9/11 Commission Questions For State Department Official Tom Fingar

COMMISSION SENSITIVE Questions for Mr. Tom Fingar Position: Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence & Research, 10/2003 Purpose: Mr. Fingar has been one of the top counterterrorism analysts in the State Department's Buereau of Intellgence and Research. The purpose of this interview is to explore Mr. Fingar's perspective on the analysis function within INR and the larger Intelligence Community (1C). We will also address the role of diplomatic reporting in the 1C and the relative value of reporting from intelligence sources including SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, OSINT and Military Intelligence, as well as Law Enforcement information. Finally, we would like his thoughts on counterterrorism intelligence in general. Key Questions Background 1) Please provide an account of your positions in the government and at the State Department and the years that you held those positions. Collection and Analysis 1) What is the role of diplomatic reporting in the IC's collection and analysis? How does State respond to NHRTC tasking? How does State approach OSINT collection? 2) What was the quality of analysis produced by the 1C in general and on counterterrorism in particular before 9-11? What is it today? 3) How do you assess the quality of INR's analysis? Do you have any measures of performance? 4) How does INR contribute to the analysis of transnational issues - do they have subject matter experts or take a generalist viewpoint? How long do experts stay on a particular subject (years)? How do they contribute to competitive analysis? Do they use a "red cell"? 5) Is Counterterrorism analysis a different type of analysis that traditional INR analysis? If so, what is being done to develop a cadre of counterterrorism analysts? What is INR's relationship to the ADCI/A&P? 6) How much of the INR's efforts were spent on current vs. strategic intelligence analysis? Would you characterize INR's analysis effort as one looking for "indicators" for "warning" or as "reporting."

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Warning 1) Before 9/11, how did the warning process work? What was INR's responsibility for warning? What was INR's relationship to the NIO/Warning? What is the current structure for warning? 2) Is follow-up and feedback routine in the warning process? What is the division of labor between the 1C and policy maker on warning? 3) What did INR do in the summer of 2001 when the DCI was banging on desks to alert the Secretary and others of impending attack? Counterterrorism pre-9/11 1) What priority was counterterrorism for INR before 9/11 ? What do you recall as the departmental and community assessment of the terrorist threat? What do you recall of the departmental and community assessment of al-Qaeda and the threat to US persons and facilities in the summer of 2001 ? Was a possible attack by alQaeda on US territory discussed? 2) With whom did you principally interact in the department on CT matters? Did you have a feedback loop for diplomatic collection or larger 1C collection to meet your needs as an analyst? 3) With whom did you interact in the Intelligence Community (especially NSA and DIA) on CT matters? What was INR's relationship with the Counter-terrorist Center? The FBI? 4) It is our understanding that a significant amount of intelligence from 1C components goes to Bureau heads and the Secretary directly (informally) rather than through INR. Is this true? What effect does that have? 5) Was there an 1C strategy for analysis against the terrorism? After 9-11, was a strategy formulated for 1C CT analysis? Is there one? Does INR have one? 6) What kind of intelligence information on terrorism was received by INR analysts? Finished SIGINT? TDFIRs? Finished analysis? Any reporting from the FBI? 7) Did you send or receive warnings about the East Africa Embassy Bombings? 8) KUALA LUMPUR: a. When did you know about the January 2000 meeting in K-L of al-Qaeda operatives? What do you recall of that information? b. Were you informed of the links between al-Qaeda operatives involved in the K-L meeting and the 12 October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole? c. If yes to the above, who else in the department was briefed on the above information? 7) Did you know about the Sullivans before the bombing of the Cole? Did you receive or provide warnings about the Cole? 9) What was/is INR's role with respect to the terrorist watch list? 10) How should the 1C conduct counterterrorism into the future? COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE 11) What should INR's role be in the future more generally? Management of the 1C 1) You have a unique perspective on the 1C because INR is in the 1C but is institutionally separate from the CIA and DoD. What is your perspective on the notion of "community?" Is that notion well suited for counterterrorism? 2) What is INR's relationship to the rest of the 1C, both formally and informally? 3) What is INR's relationship to the DCI, the DDCIs, the ADCI/C, and the DDI? 4) How well does the 1C set priorities and allocate resources based on them?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

WITH DRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Box: 00003 Series: Copies: 1

Folder: 0009 Document: 10 Team 2 Files Pages: 29 ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: Tom Fingar Document Date: 11-19-2003 Document Type: Handwritten Notes Special Media: From: To: Subject:

notes and summary of interview with Tom Fingar

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 361 Withdrawn: 11-05-2008 RETRIEVAL*: 361 00003 0009 10 System DocID: 5520 j-