2010 Election Automation Scenario

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AUTOMATION SCENARIO May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections

STATISTICS • Estimated 47,000,000 registered voters •

44,009,069 registered voters - as of April 20, 2009 ERB Hearing

• •

58,327 registration records cancelled by reason of death 1,246,272 registration records deactivated

• Last ERB Hearing on November 16, 2009

• • • • • • •

80 Provinces 1,631 cities and municipalities 320,415 Established Precincts (estimate) 80,136 Clustered Precincts (estimate) 37,884 Polling Centers (estimate) 82,200 PCOS Machines 80,136 PCOS Machines for distribution to clustered precincts

Board of Election Inspectors • One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct • Three regular members – Chairman – Delivers ballot to voter

– Poll Clerk – Third Member

• Support Staff – Depends on number of precincts clustered – To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in managing – List of Voters with Voting Records – Book of Voters

Board of Election Inspectors No. of Precincts Clustered

0 2 3 4 5

No. of Support Staff

none none 1 2 3

Total no. of personnel (BEI + Support 3 Staff)

3 4 5 6

Establishing Identity of Voter • LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS – Photograph

Establishing Identity of Voter

Establishing Identity of Voter • If identity cannot be established through photograph – Compare signatures • Use Book of Voters – Contains applications for registration » Includes specimen signature of voter

– Other methods to challenge identity

Official Ballots • Pre-printed names of candidates • 300 candidates can be accommoda ted – 150 names per side of

Official Ballots • Ovals opposite names of candidate

• Shade oval opposite name of chosen candidate

PCOS

Precinct Count Optical Scan

• One unit per clustered precinct • Voter personally feeds ballot into machine • Ballot can be fed at any orientation • Ballot scanned both sides simultaneously

TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURES At least three days before election day • Public shall accomplish test ballots • Ballots shall be manually counted and election returns accomplished • Same set of ballots that was manually counted shall be fed into the counting machine • Manual count shall be compared with the print-out of the election returns • If public is satisfied that the manual count is the same as the automated count, the print-out and manually prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses • Machines shall be sealed without any connection to transmission links • Public shall be allowed to secure the polling places where the counting machines are installed • The only time that the counting machines shall be opened is

Voting • Voting period – 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. • Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to vote – Poll Clerk lists down names voters queuing – Poll Clerk calls voter to cast ballot – Voter who fails to appear after being called twice shall not longer be allowed to vote

– Precinct set up • At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one time

Voting • Before voting starts – Show that ballot box is empty • Transparent plastic

– Turn on and initialize PCOS – Print “Zero Report” • To show that there is no entry/vote in machine’s memory

Counting • At close of polls – Perform close function • To prevent additional ballots from being inserted

– After close function, PCOS automatically • Starts counting process • Prints election returns after completion of

Counting • Insert transmission cable – After printing first eight (8) copies of ER • To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be manipulated remotely

• Perform electronic transmission function • Print additional twenty-two (22) copies of ER – Automatically performed by PCOS

Canvassing/Consolidation • Electronically transmitted results – Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and proclamation of winning candidates for • • • •

City/municipal officials Provincial officials Members, House of Representatives Senators and Party-list

– Congress will also receive electronically transmitted results • Constitution authorized the Congress to promulgate rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice-President

Co ng re ss

CO MELEC

Na tion al Boa rd of Canvasser s

Physical transport Pro v. CO C

Provin ci al Boa rd of Ca nvassers

SOV M/C

Physical transport Mu n./Cit y COC

Munici pa l/C ity Boa rd of Canvasser s

SOV P

Physical transport

Ele ct ion Re tu rn s Precin ct

Manual System of Canvassing

Co ng re ss

CO MELEC

Na tion al Boa rd of Canvasser s

Physical transport

Electronic Transmission

Pro v. CO C

Provin ci al Boa rd of Ca nvassers

SOV M/C

Physical transport Mu n./Cit y COC

Munici pa l/C ity Boa rd of Canvasser s

SOV P

Physical transport

Ele ct ion Re tu rn s Precin ct

Come le c Cen tra l Ba ck-up Serve r Adv ance Resu lts/ Mo nito ring

Secur ed Pub li c Website

Ser ve r for Domi nant Majori ty/ Min orit y Part ie s, Cit iz ens Arm, KBP Adv ance Resu lts

SECURITY • Security measures under a manual election system still applicable • Strengthen security through automation – Password – PIN – Digital signatures – Encryption

SECURITY • 128-bit 128 encryption 

2

2

• • • • • • •

2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 2

3

= = = = = = =

4 8 16 32 64 128 256

• • • • • • •

29 210 211 212 13 2 14 2 215

= 512• 216 = 17 = 1024 65,536 = 2048 • 218 = 19 = 4096 131,072 • 20 = 8192 2 = 262,144 21 = 16,384 • 222 = = 32,768 524,288 • 2 = 1,048,576

SECURITY • 128-bit encryption • 223 = 24 8,388,608 • 225 = 16,777,216 26 • 227 = 33,554,432 28 • 229 = 67,108,864 •2 = 134,217,728

• 230 = 31 1,073,741,824 • 232 = 2,147,483,648 33 • 234 = 4,294,967,296 35 • 236 = 8,569,934,592 • 2 = 17,179,869,184

SECURITY • 128-bit encryption • • • •

237 238 239 240

= = = =

137,438,953,472 274,877,906,944 549,755,813,888 over One Trillion combinations

SECURITY • 128-bit encryption – Same security system used by banks

• Random Encryption – Temperature of machine – Voltage – Unique machine identity – User identity

• No single/master decryption code

SECURITY • Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be same amount of time needed to decrypt next precinct result • Transmission takes at most 2 minutes • Copies for distribution – 30 copies of election returns at the precinct level – 30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal level – 14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial level

SECURITY • Audit Log – Activities – Time – Date

SECURITY • • • • •

Paper Ballot Ballot digital image Data storage device Transmitted results Hard copies of election results

FIELD TEST/S • 8 areas – 2 for NCR – 2 each (1 urban/1 rural) • Luzon • Visayas • Mindanao

• To test system and transmission in the same environment/conditions as on election day

CONTINUITY PLAN • Types of Systems Breakdown – Fails to scan – Able to scan but fails to print ER – Able to print ER but fails to transmit – Able to transmit but fails to consolidate

CONTINUITY PLAN • Fails to scan – Use spare PCOS – Use PCOS of another precinct • Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct • Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct • Scan ballots

– If all PCOS fails • Manual counting

CONTINUITY PLAN • Able to scan but fails to print ER – Use spare PCOS – Use PCOS of another precinct • Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct • Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct • Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let replacement PCOS print ER

– If all PCOS fails • Manual counting

CONTINUITY PLAN • Able to print ER but fails to transmit – Go to nearest precinct or polling center which has a functioning transmission facility – Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let the functioning facility transmit precinct results – If all transmission facilities bog down • Physically transport removable storage device to canvassing site – In the presence of watchers and security escorts

CONTINUITY PLAN • Able to transmit but fails to consolidate • Use consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) of another municipality/province • Use the removable storage device and let functioning CCS consolidate the results • Provide back-up canvassing through the Central Server – Print results and send the same to affected board of canvassers – Print results and constitute special board of canvassers to take the place of the affected board

Basic Elements of Elections • People – – – –

Vote-buying Coercion Intimidation Terrorism

• Systems & Procedures – Misreading of ballots – Unreadable handwriting – Error • Honest • Deliberate

– Fraud – Manufactured election returns – Tampering of election results

Successful Implementation • • • •

Vigilance of citizenry Cooperation Coordination Support

THANK YOU!

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