 30second political advertisements of a candidate in GMA will only be communicated to barely 40% of the viewing audience, not even the voting population, but only in Mega Manila. The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. The adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits — leveling the playing field — does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. Furthermore, to add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself — a form of suppression of his political speech.

Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to suffrage. Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright. It has also been said that "[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms." Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space — including the means to disseminate their ideas. This could not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by which the respondent implemented the time limits in regard to political advertisements in the broadcast media. Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry. GMA estimated that during the campaign period, they would have to spend an estimated 27,494,720 manhours in monitoring the election campaign commercials of the different candidates in the country which would entail engaging and training 39,055 additional persons on an eight-hour shift. However, the Court did agree with the contentions of GMA. Their apprehensions appear more to be the result of a misappreciation of the real import of the regulation rather than a real and present threat to its broadcast activities. The Court is more in agreement with the COMELEC when they said that the legal duty of monitoring lies with them. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the Comelec in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. There is absolutely no duty on the broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time. The COMELEC issued Resolution 9631 which required broadcasters to give COMELEC prior notice or a 24-hour notice after first publication or broadcast of an appearance or guesting by a candidate on a bona fide newscast or documentary. Such a requirement is a reasonable means adopted by the COMELEC to ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunities to promote their respective candidacies. Unlike the restrictive aggregate-based airtime limits, the directive to give prior notice is not unduly burdensome and unreasonable, much less could it be characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of information before broadcast. The Court held that it is more in the nature of a content-neutral regulation designed to assist the poll body to undertake its job of ensuring fair elections without having to undertake any chore of approving or disapproving certain expressions. One-liner: Airtime limits on political ads should be on a per-station basis for candidates to fully express their constitutional right to free speech. NPC, PPI, and KBP, petitioners vs. COMELEC, respondent. G.R. Nos. 102653, 102925, and 102983. March 5, 1992. TOPIC: News and opinions regarding candidates

FACTS: During the 1992 elections, mass media representatives, candidates for office, and taxpayers and voters questioned the constitutionality of Sec. 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987). Their petitions were consolidated in one case. e) Petitioner’s Arguments – (NPC et al. – Lost) Petitioners principally argue that Sec. 11 (b) of RA 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression. They maintain that: 1) the prohibition imposed by Sec. 11 (b) amounts to censorship because it singles out media-based election or political propaganda 2) the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues and 3) it abridges the freedom of speech of candidates and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda limits the right of voters to information and opinion. f) Respondent’s Arguments – (COMELEC - Won) Not stated. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court: N/A FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals: N/A RULING: The petition is dismissed. Rule: Sec. 11 (b) of RA 6646 states that: "Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;. xxx xxx xxx b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881… Secs. 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines states that: "Sec. 90. Comelec space. — The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as 'Comelec Space' wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as 'Comelec Time' which shall be allocated

equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign." (Emphasis supplied). Lastly, Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows: "Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections." (Emphasis supplied). Application: The objective behind Sec. 11 (b) of RA 6646 is to equalize the situation of rich and poor candidates and to prevent candidates with huge war chests from enjoying undue advantage. The objective is not only a concededly legitimate one; it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution. The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" is to ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." The Court said that while freedom of speech and freedom of the press are important in a democratic polity, these rights are not unlimited. Equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value under Art. II, Sec. 26 of the Constitution. The court took into consideration the character and extent of the limitations of a particular measure upon freedom of speech and of the press. They gave three important limitations which circumscribes the restrictive impact of Sec. 11 (b) RA 6646. 1. It is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. In a resolution, the Comelec has defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992. 2. It is limited in its scope of application. It purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their

qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. 3. It exempts from its prohibition print or air space time bought by or donated to the COMELEC. COMELEC is mandated to allocate said print or air space time on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station. That the COMELEC might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved. Should there be unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec, prejudiced candidates will have appropriate judicial remedies available. The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to fora other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media. Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address Conclusion: The media has the constitutional right to report news and opinions about candidates, so long as the opinions are not advertisements which candidates covertly pay for. PART V CANDIDATES

GAYO VS VERCELES G.R. No. 150477, FEBRUARY 28, 2005 FACTS:  In 1997 Verceles migrated to USA with family but she retained her filipino citizenship.  1993 she returned to the Philippines for good  1995, she registered as a voter of La Union and filed her income tax returns  1997, she effectively abandoned her status as lawful resident of USA for the May 1998 elections.  January 1998, she surrendered her alien registration.  She was elected as Mayor of Tubao, La Union in the May 1998 elections.  In 2001 she ran for re-election and won. However, petitioner, also a candidate for mayor for the May 2001 elections, filed a petition for quo warranto, praying that the respondent be declared disqualified to hold the position of Mayor and that her proclamation be declared null and void. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for mayor in the May 2001 elections. 2. Whether or not LGC impliedly repealed Sec68 of the OEC by the fact that LGC does not provide waiver for status as permanent residents abroad which is provided under Sec 68 of OEC. RULING: 1. Yes, Sec 39 of the LGC of 1991 require residence for at least (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election for the local elective officials. A Filipino citizens immigration to a foreign country constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In other words, the acquisition of a permanent residency status in a foreign country constitutes a renunciation of the status as a resident of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Court explained in another case that a new domicile is reacquired if the following conditions concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The respondent effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, respondent reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May 2001 elections. Records show that she surrendered her green card to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in 1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency could not have been made clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in 1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic visits to her children who were residing there. Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as such for the duration of her term. We find such acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again made the Philippines her permanent residence

2. No, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was not repealed by the LGC of 1991. The repealing clause of the LGC, Section 534, does not specifically mention a repeal of any provision of the Omnibus Election Code. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and the old laws. In this case, we discern no irreconcilable inconsistency between Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40(f) of the LGC. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides in part: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. On the other hand, Sec. 40(f) of the LGC provides that permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code are disqualified from running for any elective local position. The two provisions are basically the same in that they both provide that permanent residents or immigrants to a foreign country are disqualified from running for any local elective position. The difference lies only in the fact that Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides for an exception to the disqualification. This does not make the two provisions inconsistent with each other. TECSON VS. COMELEC, GR No. 161434, March 3 2004 FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

1.

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in RomualdezMarcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon. Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with COMELEC praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. Second Division of the COMELEC declared Frivaldo DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled. His MR remained unacted upon until after the elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections. COMELEC en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon, being the second highest candidate after Frivaldo. COMELEC en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Frivaldo filed with the COMELEC a new petition praying for the annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on the day of proclamation, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order of the Comelec was released and received by Frivaldo, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation as governor ". Comelec First Division promulgated the Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes, "was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon". Lee’s MR was denied.

7. Issues: 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? 2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon? Ruling:

DUMPIT-MICHELINA VS BOADO 1.

LIMBONA VS COMELEC FRIVALDO VS COMELEC AND LEE One liner: An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Facts:

The LGC of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus: Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the

day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize. His attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects. Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, twice. Now, he successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725. He took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree and insists that he should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon. First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed” by "then President Corazon Aquino. There was no express repeal that was made because then President Aquino did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". Second, Lee argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed and approved in just one day. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. Frivaldo was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the US -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the reestablishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people. Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the LGC "must exist on the date

of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed”. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least 23 years of age on election day). The purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. On the argument that citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter, if the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote. It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected. The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not

produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts…curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations…(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils.

2.

There is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.

P.D. 725 creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship…" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who had lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation. The date of retroactivity is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application because it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation. And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

Lee contends that the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division as affirmed by Comelec En Banc became final and executory after five (5) days. Hence, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. And these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified him from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, we held: Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands. Nolasco vs COMELEC and Eduardo Alarilla Blanco vs. COMELEC and Eduardo Alarilla One liner: Any candidate who is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of vote-buying shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Facts: 1. 2.

Florentino Blanco and Eduardo Alarilla were running for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Blanco won and Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor. Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He alleged:  Blanco was maintaining his own "private army" at his aforesaid resident;  A search on Blanco’s premises resulted in the arrest of 6 men who were found carrying various high-powered firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long arms.  Blanco's wife and brother, claiming to be the campaign manager of respondent in the Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the locked room so they could withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay their watchers.

3.

4. 5. 6.

They were allowed to withdraw 10 large plastic bags from the vault.  Each bag contained 10 shoe boxes which contained 200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened contained the amount of P1,000 totaling P10 million. The money were intended as bribe money to the teachers of Meycauayan.  On election day, Blanco perpetrated the most massive vote-buying activity ever in the history of Meycauayan politics.  This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by Blanco through his organization called "MTB" or "MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS”.  Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, Blanco used another scheme where Blanco’s paid voter will identify his target from the list of voters and will impersonate said voter in the list and falsify his signature.  These acts are clear grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Election Code. Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation which was granted by the COMELEC (First Division) after finding that there was a "probable commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification pursuant to the provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support of disqualification is strong." COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-buying Blanco moved for reconsideration which was denied. Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. He moved for reconsideration of that part of the resolution directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor he should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified.

Blanco’s contentions COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming the majority decision of the First Division. It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case were referred by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their proclamation.

It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING. VOTE-BUYING, terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest where the issue of vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing of the issue in a summary proceeding; Nolasco’s contentions He should be declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in Labo vs. COMELEC. Issue: 1. 2.

WON Blanco should be disqualified for vote-buying. WON Nolasco should succeed Blanco as mayor.

Ruling: 1. Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. The suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so warrants. COMELEC did not depart from the procedure laid down in COMELEC Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution pertinently provides: Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. Blanco was not deprived of equal protection of our laws. COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all-encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election..." This includes the power to cancel proclamations. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides: Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public

officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws.

on section 4 of its Rules of Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character. There is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying activities of Blanco. There were affidavits as to how the alleged vote-buying was conducted. They were corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for Tinoy Blanco] cards. There were individuals who were apprehended for attempting to vote for Blanco when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. The denials made by those close to Blanco were general denial. If unsubstantiated, they are negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses. Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers in envelopes with inscription “VOTE!!! TINOY”.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. COMELEC cannot always be straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that Resolution No. 2050 was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial solution to the problem. Its decision to resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The action of the COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Sec. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Voteselling. — The presentation of a complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter's acceptance of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legal officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (emphasis supplied) COMELEC did not err in using summary proceedings to resolve his disqualification case. Its action is safely anchored

Blanco avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be consummated. Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money ..." Section 28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals. While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising something in consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying. 2.

Nolasco should be declared mayor in the event Blanco is finally disqualified. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) provides Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.

Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Art. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials. — (a) What constitutes permanent vacancy — A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. (b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor — (1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor… In the case of Reyes v. COMELEC, That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above doctrine. Therefore, Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as Mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. Diangka v Comelec Topic: Acts of Terrorism Facts: Petitioner Maimona Diangka filed a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of Comelec in disqualifying her as a candidate for Mayor of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner was the wife of the incumbent Mayor. Ali Balindong the other Mayoralty candidate, filed a special action for disqualification against Diangka and her husband alleging that they committed 2 acts of terrorism. First, that they loaded the ballot boxes into an ambulance then subsequently, through force and threats thereto, made the watchers of Balindong go down from the vehicle. Second, that Diangka’s husband went to the voting areas and caused a commotion that prevented the voters from voting.

In the results of the elections. Diangka emerged the winner. COMELEC ordered the board of canvassers to cease and desist from declaring Diangka as mayor but that order came in late and still Diangka was declared mayor. In the hearing for the disqualification, only Balindong and lawyer appeared, hence COMELEC disqualified Diangka. Now Diangka assails the decision via certiorari, meanwhile vice-mayor elect Macapodi assumed the mayor position. Issue: WON Diangka can be held liable for the two acts of terrorism of her husband thus she could be disqualified by the COMELEC. Held: 1. Comelec determined that Diangka was at the front seat beside the driver in the ambulance when the watchers Balindong were made to go down via threats. Her excuse that she did not know nor was she in collusion with her husband can not hold water. First, she admitted that she requested that the driver, after they threatened the watchers, drop her off at school. Such shows she had control over the driver. Second, her mere presence in the ambulance shows that she acquiesced to her husbands acts and hence guilty also. 2. Comelec determined that is was actually Diangka’s husband who caused the commotion which prevented the voters from voting. While it was not actually Diangka who committed the acts, she did not prove that her running was not a mere alter ego of her husband who is in his 3 term as a mayor. This together with her presence in the ambulance makes her guilty of the acts of terrorism in violation of the omnibus election code. Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy. MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538) Topic: Disqualification case on the ground of “fugitive from justice” MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538) Facts: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position… (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon. Issue: Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice”. Held:

No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. MATEO CAASI vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL [G.R. No. 88831. November 8, 1990.] ANECITO CASCANTE vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL [G.R. No. 84508. November 8, 1990.] TOPIC: candidates, permanent residents abroad One-liner: application for immigrant status and permanent residence and possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is permanent resident of another country. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card, not a valid waiver. FACTS:  Merito Miguel in both consolidated cases is the respondent.  He was elected as municipal mayor of bolinao, pangasinan.  Both cases seek to disqualify him on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence a permanent resident of the united states of America.  The comelec dismissed both petitions, hence this appeal. Respondent’s contention: (lost)  Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States.  He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there.  He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.  Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. ISSUE: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent

resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. COMELEC ruling: (dismissed both petitions)  "The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not suf ciently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card,  Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality.  As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local offcials as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. SC Ruling:  not qualified RULE:  Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides: "SEC. 68. Disqualifications . . . Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.”  To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to ling his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" 

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective of ce for at least one (1) year at the time of ling his certi cate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess.



In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion

RULING:  In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public of cials in the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public of ce in the Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.



In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."



On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN.



Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualifed to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. L CONCLUSION:  Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY [G.R. No. 219603. January 26, 2016.] Topic: moral turpitude One-liner: Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. FACTS:  petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-Delgado) filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections (Comelec), on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.  Ty-Delgado argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. C  On 16 September 2008, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176, entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines," convicting Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel. In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to

pay a fine. On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur  On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House Respondents contention: (lost)  through his counsel, alleged that the petition for disqualification was actually a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, and it was led out of time.  He admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude.  He argued that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing company. Petitioners contention: (won)  Ty-Delgado led an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the penalty imposed on him. ISSUE: 1) W/N a conviction of libel constitutes a crime of moral turpitude The HRET Decision  held that it had jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition since it involved the eligibility of a Member of the House of Representatives due to a disqualiFIcation under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.  However, the HRET held that there is nothing in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines which found that Pichay directly participated in any way in writing the libelous articles, aside from being the president of the publishing company.  Thus, the HRET concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel showed that the crime did not involve moral turpitude. SC RULING:  Petition is meritorious RULE:  A sentence by nal judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code: Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.  The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent 

authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. 

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.  Although notbevery criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not.  In Zari v. Flores, we likewise listed libel as one of the crimes involving moral turpitude. The Revised Penal Code de fines libel as a "public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." The law recognizes that the enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property. APPLICATION:  The fact that another libelous article was published after the ling of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.  He committed an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow men, or society in general," and an act which is "contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."  The dissenting opinion before the HRET even considered it "significant that [Pichay] has raised no issue against libel being a crime involving moral turpitude, and has taken issue only against ascribing moral turpitude to him despite his being only the President of the publishing company."  Thus, Pichay insists that, since he was only the publisher of the libelous articles and the penalty for his conviction was reduced to payment of ne, the circumstances of his conviction for libel did not amount to moral turpitude.  The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof."  Accordingly, we cannot distinguish Pichay's criminal liability from the others' criminal liability only because he was the president of the company that published the libelous articles instead of being their author. Pichay's criminal liability was the same as that of the others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on the author of the libelous articles.  The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the libelous articles.  Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code



for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he led his certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections.

PAMIL vs TELERON QUINTO vs COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that, “For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.” ISSUE: Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional. RULING: NO. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemedresigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain." In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. NOTES: This is not applicable in barangay office: any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned orcontrolled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. SALCEDO VS COMELEC

DOMINGO v CITY BOARD OF CANVASSERS Topic: Substitution of candidates Facts: Petitioner filed with the COMELEC his certificate of candidacy for the position of city councilor for the First District of Manila. Another candidate, Pedro P. Alfonso, father of private respondent Irma Alfonso also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position aforementioned. Pedro Alfonso, however died a day before the elections. Private respondent Irma Alfonso filed her certificate of candidacy in substitution of her deceased father. The name of Irma Alfonso was added to the list of candidates but the name of Pedro Alfonso was not deleted. It appearing that the deceased Pedro Alfonso garnered votes that would include him in the list of winning candidates, the Board of Canvassers decided to add the votes received by the deceased Pedro Alfonso to those of his daughter. Petitioner contests the act of the City Board of Canvassers in adding the votes cast for Pedro Alfonso to those of private respondent. Thus, she filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeking to enjoin the City Board of Canvassers. Issue: whether it was lawful for the City Board of Canvassers for the City of Manila to add the votes garnered by deceased Pedro Alfonso to those of his daughter Ruling: The court was constrained not to give due course to the petition. Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that he would not get plain, speedy and adequate remedy from the COMELEC with which he admittedly filed his pre-proclamation case. Petitioner also failed to show compelling reason why this Court should interfere at this point with the COMELEC's, exercise of its original jurisdiction over pre-proclamation cases particularly those involving city officials like the one at bar. Further, there being no decision or order as yet rendered by the COMELEC in the said preproclamation case, the instant petition is even premature. Moreover, even if the petitioner were to be unsuccessful in his preproclamation petition before the COMELEC and would thus be compelled to file an election contest against the herein private respondent, it is worthy to note that as to the election of city officials, the Omnibus Election Code vests upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction over election protests SINACA v MULA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Topic: Substitution of Candidates Facts: two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD (hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of

mayor of the Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte – the "BARBERS Wing" and "MATUGAS Wing". MULA, a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the "BARBERS Wing," filed before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against TEODORO. COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO. Herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, an independent candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS "MATUGAS Wing" as the substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. MULA filed through mail another petition for disqualification, this time against EMANNUEL as substitute candidate is illegal. But COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification and upheld the candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL. Issue: Whether respondent is disqualified as a substitute candidate Ruling: Tthe issue as to the validity of EMMANUEL's nomination as substitute candidate has been rendered moot and academic by his proclamation on May 12, 1998, by the Board of Canvassers of Malimono as the duly elected municipal mayor and after he has assumed into office. The fact that the nomination of a substitute lacks the signature of one of the authorized signatory is but a technicality which cannot be used to frustrate the will of the electorate. It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory. With respect to election laws, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before election will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate should have been questioned before the election; they may not be questioned after the election without invalidating the will of the electorate, which should not be done. Thus, were a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred (charmos). TAGOLINO VS. HRET AND LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ Topic: Substitution of Candidates Facts:

Richard Gomez filed his COC with COMELEC seeking congressional office as Representative for the 4th legislative district of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. One of the opposing candidates, Juntilla filed a petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his COC that he resided in Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the 1 year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution and thus should be declared disqualifed/ineligible to run for said office. Juntilla prays that Richard’s COC be cancelled. COMELEC granted Juntilla’s Petition cancelled Richard’s COC. Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010. Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution." Thereafter, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her COC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the Party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post which was approved by COMELEC En Banc. Issue: WON there was a valid substitution. Ruling: No.The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived. Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected. It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of

penal sanction brought by the commission of the abovementioned election offenses. On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, where the Court illumined: Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied) Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification. Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga v. COMELEC (Talaga), the Court ruled that: xxxx While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. MONSALE (PROTESTANT-APPELLEE) VS. NICO (PROTESTEEAPPELLANT) Topic: Withdrawal of the COC

Facts: This is appeal by the protestee from a decision of the Court of instance of Iloilo declaring the protestant elected municipal mayor of Miagao as a result of the general elections held on November 11, 1947. Protestant withdrew his COC on Oct. 10, 1947, but attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal on Nov. 7. COMELEC ruled that he could no longer be a candidate. Thereafter, Nico was proclaimed elected. No votes was counted in favor of protestant because he was not a candidate. Issue: WON a candidate who has withdrawn his COC may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filing a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filing of such candidate. Ruling: In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and requested the Commission on Election that it "be considered as though it has never been filed at all." There is no question as to the right off a candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-on days before the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of facts the boards of election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao we duly notified of his letter to the Commission on Election dated November 6, 1947, which subscribed and swore to before a notary public on November 7, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at sixty days before the election. The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified. The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal." In the case Clutario vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-1704, this court sustained the ruling of said commission upon similar facts that "by own voluntary act and deed petitioner has nullified his certificate of candidacy and in the light of the

election laws such certificate of candidacy has been definitely withdrawn hence nonexisting." Under section 174 of the Revised Election Code, "a petition contesting the election of a provincial or municipal officer-elect shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province by any candidate voted for insaid election and who has presented a certificate of candidacy." This clearly implies that a candidate voted for who has not presented a certificate of candidacy has no right to contest the election. In other words, the herein protestant, not being a registered candidate, has no standing before the court. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the protest is ordered dismissed with costs against the appellee. So ordered. GO VS. COMELEC One-liner: There is nothing in the law which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality. Overview: In her petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the COMELEC en banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline. COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that petitioners affidavit of withdrawal of her COC for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was ineffectual because it was submitted twenty eight (28) minutes late at the office of the municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof was filed with said office at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and the original copy thereof was actually received by the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, to whom petitioner filed her COC for governor at 11:47 p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. Facts: Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001. On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte. On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte.

Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. At that late hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the lection officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal. On 05 March 2001, respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition to disqualify petitioner. The petitions were based on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both. COMELEC recommends to delete/cancel the name of CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO from the certified list of candidates for Governor of Leyte and Mayoralty candidates of Baybay, Leyte. COMELEC en banc approved. Hence, this petition. Issues: I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions? II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte? (a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed? (b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax? II. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law? Ruling: The COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte is annulled. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.

Petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor. Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that: "SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. "A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. "No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."

He alleged that respondent was maintaining his own `private army' at his aforesaid resident. An elite composite team of the PNP Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command, backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force, accompanied by mediamen who witnessed and recorded the search by video and still cameras, raided the house of respondent Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various high powered firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long arms. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass window, respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject premises. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the composite police-military team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant so that they could enter the said room to seize the said firearm.

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife and respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of respondent in the Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the locked room so they could withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay their watchers, and the teachers of Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution cannot contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.

For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.

NOLASCO VS. COMELEC Facts: The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8, 1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038 votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes. On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. Alarilla’s contentions:

When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained 200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened contained the amount of P1,000.00. When questioned, respondent's brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife, admitted to the raiding team that the total amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as respondent's bribe money to the teachers of Meycauayan. The cover of one of the shoe boxes containing the inscription that it is intended to the teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The petitioner further alleged that respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying activity ever in the history of Meycauayan politics supported by an envelope where this P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100 peso denominations totalling one thousand pesos per envelope with the inscription `VOTE!!! TINOY.' This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his organization called `MTB' or `MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS.' The chairman of this movement is

respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted to the police during the raid that these money were for the teachers and watchers of Meycauayan, Bulacan. There is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy. Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy and return it to respondent's headquarters to receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money after voting for respondent during the elections. The voter will initially be given a down-payment of P500.00. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use of flying voters. A copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995 showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after being caught and arrested that they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent and his followers, to vote for other voters in the voter's list. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another scheme as follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his target from the list of voter and will impersonate said voter in the list and falsify his signature. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the good graces of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the petition of the people of Meycauayan. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to terrorize the population and make the people afraid to complain against respondent's massive vote buying and cheating in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the teachers ensured the implementation of his vote-buying ballot box switching, impersonations, and other cheating schemes. COMELEC: On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there was a "probable commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification pursuant to the provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support of disqualification is strong." It directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election returns of the municipality of Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan until such time when the petitions for disqualification against him shall have been resolved." COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco. The parties thereafter submitted their position papers. Blanco even replied to the position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.

On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-buying.

Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. He urged that as vice-mayor he should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were heard on September 7, 1995. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda with right of reply. On October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration. Blanco’s contentions: Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in suspending proclamation of Petitioner Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice or hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco's constitutional right to due process of law. It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this Honorable Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, COMELEC violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case were referred by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their proclamation -- an act which evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein. It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in violation of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-BUYING, terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest where the issue of vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing of the issue in a summary proceeding It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in VOTE-BUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a disputable presumption of vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646; It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down by jurisprudence. Nolasco’s contentions: He should be declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of the the Local Government Code of 1991. Ruling on Blanco’s Petition:

Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. It ought to be emphasized that the suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so warrants. It is akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can issue exparte under exigent circumstances. In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his position paper and reply to Alarilla's position paper. The COMELEC considered the evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to be heard. Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel proclamations. Our laws are no less explicit on the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides: "Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws." Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides: "Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of

votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot always be straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that the resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its Rules of Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character. The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying activities of Blanco. A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the Reply of the Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner would reveal that they are in the nature of general denials emanating from individuals closely associated or related to respondent Blanco. The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's political leaders and private secretary. On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos is rich in detail as to how the alleged vote-buying was conducted. Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for Tinoy Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and allegedly used as a means to facilitate the votebuying scheme. There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for Respondent.

On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote for Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of the suspected flying voters. The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two suspected flying voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate their names in the voter's list. Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be consummated. Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money x x x." Section 28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: x x x. While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising something in consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying. In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the votes of said affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of vote-buying."

A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign judgment. Its free exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we succinctly held in People v. San Juan, "each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process." IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated October 23, 1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as Mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. No costs. SO ORDERED. REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, PETITIONER VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004

These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of Commissioner Maambong.

TOPIC: Nuisance candidate

There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings especially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. More importantly, we cannot depart from the settled norm of reviewing decisions of the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the factual findings of the COMELEC absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its decision, order or resolution.”

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President for the 2004 elections. In a resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to his CoC. Pamatong moved for reconsideration but this was denied. He was declared a nuisance candidate along with 35 others who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. He filed the present petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Ruling on Nolasco’s Petition: Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

FACTS:

a)

Petitioner’s Arguments – (Pamatong – Lost)

The resolutions were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous

national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. b)

Respondent’s Arguments – (COMELEC – Won)

In their comment, the COMELEC cited the practical considerations behind the assailed resolution, which is the need to limit the number of candidates, especially in the case of candidates for national positions, because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less PhP450 million. ISSUE: Whether or not the “equal access to opportunities for public office” gives petitioner a constitutional right to run for or hold public office FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court: N/A FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals: N/A RULING: The case was remanded to COMELEC. Rule: Art. II, Sec. 26 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that: Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Art. IX, Sec. 10 of the Constitution also states that: Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. Application: The “equal access to opportunities for public office” does not a constitutional right to run for or hold public office. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. The provisions under Article II are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated therein, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for

legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The approval of the “Davide amendment” indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and 2002 COMELEC Resolution outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates is that the State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. There would be many aspects of the election process that would be affected if “nuisance candidates” would be allowed to run, such as the printing of ballots, the candidates’ entitlement to watchers, their receipt of electoral contributions, and the formulation of election rules and regulations which depend on the number of candidates. Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, in the mind of the Court, is satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The Court refused to pass on the allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC in issuing the assailed resolutions, as well as the photocopies of Pamatong’s credentials which evinced his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Thus, the case was remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence. One-liner: The COMELEC resolution banning nuisance candidates to run for public office is justified by the State’s compelling interest to have a rational, objective, and orderly elections. CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ, III, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND BENHUR SALIMBANGON, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 189034. January 12, 2010. TOPIC: Nuisance candidates FACTS: In the May 2007 elections, petitioner Celestino A. Martinez and private respondent Benhur Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 2007, Edilito C. Martinez filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. About a month before the election, Celestino M. filed a petition to declare Edilito M. a nuisance candidate. He averred that as a habalhabal driver with no real property or income tax return filings for the past years, Edilito as an independent candidate did not have any political machinery to propel his candidacy nor did he have political supporters to help him in his campaign. He claimed that after Edilito filed his CoC, he was never heard of again and neither started campaigning. Given such lack of bona fide intention of Edilito to run for the office, Celestino contended that his candidacy would just cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of their surnames. The COMELEC declared Edilito as a nuisance candidate but only about a month after the elections. Edilito did not move to reconsider or file an appeal. Subsequently, Salimbangon was declared the winner by a margin of 104 votes. Martinez filed an election protest against the House of Representatives (HRET) on the ground that the Board of Election Inspectors did not count in his favour (300) ballots more or less with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative. During the revision, ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative were not counted and temporarily classified as stray. Out of 9,831 stray ballots, Martinez claimed that 5,401 ballots should be counted for him. g)

Petitioner’s Arguments – (Martinez – Won)

HRET gravely abused its discretion when it failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" votes in his favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. Petitioner argues that the Decision disenfranchised 5,401 voters when it ruled that said votes cannot be counted as votes for him since "there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter", in utter disregard of the mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution. He maintains that there is no clear and good reason to justify the rejection of those 5,401 ballots, and points out that at the time private respondent was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers, only 104 votes separated private respondent from him. He contends that the HRET erred in concluding that the ruling in Bautista v. Commission on Elections cannot be applied. h)

Respondent’s Arguments – (HRET & Salimbangon – Lost)

The HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray based on the Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day, the HRET held that 5,401 ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. Salimbangon asserted that the HRET correctly refused to credit petitioner with these votes, stressing that there were admittedly three (3) candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu as of May 14, 2007. Not a single voter in the district knew of any nuisance congressional candidate on election day. he argued that it would be illogical and most unfair to count the said ballots in favor of petitioner as it is erroneous to base the voter's intent on the supervening circumstance which was inexistent on the date the ballot was accomplished and cast. ISSUES: 1. 2.

What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections? Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court: The HRET refused to credit Celestino M. with the 5,000+ votes on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. HRET refused to apply Bautista v. COMELEC because they said that the case herein is not on all fours with it. Bautista was declared a nuisance candidate before the elections, but Edilito was not yet declared disqualified during the elections. Also, the voters of Navotas in Bautista had constructive and actual knowledge of his delisting as a mayoralty candidate, while there were no newspaper releases and other forms of notification to the voters of the Fourth District of Cebu about Edilito’s disqualification.

FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals: N/A RULING: The petition is granted. Rule: Sec. 5 (d) of RA 6646 or "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987" provides that: The Commission shall render its decision within five (5) days from receipt thereof (verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate). COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 states that: (5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate. Application: 1.

Final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day.

In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them. As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter's will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter's will was similarly present in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative — over 5,000 — which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent's lead of only 453 votes after the recount. Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him

invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. HRET failed to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. These can be gleaned from the findings of the Commission on the personal circumstances of Edilito C. Martinez clearly indicating lack of serious intent to run for the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, foremost of which is his sudden absence after such filing. In contrast to petitioner who is a well-known politician, a former municipal mayor for three (3) terms and a strong contender for the position of Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu (then occupied by his mother), it seems too obvious that Edilito C. Martinez was far from the voters' consciousness as he did not even campaign nor formally launch his candidacy. Petitioner should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor should the absence of objection over straying of votes during the actual counting bar petitioner from raising the issue in his election protest. The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez, who did not even bother to file an answer and simply disappeared after filing his certificate of candidacy, was an unknown in politics within the district, a "habal-habal" driver who had neither the financial resources nor political support to sustain his candidacy. The similarity of his surname with that of petitioner was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil petitioner's chances of winning the congressional race for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. 2.

The votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.

The Court held that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be

counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes. One-liner: Final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel their certificate of candidacy as of election day, otherwise the electoral process will be put into mockery. PART VI ELECTION PANGANDAMAN VS COMELEC

BATALLA VS COMELEC

FERRER V COMELEC [G.R. No. 139489. April 10, 2000] Topic: Ballot Appreciation Facts: Petitioner Dante B. Ferrer and private respondent Rafael M. Grospe were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay Bantug Hacienda, Talavera, Nueva Ecija during the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. The final result of the canvassing was as follows: DANILO B. FERRER..........-....277 votes RAFAEL M. GROSPE.........-....275 votes Private respondent filed for an election protest on the MTC of Nueva Ecija and prayed for the re-opening of the ballot boxes of Precinct Nos. 21 and 21-A and for the ballots therein to be recounted. Among the eleven (11) ballots claimed by private respondent, eight (8) were credited to him by the trial court. The court rejected three (3) rejected ballots On the other hand, the trial court credited twenty-nine (29) ballots claimed by petitioner. The final results affirmed the proclamation of petitioner as Punong Barangay with a total votes of 280 against private respondent's 276 votes after adding the corresponding credited ballots in their favor. In due time, private respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Commission on Elections.

RAFAEL M. GROSPE...........-....279 votes Private respondent ended with a one (1) point lead over the petitioner. Issue: Who should be the rightful winner of the Punong Barangay elections? Ruling: (I think we need to thoroughly look into these since Ballot Appreciation ) Ferrer. After a thorough evaluation and examination of the contested ballots, which we visually scrutinized, we make the following findings: A. For Danilo B. Ferrer 1. Exhibit "A-1" is counted in favor of petitioner since "FERRER" is the surname of petitioner and no other candidate has the same surname. 2.....Exhibit "A-2", the vote is valid for "Danilo Ferrer" which was written on the first line for Kagawad leaving the line/space for Punong Barangay vacant under the neighborhood rule. 3.....Exhibit A-3, the vote "Prongcoran Danilo Ferrer" is valid for Danilo Ferrer regardless of the designation. There is no showing that the designation/appellation was used to identify the voter as to render the ballot marked 4.....Exhibits "A-4" and "A-16" are valid votes for Danilo Ferrer. Unquestionably, in Exhibit "A-4", the vote "Danilo Ferrer" is valid. The words "Kamot Capitan" written in the fourth line of Kagawad does not invalidate the ballot nor invalidate the vote for Danilo Ferrer. Since the words "Kamot Capitan" do not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it was intended, the same shall be considered as a stray vote for Kagawad but will not invalidate the whole ballot. 5.....Exhibits "A-5" to "A-9", "A-10", "A14", "A-15" and "1" or a total of nine (9) votes are valid votes in favor of Danilo Ferrer since the votes indicate either the full name of Ferrer or his nickname Danny with his surname Ferrer.

Findings and conclusion of the COMELEC are as follows: DANILO B. FERRER............-....278 votes

6.....Exhibits "11", "A-13", "5" and "8" are valid votes for Danilo Ferrer since the use of nicknames accompanied by the

surname is valid and does not annul the vote. 7.....Exhibit "A-12", the vote "Danny F" is valid since under the law if the nickname is unaccompanied by the name or surname of the candidate and it is the one by which he was generally or popularly known in the locality, the name shall be counted in favor of said candidate, if there is no other candidate for the same office with the same nickname. Moreover, the intent of the voter is to vote for Danilo Ferrer since the initial of his surname is indicated. 8.....Exhibit "2", the ballot unmistakably indicates "Danny F" above illegible writings. We rule that these are not written by two (2) persons. Some unlettered voters in their effort and desire to make their will known end up making scribbles on their ballots absent any malice on their part. They are able to produce/write letters. Credit must be given to them. We hold that the voter intended to vote for Danilo Ferrer. Ex 9.....Exhibit "3", the ballot is valid for Danilo B. Ferrer. Since there is no other candidate with the same first name, the vote "Danilo" is properly credited to Ferrer.[ 10.....Exhibits "5", "9" and "10", the vote "Danny" is valid in favor of petitioner for the same reason stated above. Under the idem sonamrule, "Danny" is likewise validated 11.....Exhibits "11" and "12", the votes "Danilo Ferrer" are valid in favor of petitioner under the neighborhood rule though the name of the candidate (Ferrer) is written on the first space provided for Kagawad but the space for Punong Barangay was left vacant. 12.....Exhibit "13" is considered valid under the neighborhood and idem sonam rule. The word "Danig" could only refer to Ferrer since it sounds like his nickname. The fact that it is written on the first space for Kagawad leaving the space for Punong Barangay unfilled does not invalidate the vote. 13.....Exhibits "6", "7" and "4" are valid votes for Danilo Ferrer. Under the neighborhood rule, even if the vote "Danilo Ferrer" or "Daniel Ferrer" is

written on the space provided for the name of the barangay, but the space for Punong Barangay is vacant, the same would not invalidate the ballot.[14] B. For Rafael M. Grospe 1. Exhibits "A", "C" and "J" with votes "Ape" are valid votes for Rafael Grospe since it is his nickname. 2. Exhibit "B" is a valid vote for Rafael Grospe since the vote "RAFAE APE GAOSPE" is unmistakably a vote for the candidate Rafael Grospe whose nickname is Ape 3. Exhibits "E" and "I" "Ape Grospe" are valid votes for Rafael Grospe following the neighborhood rule, since they are written on the first space provided for the Kagawad and the space for Punong Barangay is left vacant. 4. Exhibits "G" and "H" are valid votes for Rafael Grospe since there is no other candidate for that position with the same first name "Rafael". 5. Exhibit "K" with the vote "Rapael Grospe" written on the second line provided for Kagawad is not valid. The neighborhood cannot apply since it appears that the voter's intention is to vote for Grospe as Kagawad and not as Punong Barangay. 6. Exhibits "D" and "F" are not valid votes for Grospe since "APF" is not his nickname plus the fact that in Exhibit "D", the vote is written between the space provided for Punong Barangay and the name of the Barangay.Kylex To recapitulate, petitioner Danilo B. Ferrer garnered a total of twentynine (29) valid votes and no stray vote while respondent Rafael M. Grospe obtained eight (8) valid votes and three (3) stray votes. Since the main issue at hand is the contested ballots claimed by the parties, the computation shall be based on the number of uncontested ballots after revision at the lower court. Thus, petitioner who garnered 251 uncontested ballots would be credited with 29 valid votes per findings above. He therefore has a total of 280 votes. Petition Granted. Ferrer to be duly elected as Punong Barangay with a total of 280 votes against Grospe with a margin of 4 votes. CORDERO V MOSCARDON [ UDK-6066, Sep 30, 1984 ]

names of the candidate of their choice on the first space provided for councilmen followed by the names of the councilmen of their choice.

Topic: Neighborhood Rule Facts: Cordero and Orrica were the only candidates for Barangay Captain in the May 17, 1982 elections in Cabanatuan, Iloilo. Orrica was proclaimed winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers by 99 votes as against 95 of Cordero. A total of 209 votes were cast, but five (5) were admittedly "no-bearing" thus leaving only a total of 204 votes. Nine (9) votes were considered stray. Petitioner CORDERO filed a protest before the Municipal Circuit Court of Cabatuan and Maasin, while ORRICA filed a counter-protest. A Revision Committee appointed by the Municipal Circuit Court reported the following results:

This can be understood that the said voters intended to vote for either the protestant or the protestee as their barangay captain. Since this is the intention of the voters therein, said intention must have to prevail over their non-writing of the name of their candidate on the space intended for barangay captain. It is their intention in these ballots as can be seen or discoverable from the face of these ballots as it is the intention of the voters in the above ballots admitted by the Committee. RTC reversed the MTC decision. Hence the petition. Issue: WON the stray votes should be counted as votes for Cordero?

For CORDERO (Protestant)

For ORRICA (Protestee)

92

64

Contested

11 (Exhs.LL to VV)

37 (Exhs. 1 to 37)

Credited

4 (Exhs.SS to VV)

35 (Exhs. 1 to 35)

Stray

7 (Exhs.LL to RR)

2 (Exhs. 36 to 37)

Total

96

99

Uncontested

After hearing, the Municipal Circuit Court credited the stray votes in favor of the respective candidates and arrived at the following results:

For CORDERO (Protestant)

For ORRICA (Protestee)

92

64

11 (Exhs.LL to VV)

37 (Exhs. 1-37)

Credited

11

37

Stray

0

0

Uncontested Contested

Ruling: MTC decision upheld. In this case, seven (7) voters wrote the name of protestant CORDERO, and two (2) voters wrote the name of protestee ORRICA, on the first space provided for councilmen followed by the names of the councilmen of their choice. As held by the Municipal Circuit Court, "it can be understood that the said voters intended to vote for either the protestant or the protestee as their barangay captain". The rule that if the name is written in the space reserved for another office, the ballot cannot be counted as a vote for such person for the office for which he is a candidate (Section 155 (5and (15 of the 1978 Election Code,) admits of exceptions, where, as in this case, the intention of the voters to vote for protestant CORDERO and protestee ORRICA, respectively, is unmistakable and should not be frustrated. Fundamentally, the purpose of election laws is to give effect rather than frustrate the will of the voter. No technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Cordero should be declared as winner. BAUTISTA V CASTRO, 206 SCRA 606 FACTS:

Total

103

101

MTC concluded that: It was the intention of the voters in ballot 36 and 37 to vote for Cordero as their barangay captain. In all these 9 ballots the voters wrote the

Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for the Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner. On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest.

It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City were contested. A revision and recounting of the ballots was conducted which resulted in a tie. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Roberto Miguel to have received the same number of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City. From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On July 29, 1982, judgment was rendered on the appeal which, as stated in the first portion of this decision, declared protestant Roberto Miguel the duly elected Barangay Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee Sergio Bautista. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be considered a valid ballot. 2) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested ballots HELD: 1. The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot. 2. As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court which ruled that these were not marked ballots and hence, were valid votes for petitioner BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court, respondent court ruled that the presence of an arrow with the words "and party," was meant for no other purpose than to Identify the voter. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general rule, a voter must write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the offices appearing thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the Revised Election Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the ballot (par. 5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation of affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not used as a means to identify the voter. Even under a liberal view, the words written on the ballots under consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the rule. Consequently, they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots. (Lloren v. CA, et al., No. L-25907, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence, respondent court excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l". Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY" was written in the spare for Barangay Captain. "BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was no doubt that the voter intended to vote for "BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner was

popularly known and which nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence, the respondent court's decision as regards Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote is counted for petitioner Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot cannot be considered as a vote for petitioner whose name was written seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing of a name more than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no other purpose than to identify the ballot ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5" and "6". Private respondent Roberto Miguel in declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of twenty-two (22) votes. ONG V COMELEC, 347 SCRA 681 FACTS: Petitioner William P. Ong and respondent Isagani B. Rizon were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte during the May 11, 1998 local elections. On May 13, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed William P. Ong as the winner with a margin of fifty-one (51) votes. In May 22, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Lanao del Norte an election protest contesting petitioners votes in five (5) clustered precincts. Only the ballot boxes for two (2) precincts, namely were opened since respondent waived the revision of the ballots in the other precincts. ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec was correct in invalidating (16) ballots of petitioner and seven (7) ballots of respondent for being marked and written by two persons. HELD: The erasures in Exhibits YYY and JJJJ of Precinct 28A, 28A1 would not invalidate the ballot absent any showing that another person wrote the name of Ong after the erasure was made. In fact, the rules on appreciation of ballots provide that: When in a space in the ballot there appears a name of candidate that is erased and another clearly written, the vote is valid for the latter. From a total of 4,411 votes of Ong per Comelec findings, a total of another twenty (20) shall be added which gives him a total of 4,431 votes. From a total of 4,414 votes of Rizon per Comelec findings, a total of five (5) votes shall be added which gives him a total of 4,419. Consequently, candidate William P. Ong won by a margin of twelve (12) votes.

FERRER VS DE ALBAN

PROTACTO VS DE LEON

*BAUTISTA VS CASTRO

VILLAROSA VS HRET Facts: VILLAROSA and QUINTOS were the only candidates for the office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 11 May 1998 synchronized national and local elections. On 27 May 1998 the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VILLAROSA as the winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes. On 4 June 1998 QUINTOS filed an election protest against VILLAROSA 2 contesting the results of the election in all the 882 precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro on the following grounds: (1) the ballots were misread and counted in favor of protestee; (2) there was rampant substitute voting, i .e., persons other than the registered voters voted; (3) violence and intimidation were committed by protestee and her followers against known supporters of protestant to enhance protestee's candidacy; (4) previously prepared ballots for the protestee were deposited in the ballot boxes; and (5) illiterate Mangyan voters voting for protestant were assisted by selfappointed assistors of protestee, who wrote "JTV" on the ballots contrary to the instruction of said illiterate voters. The HRET thereafter required the parties to designate 25% of the protested and counter-protested precincts as their respective pilot precincts pursuant to Rule 68 of the HRET Rules of Procedure. During the revision, ballots bearing "JTV," "JTB," "GTV," "GTB," "Jitivi," "Gitivi," "Jitibi" and "Gitibi" on the line for Representative were classified as ballots for VILLAROSA, which the revisors of QUINTOS objected to. Likewise, ballots bearing "Girlie" on the line for Representative were classified as votes for VILLAROSA. HRET promulgated a resolution stating that with QUINTOS' withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts, QUINTOS impliedly limited the issue to WHETHER OR NOT THE "JTV" VOTES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF PROTESTEE AMELITA C. VILLAROSA. On 9 December 1999 the HRET conducted an oral argument and heard QUINTOS and VILLAROSA on the aforestated issue. HRET ordered to "PROCEED with the revision of the ballots in the remaining 75%; and DIRECT the Secretariat to continue with the revision." This resolution prompted VILLAROSA to file an Omnibus Motion praying for (1) the suspension of the revision of the ballots pursuant to HRET Resolution No. 00-65; (2) a categorical ruling that all ballots cast for "JTV" are valid votes for VILLAROSA; and (3) the dismissal of the protest.

On 8 June 2000 the HRET issued Resolution No. 00-82 informing the parties that "the Tribunal ruled on May 18, 2000, by [a] vote of 5-4 of its members, not to count 'JTV' and its variations as valid votes for Protestee Amelita C. Villarosa, the same being considered stray ballots . . . [and that it] directed that the revision of ballots proceed with respect to the 75% counter-protest precincts." Villarosa filed certiorari arguing that "JTV" was her designated nickname in the official list of candidates submitted by the provincial election supervisor to the COMELEC in Manila; it was the nickname she used in her posters, handbills and other election propaganda throughout the campaign period. In her speeches during the rallies, she urged the voters who might have found her full name difficult to write to simply vote "JTV," as she had decided to use that nickname as a shortcut of her name as a married woman under Article 370 of the Civil Code. Under this Article, a married woman may use (1) her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname; (2) her maiden first name and her husband's surname; or (3) her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs. The HRET thus agreed with the COMELEC in its resolution 13 that disallowed VILLAROSA to use "JTV" as a nickname because the same was not her nickname with which she was popularly known. Issue: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring the "JTV" votes as stray votes. Ruling: NO. The facts established in this case, strengthened by the admission of the parties at the preliminary conference conducted by the HRET on 6 August 1998 and during the oral argument before the Court on 15 August 2000, lead us to no other conclusion than that the use by VILLAROSA of "JTV" as her nickname or stage name, as indicated in her Certificate of Candidacy, was a clever ruse or ploy to make a mockery of the election process. Therefore, the HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ruling that "JTV " votes should not be counted in favor of VILLAROSA. They are stray votes. Before VILLAROSA filed her certificate of candidacy on 27 March 1998 for the 11 May 1998 elections, VILLAROSA never used "JTV" as her nickname or stage name. Her nickname was "GIRLIE." In her affidavit dated 16 April 1998 which she filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor, she requested that she be allowed to insert in her Certificate of Candidacy the name "GIRLIE" between her given name Amelita and the initial of her maiden surname C so that her name would read in full as follows: "MA. AMELITA "Girlie" C. VILLAROSA." Moreover, the following conclusions are beyond dispute: "JTV" represents either the initials or the nickname of Jose Tapales Villarosa. VILLAROSA was never generally or popularly known as "JTV." She was generally or popularly known as "GIRLIE." Clearly then, since "JTV" remains to be either the initials or nickname of Jose Tapales Villarosa, who was the incumbent Congressman during the election and campaign periods for the 11 May 1998 elections, votes entered or written as "JTV" cannot be considered as votes for petitioner. The votes "JTV" or any variations thereof are, therefore, stray votes.

Even if VILLAROSA decided to use "JTV" as her nickname for purposes of the 11 May 1998 elections, one must never forget that she never used it as a nickname before she filed her certificate of candidacy. The nickname which the second paragraph of Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code allows to be included in the certificate of candidacy is that "by which [the candidate] is generally or popularly known." This clearly means the nickname by which one has been generally or popularly known BEFORE the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but NOT what the candidate wants to THEREAFTER use. By her own statement under oath in her affidavit of 16 April 1998, VILLAROSA solemnly declared that she was generally and popularly known in every barangay in Occidental Mindoro as "GIRLIE" BEFORE and AFTER she filed her certificate of candidacy. And, as asserted by her counsel during the oral argument on 15 August 2000, her other nickname before she filed her certificate of candidacy was "MRS. "JTV," not "JTV." Rule 14 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides: 14. Any vote containing initials only or which is illegible or which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended shall be considered as a stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. Under this rule three kinds of votes are considered stray: (1) a vote containing initials only, (2) a vote which is illegible, and (3) a vote which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended. The only error of the HRET is its ruling that if the votes are in initials only, they are to be considered stray votes if they do not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom the votes are intended. The first category of stray votes under this rule is not to be qualified by the third category in the sense that votes in initials only may be counted for a candidate provided that the initials would sufficiently identify the candidate voted for. Such construction of the rule fails to give meaning to the disjunctive conjunction O R separating the first category from the second, and the second from the third. Since votes for "GIRLIE" written in the space for Representative were in fact claimed by VILLAROSA and credited in her favor, then the HRET correctly ruled that "JTV" votes or variations thereof, under the idem sonans rule, cannot be counted for VILLAROSA because only one nickname or stage name is allowed. From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of VILLAROSA was evident when, in her certificate of candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in question whom she wanted to succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose credibility is essential in preserving democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria sua propia. No one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED for lack of merit. COMELEC VS ROMILLO Facts:

COMELEC filed four (4) criminal Complaints against one Eden Asuncion for election offenses committed on Election Day, November 8, 1971, at around 10:00 A.M., at Polling Precinct No. 58, Laoag City. The criminal cases filed were: 1. Criminal Case No. 119-II, for violation of Section 61 of the Election Code of 1971, by carrying a gun inside the said polling place on the same date and time, while the voting was in progress; 2.

Criminal Case No. 120-II, for violation of Section 172 of the Election Code of 1971, by unlawfully entering said polling place on the same date and time;

3.

Criminal Case No. 121-II, for violation of Sec 231(a), par. 25 of the Election Code of 1971, by employing unlawful means or scheme to discover or read the contents of prepared ballots by voters of said polling place on the same date and time;

4. Criminal Case No. 122-II, for violation of Sec. 231 (a), par. 32 of the Election Code of 1971, by conducting himself in a disorderly manner as to interrupt the voting proceedings in said polling place on the same date and time. Respondent Judge issued the Order, dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 119-II, 121-II and 122-II for insufficiency of evidence, and quashing the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 120-II, which is the questioned portion of the Order, on the ground that the mere presence of an unauthorized person in the polling place does not constitute an offense. COMELEC's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse in issuing the Order dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 119-II, 121-II and 122-II for insufficiency of evidence, and quashing the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 120-II Ruling: Section 172, paragraph 1 of the Election Code of 1971, alleged to have been violated, provides: "SEC. 172. Persons allowed in and around the polling place. — During the voting, no person shall be allowed inside the polling place, except the members of the board of inspectors and their substitutes, the watchers, the representatives of the Commission, the voters casting their votes, the voters waiting for their turn to get inside the booths whose number shall not exceed twice the number of booths and the voters waiting for their turn to cast their votes whose number shall not exceed forty at any one time. The watchers shall stay only in the space reserved for them it being illegal for them to enter places reserved for the voters or for the board, or to mingle and talk with the voters within the polling place. XxXxXX Violation of the foregoing provision is classified as a serious election offense, thus:

"Sec. 230. Election offenses and their classification. — Violation of any of the provisions, or pertinent portions of sections . . . one hundred and seventy-two . . . shall be serious election offenses; . . ." the penalty prescribed therefor being: "SEC. 233. Penalties. — Anyone found guilty of a serious election offense shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than six years and one day but not more than twelve years; . . ." From the tenor of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that Section 172, in relation to Sections 230 and 233 of the Revised Election Code of 1971, is penal in character, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge. But while respondent Judge may have erred in his rationalization, the quashal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 120-II will have to be upheld. The same reason given by respondent Judge for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 119-II, 121-II and 122-II, that is, for insufficiency of evidence, applies. Quoted in the dismissal Order is the following testimony of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 58, Laoag City, showing the absence of a prima facie case against the accused. “'A — All I can say is that when I saw Eden Asuncion tried (sic) to enter the voting booth, I stopped him and sent him out and he did so; I never saw him carrying a firearm. With respect to the charges that Eden Asuncion watched voters fill up their ballots and reading the contents of the same, I never saw him committed those acts because when he tried to enter the voting booths I called his attention to go out and he went out.' (Exhibit "I") Under those circumstances, by no means can it be concluded that Eden Asuncion had violated Section 172 of the Election Code. The secrecy and sanctity of the ballot sought to be protected by the said provision has not been violated. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is denied. No costs. LAODENIO V COMELEC Canvassing bodies, enumerated Facts: FELIPE L. LAODENIO, petitioner, and ROGELIO LONGCOP, respondent, were candidates for the position of Mayor of Mapanas, Northern Samar, during the 8 May 1995 elections. On 15 May 1995 Longcop was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

resume canvass on 12 May 1995 at the capital town of Catarman, Northern Samar. The Board however reconvened on 12 May 1995 in Mapanas and proceeded with the canvass. The respondent board thereafter adjourned and surreptitiously reconvened on 15 May 1995, with a new chairman who was allegedly appointed by the Provincial Election Supervisor (THE CONTENTIOUS BIT) Laodenio's contention: 1. When the election returns from Precinct Nos. 5-A and 7-A were about to be canvassed, petitioner manifested his oral objections thereto and likewise submitted his written objections on the same day, 12 May 1995. The respondent board however did not give the petitioner opportunity to file an appeal from its decision to proceed with the canvass of the election returns from precinct nos. 7-A and 5-A. 2. Laodenio claims that a petition may be iled directly with COMELEC pursuant to Rule 27, Sec. 4, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure when, as in this case, the issue involves the illegal composition of the Board of Canvassers. Petitioner argues that the Board was illegally constituted on 15 May 1995 since the new Chairman was appointed merely by the Provincial Election Supervisor and not by respondent COMELEC, in clear contravention of Sec. 10 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2756. Comelec's contention: Dismissed for lack of merit Adjournments were justiied and were not improperly prolonged as claimed by petitioner; he was in fact deemed to have acquiesced to the new composition of the Municipal Board of Canvassers when he actively participated in the proceedings therein; there was no showing that he manifested on time his intent to appeal the rulings of the Board. Issue: W/N the composition of the board of canvassers was illegal (Note: I focused in this issue but there was a second one pertaining to the returns that I didn't include since di siya under sa syllabus) Ruling: This argument is devoid of merit. Apparently, it emanates from a misapprehension of the applicability of certain election laws. Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 provides :

Laodenio filed a petition with respondent COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Longcop and to declare illegal the constitution of the Municipal Board of Canvassers as well as its proceedings.

Sec. 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced. Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission...

During the canvass, respondent board of canvassers adjourned repeatedly starting May 9, 1995, after the poll clerk of precinct no 7-A testiied before the Board that the election returns for the said precinct was tampered with and falsiied to increase the total votes cast in favor of respondent Longcop from 88 to 188.

As evidenced by the Minutes of the Board, petitioner indeed raised the matter of illegal composition of the Board at the irst instance before said Board when his counsel questioned the authority of the new Chairman. However, after seeing the notice of the Provincial Election Supervisor, his counsel agreed to the opening of the canvassing.

On 10 May 1995, the Board resumed its canvass but it adjourned again at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon as it has not yet decided on what to do with the election returns for precinct nos. 7-A and 5-A. When it adjourned on May 10, 1995 it announced that it will only

In fact, petitioner thereafter actively participated in the proceedings. Consequently, COMELEC concluded that "Such acts could be justiiably taken as acquiescence to the new composition of the Board.

Otherwise, had he felt aggrieved thereby, he should have elevated the issue on appeal to the Commission."

elected member of the House of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao.

Sec. 19 of R.A. 7166 provides: Sec. 19. Contested Composition or Proceedings ofthe Board; Period to Appeal; Decision by the Commission. - Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the Commission within three (3) days from a ruling thereon x x x x

Mastura now comes to us imputing to public respondent COMELEC Second Division grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders.

Although Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5, par. (a)(1) of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also allow filing of a petition directly with respondent COMELEC when the issue involves the illegal composition of the Board, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the same Rule requires that it must be filed IMMEDIATELY when the Board begins to act as such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal. In the present case, the petition was filed five (5) days after respondent Longcop had been proclaimed by the Board. MASTURA VS COMELEC Power of Comelec over Board of Canvasssers Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the irst district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certiicate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certiicate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order annulling the Certiicate of Canvass of Matanog. A new Municipal Board of Canvassers for the Municipality of Matanog, Maguindanao was also constituted. The new Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and recanvassed the votes. During the proceedings Mastura objected to the inclusion of fifty (50) out of the fifty-seven (57) election returns on the ground that the COMELEC copy of the election returns was not relective of the true results unless compared with the copy of the original Municipal Board of Canvassers. But the new Municipal Board of Canvassers believed otherwise; hence, it included in the canvass the ifty (50) election returns objected to by Mastura who thereafter walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing. After the proceedings in the Municipal Board of Canvassers, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened and prepared the Certiicate of Canvass and Statement of Votes of the Municipality of Matanog. As a result, private respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed the duly

Issue: W/N Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion Ruling: We ind no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsiied or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself. That the Certiicate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual inding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves. The rule that factual indings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such indings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself - on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. Pursuant to its administrative functions, the COMELEC exercises direct supervision and control over the proceedings before the Board of Canvassers. Lucman v Dimaporo: The function of a canvassing board in the canvass of the returns is purely ministerial in nature. Equally ministerial, therefore, is the function of the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its supervisory power over said Board, pursuant to our Constitution and laws. So long as the election returns have been accomplished in due form, the Board, and on appeal therefrom, the Commission on Elections must include said returns in the canvass. -----Comelec is the constitutional body charged with the duty to enforce all laws relative to elections, duty bound to see to it that the board of canvassers perform its proper function. It is within the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation based on incomplete returns, or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all. Neither Constitution nor

statute has granted Comelec or board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election returns, to look beyond the face thereof, once satisied of their authenticity. The assailed Orders having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of any inding of grave abuse of discretion, judicial interference is therefore unnecessary and uncalled for. Consequently, the questioned Orders must perforce be upheld. EN BANC A.M. No. MTJ-92-728. July 8, 1994 MAYOR PERLITA LIBARDOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE ABDULLAH M. CASAR, respondent. Lisod siya sabton na case kay dili discussed ang pertaining to power of Comelec over the BOC since more of an admin case against the judge ni, pero ang basic tenet kay pertaining to the power of Comelec to control the BOC A judge has no jurisdiction to suspend the canvassing of election returns, as any question on the proclamation by the BOC is appealable only after the Board of Canvassers has rendered its ruling on the objections of any party to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns. FACTS: Judge Casar, in May 14, 1992, issued an order restraining the Comelec Board of Canvassers (BOC) of Maigo, Lanao del Norte from canvassing election returns of Precinct No. 10-A until either the COMELEC Manila or the RTC in Iligan City could act on the petition of Wilfredo P. Randa, a mayoralty candidate (Nationalist People's Coalition [NPC]) who was running against complainant (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino [LDP]) in Maigo, Lanao del Norte, in the synchronized national and local elections of 11 May 1992. Libardos alleged that during the canvassing, Randa filed a complaint for Preliminary Injunction with the MCTC presided over by Casar against Board of Canvassers by reason of which the May 14 order. Accordingly, the said order caused the delay in the canvassing of the election returns which was resumed only after the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte sent a message to the COMELEC (Manila) requesting that an order be issued ordering the BOC to disregard the restraining order. Respondent admitted that the order was issued without jurisdiction the order was issued on the alleged ground that the judges of the "RTC at Iligan City are not available to issue a Preliminary Injunction, and, it is admitted fact the COMELEC, Manila is very far and might not receive on time the appeal of the petitioner." In further justification, Judge Casar said that he issued it "as an immediate remedy and arrangement to prevent bloodshed between the contending parties… which if said imminent trouble will occur, would cause not only irreparable damages but may ignite and give rise to the revival of the centuries-old conflict between Christians and Muslims in the province." He also pointed out that complainant's failure to question or move for a reconsideration of the assailed order implied her acceptance thereof; and suggested that complainant filed the complaint for the purpose of harassing him and to block his application for promotion to the Regional Trial Court. *Complainant asserts that respondent's justification in issuing the order constituted ignorance of the law, considering that on 14 May 1992 there was as yet no appeal to speak of from the decision of the Board of Canvassers because the election returns had not been canvassed and that it is an express provision of law that an appeal can

be had only after the Board of Canvassers has rendered its ruling on the objections of any party to the inclusion or exclusion of election returns. ISSUE: Did Judge Casar have jurisdiction to issue the order? Is he administratively liable? RULING: The SC agreed with the conclusions of the OCA: This was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, which report found for the complainant. As admitted by the respondent and after having been ruled upon by the COMELEC En Banc, the assailed Order was issued without jurisdiction, the acts accompanied of should be met with a corresponding sanction. Formal investigation of the charge is no longer necessary because respondent already admitted to it. The reason/defense interposed by the respondent is unavailing. As a judicial officer, he is to know and be kept abreast with the latest law and jurisprudence. His feeling of sympathy and fairness cannot serve as a license for him to deliberately transgress or dispense with the existing laws involving the controversy. Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his May 14 Order knowing that he does not have jurisdiction to act on the petition filed by Wilfredo Randa.* The SC found respondent's actuation as unbecoming that of a worthy Judge, for a judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence (Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct). While his reasons for issuing the assailed order are perhaps commendable and demonstrative of his concern for peace and order during the election period in the given community, he lost sight of his bounden duty, as a Judge, to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1, supra). A Judge should behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01, Canon 2, supra). ACCORDINGLY, the Court RESOLVED to hold respondent judge administratively liable for having knowingly issued an order without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and to impose on him a fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act or acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. (Side note: The case filed was for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, arbitrariness and conduct unbecoming a judge. There was found no ignorance of the law because there was no evidence to show the judicial acts complained of were ill-motivated and corrupt. The documents on file in the case do not show that questioned order was ill-motivated or corrupt.) EN BANC G.R. No. 135423. November 29, 1999 JESUS L. CHU, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF USON, MASBATE and SALVADORA O. SANCHEZ, respondents.

A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. FACTS: Petitioner Chu and private respondent Sanchez were candidates for municipal mayor of Uson, Masbate in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner objected to the inclusion in the canvass of some of the election returns alleging that Sanchez, with the aid of armed men, entered into the polling places where the centralized counting was being conducted, and exerted undue influence and intimidation upon the board of election inspectors (BEI) who were then counting the votes and preparing the election returns, thus, the votes reflected in these returns are no longer reflective of the will of the electorate and should not be included in the canvass. He further claims that he orally objected to the inclusion of 74 election returns, but was only able to file written objections within 24 hours from the time the oral objections were made as required under section 245 of the OEC for 37 election returns, accordingly because the MBC refused to give him the prescribed form when it convened until after they finished the canvassing the next day. MBC rejected the objections, finding that the affidavits by petitioner were not sufficient to support his allegations and giving more weight to the affidavits by the BEI. Petitioner appealed to the Comelec but Comelec Second Division denied it and directed the MBC to reconvene and include in the canvass the 37 election returns and, thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate, holding that the appeal showed nothing that would remotely evince the alleged intimidation, duress, coercion or undue influence supposedly exerted during the counting of votes and the preparation of the election returns. [The evidence presented are insubstantial and lacks the specifics required to prove the acts imputed to her respondent which would suffice to render the subject election returns defective or invalid.] MBC then proclaimed Sanchez as the winning candidate. ISSUE: Is there a pre-proclamation controversy that would justify the exclusion of election returns? RULING: The petition is without merit. The Code provides that a pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. Section 243 of the Code enumerates the specific issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are

incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. In addition to the restrictive and exclusive scope of its subject matter, all pre-proclamation controversies on election returns or certificates of canvass shall be disposed of summarily — first, by the board of canvassers, and then, by the Comelec. In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the Comelec are not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. In such summary proceedings, there is no room for the presentation of evidence aliunde, the inspection of voluminous documents, and for meticulous technical examinations which take up considerable time. A party seeking to raise issues the resolution of which would compel or necessitate the Comelec to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest. The legislative intent is to give life to the policy that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible for it is in the public interest that the position for which the election was held should be filled promptly, even though the proclamation of the winning candidates be provisional in nature, in that the same may still be subject to the results of the election protests that may be subsequently filed. The only issue raised by petitioner which may possibly be the subject of a pre-proclamation controversy is the entry of Sanchez and her armed bodyguards in the polling places during the counting of ballots and the preparation of the election returns, which allegedly caused the intimidation and undue influence of the members of the BEI, resulting in the "sudden and radical change" in the election returns. This would appear to fall under section 243 (c) of the Code, which provides that one of the issues properly pertaining to a preproclamation controversy is that [t]he election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic. However, petitioner does not claim that there are any defects or irregularities apparent from a physical inspection of the election returns. Neither did the MBC nor the Comelec make any finding that the returns contained any palpable errors or material defects. To prove the intimidation which petitioner asserts would require the reception of evidence in a full-blown proceeding and such election irregularities cannot be proven in a summary proceeding like a pre-proclamation controversy, but rather should be properly raised in an election protest. It is settled in jurisprudence that returns will not be excluded on the mere allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns, on their face, appear regular and wanting of any physical signs of tampering, alteration, or other similar vice. Thus, if there had been sham voting or minimal voting which was made to appear as normal through the falsification of the election returns, such grounds are properly cognizable in an election protest and not in a preproclamation controversy.

We wish to stress that our ruling in this case merely sustains the Comelec's position that, in the absence of "palpable errors and/or material defects [which] are clearly discernible on the faces of these returns," the board of canvassers should include in the canvass the 37 election returns and that, by ruling thus, we have no intention of passing upon the verity of petitioner's imputations of electoral irregularities and acts of terrorism, which we reiterate is not in issue in a pre-proclamation controversy, but should be resolved in a proper electoral protest. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for petitioner's failure to demonstrate that public respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its resolution dated September 1, 1998. EN BANC G.R. No. 145802. April 4, 2001 DOMINADOR T. BELAC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROMMEL DIASEN, respondents. FACTS: Rommel Diasen of the LAMMP and Dominador Belac of the LAKAS-NUCD were candidates for governor in the province of Kalinga during the May 11, 1998 national and local elections. Diasen objected to the inclusion of the election returns of 42 precincts in the municipality of Pinukpuk as well as of 28 precincts of the town of Tinglayan and then filed with the Kalinga Provincial Board of Canvassers a petition for exclusion of the said Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes, alleging in the main that (1) The Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes were not prepared by the Board of Election Inspectors, not having been signed by the respective watchers for the candidates' political parties and (2) There were discrepancies in the tally of votes. However, the Provincial BOC included in its canvass the results as stated in the election returns for Pinukpuk. On Diasen's objection to the inclusion of the election returns for Tinglayan, the Board ruled that it will only issue a certificate of correction since the discrepancies were caused by mere error in indicating the entries. The BOC proclaimed Belac as the duly elected governor for the province of Kalinga. Belac was initially proclaimed as the governor, however Diasen filed a motion for reconsideration which was then granted by the Comelec en banc by a 3-3 vote. Belac questioned this because accordingly, 2 of the votes en banc were made by 2 Commissioners should not be considered because they retired before the promulgation of the judgment. The Commission en banc with new members affirmed the proclamation of Diasen. ISSUE: Can COMELEC in a pre-proclamation case go beyond the face of the election returns? RULING: When the Provincial Board of Canvassers commenced the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes for Pinukpuk and Tinglayan, respondent Diasen objected to the inclusion

of the election returns of several precincts in both municipalities; and that within twenty-four hours therefrom, he filed a formal petition with the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the exclusion of the Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes for the said municipalities. Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the Board or directly with the Commission, on any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. The Specific issued which may be raised in a preproclamation controversy as per Section 243 of the Code are: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. This enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Respondent Diasen's petition pertains to a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, it alleges that the votes for petitioner Belac were all padded through "Operation Dagdag"; the election returns for him (Diasen) was tampered, falsified and manufactured; and that the election returns were already prepared even before the counting of votes. He thus prays that the votes must be recounted. Diasen did not say that the alleged irregularities appear on the face of the election returns. Obviously, they came from external sources and, therefore, not manifest on the election returns. The PBOC explained that it refused to exclude the Certificate of Canvass of Tinglayan because it was regular on its face and the grounds raised by Diasen are not among those in the list enumerated by law. Nothing therein shows it was manufactured or prepared under duress, threat or intimidation or that it was tampered or falsified. As to the Statement of Votes for Tinglayan, the reason why some election returns were not canvassed was because of ballot snatching in some areas. The incompleteness of the Statement of Votes, therefore, did not vitiate the Certificate of Canvass. With respect to the Certificate of Canvass and Statement of Votes for Pinukpuk, the Board checked the entries of the election returns in the presence of the parties' representatives. Having found there were some "Dagdag" for Belac, the Board required the correction of the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass basing the correction on the figures in the election returns, pursuant to the General Instructions for Boards of Canvassers. It was only after the proper correction was made that the Board included the Certificate of Canvass in the provincial canvass. In Matalam vs. COMELEC, this Court held that "in a preproclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities. Indeed, in the case of Loong vs. Comelec, 5 the Court, through Mr. Justice

Regino Hermosisima, Jr., declared that "the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction . . . is that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes."

when respondent Comelec finally promulgated the other challenged Resolution dated November 16, 2000.

Through jurisprudence the SC categorically ruled that in a pre-proclamation controversy, COMELEC is not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. A party seeking to raise issues resolution of which would compel or necessitate COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest. By their very nature, and given the obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the results of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved in summary proceedings without the need to present evidence aliunde and certainly without having to go through voluminous documents and subjecting them to meticulous technical examinations which take up considerable time." In concluding that there were serious irregularities, tampering and falsification of the questioned election returns; and that they were manufactured, respondent COMELEC looked beyond the face of the documents, hence, exceeding its authority.

Here, the Comelec failed to comply with this mandate. Let it be reminded that pre-proclamation controversies, by their very nature, are to be resolved in summary proceedings which obviously should be disposed of without any unnecessary delay.

We thus hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondent Diasen's motion for reconsideration. At this point, counsel for respondent Diasen must remember that he should have determined carefully the proper legal remedy or recourse for his client, such as an election protest. Needless to state, a procedural flaw, as in this case, causes prejudice to the litigants and impairs the proper administration of justice. On the issue of the votes by retired Commissioners "A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The resolution or decision [of the Division] must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated." Upon their retirement the commissioners had been stripped of all authority to participate in the promulgation of the Resolution. On the summary nature of pre-proclamation cases On petitioner's contention that there was a long and deliberate delay on the part of public respondent Comelec — as previously stated, respondent Diasen's motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Comelec First Division was filed with respondent Comelec en bancon June 19, 1998. However, it was only on February 22, 2000, or after almost two (2) years, when the motion was resolved. In view of the equally divided voting, a rehearing was ordered. The parties merely submitted memoranda. Yet, it was only on November 16, 2000, or after almost nine (9) months from February 22, 2000,

Pre-proclamation controversies are mandated by law to be summarily disposed of.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due course and is GRANTED. The challenged Resolutions dated February 22, 2000 and November 16,. 2000 of respondent COMELEC en banc are SET ASIDE, while the Resolution of the COMELEC (First Division) dated June 4, 1998 is AFFIRMED. Respondent COMELEC is directed to forthwith conduct the proclamation of petitioner Dominador Belac in accordance with law. EN BANC G.R. No. 105323. July 3, 1992 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited only to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code which is restrictive and exclusive. FACTS: On May 5, 1992, and SC decision disqualified Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. This was received by Comelec on May 6, 1992. Petitioner filed a motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Resolution to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and "to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. The Comelec issued the resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates but failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of qualified candidates. According to petitioner, the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate. Confusion arose, allegedly nationwide, as the "Chavez" votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs). Comelec Commissioner Rama issued a directive over radio and TV ordering all "Chavez" votes to be credited in favor of petitioner. Petitioner still however contends that the information did not reach a significant number of precincts and it did not reach all the various BEIs of the 170,354 election precincts throughout the country on time for implementation and that the minutes

of voting did not indicate the number of "Chavez" votes which were declared stray or invalidated. Petitioner filed an urgent petition before the Comelec praying the re-opening of ballot boxes in 13 provinces (80,348 precincts) and to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor and to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates. This was then dismissed. Petitioner alleges that Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion and therefore prays that the Comelec be enjoined from proclaiming the 24th winning senatorial candidate until after his petition before the Commission is resolved. A Motion for Leave to Intervene was filed by Senator Agapito Aquino praying for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members of the Senate. ISSUE: Does the petition of Chavez involve a pre-proclamation controversy? RULING: Yes. On whether the Court may exercise judicial review No. The SC can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions. Comelec's alleged failure to implement its own resolution is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, respondent Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone. The controversy being in the nature of a pre-proclamation While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over preproclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives as per Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166. What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order enjoining "the proclamation of the 24th highest ranking senatorial candidate without first acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992" but also prays that judgment be rendered requiring the Comelec

to re-open the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces therein enumerated including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for "Chavez" votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner. It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns" but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots. Petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate. The proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases like the one at bar must be faithfully followed lest we allow anarchy to reign. The proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial measures. The instant petition falls squarely with the case of Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: "Sanchez anchors his petition for recount and/or reappreciation on Section 243, paragraph (b) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 234 thereof with regard to material defects in canvassed election returns. He contends that the canvassed returns discarding "Sanchez" votes as stray were "incomplete" and therefore warrant a recount or reappreciation of the ballots under Section 234. . . . ". . . The fact that some votes written solely as Sanchez" were declared stray votes because of the inspectors' erroneous belief that Gil Sanchez had not been disqualified as a candidate, involves an erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established by the law as well as jurisprudence . . . that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of ballots. "2. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts is not a 'proceeding of the board of canvassers' for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings under Section 241, Omnibus Election Code, but of the boards of election inspectors who are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of appreciation provided in Section 211, Omnibus Election Code. Otherwise stated, the

appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The functions of ballots appreciation is performed by the boards election inspectors at the precinct level. (Emphasis supplied) "3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a preproclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. xxx xxx xxx "7. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)." In the case at bar, petitioner's allegation that "Chavez" votes were either invalidated or declared stray has no relation to the correctness or authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Otherwise stated, petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction. As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates . Premises considered, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.