Additional Questions For Aviation Security Witnesses By The 9/11 Commission

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS GARVEY: 1) Post 9-11, did the FAA interview the crews that had access to the flights such as cleaning crews, food service people etc. to see who these people were and what they might know? a) Is the FAA's review contained in any official document or report that the commission can examine? 2) Prior to 9-11 screeners were only required to have three hours of on-the job training. That seems incredibly low. Why was that deemed sufficient in an area the IG had reported numerous times was a "weak" point in the aviation security system? 3) You said in your testimony: "The challenge is not formulating attack scenarios. The challenge is figuring out how to best allocate finite resources in an environment of uncertainty." How do you know here to place your resources if you don't try to formulate how you might be attacked? 4) In your testimony you said, "When one of our inspectors was asked to evaluate the language proficiency of Hani Hanjour, a flight school student, (and one of the hijackers), we knew nothing of his terrorist connections." Why was the inspector asked to evaluate the individual's language proficiency? (PAGE 15). (ALSO FOR CANAVAN) 5) You said in your testimony that FAA did not have any "SOLID" intelligence that indicated the type of attack we saw on 9/11 was planned." Can you amplify that answer, particularly what level of information or specificity of threat would qualify as "solid."? 6) The IG said "...neither the system nor the model on which it was based worked very well." How was this model formulated, by whom, according to what criteria and how was it updated? 7) The FAA never established standards for measuring screener performance. Why wasn't this deemed a priority?

MEAD 1) The security function is now under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security with a new Inspector General. Given your many years of experience, are you coordinating/consulting with the IG to assure a continuity of oversight? MAY: 1) Ms. Garvey said in her testimony that the industry (and Congress) did not provide sufficient support for strengthening background checks of individuals with unescorted access to sterile areas of the airport. Why would the industry not support such an initiative that the IG had identified as a key element of improving aviation security? 2) The commission is interested in what programs and procedures the Airlines had in place to check the efficacy of your screening contractors. I understand that the ATA has provided figures that range from S330 billion to $1 trillion in what the industry spent per year in security related expenses. If the industry isn't really even sure what it spent on security, how can you have adequately assessed the quality of the systems you were funding? 3) Several of the hijackers bought expensive First Class tickets with cash. Isn't that somewhat unusual? Did the industry have any protocols or procedures for identifying and assessing unusual purchases? f/f///

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