Admin Case-digest-0209.docx

CALALANG VS WILLIAMS Facts: In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certainstreets in Manila. Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the Na tional Assembly inthe exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, byvirtue of which the rules and reg ulations complained of werepromulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoidobstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of thepublic. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly wasprompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It wasin spired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to saythe

least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at thebottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promotethe general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, withproperty, and with business and occu pations. Persons and propertymay be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order tosecure the general com fort, health, and prosperity of the state (U. S.vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Gov- ernment the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liber ty is ablessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not bemade to prevail over authority because then so ciety will fall intoanarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over libertybecause then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen shouldachieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mindthrough education and, personal discipline, so that there may beestablished the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and orderand happiness for all. The moment greater authority is con ferredupon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from theresiduum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies inthe fact that the apparent curtailment of lib erty is precisely the verymeans of insuring its preservation. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Com- munications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets de signated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public con venience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, there fore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon whichthe application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rulesand regulations on the use of national roads and to determine whenand how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of thecondition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements ofpublic convenience and interest, is an administrative function whichcannot be di rectly discharged by the National Assembly. It mustdepend on the discretion of some other government official to whom isconfided the duty of determining whether the proper occa sion existsfor executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of suchdiscretion is the making of the law. Azarcon vs Sandiganbayan Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla. After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility. Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property. Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a

depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer. Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; “Implied Powers” are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.—It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as “defined either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both.” Thus, although the “appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, x x x” the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still be limited to that “conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication” in its enabling act. Hence, “(a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.” Corollarily, implied powers “are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.” For to so extend the statutory grant of power “would be an encroachment on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution.” It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring “any person” to preserve a distrained property, thus: The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or any person having possession or control of such property to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not to dispose of the same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the Commissioner. PIMENTEL VS COMELEC Facts : The herein petitioners are the contestants while herein private respondents are the contestees in Election Cases Nos. 8, 9 and 10 which are pending before the Court of First Instance of Quirino. Petitioners-contestants allege in their election protests that they were duly certified candidates for mayor, vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Diffun, Quirino, Province, in the general elections held last January 30, 1980, as shown in the resolution of the Comelec dated February 4, 1980 (attached to the election protests as Annex “A”) but that they were not considered as such by the Municipal Board of Canvassers who, consequently, did not count the votes cast in their favor and proceeded to proclaim the contestees as the duly elected officials of Diffun. Petitioners-contestants contend that had it not been for the said error in the appreciation of the votes cast in their favor, they

would have certainly emerged as the winners in said election. They therefore pray of said Court of First Instance of Quirino—(1) to fix the bond to be filed by them; (2) to cause to be brought to the court the registration list, the unused ballots and the documents used in all of the precincts of the municipality of Diffun; (3) to order the examination of the ballots, using the necessary officers with emoluments to be fixed by said court; (4) to order the votes cast in favor of contestants to be counted in their favor; and (5) to annul the proclamation of the contestees and to declare the contestants as the duly elected officials of Diffun. In their answers to the election protests, the contestees deny that contestants are duly certified candidates and allege that during the voting and the counting of votes in the voting centers, the contestants were not bona fide candidates and it was for this reason that the votes cast in their favor were not counted. ISSUE: whether or not the Commission on Elections had jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 9592 which—(1) required the herein petitioners to answer the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by the herein private respondents, thereby taking cognizance of such special civil action which questioned the validity of an interlocutory order, dated March 20-1980, issued by the Court of First Instance of Quirino in Election Cases Nos. 8, 9 and 10, involving the offices of Mayor, Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Diffun, Quirino Province; and (2) temporarily restrained said Court of First Instance of Quirino from enforcing said order of March 20, 1980, which denied herein private respondents’ motion seeking to prevent the trial court from re-examining the ballots and to limit the counting of votes cast in favor of petitioners-contestants to those reflected in the election returns. HELD : Accordingly, the aforequoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, cannot be construed as a grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases appealable to it. Much less can such provision be interpreted, by analogy, as a grant to the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance and appealable to said commission under Sec. 196 of the Revised Election Code. While it is true that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases appealable to it, the grant of jurisdiction is not by virtue of the aforequoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but by express legislative fiat, namely, Sec. 30 of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296), to wit: “SEC. 30. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.—The Court of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of

mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. ’ No such legislative grant of jurisdiction exists in the case of the Commission on Elections. Consequently, respondents’ contention that the Commission on Elections has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the Courts of First Instance and appealable to said Commission cannot be sustained. It results, therefore, that Resolution, that Resolution No. 9592 was issued by the COMELEC without authority to do so GARMENTS AND TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD VS CA

Lorenzo Tañada vs Mariano Cuenco After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question. HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved? The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution. FACTS: On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ETare reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tañada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion. ISSUES: 1.WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter 2.WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate HELD: 1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised (constitutionality).The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary powers. 2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against

partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid. WHEREFORE: The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the Chairman. PARAS DISSENTING: The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Consti mandate that the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9) must be held fixed, since the Consti must have consistent application. There is no rule against the minority party nominating a majority party member to the ET. Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushing aside partisan concerns. LABRADOR DISSENTING: The petition itself is unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because:1.9-member ET mandate violated2.right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to nominate3.process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v. Senate power)4.SC arrogation of power in determining Con Con’s proviso of <9 ET member sunder certain circumstances The refusal of Tañada to nominate mustbe considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2. carpio vs executive In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president. ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975. HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the

Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.” Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government. EXTENSIVE ENTERPRISES VS SARBRO

VILLALUZ VS ZALDIVAR Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him. ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the president. HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” . There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that “the Congress may by

law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department”. ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the /urisdiction of the president to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the president. HELD: 2es. he president has /urisdiction and not the #i'il ,er'ice. he resident of the hilippines has /urisdiction to in'esti$ate and remo'e him since he is a presi dentialappointee who belon$s to the non3competiti'e or unclassified ser'ice under ,ec 5 of Republic Act 4o. !6 bein$ a presidential appointee" Villaluz belon$s to the non3competiti'e or unclassified ser'ice of the $o'ernment and as such he c an onl) bein'esti$ated and remo'ed from office after due hearin$ b) the resident of the hilippinesunder the principle that 7the power to remo'e is inherent in the power to appoint . here is some point in the ar$ument that the power of control of the resident ma) e+tendto the power to in'esti$ate" suspend or remo'e officers and emplo)ees who belon$ to thee+ecuti'e department if the) are presidential appointees or do not belon$ to the classifiedser'ice for such can be /ustified under the principle that the power to remo'e is inherent inthe power to appoint but not with re$ard to those officers or emplo)ees who belon$ to theclassified ser'ice for as to them that inherent power cannot be e+ercised. his is in line withthe pro'ision of our #onstitution which sa)s that 7the #on$ress ma) b) law 'est theappointment of the inferior officers" in the resident alone" in the courts" or in heads of department . TAULE VS SANTOS Facts: An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president. Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be

presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court. Issues: 1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC. 2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest. Decision: Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted. Ratio Decidendi: 1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it. 2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina,

Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision. • Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.

BORRES VS CANONOY SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTOIN Facts: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US Attempt to evade or defeat tax Fraud by wire, radio, or television False statement or entries Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds: He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to

issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar. Issue/s: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Discussions: The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.

Ruling/s: No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. RULING: Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark

Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. “Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. “The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. “Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision. “In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. “The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution Issue: WON Jimenez was deprived of due process. Held: Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: 1. The provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request & 2. The temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the

evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. The Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents. The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side. In view of the foregoing premises, the petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.