Case Digest Admin Law1.docx

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns. Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA. The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

PEOPLE VS. MACEREN Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. FACTS:

(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and

The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

HELD:

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that: (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal;

Issue Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Held LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.

PEOPLE v MACEREN

TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD Citation: 151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; June 18, 1987

FACTS

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

- Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.

DOCTRINES:

- Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that they engaged in electro fishing.

Validity of law; title of bill – The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

- Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court dismissed the case. CFI affirmed. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section II of the Fisheries Law. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

Taxation; security against oppressive taxation – The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

ISSUE/S

Taxation as a revenue and regulatory measure – The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. . . . The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.

1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 HELD 1. YES. Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute Reasoning The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

Undue delegation of legislative power – The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

FACTS: Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board". P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on the gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10). The rationale for this decree is set forth in its preambulatory/whereas clauses to wit: 1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes ... have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of [taxes] thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues; 2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year; 3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry, ...; 5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry ..., but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree. Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity. At the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may validly tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above. The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth [READ: PORN], and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people [AGAIN, READ: PORN] and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; (emphasis supplied and certain passages omitted)

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."

ISSUES: The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject matter of the law. 2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and HELD:

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.

Peralta v. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 95832. August 10, 1992] FACTS Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the

provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by the said policy, questioned the said administrative interpretation. ISSUES Whether or not the Civil Service Commission’s interpretative construction is: 

(1) valid and constitutional.



(2) binding upon the courts.

RULING 



(1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. The law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they cannot be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process. (2) NO. Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank: . . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such

determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official. To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government employees.

Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna 228 SCRA 329, Dec. 10, 1993 Facts: P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of said law, “all employers are required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more than P 1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, and such should be paid on December 24 of every year.” The Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 contained provisions defining “13-month pay” and “basic salary” and the employers exempted from giving it and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter alia set items of compensation not included in the computation of 13-month pay. (overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations which are not part of basic salary shall not be included in the computation of 13-month pay). Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated on August 13, 1985 M.O. No. 28, containing a single provision that modifies P.D. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P 1,000.00 a month. More than a year later, Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13-month pay law was promulgated by the then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon, among other things, defined particularly what remunerative items were and were not included in the concept of 13-month pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission or commissions were included in the computation of 13th month pay) A routine inspection was conducted in the premises of petitioner. Finding that petitioner had not been including the commissions earned by its medical representatives in the computation of their 1month pay, a Notice of Inspection Result was served on petitioner to effect restitution or correction of “the underpayment of 13-month pay for the years, 1986 to 1988 of Medical representatives. Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice of Inspection Results and expressing the view that the commission paid to its medical representatives are not to be included in the computation of the 13-moth pay since the law and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or BASIC salary and therefore exclude all remunerations which part of the REGULAR salary are not. Regional

Dir. Luna Piezas issued an order for the payment of underpaid 13month pay for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed and the then Acting labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna affirmed the order with modification that the sales commission earned of medical representatives before August 13, 1989 (effectivity date of MO 28 and its implementing guidelines) shall be excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay. Similar routine inspection was conducted in the premises of Phil. Fuji Xerox where it was found there was underpayment of 13th month pay since commissions were not included. In their almost identicallyworded petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel, attribute grave abuse of discretion to respondent labor officials Hon. Dionisio dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano. ISSUE: Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-month pay. HELD: NO. Contrary to respondent’s contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal, supersede or abrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of MO No. 28, it merely “modified” Section 1 of the decree by removing the P 1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Month pay as envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and while entitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than P 1,000.00 said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the basic salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the term “basic salary” was defined in PD 851 applies equally to “basic salary” under M.O. No. 28. The term “basic salary” is to be understood in its common, generally accepted meaning, i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional payments as bonuses and overtime. In remunerative schemes consists of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the “basic salary” for this is what the employee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in consummating sales of other related transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which the SC has made clear do not from part of the “basic salary.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court said that, including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Sec. of Education, Culture and Sports, G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987 (Admin Law, quasi-legislative power,) Facts: The DECS, as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education and through respondent Secretary issued Dep Order No. 37, a modification of a previous Department Order, authorizing the 10% to 15% increase in school fees. Petitioner opposed and alleged in a petition that said order was issued without any legal basis arguing that authority of DECS to regulate school fees does not always include the power to increase the same. Sec. 57 (3) of BP Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982), vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system; and Sec. 70 of the same act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law. The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary. Issue: WON the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a valid delegation of legislative power. Held: Yes. Power granted to the educational department to regulate the educational system includes the power to prescribe school fees. In the absence of a statue stating otherwise, this power include the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS.