002 Draft With Links Kapoustin Report

Before the Honourable Members of Parliament 2004

THE KAPOUSTIN REPORT CHARTER VIOLATIONS and UNLAWFUL COMMISSIONS OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

THE CASE OF MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN AND

THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA THE MALICIOUS FOREIGN PROSECUTIONS AND TORTURE OF CANADA ’S CITIZENS THE SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS A PRIVATE CITIZEN’S UNSOLICITED EXPOSE INTO A LEGISLATIVELY UNREGULATED CULTURE OF DISINFORMATION AND SECRET FOREIGN COMMISSIONS OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON AND FEDERAL EXECUTIVE SERVICES AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA WHEN REQUESTING FOREIGN POLICE AND PROSECUTION OFFICIALS OBTAIN INFORMATION BY ARRESTING, PROSECUTING AND COERCIVELY QUESTIONING AND TORTURING CITIZENS OF CANADA WHO TRAVEL OR WORK ABROAD. THE REPORT DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF THIS PARLIAMENT ANOTHER CASE SIMILAR TO THAT OF ARAR. IN BOTH CASES THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON AND FEDERAL EXECUTIVE SERVICES AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA HAVE ACTED TO INTENTIONALLY COMPROMISE THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND INTEGRITY OF FOREIGN POLICE AND PROSECUTION OFFICIALS BY SHIELDING MALICIOUSLY MANUFACTURED FALSEHOODS AND MISREPRESENTED OR UNVERIFIED CANADIAN POLICE FACTS BEHIND WORDS OF TRUST VERBA PRECARIA. THESE UNLAWFUL AND MALICIOUS RCMP CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS ARE THEN SANCTIFIED IN SECRET CROWN INDICTMENTS DELIVERED TO FOREIGN STATES AND SHIELDED BEHIND THE MANTEL OF CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY. IN ARAR AND KAPOUSTIN THE EXTRADITING STATES HAVE BEEN SECRETLY ADVISED BY CANADA THAT IT HAS NO INTEREST IN REPATRIATING ONE OF ITS NATURALIZED CITIZENS. IN THE KAPOUSTIN CASE, THE CROWN PROMISED MONEY TO BULGARIAN POLICE IN EXCHANGE FOR INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED AFTER THE FACT OF BULGARIA ARRESTING, QUESTIONING, THEN PROSECUTING AND CONVICTING KAPOUSTIN, A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF CANADA. IN BOTH ARAR AND KAPOSUTIN THE RCMP NEVER EXPRESSES ANY CONCERNS IF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BY IT WAS TO BE OBTAINED BY MEANS INVOLVING THE PHYSICAL OR PHYSIOLOGICAL TORTURE OF A CITIZEN OF CANADA . THIS REPORT ALSO DOCUMENTS HOW CANADA’S DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REFUSED TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATING TO OTHER CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES KAPOUSTIN’S CONCERN OVER HIS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION BY A CROWN SERVANT AND THE OTHER MALFEASENCES COMMITTED BY THE RCMP. FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS REPREATEDLY EXCUSING WHAT IS A MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND THE ACTS OF TORTURE AND INHUMANE TREATMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS AS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. CROWN OFFICIALS HAVING GONE SO FAR AS TO HAVE REQUESTED THE KAPOUSTIN FAMILY COMPROMISE THEIR CHARTER PROTECTIONS AND OTHER LEGAL RIGHTS IN AND OUTSIDE OF CANADA ONLY SO CANADA FOREIGN AFFAIRS COULD SECURE TREATY COOPERATION FROM BULGARIAN OFFICIALS. THE REPORT SEEKS AN INVESTIGATION INTO THIS CULTURE OF APPEASEMENT. THE OBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS TO PRECIPITATE FURTHER ENQUIRY BY THE HONOURABLE MEMEBERS OF PARLIAMENT INTO THE ALLEGATIONS MADE HERE AND INTO A POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE GAP, LEGES LACUNA, PERMITTING THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON AND FEDERAL EXECUTIVE SERVICES AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA TO VIOLATE IN SECRET AND OUTSIDE OF CANADA THEIR CHARTER COVENANTS AND PRE-EXISTING POSITIVE LEGAL DUTIES TO CITIZENS OF CANADA WHO ARE UNABLE TO ACT FREELEY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR FOREGN DETNETION.

Written Comments Prepared by: Dr. Donald Kommers, Science and Professor of Law Notre Dame Law School and others [to be requested]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I The Author .................................................................................................................................4 CHAPTER II Introduction ..............................................................................................................................5 CHAPTER III THE FACTS...........................................................................................................................16 SECTION A R.C.M.P. Contacts and Exchanges in Bulgaria ....................................................................16 SECTION B Arrest and Extradition of KAPOUSTIN...............................................................................19 1.

Part 1 7 February 1996 Frankfurt International Airport 19

2.

Part 2 Bulgarian Information as Provided to Interpol 20

3.

Part 3 R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” Released to Mass Media 22

SECTION C Government of Canada Denials............................................................................................28 SECTION D Physical and Mental Torture of Kapoustin...........................................................................29 4.

Part 1 Applicants Earlier Complaints 40

.1 April 1st 2000 Complaint as filed with Office of Canada's Prime Minister..................40 .2 June 23rd 2000 Civil Action against DOORNBOS and other filed in British Columbia Supreme Court........................................................................................................40 .3 May 3rd 2001 Refusal of Embassy of Canada to serve complaint to R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS...........................................................................................................40 .4 May 3rd 2001 Complaint to R.C.M.P. against DOORNBOS and Cover Letter............40 .5 May 3rd 2001 Complaint to General Director of DRAIT Mr. Gar Pardy.....................40 .6 May 19th 2001 Complaint to Attorney General of British Columbia ..........................40 .7 May 19th 2001 Complaint to the Honourable Anne McLellan the Minister of Justice Canada40 .8 May 21st 2001 Complaint and Request to the Attorney General of British Columbia for Legal Aid ..........................................................................................................................40 .9 May 27th 2001 Letter to DOORNBOS.........................................................................40 SECTION E Legal Grounds.......................................................................................................................40 5.

Part 1 For Earlier Complaints

40

SECTION F NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT........................................................................................44 6.

Part 1 –The Allegations

44

SECTION G Discussion.............................................................................................................................49 7.

Part 1 Preamble

49

SECTION H What is Apparent from the Evidence....................................................................................50 8.

Part 1 Outstanding Facts Not Open to Dispute 50

9.

Part 2 Malicious Prosecution

53

10. Part 3 Crown Misrepresentations and Undue Influence 54 11. Part 4 Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Extortion 54

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SECTION I Criminal Defamation - Slander and Libel..............................................................................55 12. Part 1 The Element of Slander - Offensive and Untrue Words Spoken by a Crown Servant 55 13. Part 2 The Element of Libel - Offensive and Untrue Words Written by the Government of Canada 58 14. Part 3 Reproduction of the Slander and Libel 59 15. Part 4 Intent and Malice - "Mens Rea" 60 16. Part 5 Relevant Law

60

17. Part 6 Reliance on Canadian Justice

60

18. Part 7 Interpretation and Factors

61

19. Part 8 Crown Reliance on the Conviction of KAPOUSTIN; fair comment or qualified privilege 61 .10 What, If Any, Relevance to the Trial Court Surrounding the Criminal Proceedings...62 20. Part 9 Respondent's Reliance on its Criminal Prosecution of Speaker. 63 21. Part 10 What Are the Facts of the Criminal Case The Defendant Bulgaria Relies On? 64 22. Part 11 Complaints to the Government of Canada 65 23. Part 12 A Question of Law, Not Facts 66 24. Part 13 Parallels in Canadian Case Law67 25. Part 14 Relevance of the Cited Gwynne Supra 69 .11 The Existing Judicial Consideration of the Rules........................................................89 .12 Judicial Review............................................................................................................94 .13 Does the Impugned Act (Rules) Offend Section 15(1)?..............................................94 .14 Vagueness....................................................................................................................98 .15 S. 1 Overbreadth..........................................................................................................99 .16 Rationality..................................................................................................................104 .17 Proportionality...........................................................................................................105 26. Part 16 Factors Existing In Aggravation of the Circumstances 114 SECTION J Complainant's Reasoning.....................................................................................................117 27. Part 1 Objectives

117

28. Part 2 Rights Relied On.

117

29. Part 3 Prior Petitions

118

30. Part 4 Background to Bringing the Complaint 119 31. Part 5 Speaker's Arrest and Extradition120 .18 Speaker's Arraignment and Trial................................................................................122

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SECTION K Practices of the Defendant Bulgaria Existing In Aggravation of the Claims ....................124 CHAPTER IV ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS..........................................................................................124 SECTION A The Arguments Evolution ..................................................................................................124 32. Part 1 Law and Enactment Relied On. 126 SECTION B A Priori................................................................................................................................127 33. Part 1 The Rights of Individuals

127

34. Part 2 Access to A Court

129

35. Part 3 Reverse Onus and Procedural Fairness. 131 36. Part 4 A Priori Rights in a "Suit in Law" 132 SECTION C A Posteriori..........................................................................................................................133 37. Part 1 A Prisoner's "Other Status"

133

38. Part 2 A State's Positive Obligation and Duty To A Person Deprived Of Liberty. 135 39. Part 3 Positive Obligation and Duty of Bulgaria 138 40. Part 4 The Master's Positive Obligation 138 41. Part 5 Procedures, Conflicts and Comity 145

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CHAPTER IThe Author The Author is a 53 year old citizen of Canada and resident of British Columbia. He and his wife Tracy have been married 17 years. Together they have a 12 year old diabetic son. Nicholas is named after the author’s late Jewish grandfather Dr. Nicholas Kapusto. The Authors father, Robert is an 82 year old retired soccer coach and artist. In the 7th year of the Author’s imprisonment his mother Tatiana died of complications arising from her Alzheimer’s. The Author and his mother never had the chance to speak before her death. The Author has one sister, Sonja and her husband Frank. It has been ten years since the author has not seen any member of his family. The Bulgarian government continues to unreasonably refuse all pleas for the Authors repatriation to Canada. The Author is a political prisoner for the 21st century.

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CHAPTER IIIntroduction

The Report concerns itself solely with facts the Author alleges to establish indictable offences Canada under Canada’s Criminal Code as committed against a citizen of Canada by Crown Servants while outside of Canada and in the exercise of their duty. The facts in this Report are upon personal knowledge of the Author as to himself and to his acts and as to all others upon information and belief based on, inter alia, the investigation made by the Author and his family through his attorneys, including inquires by them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada and Ministry of Justice, Republic of Bulgaria and a review of filings of the Sofia City District Criminal Court, Sofia, Republic of Bulgaria under Bulgarian criminal case No c.c.c.c 1403/98 as well as published and televised reports and news articles. In 1992 the Author and a number of other Canadian investors formed a limited partnership for the marketing and development of clinical drugs. That partnership’s General Partner entered into a series of contracts and agreements with commercial agencies and institutions owned and operated by the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria. It was in 1993 and for the purpose of consolidation and refinancing of the commercial activities, contracts and agreements concluded with the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria in 1992 that the Author incorporated the Bulgarian corporation “LifeChoice. As a part of the planned refinancing the Bulgarian company would privately and publicly offer a variety of corporate securities that would not legally encumber its assets or dilute its shares. No shares of the Author’s Bulgarian company were sold and it remains closely held by the Arthur to this day. To this day the value of Company assets still under distrain by the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria exceeds liabilities of the Company. During the period in question the Republic of Bulgaria had no legislation or agency regulating the selling or trading of corporate securities. Sales and trades in corporate securities of the Company from August 1993 to July 1994 exceeded all expectations, the Author and his Company becoming Bulgarian household names, at first famous and later infamous. It was in early 1995 that the first articles appeared in the Bulgarian press claiming an unidentified

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Canadian source for the information on the Author’s criminal activities in Bulgaria and Canada. The Author had no idea at the time that the source of that information was the Crown. This Report documents events as they secretly unfold in mid 1995 when on May 15th of that year a Crown Servant assigned to the Embassy of Canada in the City of Vienna, Austria traveled at Government of Canada expense to the City of Sofia, the Republic of Bulgaria. This is not the first such meeting, anecdotal evidence suggesting several earlier such meetings and an unidentified number of official correspondences. It is however the first confirmed meeting having occurred at an exact time and place. The objective of the May 15th 1995 and other Government of Canada diplomatic missions to Bulgaria and the Crown Servant himself was to make a presentation to representatives of the Government of Bulgarian Ministry of Interior Police – Organized Crime Division or department on what the Crown knew to manufactured and unverified Canadian “police conclusions” designed to deceive and incite the Bulgarians. With its’ false or unverified police “facts” and information the Crown hoped to secure the agreement of Bulgarian police and prosecutors to issue a criminal indictment upon the Crown information and so commence the prosecution in Bulgaria of a citizen of Canada currently operating the Company named by the Crown. That citizen is the Author. However, once again anecdotal evidence suggests that on May 15th 1995 the Bulgarian authorities refused to proceed to the criminal prosecution of the Author without first receiving a written criminal indictment issued by the Crown. The Crown indictment of the Author was to set out the nature of the specific criminal allegations as made by the Crown against him and as alleged by the Crown to have been committed by him in the Republic of Bulgaria and Canada. This official Government of Canada document was further to set out for the Bulgarian authorities that if the Bulgarian criminal prosecution of the Author was successful, then the Republic of Bulgaria would receive a substantial portion of at least 16,000,000 U.S. dollars alleged by the Crown to have been deposited to banks in Canada by the Author. On July 7th 1995 the same Crown Servant assigned to the Embassy of Canada in the City of Vienna, Austria once more traveled at Government of Canada expense to the City of Sofia, the Republic of Bulgaria and delivered to Bulgarian authorities the Crown’s secret criminal indictment of the Author, its written request for his criminal prosecution in Bulgaria and a promise of money if that prosecution is successful. The Crown’s involvement and cooperation with Bulgarian authorities in the malicious prosecution, torture and wrongful conviction of the Author began in early 1995 and abruptly ended in August of 1997 when Bulgarian prosecutors failed to produce the information originally demanded in the Crown indictment of July 7th 1995. Needless to say the Crown was

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not unsuccessful in confiscating the 16,000,000 U.S. dollars of alleged criminal proceeds originating from Bulgaria The Government of Bulgaria did not receive its payment of a cash reward as promised by the Government of Canada, and this notwithstanding that the Government of Bulgaria had keeps its bargain with the Crown by prosecuting, questioning and torturing the Author as the Crown had requested. It was seven years and two months, three re-indictments, four judicial decisions, two convictions, one overturned conviction and two acquittals before the Bulgarian Criminal Court of Appeals finally settled on a final indictment and criminal conviction that the judges believed would settle the public outcry for the Authors conviction. The judicial controversy only ended when this Author was assured by Canada Foreign Affairs that the best course of action to return him to his family in Canada was to withdraw his appeal and accepting a criminal conviction of 17 years with the understanding he would be transferred to a prison in Canada.. Somebody lied and the Author has spent 10 years in a Bulgarian prison. Of these the Author has spent 2 years and 2 months in an isolation cell were he had no contact with anyone except his interrogators and Bulgarian attorneys. Bulgarian isolation cells as a rule have no toilets, windows and are lit 24 hours. Offenders are not allowed outside their cells for exercise. Beatings are regular, showers and visits with attorneys are not. Watches, radios and phone calls are not permitted O the following 7 years there have been only cold showers and overcrowded prison cell having no toilet facilities or running water. Drinking water coming from inside a used plastic Coca Cola bottle inmates refill three or four times a time. The Author faces the prospect of addition 7 more years away from Canada. All the suffering of his family and all the lost years are largely if not exclusively due only to the malfeasances of Crown Servants who sought in secret and in scienter with the Attorney General for Canada to incite hatred against the Author solely in order to advance the criminal investigation of a religious organization in Canada and the possible criminal indictment of its members. In 2004 and only after the threat of civil litigation, public exposure and appeals to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria the Author succeeded to circumvent corrupt prison Wardens to force an inspection of his prison cell. As a result the Author and 98 other foreign inmates were transferred to recently renovated cells.

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In 2004 Bulgarian The Author had no direct or indirect association with the Kaballarian Society of Canada. Apparently his only crime was to have friends and business associates in Canada who were apparently among its members. . The facts show that the malicious indictment and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN and the offensive words as first spoken by DOORNBOS occurred before the May 15th 1996 operative meeting organised by the Crown in Sofia, Bulgaria with Bulgarian police officials. The mens rea for the defamations and malicious prosecution of KAPOUSTIN by a servant of the Crown and servants to the Republic of Bulgaria is their self-reward, advancement and in Bulgaria the self-enrichment of certain officials who are acting without regard to the law or the physical, psychological and material harm and consequences to be inflicted upon KAPOUSTIN and his family.

History of Complaints On January 23rd 2004, by E-Mail, KAPOUSTIN filed a preliminary complaint with Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP, Ms. Shirley Heafey Commissioner 60 Queen Street 3rd Floor Ottawa, Ontario Canada The complaint filed is against a Crown Servant, one Derek A. DOORNBOS and unknown others employed by the ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON AND FEDERAL EXECUTIVE SERVICES. Derek A. DOORNBOS having at the time of the offences alleged against a Staff Sgt and the Command Liaison Officer assigned by the R.C.M.P. to the Embassy of Canada to Austria. From the period of April 1995 to the present there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that the Ministry of the Attorney General of Canada or the Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada had in any way been aware of the actions of DOORNBOS or his conduct in Bulgaria.

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From April 1995 to August 1998 DOORNBOS exploited the facilities, ways and means of the Embassy of Canada to Austria to intentionally and unlawfully cause injury and harm to KAPOUSTIN and his family. The facilities of the Embassy were made available to DOORNBOS in his capacity as a servant of the Crown. All actions of DOORNBOS are therefore directly attributable to the Crown. Crown servant DOORNBOS is responsible for accessing and collecting private and police information and data concerning KAPOUSTIN and others in Canada and then delivering it to Bulgaria police and prosecution officials. This includes but is not limited to what has been set out below under SECTION “A” “FACTS”. Crown police information and conclusions collected in Canada are “volunteered” by DOORNBOS to police and prosecution officials of the Republic of Bulgaria, this without any request from the Government of Bulgaria. The Crown knowingly provides reports about KAPOUSTIN to Bulgarian police and prosecution officials that are “false or erroneous or defective in material particulars and intended to mislead” Bulgarian authorities and the general public into believing KAPOUSTIN is a convicted felon and organiser of criminal activities in 6 (six) countries. These false or erroneous or defective in material particulars proliferate in the written record of Crown correspondence with Bulgarian authorities. Such actions run foul of Canadian law. There is no indication that the actions of DOORNBOS are in any way controlled, directed, ordered or otherwise condoned by a court of Canada. DOORNBOS, traveled repeatedly to the Republic of Bulgaria for the Crown. The singular purpose of DOORNBOS traveling to Bulgaria for the Crown is to have KAPOUSTIN, a citizen of Canada, arrested and prosecuted by Bulgarian authorities. Insodoing, the Crown hoped to realize its objective of obtaining information for a criminal investigation in Canada and the eventual confiscation by the Crown of assets and property in Canada valued by the Crown at more than 16,000,000 United States Dollars. The DOORNBOS slanders, criminal indictment and malicious prosecution of KAPOUSTIN are committed while performing official duties for the Crown. Anecdotal and circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that prior to May 15th 1995 there existed an earlier agreement between the Crown and the Republic of Bulgaria [See index “Inspectors”; “Bulgarian National Bank”; “Tax Department”; “Sofia Regional Prosecutor”].

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Available documents show that the Crown and the police and prosecution officials of Bulgaria were jointly and severally intent on sharing in the seizure and confiscation of millions of dollars in Canada and represented by the Crown to the Government of Bulgaria as proceeds of the crimes committed by KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria. From April 1995 to September 1997 the Crown repeatedly pressured Bulgarian police and prosecution officials to collect documents and facts on the funds transferred by KAPOUSTIN out of Bulgaria. This fact is significant because KAPOUSTIN is to later be acquitted of all original charges found in the Bulgarian police warrants of 28.11.1995 and 13.02.1996 and is instead convicted and sentenced in August of 2002 for having otherwise lawfully transferred funds to third part bank accounts outside of Bulgaria. The pre-May 15th 1995 requests by the Crown to the Government of Bulgaria result in unannounced and unexpected inspections of the offices of KAPOUSTIN and LIFECHOICE by auditors and regulators of the BULGARIAN NATIONAL BANK DEPARTMENT FOR FINANCIAL AUDITS (SUPERVISING) MR. SASHO RUSSEV. This inspection is unusual in that LIFECHOICE is not licensed in Bulgaria as a banking or non-banking financial institution or corporation and therefore is not legally subject to such inspections. The Crown reduced its intent to writing on July 7th 1995. To circumvent Canadian law, the Crown would have KAPOUSTIN indicted outside of Canada on the charges of fraud and misappropriation of Bulgarian public funds as identified in a July 7th 1995 indictment. At the request of the Crown, KAPOUSTIN is to be arrested and prosecuted by Bulgaria police and prosecutors on the accusations and charges identified by the Crown as police facts and conclusions. Bulgarian police and prosecutors are to secure information for the Crown once taking custody of KAPOUSTIN. The Crown is relying on the arrest and detention of KAPOUSTIN by Bulgarian police and prosecutors as a means to make it “relatively easy” for the Crown to “obtain in Canada” a court order allowing the Crown to seize important documents and cash in excess of “16,000,000 dollars” identified by the Crown to be in banks accounts in Canada and a part of the “criminal proceeds” that KAPOUSTIN transferred from his accounts in the Republic of Bulgaria. KAPOUSTIN is arrested on February 7th 1996 and delivered into Bulgarian custody by German police on September 2nd 1996. On September 17th 1996, Bulgarian authorities place KAPOUSTIN into solitary confinement. The cell is windowless, unventilated and illuminated 24hrs a day by a single 40 Watt light.

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Bulgarian police investigators then begin to seek information from KAPOUSTIN for the Crown. At no time is KAPOUSTIN, a citizen of Canada, informed that the charges against him and the questions put to him are a result of a Crown criminal indictment. KAPOUSTIN is only told that “Canada does not like you”. KAPOUSTIN is to remain in solitary confinement for two years and two months before being transferred to a regular remand facility and into the general inmate population. The Crown had no reasonable or lawful justification or excuse for requesting or permitting the police and prosecution officials of a foreign state, the Republic of Bulgaria, to use threats, accusations, menaces, drugs and violence to secure information from KAPOUSTIN concerning a criminal investigation in Canada and the proceeds of crime alleged to be in banks of Canada. As a result, during the period of October 1996 and August 1997 KAPOUSTIN was unlawfully deprived of his liberty and summarily and repeatedly beaten by Bulgarian Ministry of Interior police. The Crown “secret commission” to Bulgarian police and prosecutors allowed for the use of “threats, accusations, menaces or violence” against KAPOUSTIN. On December 13th 1995 DOORNBOS agreed to share “any reward advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration” resulting from a successful criminal prosecution and conviction of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria and the seizures of property and cash in Bulgaria and Canada. The malicious indictment and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN, the actionable and offensive words of DOORNBOS are first partially reproduced in writing by the Crown on July 7th 1995. The sole purpose for the Republic of Bulgaria to arrest and prosecute a citizen of Canada (KAPOUSTIN) at the request of the Crown is to aid in an unrelated R.C.M.P. criminal investigation being conducted in Canada [See index “Shearing”]. The Crown criminal indictment and INFORMATION of July 7th 1995 formally requests that KAPOUSTIN be arrested and prosecuted on criminal charges described by the Crown as being the commission of frauds and misappropriations in Bulgaria, the proceeds of which the Crown will find “easy to prove” deposited to bank accounts in Canada. The Crown is directly responsible for the malicious prosecution of KAPOUSTIN and is the principal author of the offensive and humiliatingly injurious falsehoods spoken as slanders and reproduced as part of a maliciously untrue and libellous Crown criminal indictment of KAPOUSTIN and his Bulgarian company LIFECHOICE.

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On July 8th 1995 and again on August 1st 1996 the actionable and offensive words of DOORNBOS are publicly reproduced in the mass media at the request of Bulgarian authorities and are attributed to the Crown by Bulgarian prosecution officials. The Crown is publicly credited by police and prosecution of Bulgaria as having indicted KAPOUSTIN, a citizen of Canada, before Bulgarian authorities and the public as an international criminal, a convicted pedophile and a pseudo-religious cult leader. Bulgarian and international media repeat all or part of the malicious Crown indictment of KAPOUSTIN. The Crown is identified as the single source for the reproduced slanders and libels that are injuriously offensive and untrue humiliating words. The Republic of Bulgaria repeatedly attributes the words to the “Canadian authorities”. The misleadingly false and libellous contents of the July 7th 1995 Crown indictment are reproduced thousand of times in the national and international media between May of 1995 and to August of 1998. The Crown is also directly responsible for having caused the unlawful seizure of private property lawfully belonging to and acquired by the Bulgarian company owned by KAPOUSTIN and other citizens of Canada. The Crown is therefore directly liable to the company LIFECHOICE for any subsequent injuries resulting from its loss of property and income in Bulgaria and elsewhere. The conduct of DOORNBOS is in breach of the Canada’s laws and the Charter rights of KAPOUSTIN and his family. According to oral and written representations made to KAPOUSTIN and his family by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) or Ministry of Foreign Affairs Canada, the swearing of the July 7th 1995 Crown indictment and information prepared and delivered by DOORNBOS to Bulgarian authorities in Sofia Bulgaria is not acknowledged by the immediate superiors of DOORNBOS. The indictment therefore violates the principles and procedures of Canadian law under the Mutual Legal Assistance In Criminal Matters Act”, Chapter M – 13.6 (RS 1985, c. 30 (4th supp.)) 1988, c. 37, assented to 28 July. It is significant to note that on 21.08.1996 the Interpol Section of the R.C.M.P. writes the Republic of Bulgaria to “…take corrective action to assure the proper authorities that Mr. Kapoustin was not involved in any such activity to our knowledge in Canada.”, but only two days later on 23.08.1996, the Crown sends the following faxed message to Bulgarian police and prosecutors requesting that “…this be passed to Mr. GUEORGIEV [proper spelling - Georgiev this is the police official having issued the international arrest warrants for KAPOUSTIN ] and ask that he [Georgiev] in turn pass any comments he may have on to me directly. I am still very

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much interested in any indication he has that any of Kapoustin gains [transfers] from the fraud in Bulgaria ended up in Canada [the accounts of Mr. Ivon Shearing]”. The July 7th 1995 “INFORMATION” is therefore an unlawful Canadian criminal indictment of KAPOUSTIN issued and sworn to be true by a servant of the Crown before the police and prosecution agencies of a foreign state, the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria. However, the July 7th 1995 Crown INFORMATION is taken at face value by the Republic of Bulgaria despite it being false and misleading in every respect. It is also significant that in a May 25th 1997 DFAIT CASE NOTE prepared by a Mr. Adcock, he writes that “the Embassy understands that the original arrest warrant dates back to July 1995” could that be July 7th 1995 ? From July of 1995 until August 2002 KAPOUSTIN remained criminally charged for the same fraud and the misappropriation of public funds as alleged in the Crown indictment of July 7th 1995. In August 2002, KAPOUSTIN and indirectly his company LIFECHOICE were acquitted a Bulgarian Court of Appeal of fraud and the criminal misappropriation of public funds. The Court of Appeal instead introduced a new indictment charging KAPOUSTIN with embezzlement for having transferred his company’s funds out of Bulgaria, notwithstanding that the lawful patrimony of the transferred funds belonged to the private company of KAPOUSTIN, LIFECHOICE and that the transfers are made in the ordinary course of its lawful business and with the full knowledge and consent of its Board of Directors and shareholders of which there are two, KAPOUSTIN controlling 100% of the all issued common shares. The Crown has ruthlessly pursued its own agenda without regard for the laws of Canada or the natural rights of KAPOUSTIN and the members of his family as citizens of Canada. These rights, protection and obligation of the Crown are enshrined in the principles of the Charter. Each act of DOORNBOS inter alia swearing out evidence against a citizen of Canada before a foreign criminal court; collecting police data and facts in Canada and delivering it to a foreign state; providing manufactured falsehoods as if fact or unverified facts as if police conclusions to mislead a foreign state; allowing media reproduction of his slanderous remarks and libellous correspondences to be attributed to the Crown; swearing out a criminal indictment and information requesting a citizen of Canada be arrested and prosecuted in a foreign state on behalf of the Crown and permitting the continued use of an unlawful detention and torture of a citizen of Canada to secure information for the Crown are jointly and severally serious breaches

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of Canadian law and Canada’s Charter and other rights of KAPOUSTIN. The actions of DOORNBOS are therefore unlawful. Much of the acts and transactions of DOORNBOS are in scienter with police and prosecution officials of the Republic of Bulgarian. The objective of DOORNBOS and Bulgarian police and prosecutors is to secure a conviction of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria is solely to confiscate money and property in Canada and Bulgaria. Should the Members of Parliament choose to closely and carefully read the records and evidence in the criminal trial of KAPOUSTIN and before a civil court of Canada, they will find that inter alio Police Investigator S. Georgiev; Deputy District Attorney Mario Stoyanov; and Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Justice Mario Dimitrov have repeatedly represented before representatives of the Government of Canada that any transfer or release of KAPOUSTIN will require his family to first pay money to any Bulgarian national who claims to have made a “loan” or “deposit” with KAPOUSTIN. These individuals are not identified in the criminal case against KAPOUSTIN and those appearing in Canada are “referred” to the family and friends of KAPOUSTIN by among others Police Investigator Georgiev or then Attorney General IVAN TATARCHEV. Requests for such payments are that the must be made in cash and are directly associated to the transfer or release of KAPOUSTIN. Requests are accompanied by threats that failure to pay will result in the continued detention of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria. According to Canadian criminal law these facts provide a prima facie case having a genus of an attempted extortion committed against KAPOUSTIN and his family in Canada. The attempted extortion of cash and private property from KAPOUSTIN is recorded in the repeated demands by Bulgarian police and politically appointed judicial officials. There is no proof any individual in Bulgaria having “loaned” money to KAPOUSTIN. Despite repeated written notices by KAPOUSTIN to the Crown and the responsible supervisory bodies of the R.C.M.P., no action or effort was or has been undertaken to interpret in a manner consistent with prevailing international and Canadian law the lawfulness or unlawful and damaging consequences of a premeditated and calculated misconduct and misdeed of a Crown agency and servant in what are obvious breaches of the laws of Canada. According to the principles of international law, the Crown violated the fundamental and legal rights of KAPOUSTIN. The representations made in the REPORT are factually accurate and complete in as far as is possible from the documents available to its Writer.

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What follows is a chronological presentation of the facts established by documents obtained by KAPOUSTIN from agencies of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria. Additional documents have been requested.

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CHAPTER IIITHE FACTS

SECTION AR.C.M.P. Contacts and Exchanges in Bulgaria 1. On May 15, 1995, in Sofia, Bulgaria, R.C.M.P. Staff Sgt. DOORNBOS met with Bulgarian Ministry of Interior official Mr. Miroslav Genov. 2. The need to pre-arrange such a meeting suggests earlier contacts between the R.C.M.P. and the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. Anecdotal evidence, other facts and evidences suggest earlier contacts. This possibility is discussed later in the REPORT. 3. It unclear what exactly is the “AGREEMENT” reached on May 15th 1995 between the R.C.M.P. and the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. 4. The Writer has no document to prove or to suggest that the R.C.M.P. was requested by the Bulgarian Government to send its representative to Sofia, Bulgaria. It is therefore concluded that the R.C.M.P. initiated contact with officers of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. In fact the alternative is true. 5. On December 15th 1999, the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice and Legal Euro-integration provided criminal defence counsel for KAPOUSTIN, Mr. Anatol Lukanov, a letter confirming that at no time had the Government of Bulgaria, the Ministry of Justice, entered into an agreement to collect or exchange police data investigative. The relevant part of this correspondence reads; “No request was made by a Minister…From the Canadian Ministry of Justcie we in the Ministry of Justice and Legal Euro-integration have not received judicial papers referring Mr. Kapoustin…”

6. The December 15th 1999 and other anecdotal evidence strongly suggests it is the Crown that initiated a clandestine contact with the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. The R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS circumventing not only Canada’s Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs but also the Bulgarian Minister of Justice. 7. It is the Crown that suggested to Bulgarian police and prosecution officials that the activities of KAPOUSTIN and his company in Bulgaria are part of a criminal organization operating internationally out of Canada. There is no evidence of Bulgaria police and prosecution officials contacting the Crown and submitting to the Crown the charges and alleged facts found in the July 7th 1995 Crown indictment.

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8. There is no evidence to suggest that before May 15th 1995 Bulgarian police or prosecution authorities had any reason to suspect KAPOUSTIN of criminal misconduct in Bulgaria. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in September 1994 the Office of the Solicitor-Attorney General [Main Public Prosecutor] of the Republic of Bulgaria conducted an investigation of LIFECHOICE and in 1995 inspectors of the Bulgarian National Bank conducted a separate investigation of the Bulgarian company LIFECHOICE. 9. Anecdotal and circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that this later inspection by the Bulgarian National Bank inspectors is directly precipitated by the interest of the Crown in transfers made by KAPOUSTIN out of Bulgaria. 10. Both investigations concluded that there is no criminal activity on the part of KAPOUSTIN or LIFECHOICE. 11. On April 14th 1995 the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Finance Mr. B. Slavkov concluded that each Depositary Receipt transaction between LIFECHOICE and a Bulgarian citizen in Bulgaria is subject to Value Added Tax. Usually, foreign governments do not impose taxes on activities they consider to be criminal in character. 12. According to the cited August 9th 1996 Verbal Note [see §C] issued to the Government of Germany by Canada Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada appears unaware of any R.C.M.P. involvement or the May 15th 1995 “AGREEMENT”. This suggests that there is a violation of Canadian law arising from this “Agreement from May 15, 1995” and that any preceding or subsequent acts by the R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS are therefore unlawful. 13. The Republic of Bulgaria is not a “signatory” to the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act", chapter M-13.6 (R.S. 1985, c30 (4th supp.)) 1988, c.37 or a party to any other treaty with Canada for the exchange of police information or police assistance in a criminal matter. 14. Mr. Miroslav Genov is identified by the R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS as being responsible for the May 15, 1995 “AGREEMENT” with the Government of Canada. 15. Mr. Genov is not an official of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Bulgaria and therefore does not have authority to enter into an agreement with Canada. 16. The Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, the Minister, who employs Mr. Genov. The Bulgarian Ministry of Interior is not a legally competent Bulgarian government authority under Article 464 para (2) of the Bulgarian Criminal Code of Procedure in force in May of 1995 and cannot have lawfully submitted a request to the Crown or have implemented a request from the Crown for legal assistance in criminal matter. 17. From 1995 to December 2000 there is no “administrative arrangement” concerning KAPOUSTIN between the governments of Canada and Bulgaria.

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18. It is apparent from the July 7th 1995 indictment that on June 13th, 1995 the Crown faxed a request to the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior requesting a criminal background check on 4 (four) Bulgarian citizens and business associates of KAPOUSTIN. They are Dr. Ph.D. MD. NENKOV, Dr. Ph.D. MD. PETRUNOV, Mr. NINOV B.S. and corporate attorney and 25% shareholder in LIFECHOICE Ms. POPOVA. 19. On July 7th 1995, in compliance with an agreement dated 15 May 1995, the Crown orders command liaison officer, S. Sgt. Derek A. DOORNBOS, Embassy of Canada, Vienna, Austria, to provide a written indictment and swear out an “INFORMATION” before Mr. Levicharov of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior and the Director of [the] Central Service for [the] Fight Against Organized Delinquency [Centralna slujba za borba s organiziranata prestapnost – CSBOP]. 20. The July 7th 1995 indictment and “INFORMATION” presents what are alleged by the Crown to be Canadian police conclusions and a prosecutable criminal charge of misappropriation (fraud). The English translations of alleged police data and conclusions in its relevant parts reads: “… [Sic]… The latter [Ivon Shearing] is a partner of MAXWELL and a former accomplice of KAPOUSTIN to his questionable operations [unidentified] at the Vancouver stock exchange [British Columbia, Canada]…[sic]…It was established that last year [1994] 4 million and 12 million USD had been transferred to several bank accounts [in Canada] of [Ivon] SHEARING …[sic]…It was established as well that other accounts of SHEARING had been credited with amounts of about 100,000 USD per day” “… [Sic]… It is considered [by the R.C.M.P.] as well that most probably a considerable part of these amounts come from the funds [cash] accumulated in Bulgaria by KAPOUSTIN through large-scale financial frauds carried out by his pyramidal structure “LIFECHOICE” [LCIAD] “Besides this it is established that the transfers go through banks in the Caribbean Island.” ([ ] and emphasis Mine)

21. The July 7th 1995 indictment is a Crown request that Bulgaria criminally prosecute KAPOUSTIN “Can a criminal prosecution of any character at all [nakazatelno proizvodstvo ot kakavto I da bilo harakter] be started against Kapoustin or Life Choice [LCIAD]?” 22. The July 7th 1995 indictment sets out in clear and certain terms an agreement that if Bulgarian police and prosecutors comply with the Crown request to arrest and prosecute KAPOUSTIN, the Crown could then immediately have police obtain a warrant in Canada to search and seize the property and cash of KAPOUSTIN and the other Canadian citizens named in the July 7th 1995 indictment. The English translation of the relevant parts reads:

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“Now each piece of information or even only supposition [by Bulgaria] whatsoever about eventual breach of Bulgarian Law by Kapoustin [Applicant] connected with LifeChoice that your service [CSBOP] could submit [to Canada], is of special importance for the investigation in Vancouver [Ivon Shearing]. In this instance our service [RCMP] in Vancouver would be able to obtain search warrants of the office premises and houses of the aforesaid subjects. In this situation we [the R.C.M.P.] consider there is every possibility we can successfully conduct a large scale joint investigation as a result of which the assets [16,000,000 USD] of SHEARING & Co [Applicant] in Canada will be confiscated and it would be comparatively easy [for the R.C.M.P.] to prove in front of the [Canadian] court that these are proceeds from criminal activities [of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria]. … [Sic] Can a criminal prosecution of any character at all [nakazatelno proizvodstvo ot kakavto I da bilo harakter] be started against Kapoustin or Life Choice [LCIAD]?” ([ ] and emphasis mine)

23. The July 7th 1995 Crown indictment also requests that Mr. Levicharov and the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior “NSBOP” interrogate KAPOUSTIN to obtain data and facts required by the Crown. Translated from the Bulgarian it reads: “Have you any additional data or operational information in what direction the funds obtained by LifeChoice [LCIAD] are being transferred out of Bulgaria?” ([ ] and emphasis mine)

24. The above is significant in that the question repeatedly asked by the Crown [see §A] to Bulgarian police and prosecution officials and repeated by them to KAPOUSTIN during his repeated beatings by Bulgarian Ministry of Interior police concerns money located in banks of Canada. The physical beating and psychological tormenting of KAPOUSTIN was a frequent routine from September 18th 1996 and ended on or about August 1997.

SECTION BArrest and Extradition of KAPOUSTIN Part 1 7 February 1996 Frankfurt International Airport 25. On 7 February 1996, KAPOUSTIN was in transit at Frankfurt International Airport to his family in Kavala, Republic of Greece. 26. KAPOUSTIN was placed under arrested by airport police during the passport verification process. 27. The arrest of KAPOUSTIN was at the request of German Interpol.

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28. Kapoustin was remanded in police custody in accordance with Article 16§1 of the European Convention on Extradition (“ECE”). 29. On 2 September1996, the 56th day of his hunger strike, KAPOUSTIN was nonambulatory. To be extradited it was necessary that KAPOUSTIN be physically carried from his prison hospital bed by German police and transported to Frankfurt International airport. On the same day KAPOUSTIN was extradited to the Republic of Bulgaria. 30. Bulgarian extradition documents alleged that KAPOUSTIN was to face trial in Bulgaria on the accusations and charges embodied in the 28 November 1995 and 12 February 1996 Order(s) of Detention [warrants of arrest] issued by one police investigator S. Georgiev of the Bulgarian National Investigative Service (“NIS”) and authorized by the supervising prosecutor M. Stoyanov of the Sofia District Attorney’s (Prosecutor’s) Office (“SCPO”). 31. The Extradition documents presented to German police, prosecution and judicial authorities charge KAPOUSTIN with fraud, forgery, tax evasion and embezzlement of PUBLIC property. The Bulgarian documents were presented in an effort to comply with Article 12§2(a) of the same European Convention on Extradition (“ECE”). 32. All charges in the Bulgarian extradition request are later dropped or KAPOUSTIN acquitted. The facts or dispositive of the conviction are amended to a charge of embezzlement altered from misappropriation of funds belonging and defrauded from the Bulgarian public to a misappropriation of private property belonging to the Bulgarian company owned by KAPOUSTIN, “LIFECHOICE INTERNATIONAL A.D.”. KAPOUSTIN having been “RE-INDICTED” and sentenced to 17 years of hard time. The factual circumstances and allegations represented in the Bulgarian extradition request and those found in the conviction are not the same. 33. KAPOUSTIN has served more than 8 years of his 17 year sentence. He is waiting more than one year for the Government of Bulgarian, Ministry of Justice, to approve a Corrections Canada request for his transfer to a prison in Canada. The transfer request is made according the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. The Government of Bulgaria has not provided an official reason for its not agreeing to the transfer of KAPOUSTIN under the Convention. 34. KAPOUSTIN, according to Article 70 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code and is eligible for parole in Bulgaria on July 7th 2004. Part 2 Bulgarian Information as Provided to Interpol 35. On 30 November 1995 Bulgarian NIS investigator Georgiev directed a request to Bulgarian Interpol. The request is predicated on Article 133 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code of Procedure. Interpol as in force on November 1995. Police investigator Georgiev requests Interpol issue an international arrest warrant for KAPOUSTIN with the objective to extradite him to Bulgarian.

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36. According to Bulgarian national law the police and prosecution are not required to secure a bench warrant from a Bulgarian criminal court of law or a judge. The 28 November 1995 police warrant is approved by a deputy Sofia District Attorney and raises a criminal charge alleging the embezzlement of public funds. The criminal charge is qualified under Article 203 para (1) of the Bulgarian Criminal Code as in force in November of 1995. 37. The data appearing in the international arrest warrant and provided to Interpol and relevant to this REPORT and Complaint before the Commissioner reads as follows: "We dispose of the following established and concrete data: … [Sic]; Some data [unidentified] exists that MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN has developed his “Pyramidal structures” in the territory of five countries – Canada, USA, Bulgaria, Greece and Georgia; … [Sic] …; We dispose of data that MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN and his wife TRACY KAPOUSTIN live at present in Greece in the town of Kavala in an apartment on 14-B,Plio St. he has bought a villa on 16,Yadras St. Being an executive director (Chief Executive Officer) of Life Choice Int. AD in Sofia his last address in Sofia is Sofia, 96-A, Rakovska St., first floor. He has offices in Sofia on 16,Knyaz Battenberg St., entrance V, fl. 6, apt. 27 as well as on 3,Krakra St. – premises of the National Institute of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases. Such an office he has got in Plovdiv on 52, Ruski Blvd. The investigation under inv. case 195/95 as per the schedule of the National Investigation Service is being carried out in the absence of the accused MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN at present by virtue of article 217a and under the conditions of article 268 par.3 and 4 of CCP [Criminal Code of Procedure] of Bulgarian Republic. We received data from the Central Service for Fight against Organized Delinquency, their ref. 3233/July 17th, 1995 [the R.C.M.P. INFORMATION subject to this complaint] that the Canadian police in Vancouver are interested in the international malfeasant activities of M. Kapoustin and his subsidiary companies, some of them have been registered in the commercial register of British Columbia province since 1991, and in the following persons [Canadian citizens]: KARIN UTE BERGSON, born on July 15th, 1942 DONALD MAXWELL, born on Oct. 23rd, 1950 RADKA K. MILANOVA, born on Jan.1st, 1954, living in Vancouver, Canada ARTHUR L. MORRISON, born on Jan. 12th, 1935

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MARY SLOAN, born on may 5th, 1947 IVON SHEARING, born on April 12th 1928 – an associate of KAPOUSTIN and MAXWELL in their questionable operations at the Vancouver stock exchange in Canada. At present SHEARING is the manager of a pseudo-religious organization called “CABALISTIC PHILOSOPHY”. It was found out that in 1994 only 16 million USD had been transferred to several bank accounts of SHEARING. Most of the transfers came from Western Europe. Other accounts of SHEARING with local banks in Vancouver are being credited with amounts of about 100.000 USD per day. Most probably large-scale “money laundering” operations are going on. The Canadian source of this information supposes that it is most likely that a considerable part of these amounts come namely from the funds accumulated in Bulgaria by KAPOUSTIN through the large-scale financial frauds carried out by his pyramidal structure “LIFE CHOICE”. The transfers are affected through Caribbean banks. Further to the aforesaid we ask for your assistance before Interpol for arranging of bilateral meetings with the Canadian competent authorities aiming at conveying information of mutual interest to both parties. At the end we ask you for urgent and active search of the accused MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN through the structures of Interpol throughout the world. There are data that the latter has circumvented Bulgarian and Canadian Tax Legislation by cash transfers of large amounts in USD and DM. A conclusion should be drawn that through the”pyramidal structure” of Life Choice and by registering of “dead souls” as clients of the latter large amounts of “dirty money have been laundered”. ([], and emphasis mine]

38. This November 30 1995 Bulgarian police request to Interpol repeats, almost verbatim the July 7th 1995 Crown indictment of KAPOUSTIN. Part 3 R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” Released to Mass Media 39. On August 1st 1996, Bulgarian police and prosecution representatives make an public official statement with the particulars of the KAPOUSTIN case according to details and police facts provided by the CROWN. Details of the May 15th 1995 meeting with Crown servant DOORNBOS and the July 7th 1995 Crown indictment of KAPOUSTIN are made public by supervising police investigator [sledovatel] and arresting officer, S. Georgiev and Sofia District Attorney Prosecutor Nestor Nestorov. This occurred while KAPOUSTIN was still remanded to a German prison hospital awaiting his extradition. 40. The most significant of the hundreds of press and electronic media releases is the August 1st 1996 article published by the Bulgarian national daily “Continent” [“Kontinent”]. The headline reads:

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“KAPOUSTIN IS AN INTERNATIONAL SWINDLER Insists the chief of the Economical Department of the National Investigation Service, Mr. Stefcho Georgiev.”

41. Sofia District Attorney Nestorov confirms to journalists that the governments of Canada and Bulgaria are mutually interest in criminally charging KAPOUSTIN. This is confirmed in the official minutes of the December 13th 1995 operative meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria attended by Crown servant DOORNBOS. The English translation of the press announcement reads: “Mr. Nestorov said ‘that Canada and Bulgaria will struggle [as to] which country is going to bring action against him [KAPOUSTIN]’” ([], and emphasis mine]

42. In the same interview, police investigator Georgiev confirms to journalists that his investigative conclusions and the charges against KAPOUSTIN are due to data and facts provided by authorities of the Government Canada. 43. Georgiev is quoted by journalists as having confirming that the Crown provided him police data on KAPOUSTIN. The English translation of the relevant parts of this interview and the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” reads: "[Sic]… [KAPOUSTIN is] a well known fraud for Interpol according to the Canadian Government” “[Sic]… [KAPOUSTIN] effected sexual offences against minors [infants, child abuses] according information from the Canadian authorities”… ([] inserted by translator. “[Sic]… [and was] already deceiving others in Georgia” "[Sic]… [KAPOUSTIN has charges in Canada that] "are old and unclear" "[Sic]… [KAPOUSTIN] did not form LifeChoice [in Canada] and didn’t dare to lie to people that insolently [in Canada]” "[Sic]… Kapoustin should be responsible for over 18,000,000 USD, which he managed to steal away from Bulgaria" [and that according to Canadian authorities the is money stolen from Bulgaria citizens] “[KAPOUSTIN sent to Canada through] the Caribbean islands” ([], and emphasis mine]

44. KAPOUSTIN and his family in Canada submitted a request that the Government of Canada immediately clarify if the Bulgarian public statement of Canadian government (R.C.M.P.) involvement was true. KAPOUSTIN and his family sought to immediately learn what official of the Government of Canada was responsible for having uttered the

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maliciously injurious lies that according to Canadian authorities KAPOUSTIN was among other things a convicted child molester. 45. These slander and libels of the Crown are reproduced in, but are not limited to, the following Bulgarian media: •

May 17-23, 1995, Newspaper "Nosten Zhivot" (Night Life)

•

June 7, 1995, Newspaper "Trud"

•

June 19-25, 1995, Newspaper "Capital"

•

June 26, 1995, Newspaper "Trud"

•

July 8, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 13, 1995, Newspaper "Continent"

•

July 14, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 18, 1995, Newspaper "Pari" (Money)

•

July 19, 1995, Newspaper "Cash" No 19

•

July 20, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 24, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 24-30, 1995, Newspaper "Capital"

•

July 31, 1995, Newspaper "Continent"

•

August 1, 1995, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

October 15, 1995, Newspaper "Weekly Standard"

•

December 5, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

December 8, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

December 18, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

December 23, 1995, Newspaper "Pari" (Money)

•

Newspaper "Nedelen Novinar" ?

•

July 8, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 13, 1995, Newspaper "Continent"

•

July 14,1995, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

July 18, 1995, Newspaper "Pari" (Money)

•

July 19, 1995, Newspaper "Cash" No 29

•

July 20, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 24, 1995, Newspaper "Business Trud"

•

July 24-30, 1995, Newspaper "Capital"

•

July 31, 1995, Newspaper "Continent"

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•

August 1, 1995, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

August 8, 1996, Newspaper "Standard"

•

September 5, 1995, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

October 15, 1995, Newspaper "Weekly Standard"

•

December 5, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

December 18, 1995, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

December 23, 1995, Newspaper "Pari" (Money)

•

February 14, 1996, Newspaper "Standard"

•

February 15, 1996, Newspaper "Standard"

•

February 22, 1996, Newspaper "Standard"

•

February 24, 1996, Newspaper "Standard"

•

June 25-27, 1996, Newspaper "Cash" No 25

•

July 22, 1996, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 31, 1996, Newspaper "Continent"

•

August 1, 1996, Newspaper "Continent"

•

August 8, 1996, Newspaper "Standard"

•

August 21, 1996, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

August 21, 1996, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

August 21, 1996, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

August 22, 1996, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

August 23, 1996, Newspaper "Standard"

•

November 11, 1996, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

November 23, 1996, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

February 23-March 1, 1998, Newspaper "Banker"

•

May 25-31, 1998, Newspaper "Banker"

•

December 7-13, 1998, Newspaper "Banker"

•

March 5, 1999, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

March 5, 1999, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

March 26, 1999, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

April 14, 1999, Newspaper "Duma" (Word)

•

April 16, 1999, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

April 17, 1999, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

April 17, 1999, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

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•

May 3-9, 1999, Newspaper "Banker"

•

September 8, 1999, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

October 18-24, 1999, Newspaper "Banker"

•

December 15, 1999, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

December 16, 1999, Newspaper "Cash"

•

January 11, 2000, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

January 11, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

January 11, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

January 12, 2000, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

January 12, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

January 12, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

January 12, 2000, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

January 12, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

January 15, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

January 15, 2000, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

January 18, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

January 18, 2000, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

January 18, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

January 18, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

January 18, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

January 25, 2000, "Democracia" (Democracy)

•

February 29, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

March, 3, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

March 17, 2000, Newspaper "Cash", No. 11

•

April 8, 2000, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

April 11, 2000, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

April 11, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

April 11, 2000, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

April 11, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

April 11, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

April 11, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

April 25, 2000, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

April 25, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

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•

June 6, 2000, Newspaper "Duma" (Word)

•

June 6, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

July 4, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

July 4, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

July 4, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

July 6, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

July 7, 2000, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

July 7, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

July 7, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

Sept. 5, 2000, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

September 5, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

September 5, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

September 5, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

September 8, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

September 8, 2000, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

September 8, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

September 8, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

September 9, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

September 26, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

September 26, 2000, "Democracia" (Democracy)

•

September 26, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

September 2000, Magazine "Society and Law", No. 3

•

October 24, 2000, Newspaper "Standard"

•

October 24, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

October 24, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

October 24, 2000, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

October 24, 2000, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

November 22, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

November 22, 2000, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

November 24, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

December 6, 2000, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

December 22, Newspaper "Cash", No. 51

•

January 6-12, 2001, Newspaper "Banker", No. 1

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•

January 13-19, 2001, Newspaper "Capital"

•

January 9, 2001, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

January 14, 2001, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

January 16, 2001, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

January 16, 2001, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

January 16, 2001, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

January 18, 2001, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

January 18, 2001, Newspaper "Standard"

•

January 20-26, 2001, Newspaper "Banker", No. 3

•

February 3-9, 2001, Newspaper "Banker", No. 5

•

February 17, 2001, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

March 14, 2001, Newspaper "Monitor"

•

March 14, 2001, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

March 14, 2001, Newspaper "Standard"

•

March 14, 2001, Newspaper "Trud" (Labour)

•

March 14, 2001, Newspaper "Novinar"

•

March 14, 2001, Newspaper "Sega" (Now)

•

March 16, 2001, Newspaper "24 Chasa" (24 Hours)

•

March 16, 2001, Newspaper "Cash", No. 11

•

March 17-23, 2001, Newspaper "Capital"

•

March 17-23, 2001, Newspaper "Banker", No. 11

SECTION CGovernment of Canada Denials 46. On August 9th 1996, Canada’s Embassy to the FRG, Bonn, issued a statement to the governments of Germany and Bulgaria. In part the “Note Verbal” to the German Foreign Ministry reads: “… [Sic] … The Canadian Embassy would also like to draw to the attention of the Foreign Ministry an article that was published in the Bulgarian newspaper Kontinent on 01 August 1996 which quotes the Chief of the Economic Crimes department of the National Investigation Department, Mr. Stefcho Georgiev, as stating that Michael Kapoustin ‘committed sexual assaults against minors, according to information received from the Canadian authorities’. This statement is not substantiated.

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The department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada has consulted Canadian and International police authorities, and confirm there are no records of this nature in Canada regarding Mr. Kapoustin. Considering the above, the Canadian Embassy again expresses its concern with the climate that is being created in Bulgaria by the authorities in anticipation of extradition, and asks the German authorities to confirm that they are satisfied that Mr. Kapoustin would receive fair and equitable treatment within the Bulgarian legal process, were he to be extradited. … [Sic] …” ([], and emphasis mine]

SECTION DPhysical and Mental Torture of Kapoustin 47. Beginning on or about September 17th 1996 This physical and mental torture involved KAPUSTIN being beaten about the shoulders, back, buttocks and legs. The sound of the blows was muffled through blankets and effected by hard, yet flexible, plastic or rubber clubs. 48. Each beating incident involved 4-6 masked individuals one of whom repeatedly interrogated KAPOUSTIN in poor English concerning funds purported to be ensconced in Canada with criminal associates identified to the Government of Bulgaria by agencies of the Government of Canada. 49. Subsequent to these beatings KAPOUSTIN was kept in isolation for days, often weeks, without any contact except the investigator supervising the case. A beating might last as little as 5 minutes with the longest being approximately 10 minutes. 50. During the 1996 and 1997 episodes of abuse KAPOUSTIN was repeatedly given, without his knowledge, psychotropic drugs to disorient and deprive him of sleep. This induced moods of extreme depression, helplessness and hallucinations. 51. Subsequent to these episodes KAPOUSTIN would again be interrogated upon the subject matter of the funds in Canada and his returning those funds to the Republic of Bulgaria. 52. Each time KAPOUSTIN denied having any knowledge of the funds he encountered assurances by his interrogators that the information was accurate and provided by Canadian authorities who sought together with Bulgaria the return of these funds. 53. Bulgarian interrogators were certain KAPOUSTIN was lying and therefore extended their beatings. Their investigation of KAPOUSTIN continued for more than 4 years before committing KAPOUSTIN to trial. There was no judicial supervision prior to trial. 54. The Government of Bulgaria and Bulgarian citizens continue to this day to believe that there are funds in Canada as represented to them by the DOORNBOS “INFORMATION”.

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Bulgarian authorities and citizens persistently demand that KAPOUSTIN forward to Bulgaria the money in Canada. There is documented evidence that the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Justice, Mr. Mario Dimitrov and the Bulgarian Solicitor General Filchev are maintaining before Canada Foreign Affairs that KAPOUSTIN does in deed have DOORNBOS “millions” as cited in the “INFORMATION” and that KAPOUSTIN must pay this money to the State of Bulgaria and Bulgarian citizens before any transfer to a prison of Canada or his release on parole. This notwithstanding his acquittal on the allegation found in the DOORNBOS “INFORMATION”. 55. The R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” was translated from English and presented to the Ministry of Interior by a Mr. A. Kosev, “KMC” [phonetic], Ministry of Interior [Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti]. 56. On 17 July 1995, the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior Ref. № 3233, the Minister agreeded to accept the sworn R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” provided by DOORNBOS. KAPOUSTIN and his company LIFECHOICE would be prosecuted solely on the data and other “police facts and conclusions” made by the R.C.M.P. in the sworn “INFORMATION”. At the order of “M”, as countersigned “MV”, the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, Central Service For [the] Fight Against Organized Crime [CSBOP] ordered Bulgarian prosecutors to “Take legal Action” or “Open a prosecution case” against KAPOUSTIN [Da se zavede delo]. 57. On 7 September 1995 Prosecutor Mindova of the Sofia District Attorney’s Office provided the Sofia Department of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior Economic Police Sector 02 material containing data for fraud [in Bulgaria] as provided from the Canadian Embassy, Vienna, Austria through the offices of the Bulgarian Solicitor General [Main Public Prosecutor]. 58. It is apparent from this document that the arrest and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgarian is the direct result of the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION”. This is supported by the fact that the 7 September 1995 letter of Deputy Sofia District Attorney Mindova instructs police investigators to act on the charges and police facts in the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION”. The English translation of the letter reads: “Herewith enclosed we send you a translation from English language of a material sent [the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION] to MPPO [Solicitor General] of RB [Republic of Bulgaria] by the Central Service for Fight against Organized Delinquency – MHA [Bulgarian Ministry of Interior] according to information from the Canadian Embassy in the Republic of Austria [DOORNBOS]concerning the activities of company Life Choice Int. AD. This material contains data for fraud by Michael Kapoustin and other persons. To be attached to the correspondence and verified. We send you a letter from the Finance Ministry – Sofia Tax Administration as well to be attached to the correspondence. Enclosure: as per text”

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([ ] and emphasis mine)

59. On October 29th 1995, the National Investigative Service, Investigator Georgiev, began the “OFFICIAL” criminal investigation of KAPOUSTIN and his company based on the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” of July 7th 1995. As a result, all the offices of KAPOUSTIN where seized and closed, as was all the property and bank accounts of his Company LIFECHOICE. 60. On 28 November 1995, police investigator (sledovatel) S. Georgiev brought a charge of embezzlement qualified according to Article 203§1 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code. In English the accusation against KAPOUSTIN reads: " I Stefcho Georgiev, prosecution investigator upon the National Prosecution Investigation Service, Sofia, today 27th day of November 1995, in the city of Sofia and with referring to the evidences pertinent to the criminal case registered under file number 195/1995 in the register of the National Prosecution Investigation Service, have established that the person being investigated, named MIHAIL KAPOUSTIN, born November 06, 1952, in Canada, address Sofia, 96-A Rakovska" street., fl. 1 - central office, has committed criminal offences (offences to be specified - where, when and how each of them has been perpetrated). In his official capacity of executive director of the company LifeChoice International Share Holding Company [LCIAD] and with the conditions of constantly perpetrated crime, for the period of time April 1, 1993 till August 1, 1995, has embezzled the corporate money as placed in his care and running under the said capacity of him, and has misused of this money for his own or of another personal benefit, this embezzlement in the sum of more than USD 5 million. Having an especially great value and representing an especially aggravated case. The committed offence is found under Article 203, § 1 ref. Article 26,§ 1 of the Penal [Criminal] Code. and with considering the degree of the danger to society of the offences committed, the personality of the perpetrator, the possibility of his non-attendance and other facts: the great degree of the danger to society - damaged in the amount of more than 5 million. USD were thousands of Bulgarian citizens - investors of the LifeChoice International Share Holding Company [LCIAD], Sofia and in compliance with the prescriptions of the p.5 of the Directions Letter of the District Attorney of Sofia [Sofia City Prosecutor's Office - phonetic SGP - Sofiiska Gradska Prokuratura] according to Articles 146 - 148, 152, 207, 209, 212,of the Penal Procedure Code [Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)] HAVE RULED: 1. To bring a charge against MIHAIL KAPOUSTIN as accused for the criminal offences stated herewith as per Article 203, § 1, ref. Article 201, ref. Article 26 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Republic of Bulgaria. 2. … [Sic]

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61. On 30 November 1995 NIS investigator Georgiev brought his request to Interpol [see above §2]. The Commissioner is requested to closely examine the data and facts presented to Interpol on November 30th 1995; repeated again in the international warrant of February 7th 1996 [see above §1] and the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” of July 7th 1995 [see above §A]. 62. NCB Interpol refused the November 30th 1995 request of NIS investigator Georgiev 63. On 15 December 1995, Bulgaria’s Deputy Solicitor General Prosecutor Doichev presented a second request to the Head of NCB Interpol Sofia, a Mr. Hristov. This “request” was actually an “ORDER” and directed Interpol Sofia to issue an International Arrest Warrant for KAPOUSTIN. Interpol representatives were to give no consideration to the merits or quality of facts or compliance with international law. Interpol NCB Sofia was to abnegate its independence, if any, as part of an international organization. The English translation of the “ORDER” reads: "I ORDER: "NCB "INTERPOL" - MHA to inform the bureaus of "INTERPOL" of the member countries in order to trace (discover) MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN. After finding him the latter to be detained (arrested) because of the crime committed by him in the Republic of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian party to be notified about this in order to send the necessary procedural documents to extradite MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN to the Republic of Bulgaria. "You are requested to notify the Main Public Prosecutor's Office after effecting the actions in connection with my order.

64. On 13 December 1995, in Sofia, the R.C.M.P. (DOORNBOS) held a tactical meeting with Bulgaria police and prosecution officials to discuss KAPOUSTIN. This occurred immediately after Bulgarian authorities issued national and international arrest warrants and confirmed to the R.C.M.P. that the Bulgarian Government had agreed with the R.C.M.P. request to arrest and prosecute KAPOUSTIN on the charges and facts found in the “INFORMATION”. 65. KAPOUSTIN would be prosecuted according to the R.C.M.P. request under Bulgarian criminal law. It was agreed that Bulgarian police and prosecution officials would collect from KAPOUSTIN and his company LIFECHOICE the information requested by DOORNBOS. 66. In attendance on December 13th 1995 at the offices of A. Alexandrov were, inter alio, Anatolii Kosev - department of “International Relations”, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior; Miroslav Genov, Central Service for [the] Fight Against Organized Delinquency; Roumen Andreev, deputy chief, National Investigative Service and police investigator [sledovatel] S. Georgiev and DOORNBOS.

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67. A Memorandum of this tactical meeting was directed to Mr. Rashkov, Head of the National Investigative Service. The English translations of parts relevant to the complaint before the Commission read: Mr. Rashkov, … [Sic]… … [Sic] … … [Sic] … During the conversations held in an operative order we specified that it is of mutual interest for the Bulgarian and Canadian authorities to establish the entire criminal activity of Michael Kapoustin in his large scale financial frauds and the incoming to Canadian and Caribbean banks of millions of USD from East and West Europe. Mr. DOORNBOS submitted a visiting card and the fax message on which we could ask our questions to the Canadian Economic Police in Vancouver and they would send a response on what they had done in an operative order through CSFAOD or NIS. … [Sic] … ([ ] and emphasis mine)

68. On 1 April 1996, the R.C.M.P. faxed Bulgarian police and prosecution officials. This correspondence occurred subsequent to the arrest of KAPOUSTIN in Germany. The fax was sent by R.C.M.P. Command Liaison Attaché, S. Sgt. DOORNBOS from the Embassy of Canada, Vienna Austria to Mr. Roumen Andreev, Deputy Director of the National [Prosecution] Investigative Service. The fax reads: “You will recall that we met in December [13th]1995 in the office of Mr. Stefan Gueorgiev Deputy Chief of the Economic Division. I am aware that Kapoustin has been arrested on your behalf in Germany some weeks ago. I am advised by the police in Sofia that the case of Kapoustin now falls entirely within your jurisdiction. Could you advise please if your further investigation had determined [the where, how or end destination of the money which Kapoustin defrauded from [Bulgarian investors] Were you able to identify offshore banking institutions, account numbers [illegible?] I am asking this as it is a very real possibility, as suggested in December that some of the funds may have been eventually transferred to Canada. If you have

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any information in this regard please advise. If not we will close our file with respect to Kapoustin and LifeChoice.” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

69. On 1 August 1996, the particulars of R.C.M.P. involvement in the arrest and prosecution KAPOUSTIN became public in the mass media [see above §3]. 70. The R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS are the obvious source of “information from the Canadian authorities” referenced in the August 1st 1996 interviews. 71. On or about 9 August 1996, the Government of Canada, Embassy to the FDRG, Bonn, issued its “Note Verbal” [see above §C]. 72. On 14 August 1996, R.C.M.P. Command Liaison, S. Sgt. D. A. DOORNBOS replied to a 31 July 1996 faxed inquiry from Bulgarian Ministry of Interior Officer Colonel D. Vangelov the Director of “CSCOC [acronym unknown]”. The R.C.M.P. faxed reply concerned a Bulgarian request for an investigation in Canada of the company “International Pharmaceutical Suppliers [Inc.]”. The relevant parts of the R.C.M.P. fax reads: “Further to your fax 389/31.07.96 I passed the information therein onto our Proceeds of Crime Unit in Vancouver. … The firm … is not/not known in police indices in Canada … [sic] … For any criminal traces of this company in Texas inquiries would have to be made by your prosecutors’ office with USA authorities. Aside from the Canada wide criminal warrants [unidentified] of arrest for Kapoustin [Applicant] Vancouver POC [Proceeds of Crime] has confirmed that several civil lawsuits have also been filed against Kapoustin [Applicant], LifeChoice and Don Maxwell in the courts in British Columbia. Could you please pass this information to Mr. Stefan Georgiev [Georgiev] of the National Prosecution Investigative Bureau [agency unknown] and ask him to please advise us when or if any information is found regarding Kapoustin [Applicant] having transferred monies to Canada.” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

73. On 23 August 1996, R.C.M.P. Command Liaison S. Sgt. DOORNBOS provided Colonel D. Vangelov, Director, Central Service for Combating Organized Crime (CSCOC) (CSBOP) a 6 page investigative police report and conclusions prepared by R.C.M.P. S. Sgt. Vander Graff (Acting) Officer in Charge, Proceeds of Crime Section, Vancouver, British Columbia. Relevant parts of the faxed investigative report reads: “Re: Michael Kapoustin [Applicant As noted … [sic] … the purpose of receiving civil files to determine information contained in them may be relevant to the criminal investigations in Canada and Bulgaria with respect to Kapoustin, et al [others, underlined].

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… [sic] … … [sic]… … [sic] … Detective Desmarais has not approached Don Maxwell and requested an interview as yet. Maxwell was obviously very involved in the LifeChoice [Canada] business as well as other business ventures involving Kapoustin until their apparent ‘falling out’. Maxwell also is likely in possession of information with respect to the Kabalarian funds transfer [Ivon Shearing] which, as you know, was the original precipitator of the Vancouver PCS [Proceeds of Crime Section] investigation. At present, there does not appear to be a substantial likelihood of charges [against KAPOUSTIN] arising from the Kabalarian [Canadian] side of the investigation however to properly complete the investigation Maxwell should be interviewed. The Def. Desmarais is prepared to conduct the interview of Maxwell and direct whatever questions the Bulgarian authorities may have to Maxwell, however because of the volume of material in the civil court registry as well as the complicated nature of the Bulgarian fraud investigation, some consideration should be given to a Bulgarian investigator attending Vancouver …[sic]” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

74. In the 23 August 1996 fax RCMP Command Liaison, S. Sgt. DOORNBOS requests that Col. D. Vangelov forward a message to police investigator S. Georgiev. That faxed message reads: “The attached message (page 2 thru 7) was received from the Vancouver RCMP Proceeds of Crime Unit. There is some information therein that may be useful for Mr. Stefan GUEORGIEV [Georgiev] of the National Prosecution Investigation Bureau [no such agency, obviously the National Investigative Service] with respect to Kapoustin and companies and accounts that he had in the Caribbean. Could this be passed to Mr. GUEORGIEV [Georgiev] and ask that he in turn pass any comments he may have on to me directly. I am still very much interested in any indication he has that any of Kapoustin gains [transfers] from the fraud in Bulgaria ended up in Canada.” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

75. On September 2nd 1996, KAPOUSTIN was extradited to Bulgaria [see above §1]. KAPOUSTIN was hospitalized in Bulgaria from September 2 to September 16th 1996. 76. On September 16th 1996, KAPOUSTIN was removed to a high security solitary confinement remand facility operated by the Bulgarian National Investigative Services. 77. On September 18th 1996, the beatings and interrogation of KAPOUSTIN commenced.

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78. Central to Bulgarian police employing physical (beatings) and psychological coercion (isolation and sense deprivation) [See Beatings and Circumstances of Bulgarian Arrest] was their desire to provide the R.C.M.P. with the data and facts repeatedly requested by DOORNBOS concerning the bank accounts and transfers of funds made by KAPOUSTIN to Canada and the Caribbean. This enquiry is repeated again and again by DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. Vancouver Proceeds of Crime Unit communications to Bulgarian police and prosecution officials [See above §§A, D, D, D, D, D, and D; See Index “transfers”] 79. The repeated and intense requests by DOORNBOS for the information concerning bank transfers made by KAPOUSTIN from Bulgaria to Canada is what precipitated the beatings and torture of KAPOUSTIN. 80. Bulgaria police and prosecution officials proved anxious to obtain the information from KAPOUSTIN. This information was requested by the Government of Canada on what we know to be the following dates; May 15, July 7, September 7 and December 13 of 1995 and again on April 1, August 14 and August 23 of 1996 and lastly on July 2 1997. 81. On July 2nd 1997, R.C.M.P. Command Liaison, S. Sgt. DOORNBOS provided to Bulgaria police and prosecution officials a copy of a British Columbia Civil Action where KAPOUSTIN is representing several corporate plaintiffs. This document was provided in response to a 25 June 1997 telephone call and 26 June 1997 fax from Bulgarian police and prosecutors to DOORNBOS. In a fax message of the same date the DOORNBOS ends his letter with a request to the Bulgarian authorities that reads: “Subject: Michael KAPOUSTIN (Kapoustin) et al … [Sic] … I am still awaiting in writing, confirmation, information and a Rogatory Request promised by Mr. Stefan GUEORGIEV [Georgiev] regarding funds that Kapoustin transferred [transfer] to Canada, specifically to the law office of McCandless, Morrison & Verdicchio. Please advise this regard.” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

82. The beatings and isolation of KAPOUSTIN is common knowledge to Bulgarians familiar with the interrogation techniques of the Bulgarian National Investigative Service and Bulgarian Ministry of Interior Treatment of Detainees and Conditions in Bulgaria. 83. On November 1st 1996, the Embassy of Canada to Bucharest, Romania, received a formal request to assist Bulgarian “investors” and the alleged “victims”. The request shows concerned over the physical safety and health of KAPOUSTIN and asks the Government of Canada to arrange a visit with KAPOUSTIN. Bulgarian police and prosecution officials refuse KAPOUSTIN all visitors. The letter is signed by 16 Bulgarian citizens and reads:

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“We are writing you on the occasion of the detention of the Canadian citizen Mr. Mihail Kapoustin. We are investors in “LifeChoice International” – AD, Bulgaria, whose executive director Mihail Kapoustin is. We are sincerely concern[ed] about his health condition. We think that his detention causes serious damages to the activities of the company and our interests. We are asking for your help in obtaining a permission to visit Mr. Mihail Kapoustin, as so far, regardless our repeating requests to the appropriate authorities, we have no[t] received any answer.” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

84. On 15 May 1997 the Canadian Government presented Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs a diplomatic note protesting. inter alia, the legal maximum period [according to the Bulgarian Criminal Code of Procedure] that KAPOUSTIN can remain in remand will expire on 1 June 1997; concerns that detention of KAPOUSTIN will be further extended; the investigation’s already considerable length of more than 2 years; that arrest warrants date back to 17 July 1995; the investigation was conducted as well during Applicant’s detention in the FRG plus nine (9) months since KAPOUSTIN was extradited; that 26 months to investigate was adequate time to fix the final charges and order trial or alternatively release KAPOUSTIN pending same; further investigation and detention amounts to punishment without trial; all others similarly charged to KAPOUSTIN in other cases are released and therefore the KAPOUSTIN should be released on bail [security] pending trial. 85. On 23 May 1997 Canada Foreign Affairs received a case note (Note sur le cas) concerning the Applicant’s arrest/detention, the relevant parts read: “Consul and HonCon visited subj 15 May. Subj appeared to be in good physical condition but was mentally distressed as a result of his continued detention and lack of news concerning setting of trial date. Legal counsel has advised him that trial date (if there is to be one) may take another one or two years. It proved impossible to obtain any corroborating info from investigator’s office. Corruption abounds within the prosecutor’s office according to local news reports. Investigator Georgiev has been removed from office with a replacement to be named in coming weeks. Whether this will or will not delay proceedings remains to be seen. Legal counsel advises they are having access problems as a result of a more rigorous application of existing law; they will pursue matter of access with prosecutor’s office. Subj. also complained that since consul’s last visit 18 March he had been denied access to exercise facility on a regular basis. Temporary investigator/replacement (deputy?) stated that the problem would be resolved. HonCon has been asked to follow up on a regular basis during the period June/September and will forward reports via cons/[illegible] Bucst. Subj. has requested CANADA advise him as to what steps/process may be used to hasten investigation and trial. According to him and his legal counsel Bulgaria

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has already been taken to the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg for a case of illegal detention. Court decision approx. 2 months was in favor of the plaintiff against Bulgaria. Subj wishes to follow same route and legal counsel stated they may file suit in July. Subj has also requested German authorities be advised that he is not being tried for offences for which he was extradited and has asked for Germany to assist with having case more speedily brought to trial. Subj has requested that you keep Mr. Kap informed of all measures taken. Diplo note which follows was presented to MFA 15 May. Ambassador Duguay will pursue matter with MFA and Prosecutor during visit scheduled for 11 – 13 June. … [sic] …” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

86. On July 2, 1997, DOORNBOS personally appears in Sofia, Bulgaria to give evidence against KAPOUSTIN. DOORNBOS appears with court certified documents collected by the R.C.M.P. in Canada and to be used in an effort to secure the conviction of KAPOUSTIN by a Bulgarian criminal court. This occurs more than two years from the initial R.C.M.P. contact and request that KAPOUSTIN be prosecuted by Bulgarian police and prosecution authorities. 87. DOORNBOS swears to and personally delivers in Sofia, Bulgaria evidence against KAPOUSTIN before Bulgarian “magistrate” [investigator] R. Kirov. This done without the implementation or administration of the either Canada’s Solicitor General and Minister of Justice or Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. The evidence DOORNBOS has collected in Canada is done without supervision by a competent court of Canada. According to DOORNBOS this document might help convict KAPOUTSIN. 88. The 7 July 1995 R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” and investigative conclusions prove a formal request and charge provided by the Government of Canada to the Government of Bulgaria. This “INFORMATION” and the related correspondence qualify the suppositions and unverified conclusions of DOORNBOS to the elevated status of “official police facts” and “investigative conclusions” of the R.C.M.P. 89. On 25 July 2000, the family of the KAPOUSTIN brought civil action in British Columbia Supreme Court civil Action No, S004040, and Vancouver Registry against RCMP Command Liaison S. Sgt. DOORNBOS and others. 90. The claim, inter alia, alleges that Canada Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Consolidated Federal and Provincial Privacy Act(s) [R.S.C. 1985, R.S.B.C. 1996] have been breached by DOORNBOS. No action against the Government of Canada appeared possible on account that at the time KAPOUSTIN believed DOORNBOS had acted alone. 91. The lawsuit was brought immediately after KAPOUSTIN learned of the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” and other exchanges between the R.C.M.P. and police and prosecution

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officials of the Republic of Bulgaria. Paragraphs 41 and 42 of the KAPOUSTIN Statement of Claim read: §41“The Plaintiffs have not asserted that the Claim falls within the purview of Section 32 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). Had the Plaintiffs so elected they would allege breaches of s. 15 (1) which triggered “a situation that is simply unacceptable” [ see USA v. Arllard (1991), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 159 at p. 522] under s. 12 of the Charter, the acts in question and consequences thereof offending the Canadian sense of what is fair, right and just under s. 11 (a) and (d), s. 9, s. 8 and s. 7 of the Charter in relationship to the nature of the cause and considerations of comity and security, and after having granted due latitude and having maintained a perspective for the reasonable requirements of law enforcement as demonstrately justifiable in a free and democratic society. The breaches of Charter rights arise from the violations of law pleaded herein. This court, in such instance, would have competent jurisdiction in this district over the subject matter of this claim pursuant to s. 24 (1) of the Charter. Plaintiffs would then claim that the officials, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government of Canada did violate the law promulgated under the (Provincial) Protection of Privacy Act [R.S.B.C. 1996] Chapter 165, Section 15 (h), S. 30 and S. 28 in conjunction with S. 22 (1); the (Federal) Privacy Act [R.S.C. 1985] Section 8 (1) and further re-allege that the acts and transactions of, inter alia, preparation of false, misleading and slanderous materials; the sending abroad of same; causing the public distribution and publication of information protected by law and the preparation and delivery abroad of official reports and documents was adequate proof of common law torts of privacy, defamation and slander as having occurred in this Court’s district. §42Plaintiffs would further allege that violations of law and the Charter arise from acts affected by a foreign state, its agents, agencies and instrumentalities against the person and property of citizens of Canada, in Canada and abroad, the conduct of said agents, agencies and instrumentalities, directly and vicariously causing, inter alia, threats, accusations, menaces and violence without reasonable justification or excuse; cruel and unusual treatment and punishment; deprivation of security of person and right to life; discrimination on account of national or ethnic origin and religion; disclosures of information to the public harmful to the individual and a violation of the right to privacy; threats to safety, mental and physical health; disclosures of information to the public resulting in undue financial loss and burden; disclosures of information to the public which were knowingly inaccurate, incomplete and unreliable, thus damaging unfairly the reputation of the person(s) referred to therein and having been compiled and identified as a part of a Canadian investigation into a possible violation of law in Canada; disclosures of information to the public which inaccurately, unreliably and slanderously indicated untrue sexual orientation, religious belief or association of the person(s) named therein and Plaintiffs would claim vicarious liability on the part of the Government of Canada for its participation in aiding and abetting the violations of law alleged and for having subjected to cruel and unusual treatment the Plaintiffs. In one instance the liberty and security of person is denied in an alleged violation of fundamental and civil rights apparently with the direct participation of a peace officer and diplomat of Canada.” ([ ] and emphasis Applicant’s)

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Part 1 Applicants Earlier Complaints .1

April 1st 2000 Complaint as filed with Office of Canada's Prime Minister

.2

June 23rd 2000 Civil Action against DOORNBOS and other filed in British Columbia Supreme Court

.3

May 3rd 2001 Refusal of Embassy of Canada to serve complaint to R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS

.4

May 3rd 2001 Complaint to R.C.M.P. against DOORNBOS and Cover Letter

.5

May 3rd 2001 Complaint to General Director of DRAIT Mr. Gar Pardy

.6

May 19th 2001 Complaint to Attorney General of British Columbia

.7

May 19th 2001 Complaint to the Honourable Anne McLellan the Minister of Justice Canada

.8

May 21st 2001 Complaint and Request to the Attorney General of British Columbia for Legal Aid

.9

May 27th 2001 Letter to DOORNBOS

SECTION ELegal Grounds Part 1 For Earlier Complaints 92. Complaints at the level of the federal government are proper since jurisdiction over the interpretation of the subject matter of this Complaint is awarded to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (the “Minister") under Article I para (1) of the "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act", chapter M-13.6 (R.S. 1985, c30 (4th supp.)) 1988, c.37 assented to 28 July (hereinafter the "Act") wherein under the Minister is designated as the "competent authority" to effect provisions of the Act. 93. The Complaints asserted that provisions of the Act have been unlawfully effected by an authority and Crown Servant not competent to do so. 94. The venue of the complaint, the Office of Minister, is proper under Article 7 para (1) of the Act. The Minister embodies the legal competence to assess the lawfulness of actions effected by agents or agencies of Canada under provisions provided for and the conditions considered by the Act. 95. The complaints asserted the Minister, as Attorney General, had proper jurisdiction and venue to ascertain the penal or administrative liability, if any, of DOORNBOS and possibly others alleged to be responsible for the acts set out above in the SECTION “FACTS” and give rise to the complaint cause of allegations that Canadian law and the Charter rights of KAPOUSTIN have been violated by an unlawful and unauthorized implementation and administration of the Act and by the slander and deep humiliation of KAPOUSTIN and his family through a malicious indictment, offensive words and misdeeds of the a Crown Servant, DOORNBOS .

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96. The complaints made are said to be violations of Canada’s basic law and are within the purview of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 97. The Attorney General of Canada has venue in that the rights of the individual as provided for and protected in the Charter cover those actions by a Crown Servant, including police activity and investigation, as conducted or affected by them through the agencies of or directly by them in a foreign state. The consequences of such activity by a Crown Servant having a direct and far reaching impact upon a citizen of Canada’s rights identified under the Charter. Such actions are subject to review by the Minister. 98. The Attorney General of Canada as the competent authority must assess if DOORNBOS did commit prosecutable acts against the person of KAPOUSTIN and against justice by successfully denying KAPOUSTIN his right to due process and law while DOORNBOS was in pursuit of a Canadian criminal investigation outside of Canada. 99. It is alleged a violation of law arises from DOORNBOS engaging on his behalf the agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state, the Republic of Bulgaria, to successfully circumvent the procedures and law embodied in the Act, the Charter and other laws of Canada. 100.The acts complained of herein as alleged are inter alia, violations of Article 17 para (1) and Article 18 para (1) of the Act. 101.There exists no instance or document in evidence that the Minister either received or in the alternative approved a lawful request, under Article 11 para (1) of the Act. 102.At no time did the Republic of Bulgaria utilize diplomatic channels to obtain in Canada on its behalf the facts and data provided by DOORNBOS to Bulgaria’s police and prosecution officials. 103.There is no instance or document in evidence to suggest that police and prosecution officials of Bulgaria requested police facts or conclusions or reports from the R.C.M.P. The R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” and DOORNBOS indicts KAPOUSTIN for what it alleges are criminal offences under Bulgarian criminal law and over which the Republic of Bulgaria has proper and sovereign jurisdiction. The R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” is an indictment of KAPOUSTIN on a charge of fraud allegedly committed by KAPOUSTIN on the territory of Bulgaria, and the proceeds of that fraud, according to the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” are in Canada thank to transfer effected by KAPOUSTIN in his legal capacity as the lawful representative of a Bulgarian company owned and managed by him, LIFECHOICE. 104.There exists no application or order from a judge in Canada of complement jurisdiction and authorizing the gathering of evidence against KAPOUSTIN in or outside of Canada, or for the preparation of police reports or evidence and their sending abroad to a foreign police agency or court.

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105.The documents referenced in the SECTION “FACTS” and attached to the Complaint prove that DOORNBOS and possibly other officials of the R.C.M.P. violated Article 20 of the Act, and therefore Canadian law when unlawfully collecting, preparing and delivering to agencies of a foreign state, the Republic of Bulgaria, evidence and data concerning KAPOUSTIN and other Canadian citizens. This information and evidence to be used against KAPOUSTIN in a Bulgarian criminal court. 106.DOORNBOS at all times knew of the Act, the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Charter and his obligation under law to them. The actions of DOORNBOS show that as a police official operating outside of Canada and diplomatic representative of the Government of Canada DOORNBOS did not feel bound by Canada’s laws. 107.The complaint reveals that the Minister could not give affect or means to the provision under Part I of the Act on account that the Republic of Bulgaria is not a party to the treaty under which the Act is promulgated and is therefore not entitled, under Article 8 of the Act, to mutual legal assistance in a criminal matter without the direct consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada. 108.Article 6 para (1) of the Act requires an "administrative arrangement" be instituted with any non treaty foreign state on a case by case basis by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada. 109.Inquiries and court records reveal no administrative arrangement is affected by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Canada and Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria upon the subject matter of KAPOUSTIN. 110.DOORNBOS and others also violated the laws of the Republic of Bulgaria. The alleged violation arises from Article 464 para (2) of the Bulgaria’s Criminal Code of Procedure and reads: “464 (1)… (2) The request for legal assistance shall be forwarded to the Ministry of Justice and Legal Euro- Integration (Bulgaria), unless another procedure is provided by international treaty to which the Republic of Bulgaria is a party.”

111.Government of Canada and the Ministry of Justice of Bulgaria have no record of such a request for legal assistance in the matter of KAPOUSTIN having ever been made in compliance with laws of the Republic of Bulgaria or for that matter the laws of Canada. 112.This Complaint to the Ministry of the Attorney General asserted that it falls within the purview of Section 32 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). KAPOUSTIN alleged breaches of s. 15 (1) which triggered “a situation that is simply unacceptable” [ see USA v. Arllard (1991), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 159 at p. 522] under s. 12 of the Charter, the acts in question and consequences thereof offending the Canadian sense of what is fair, right and just under s. 11 (a) and (d), s. 9, s. 8 and s. 7 of the Charter

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in relationship to the nature of the cause and considerations of comity and security, and after having granted due latitude and having maintained a perspective for the reasonable requirements of law enforcement as demonstrate justifiable in a free and democratic society. 113.The breaches of the Charter rights of KAPOUSTIN arise from the violations of the laws of Canada some have been identified in this Complaint. In such an instance the Attorney General would have competent jurisdiction over the subject matter of this claim pursuant to s. 24 (1) of the Charter. 114.KAPOUSTIN claimed that the DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. violate the law promulgated under the (Provincial) Protection of Privacy Act [R.S.B.C. 1996] Chapter 165, Section 15 (h), S. 30 and S. 28 in conjunction with S. 22 (1); the (Federal) Privacy Act [R.S.C. 1985] Section 8 (1) and he further alleged that the acts and transactions of, inter alia, preparation of false, misleading and slanderous materials; the sending abroad of same; causing the public distribution and publication of information protected by law and the preparation and delivery abroad of official reports and documents was adequate proof of common law torts of privacy, defamation and slander as having occurred in Canada even though having been transmitted abroad. 115.KAPOUSTIN complained that violations of law and the Charter arise from acts affected in a foreign state by an agency of the Government of Canada against the person and property of a citizen of Canada. The conduct of DOORNBOS directly and vicariously caused, inter alia, threats, accusations, menaces and violence without reasonable justification or excuse; cruel and unusual treatment and punishment; deprivation of security of person and right to life; discrimination on account of national or ethnic origin and religion; disclosures of information to the public harmful to the individual and a violation of the right to privacy; threats to safety, mental and physical health; disclosures of information to the public resulting in undue financial loss and burden; the disclosure of information to the public which were knowingly inaccurate, incomplete and unreliable, thus damaging unfairly the reputation of KAPOUSTIN who is the person(s) referred to therein and having been compiled and identified as a part of a Canadian investigation into a possible violation of law in Canada; disclosures of information to the public which inaccurately, unreliably and slanderously indicated untrue sexual orientation, religious belief or association of KAPOSUTIN as the person(s) named. 116.KAPOUSTIN claimed the vicarious liability on the part of the Government of Canada for its participation in aiding and abetting the violations of law alleged and for having been the direct cause for KAPOUSTIN to be cruel and unusual treatment in Bulgaria. The physical and psychological coercion and torture of KAPOUSTIN being for the singular purpose of securing data and facts for Canada’s R.C.M.P. The rights of KAPOUSTIN as a citizen of Canada to enjoy his fundamental right to liberty and security of person are denied to him in violation of his fundamental and civil rights. 117.The breaches of the Charter rights of KAPOUSTIN are with the direct knowledge and participation of a peace officer, and Crown Servant Derek DOORNBOS. 19178560.doc

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118.All these earlier complaints established in documents the accountability of DOORNBOS for at least the common law torts of privacy, defamation and slander arising DOORBOS having made, inter alia, preparation of false, misleading and slanderous materials; the sending abroad of unverified and untrue information; making of false accusations before officials of justice; production of false evidence before a court of law; distributing and causing the public distribution and publication of slanderous remarks embodied in official correspondence and reports protected under law; impugning the character, integrity and honour of the subject with the intent to cause cruel or unusual treatment and punishment; intimidation and harassment with intent to inflict material harm, mental and physical suffering and emotional distress. SECTION FNATURE OF THE COMPLAINT Part 1 –The Allegations 119.This complaint seeks to pursue remedies for a malicious prosecution of KAPOUSTIN by the R.C.M.P. and identity the injuries and damages suffered by KAPOUSTIN from what are deliberate acts of defamation by libel and slander during the years of 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. 120.The complaint alleges KAPOUSTIN suffered physical injury, mental anguish, deep humiliation, emotional distress and financial loss from the materially false, misleading and deliberately libellous and slanderous statements and injurious lies that DOORNBOS prepared and formed as part conclusions of police investigations provided as a record of criminal activity in Canada and elsewhere. 121.DOORNBOS, then wilfully in oral statements to the public and written reports did cause the same to be repeatedly printed in the press and announced on radio and television. Insodoing DOORNBOS was able to secure the arrest and prosecution of KAPOUTSIN by Bulgarian police and prosecution officials. 122.The complaint before the Commission may be summarised as alleging that the malicious foreign prosecution on a charge of fraud, and the physical and psychological coercion of a Canadian citizen, KAPOUSTIN, is directly the result of a written request of the R.C.M.P. submitted to the Republic of Bulgaria on July 7th 1995 and the subsequent unlawful actions of one Derek DOORNBOS. 123.The complaint alleges there is a conscious violation of Canada’s Charter and the Act when an “administrative arrangement” is made between DOORNBOS, an Officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and an agency of a foreign state, the Republic of Bulgaria. 124.That on or about May 15, 1995 without the knowledge, consent or participation of the respective parties of Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Justice and Office of the Attorney General of Canada, DOORNDOS entered into an unlawful agreement for

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the Republic of Bulgaria to arrest and prosecute KAPOUSTIN on the charges, information and data provided by DOORNBOS. 125.The complaint alleges that the injuries caused KAPOUSTIN and his family would not have been otherwise possible if not for the means and instrumentalities available to DOORNBOS as an official at Government of Canada. The facilities situated at the Embassy of Canada, Vienna, Austria, and if not for the instrumentalities and secure telecommunications, diplomatic mails and other facilities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa, Ontario and Vancouver, British Columbia. 126.It is alleged a violation of law arises from DOORNBOS ’use of these resources of the Federal Government of Canada on behalf of the Republic of Bulgaria. 127.It is alleged that commencing on or about May 15, 1995 and including but not limited to the dates of June 13, 1995; July 7, 1995; September 7, 1995; December 13, 1995; April 1, 1996; August 14, 1996; August 23, 1996 and July 2, 1997, DOORNBOS, an employee of the Government of Canada, did meet or have contact with Stefcho Georgiev and other officials of the Republic of Bulgaria with the purpose and intent to officially and publicly humiliate, degrade and damage the reputation as well as the financial well being of KAPOUSTIN by knowingly, with malice and aforethought, uttering untrue, false and slanderous remarks concerning the personality, character and business activities of the KAPOUSTIN. 128.DOORNBOS knew or should have known that the representations made by him are untrue and his criminal indictment of KAPOUSTIN on a charge of a fraud committed in Bulgaria to be false. 129.DOORNBOS knew the ultimate results of his conduct. Yet DOORNBOS acted intentionally to represent what he knew to false and slanderous remarks to police and prosecution officials of Bulgaria DOORNBOS intended that Bulgarian authorities and the public at large would believe that, inter alia, KAPOUSTIN is convicted in Canada for the sexual rape of children; was an internationally recognized swindler and fraud and swindler known to be a close associate of one Ivon Shearing and a participant and financial supporter of Mr. Shearing and his “pseudo – religious cult” the “Kabalarian Society” of Canada; that KAPOUSTIN is a criminal and his company “LifeChoice” is a criminal operation and large scale fraud that transferred 16 million United States dollars to Canada; that all or a substantial part of these criminal proceeds comes from citizens of the Republic of Bulgaria. DOORNBOS knew his “police facts” to be untrue. 130.From the period of May 31, 1995 to the present the aforesaid misrepresentations and slander appeared repeatedly in hundreds of national newspaper articles, television and radio programs and official documents throughout the Republic of Bulgaria as well as on a number of occasions in parts of Canada and Europe via electronic news services. The aforesaid is best represented and evidenced by a published interview with Georgiev in Continent newspaper, Sofia, Bulgaria, on August 1, 1996.

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131.DOORNBUS knowingly acted to humiliate KAPOUSTIN by publicly accusing him of acts of moral perversion with the real expectation that this would further facilitate the arrest and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN. 132.The DOORNBOS’ caused KAPOUSTIN and his family to suffer pecuniary and nonpecuniary injuries inter alia, from the seizure and destruction of property, loss of income, the extortion of cash, physical torture; permanent injury derived of emotional and psychological trauma and public humiliation and loss of reputation. 133.DOORNBOS, to elicit the cooperation of Bulgarian police and prosecution officials, mislead and misrepresented to them that all or a substantial part of 16 million United States dollars alleged to be criminal proceeds of KAPOUTSIN in Canada is to be shared between Canada and Bulgaria. 134.It is alleged the slander, misrepresentation, misstatements and other misinformation prepared by DOORNBOS as subsequently transmitted from Canada’s embassy at Vienna, Austria and its public release to agencies of a foreign state, Bulgaria, was undertaken to make such information ultimately public. The slanders, misrepresentation, misstatements and manufacture conclusions of DOORNBOS manifest acts which are a breach the rights of KAPOUSTIN and his family under the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act. DOORNBOS failed to comply with the law and procedure incumbent upon them under law. 135.It is alleged the said data provided Bulgaria by DOORNBOS on behalf of the Government of Canada, and the cause of this complaint is submitted to Bulgarian police and prosecution officials in the full knowledge that it was to be made public, and was to be used to secure the arrest and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN, a citizen of Canada. 136.DOORNBOS stated his purpose and intent to Bulgarian and police officials was to have Bulgaria prosecute KAPOUSTIN to aid and facilitate the criminal investigation of one Ivon Shearing and the Kabalarian society. An investigation and subsequent penal proceeding to which the Claimant was neither a party, a witness to nor a subject of any possible future indictment of Shearing. 137.The interactions complained of here and recorded in official documents establish DOORNBOS to be irresponsible and his behaviour unlawful. 138.Subsequent events prove the conduct of DOORNBOS to be the product of a criminal malfeasance designed by DOORNBOS to secure for himself professional prestige and financial gain, at the expense of the honour, integrity and property of KAPOUSTIN. 139.The Complaint before the Commissioner alleges that the arrest, detention and torture of KAPOUSTIN by agencies and instrumentalities of the Republic of Bulgaria is directly on account of the unlawful implementation of the Act and the effecting of its provisions by DOORNBOS. The exchanges and other transactions with Bulgaria when affected under the Act did cause the preparation and dissemination to the mass media of official

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Government of Canada correspondence, reports and evidence which was known by DOORNBOS to be false, misleading, suggestive and intentionally slanderous. DOORNBOS intended his misrepresentations and misstatements to cause and in fact did cause in substantial part the prosecution, arrest, extradition and torture of the KAPOUSTIN by agencies of Bulgaria with whom DOORNBOS and the Government of Canada unlawfully interacted. 140.On account of Government of Canada assurances offered by DOORNBOS to Bulgarian authorities, and due to the Bulgarian belief and the DOORNBOS promise of a financial reward, Bulgaria police and prosecutors did not subject the DOORNBOS representations to any proper legal test as was incumbent upon it. 141.DOORNBOS provided the data and the only confirmation to Bulgarian authorities of his “Canadian police facts and conclusion”. This was all that was needed to secure Bulgarian cooperation in the arrest, prosecution and public humiliation of KAPOUSTIN and the seizure of his property. 142.DOORNBOS knowingly acted to cause Bulgarian agencies to embark upon an official campaign to induce in the minds of the public enmity, hostility, antipathy, rancour, malice, discrimination and bias against KAPOUSTIN with the intent to cause loss of reputation and goodwill. 143.The R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” provided by DOORNBOS is directly responsible for arrest and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN. 144.The R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” provided by DOORNBOS is directly responsible for precipitating both official and public acrimony in Bulgaria towards KAPOUSTIN. In particular the slanderous and libellous assertions of Canadian “police fact” that are directly attributed to the R.C.M.P. (“Canadian authorities”) in the August 1st 1996 public statement of Bulgarian police and prosecutors lead directly to KAPOUSTIN being beaten and tortured by Bulgarian Ministry of Interior police and his continued imprisonment by Bulgarian prosecutors and judges without possibility of bail or transfer. 145.The R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” provided by DOORNBOS as well as statement attributed to him by Bulgarian police and prosecution officials are the substance and provides the content and foundation for all the slanders and libels of KAPOUSTIN in Canada, Bulgaria and internationally. 146.DOORNBOS and the RCMP knowing acted to secure a maliciously prosecution of KAPOUSTIN by the police and prosecution officials of a foreign State, the Republic of Bulgaria. 147.DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P., by conduct and according to official documents issued by them are clearly and directly responsible for the unlawful arrest, extradition, detention, public humiliation, psychological and physical torment, beatings and unlawful conviction of KAPOUSTIN by Bulgarian police and prosecution officials acting on their information.

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148.The DOORNBOS “INFORMATION” makes false and malicious representation against KAPOUSTIN as if they are true and verified Canadian police facts, which they are not. DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. knew their representation to Bulgarian police and prosecution officials to be unverified conjecture at best and are at worst criminally false and the charges levelled against KAPOUSTIN untrue. 149.The sole intended purpose of the “INFORMATION” and the false criminal charges and misrepresentations set out therein is to cause Bulgarian police and prosecution officials to arrest, prosecute and question KAPOUSTIN according to Bulgarian criminal law. The R.C.M.P. seeking to avoid the limitation imposed on it under Canada’s laws and insodoing to aid an R.C.M.P. investigation in Canada by having Bulgarian police and prosecution officials arrest and question KAPOUSTIN.. 150.DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. knew KAPOUSTIN would be held in remand indefinitely, without benefit of habeas corpus or other judicial control of his remand and that he would be confined to a solitary cell. 151.DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. knew that according to international reports on conditions within Bulgaria’s criminal justice system and remand facilities KAPOUSTIN, a Canadian citizen, would be likely subjected to psychological and physical coercion as part of the interrogation procedure. The facts and data sought after by the R.C.M.P. would most probably be obtained only through the torture of KAPOUTSIN. 152.DOORNBOS, to aid of an R.C.M.P. investigation unrelated to KAPOUSTIN, did knowingly with malice and forethought, commit official malfeasances by assisting Bulgarian police and prosecution officials in the public humiliation and defamation of KAPOUSTIN and his family. 153.DOORNBOS is the “Official Canadian Source” providing Bulgarian police and prosecution officials with the slanders and libels appearing and continuing to appear in the Bulgarian and international media. 154.DOORNBOS, in aid of an R.C.M.P. investigation unrelated to KAPOUSTIN, did violate Canada’s Privacy Act, the Access to Information Act and Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 155.DOORNBOS, in aid an R.C.M.P. investigation unrelated to KAPOUSTIN, unlawfully implemented the "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act" as an official of the Government of Canada. 156.DOORNBOS was neither authorized nor legally competent according to the Canadian legislation at the time to affect legal assistance with the Republic of Bulgaria in a criminal matter for the R.C.M.P. or for the benefit of a foreign government or agency, the Republic of Bulgaria.

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SECTION GDiscussion Part 1 Preamble 157.To bring the present case before the Commissioner has proven regrettably difficult and time consuming for someone not fully comprehending the practice of the law. There will come moments during this discussion where it appears the Complainant is stating the obvious, burdening the learned Commissioner with unneeded details, and the foolishness of a layman. However, the Complainant concluded he would be better served to demonstrate to the Commission by what method, on what facts, and according to what legislation, and logic he arrive, rightly or wrongly, at this Complaint and the arguments that follow. Anything less could not possibly serve to adequately convey the personal difficulties in organising what has proved a complex and difficult thesis to express. 158.This Complaint to the Commissioner has been long in coming and comes from a great distance, geographically and philosophically. 159.The Complaint is unusual in that it comes from a citizen of Canada incarcerated abroad and still suffering, after 8 years, physical, psychological and material consequences from the unlawful conducts of a Crown Servant, DOORNBOS. 160.This fact of time, distance and my absence from Canada may cause the Commissioner, like the other agencies and officials of the Government of Canada before her, to not act on my Complaint. The Commissioner continuing the practice of the Government of Canada of being blind and deaf to complaints from citizens of Canada who are prevented by their circumstances from being present in Canada to persist and prevail in their Complaints. 161.However, is it fair? And, is it reasonable to for the Commissioner or the Commission to refuse to hear complaints delayed not by the Complainant but by the malicious nature and long lasting effects of a Crown Servant‘s misconduct outside of Canada and the afflictive nature of imprisonment? That is a moral question for the Commissioner to ponder together with the following issues. 162.The Complainant asks the Commissioner and the Commission to closely examine the painfully long and frustratingly circuitous route followed in bringing the present Complaint. That route has been and remains one fraught with real, and not imaged risks to KAPOUSTIN and those who continue to aid him while imprisoned in the Republic of Bulgaria. 163.The fact that this Complaint is before the Commissioner is itself a minor miracle in the greater scheme of the suffering of KAPOUSTIN while in Bulgaria’s remand facilities and its prisons. 164.The law suits of KAPOUSTIN, his family and others against DOORNBOS and the State of Bulgaria before Canada’s trial courts and the present Complaint represent no mean feat

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for KAPOUSTIN to have made a reality, as opposed to only the dream, of raising such complaints before the Commissioner and Canadian courts of law. 165.For these reasons this KAPOUSTIN and his family are relying on Canadian justice, the Commissioner and Canada’s law courts to not demur on the technicalities of time, form, or style when such complaints are made by a lay citizen of Canada who finds himself abroad, unlawfully deprived of his liberty and any other chance of a fair hearing of the facts and his complaints such as they are. 166.The Commissioner is therefore asked to find in this poor offering the essence of what is right and just. The Commissioner is asked to recognise the inherent practical difficulties confronting a prisoner required to act on his own before the Commission, The Commissioner recalling that confinement and deprivation of liberty are by their very nature limiting and an obstruction. 167.The circumstances now before the Commissioner are exceptional, and imprisonment, sine die, of any individual Canadian in any foreign penal institution removed from his family, home and culture must be, at its very core, a cruel punishment on those Canadian families touched by such circumstances. KAPOUSTIN has suffered 8 full years of such punishment. 168.Application to the Commission by a citizen of Canada incarcerated in a foreign prison presents certain difficulties. Among these time is a principal if not predominate factor. Also, the means and facilities for KAPOUSTIN to bring his complaint from prison are controlled individuals and elements in the Government of Bulgaria, and most probably the Government of Canada, who seek such complaints to remain non-issues, notwithstanding their legal or factual merit and the legal right of KAPOUSTIN to the means and facilities to bring his complaints and to expect a fair hearing on the merits. As a result, there will be times when KAPOUSTIN will plead for the assistance of the Commissioner in having the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada assist in removing unreasonable practical obstacles or negative changes in the present status quo at the Sofia Central Penitentiary that might obstruct the legal rights of KAPOUSTIN in Canada. The Commissioner never forgetting that the State of Bulgaria is a Defendant before a civil court of Canada and Bulgaria’s interests are not served by KAPOUSTIN prevailing before the Commissioner or the courts. SECTION HWhat is Apparent from the Evidence 169.The following is apparent if only we proceed on the documented evidence submitted with this Complaint. Part 1 Outstanding Facts Not Open to Dispute 170.The documented evidence before the Commissioner is part of the trial record of a Bulgaria criminal court and notorious public knowledge established as “official facts” by Bulgarian police and prosecutors interviewed and quoted in the Bulgarian media. 19178560.doc

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171.That DOORNBOS, the R.C.M.P., the Embassy of Canada to Austria and the Government of Canada where all involved in the 1995-1998 indictment, arrest and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN by Bulgarian police and prosecution officials. 172.Records show that DOORNBOS collected of police data and facts in Canada on behalf of Bulgarian police and prosecution officials and later delivered that data in Bulgaria. 173.That correspondences received by KAPOUSTIN and his family from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada suggest that no agency of Government in Canada was aware of the activities of DOORNBOS in Bulgaria. 174.The documents in evidence to this Complaint objectively demonstrates how Crown Servant DOORNBOS aggressively pursued a singular objective on behalf of the Crown and that is to have Bulgaria aid a criminal investigation in Canada by arresting, prosecuting, convicting and imprisoning a citizen of Canada, KAPOUSTIN. 175.It is a fact that DOORNBOS was concerned with the criminal indictment of one Ivon Shearing in Canada, and his indictment of KAPOUSTIN before Bulgarian authorities was to aid the R.C.M.P. investigation, arrest, prosecution and conviction of Shearing. 176.There can be no doubt to any objective observer that DOORNBOS did travel to Sofia, Bulgaria on or about May 15th 1995 and that this meeting was to discuss the criminal prosecution of KAPOUSTIN and his Company LIFECHOICE. 177.That DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. repeatedly insisted to Bulgarian police and prosecution authorities that funds transferred by KAPOUTSIN out of Bulgaria are linked to the alleged criminal activities of one Ivon Shearing and have ended up in Canada. 178.That DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. insisted to Bulgarian police and prosecution authorities that there is a link between the KAPOUSTIN transfers and the criminal proceeds of one Ivon Shearing in Canada. That it could be easily proven by the R.C.M.P. that the “substantial” part of Kabalarian proceeds of crime in Canada are from the “frauds” committed by KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria. It is fact that DOORNBOS stated this in writing. 179.That in the July 7th 1995 R.C.M.P. criminal indictment of KAPOUSTIN and in later faxes, oral communication and at other times, DOORNBOS continuously insisted on information about funds KAPOUSTIN had transferred funds out of Bulgaria to banks in the Caribbean and Canada. DOORNBOS insisted to Bulgarian authorities that the cash transfers by KAPOUSTIN for LIFECHOICE are proceeds of the “frauds” committed by KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria and that DOORNBOS could prove “before a Court” these funds belonged to defrauded Bulgarian citizens. 180.That the numerous R.C.M.P. faxes to Bulgarian police and prosecution officials from May 15th 1995 to August of 1998, the business card of DOORNBOS, his signature on evidence presented to a Bulgarian criminal court and the internal “Operative Reports” of

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Bulgarian officials is irrefutably proof establishing that DOORNBOS had numerous contacts and exchanges of information concerning the “Frauds” of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria. 181.If the Bulgarian language translation of the July 7th 1995 “INFORMATION” is accurate, then there can be no doubt that DOORNBOS, on behalf of the Government of Canada, had requested Bulgarian authorities indict and prosecute KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria on the criminal charges and facts appearing in the indictment for fraud of KAPOUSTIN as found in the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” or on any other possible criminal charge that leads to a prosecution of KAPOUSTIN or “HIS COMPANY LIFECHOICE”. 182.It is a documented fact that on July 17th 1995 Bulgarian authorities agreed to the DOORNBOS request to indict and prosecute KAPOUSTIN and his Company on a charge(s) of misappropriation of public funds by way of fraud as requested by the R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION”. 183.It is a fact that on September 9th 1995 the DOORNBOS “INFORMATION” was submitted to Bulgarian prosecution officials as “Official evidence from Canadian authorities of frauds” committed by Kapoustin in Bulgaria. A question to the Commissioner. Why and how did one Crown Servant and R.C.M.P. officer collect and then provide Bulgarian police and prosecution officials with police R.C.M.P. facts, evidence and police conclusion sufficient to request Bulgarian authorities prosecute KAPOUSTIN for frauds the R.C.M.P. concludes have been committed in Bulgaria? 184.There is no doubts that the November 30th 1995 Bulgarian Prosecutors made a written request for Interpol Sofia to issue an International Arrest Warrant for KAPOUSTIN. There can be no doubt that the International Arrest Warrant as transmitted by telex on February 7th 1996 to police at Frankfurt International Airport is, like the November 30 th 1995 Bulgarian request to Interpol, are for the most part word for word the criminal indictment and “police facts” presented by DOORNBOS in the July 7th 1995 sworn “INFORMATION”. 185.The international arrest warrant for KAPOUSTIN relied if not entirely then at least in substance and pith on the July 7th 1995 R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” and not on Bulgarian police investigative work or conclusions. 186.The available evidence and the numerous contacts between DOORNBOS and Bulgarian Police Investigator S. Georgiev provide more than circumstantial evidence that DOORNBOS is the sole Government of Canada authority in contact with Bulgarian prosecutors and police. DOORNBOS is therefore source of the slanders spoken by Georgiev and reported by him and District Attorney Nestor Nestorov and Prosecutor Mario Stoyanov to the Bulgarian media. 187.This DOORNBOS nexus to the years of slanders and libels appearing in the media against KAPOUSTIN, his family and the Company LIFECHOICE, is established by the particularly injurious remarks and defamations disguised as Canadian police facts and 19178560.doc

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appearing in the August 1st 1996 article published by the Bulgarian newspaper “Continent”. 188.That all the R.C.M.P. indictment against KAPOUSTIN for fraud, misappropriation of public funds, money laundering and as an accomplice of one Ivon Shearing in Bulgaria as appears in the July 7th 1995 “INFORMATION” are proven to be the false and malicious fabrications of DOORNBOS, KAPOUSTIN having been acquitted. Part 2 Malicious Prosecution 189.The facts of the Complaint strongly suggest that the intended purpose of the Crown's July 7th 1995 indictment and its unverified or untrue representations to Bulgarian authorities is formulated not to display the truth but only to provide a cause to initiate criminal proceedings against the KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria. 190.It was the Crown that acted in May and July of 1995 to initiate criminal proceeding against KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria. The July indictment of KAPOUSTIN by the Crown acted as an incitement to Bulgaria's interior police to seek the arrest of KAPOUSTIN and his prosecution in Bulgaria. 191.The facts of the case prove the Crown indictment to be directly responsible for the July 17th 1995 order of the Bulgaria's Ministry of Interior, to ORDER the national police and prosecutors to deprive a citizen of Canada of his liberty. Bulgarian authorities were acting on the Crown request to prosecute KAPOUSTIN. 192.No judicial supervision or other due process of law before a court of competent jurisdiction was involved either by the Crown in Canada or by Bulgarian police or prosecutors in Bulgaria before or after their joint indictment and arrest of KAPOUSTIN. 193.The Crown deliberately, recklessly or negligently failed to adhere to Canadian law in engaging itself in the bringing of criminal charges against a Canadian citizen in Bulgaria on what was known, or should have been known, at the time to servants of the Crown to be untrue and maliciously false representations. 194.The facts of the Complaint show that the Crown failed to observe or otherwise be bound by its constitutional guarantees to a person accused of a crime by Canadian authorities. 195.The Crown violated the Charter guarantees of KAPOUSTIN when having Crown Servant DOORNBOS travel to Sofia, Bulgaria in May 1995, July 1995, December 1995, August 1996, December 1996 and finally in December 1998 where a Crown servant swore out, in the Bulgaria language, an information against KAPUSTIN and delivered with it documents dated and collected by the Attorney General of the Province of British Columbia in the province. 196.The foresaid forms the factual background for KAPOUSTIN to bring a Complaint before the Commissioner and to incorporate in that Complaint the claim of malicious prosecution

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against the Crown to include, inter alia, a deliberate, reckless or negligent failure of the Crown to adhere to Canadian and international law, causing KAPOUSTIN and his family to suffer damages in the Canada, the province of British Columbia resulting from personal injury, including mental distress and physical anxiety. Part 3 Crown Misrepresentations and Undue Influence 197.The Complaint also provides facts before the Commissioner that prove misrepresentation, undue influence, and unconscionability, claiming that the Crown and DOORNBOS had a duty of care to KAPOUSTIN to be responsive to a possible abuse of his Charter protections and human and legal rights arising from a misrepresentation of fact, the undue influence of a Crown Servant’s words and the record of unconscionable conduct of Bulgarian authorities. The failure of the Crown and DOORNBOS to observe its duty of care had made KAPOUSTIN vulnerable to physical, psychological and legal abuses and public humiliation. 198.The Complaint also provides facts that the Crown and DOORNBOS confronted Bulgarian authorities with misrepresentations of police fact and provided an untrue warranty to Bulgarian authorities as to the accuracy of the DOORNBOS “INFORMATION”. DOORBOS then used his position as a Crown Servant and R.C.M.P. official to exert undue influence over Bulgarian police and prosecutors and others under their control and so influence the decision to arrest, prosecute and indict KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria on a charge of misappropriation by fraud. There was no reasonable reason for DOORNBOS to make his untrue and misleadingly false representation of police fact and conclusions to Bulgarian authorities except to exert an undue influence in securing Bulgarian cooperation in the arrest and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN. Part 4 Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Extortion 199.Complaints of attempted extortion in Canada by Bulgarian nationals visiting Canada and over phone lines have been reported by the KAPOUSTIN family to Mr. Gar Pardy, Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 200.DOORNBOS claims of KAPOUSTIN having access to millions of dollars of criminal proceeds deposited in Canadian banks resulted in Bulgarian police and prosecution officials to unlawfully and repeatedly attempt to extort money from the KAPOUSTIN family in Canada with threats of violence against KAPOUSTIN who was isolated in remand. 201.The specific issues of these complaints are brought before the Commissioner in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding and as a fact exiting in aggravation of the Complaint against DOORNBOS. 202.Furthermore, the Crown intentionally did seek to damage KAPOUSTIN and his family’s reputation, and ability to earn an income in Canada or connected to Bulgaria as follows.

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SECTION ICriminal Defamation - Slander and Libel Part 1 The Element of Slander - Offensive and Untrue Words Spoken by a Crown Servant 203.One nexus to Canada required for jurisdiction of the Commissioner and the Commission to hear the KAPOUSTIN Complaint against DOORNBOS is also as framed in the defamation that resulted from a wrongful criminal indictment against KAPOUSTIN brought by the R.C.M.P. in Bulgaria and the slanderous and libellous words that are actionable according to Canadian law. The injurious misrepresentations of fact are made by a Crown Servant in the name of the Government of Canada to Bulgaria authorities and public; 204.The Complaint formed in criminal defamation is in aggravation of that of malicious prosecution and those other complaints and the fact that the governments of Canada and Bulgaria have not apologised to KAPOUSTIN or his family for the defamation and criminal misconduct of a Crown Servant and Bulgaria police and prosecutors in performance of their duties. The continued silence only acts to reaffirm the maliciousness and lack of remorse for the pain and suffering wrongly and unlawfully caused by the Crown to KAPOUSTIN and his family. 205.Prior to March 2000, KAPOUSTIN and his family could not fully understand what words were spoken by DOORNBOS and what had occurred on or about May 15th 1995 in Sofia, Bulgaria. 206.It appears from the facts of this Complaint that on that date the Crown had dispatched its servant, DOORNBOS, to meet secretly with officials from the Interior Ministry (internal secret police) of Bulgaria in the city of Sofia, Bulgaria. 207.What can be evidentially adduced from documents filed with the Commissioner and together with the available extracts from press and wire service reports on KAPOUSTIN is the following. 208.That in May of 1995 the Crown and DOORNBOS made the first, of what proved to be a series, of slanderously false assertions to officials, and agencies, of Bulgaria. 209.The facts show the offensive and actionable words were mostly first spoken on May 15th 1995 by Crown Servant Derek A. DOORNBOS, a diplomatic liaison to Austria and R.C.M.P. Staff Sgt. 210.The offensive and actionable words were spoken by DOORNBOS in connection to performing his official duties for the Crown and the Ministry of the Attorney General of the Canada. 211.The offensive words concerned, inter alia, the religious beliefs of KAPOUSTIN, his moral character and an alleged conviction in British Columbia of KAPOUSTIN on

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multiple counts of sexual perversion and for sexual assault of children and that the business activities of KAPOUSTIN in the Canada and elsewhere as connected to Bulgaria are all criminal in character. 212.Bulgarian authorities repeated the offensive and untrue words of DOORNBOS and took them to mean, and was understood by Bulgarian authorities and the public at large to mean that KAPOUSTIN was a cold blooded sexual predator who violated children, without any sense of morality, and was a detestable human being. 213.The Crown further advised Bulgaria authorities that activities of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria were “in fact” part of organised crime in the province of British Columbia, and the proceeds collected in Bulgaria are to be found in banks of the province known to the Crown. 214.A further element in defamation complaints before the Commissioner court is that DOORNBOS knew his words and the later publication of his words did contain not a morsel of truth and not a measure of public value. 215.What is significant to this Complaint against the Crown is that the actionable words were spoken and written as facts, not allegations or suspicions. 216.The words spoken by DOORNBOS could only have been calculated to destroy the reputation of KAPOUSTIN and his family, and so ruin their personal and business relationship with their clients, and foreclosed to KAPOUSTIN and his family any possibility for their companies in British Columbia, Bulgaria or elsewhere to continue pursuing commercial activities. The public goodwill and popular image of KAPOUSTIN that existed until May 1995 was destroyed by the DOORNBOS words and his maliciously untrue criminal indictment of KAPOUSTIN. 217.The words of the Government of Canada were publicly exploited by government agencies and officials of Bulgaria who widely reproduced the actionable words in the mass media as early as July 8th of 1995, four months prior to any criminal complaints being brought against this Speaker. 218.The most outstanding reproduction and example of the actionable words of the Crown appear in an August 1st 1996 newspaper interview in "Continent", and later again on state owned television and radio. The defendant S. Georgiev, lead prosecution investigator for the defendant Bulgaria, having clearly and in no uncertain terms credited the offensive and actionable words to the Crown. 219.KAPOUSTIN and his family had no way to know KAPOUSTIN had been maliciously prosecuted for fraud by Bulgarian authorities at the request of the Crown and could not know they were being publicly defamed solely due to the spoken and written words of a Crown Servant.

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220.The KAPOUSTIN family was also mislead by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Canada having issued a letter to the KAPOUSTIN family that the R.C.M.P. and Crown was not involved in the indictment and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN by Bulgarian authorities. This assurance proved false. 221.The actual damages from the criminal defamation of KAPOUSTIN had manifested themselves, and the damages only manifested themselves to KAPOUSTIN, when they were finally able to be linked to DOORNBOS acting in Bulgaria. 222.The facts of this Complaint show that KAPOUSTIN presumed that some damage would flow in the ordinary course of events from the mere invasion of his rights as a result of his malicious prosecution for fraud and the accompanying public slander or libel clearly in evidence around him in Bulgaria. 223.However, only when Bulgaria authorities relented in their isolation of KAPOUSTIN was KAPOUSTIN able to learn and show that the words reproduced in the mass media or printed in documents were attributable to a Crown Servant and actionable by KAPOUSTIN alleging and proving special damages in material or temporal loss suffered by him and his family in Canada, either as pecuniary damages or other damages and capable of being estimated in money. Something KAPOUSTIN could only begin to do after obtaining a court order in Bulgaria allowing him access to his interpreter and corporate or other documents under the control of the Bulgaria authorities. 224.The injury and damages suffered by KAPOUSTIN are aggravated by Bulgaria authorities having publicly repeated and published the slanders or libels attributable to a servant of the Crown, DOORNBOS having added his own twist to the actionable words. 225.The facts of the Complaint before the Commissioner raise issues of individual suffering, psychological and physical injuries. The damages and costs to KAPOUSTIN and his family having resulted from their experiencing deep humiliation, public insults and emotional distress. 226.In one form or another the actionable words represent slander and libel and are directly attributable to the Government of Canada as publicly repeated or reproduced by the defendant Bulgaria from July of 1995 to as recently as October 2001. 227.KAPOUSTIN claims his Complaint is actionable against the Crown under the Crown Proceedings Act [RSBC 1996] c. 89. Admittedly, KAPOUSTIN did fail to name the Crown, in "Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of British Columbia" as defendant, when having filed his lawsuit before the Supreme Court of British Columbia under docket No. S004040. KAPOUSTIN instead named the defendant DOORNBOS as personally liable. 228.The foregoing forms a principal element of the Complaint.

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229.The facts of the Complaint before the Commissioner show that on July 7th 1995 the actionable words are, in part, reproduced to writing and attributed to the Government of Canada by Bulgarian police and prosecution officials. Part 2 The Element of Libel - Offensive and Untrue Words Written by the Government of Canada 230.Documentary evidence before the Commissioner provides the first written proof of the offensive words, alleged as libel, as first appearing in writing on July 7th 1995 in the form of a criminal indictment of KAPOUSTIN delivered by the Government of Canada to the Government of Bulgaria. 231.Bulgaria authorities refuse to provide KAPOUSTIN a copy of the original July 7th 1995 Crown indictment of KAPOUSTIN as sent by the Embassy of Canada at Austria. What is available to the Commission is a certified English language translation of a copy obtained from the criminal trial records of the proceeding against KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria. 232.The libel claim turns on the words and their context as set out in the foresaid July 7th 1995 indictment, the “INFORMATION” sworn to by DOORNBOS. 233.In no uncertain terms the Government of Canada had provided police agencies of Bulgaria with what the Crown presented as Canadian police conclusions determined by the R.C.M.P. in Bulgaria and in the province of British Columbia. 234.The libellous Crown indictment specifically identifies KAPOUSTIN as a known criminal to Canadian police authorities. It leaves no room for doubt on the reader’s part as to the guilt of KAPOUSTIN for the criminal act identified in the Crown indictment and his association with a criminal organization in Canada, the Kabalarian Society. 235.There exists an absolute certainty in the words used and their context as conclusions of the Crown. 236.The Crown can be seen to mean, and was understood by agencies of the defendant Bulgaria to mean, by what was written there, that the plaintiffs' companies in British Columbia and in Bulgaria are actively engaged in the commission of crimes on Bulgaria territory. 237.The crimes are described by the Crown as being committed against Bulgarian citizens and therefore actionable in Bulgaria. 238.The libellous letter goes on to say, in no uncertain terms, that the money proceeds of the crimes committed in Bulgaria by this Complainant are being deposited to bank accounts in Canada. 239.The Crown advises the Defendant Bulgaria, in writing, that the Speaker's criminal activities are fronted in the province, and internationally, by a pseudo-religious

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organisation based on the Judaic mystic belief of the Cabbala. Advising the defendant Bulgaria that the activities of the Complainant form a part of a larger on going money laundering operation directed from the province by associates of the plaintiffs. 240.The libellous words had been clearly written from the Crown to the defendant government of Bulgaria and leave little doubt as to their character of accusatory conclusions designed to impute the commission of a criminal offence(s) in Bulgaria as connected to the province. 241.The stated purpose written into the letter was to criminally indict the plaintiffs company, and Speaker, in Bulgaria. The Crown stating, in no uncertain terms, for the defendant Bulgaria to lay the criminal charges of fraud and misappropriation having been identified by the Crown. 242.The Crown further advised the defendant Bulgaria that on its prosecution of this Complainant in Bulgaria a court order could be obtained in the province of British Columbia by the Attorney General of British Columbia to seize the money proceeds identified in provincial banks. According to the Crown a significant part of the Speaker's criminal proceeds are to be found in banks of the province and easily identifiable as the proceeds of crimes committed in Bulgaria. 243. The Crown estimated the amount of criminal proceeds to be around $20,000,000 (million) USD, and could be shared with agencies of the defendant Bulgaria. 244.The Crown directed the defendant Bulgaria, in the strongest terms, to have its agencies undertake every effort to somehow prosecute the Speaker, depriving him, a Canadian citizen, of his liberty while still in Bulgaria. 245.The Crown request was made as an indictment formulated in the province of British Columbia, written at its embassy in Austria and personally delivered by a Crown servant for execution by agency of a foreign power. 246.The facts of the case before the trial court show that the aforesaid July 7th 1995 Crown document and the conclusions and requests its words embody, prove to be the principle reason for the beatings, drugging and other torment the Complainant suffered under the solitary isolation imposed by the defendant Bulgaria from September of 1996 to 1999. Part 3 Reproduction of the Slander and Libel 247.The facts of the case show that on July 8th 1995, there appeared in newspaper, television and radio reports the first in a series of egregious and deliberate assassinations of the character and public image of the plaintiffs' and their company. 248.The public statements of officials of the defendant government of Bulgaria were overt acts designed to be insulting, degrading, and humiliating, having later proved to be false in every particular.

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249.The law suit alleges that the offensive, and insulting publications and television reports appearing through out the period of July 1995 to April 2001 were malicious in the extreme, having falsely suggested that the Speaker, the plaintiffs and their companies’ activities were a public menace and danger. 250.The libellous publications, and television reports, all relied on the oral and written representations of the Crown, and the agencies of the Defendant Bulgaria, and calculated to damage the family of the Speaker, causing them jointly and severally to suffer personal injury and physical harm in the province as a result of their anguish and emotional trauma, at becoming the subject of public ridicule in the British Columbia where the family resided, and in Bulgaria where the family had their investments and assets. What appeared before the public went unexplained by any evidence. 251.Each defendant named in the law suit shared a collective purpose, to engender hatred and contempt of the plaintiffs and to invite others to join in doing the plaintiffs’ personal harm. The overt actions and words of the Crown and defendants DOORNBOS and Bulgaria, having nothing to do with the attainment of truth and the common good. Part 4 Intent and Malice - "Mens Rea" 252.The plaintiffs claim that the facts of the case establish the presence of "Mens Rea", this providing a significant factor in aggravation of the damages claimed, the defendants each having prior knowledge that the words spoken, and later written, first by defendant DOORNBOS and later repeated or reproduced by the defendant Bulgaria, were in every way false, and intended only to promote with certainty a public hatred of the plaintiffs. Injuring the plaintiffs’ reputation, and exposing them, particularly the Speaker, to further contempt and public ridicule and insult. 253. Part 5 Relevant Law 254.This Complaint raises questions, and seeks relief under, inter alia, Canada's Bill or Rights 1960, c. 44, s. 3; 1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 29; 1985, c. 26, s. 105; 1992, c. 1, s. 144(F), the Constitution Act, 1982 (79) enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11, which came into force on April 17, 1982, "Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"; the Canadian Human Rights Act 1976-77, c. 33, s. 1; the Constitutional Question Act [RSBC 1996] c. 68; the Judicial Review Procedures Act [RSBC 1996] c. 241; Crown Liability and Proceedings Act R.S., 1985, c. C-50, s. 1; 1990, c. 8, s. 21. Part 6 Reliance on Canadian Justice 255.KAPOUSTIN, as a Canadian, relies not so much on his own poor abilities, but instead on the historic fact of the fairness of Commission, of Canada's courts and the humanity and compassion of his fellow citizens, the people of Canada.

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Part 7 Interpretation and Factors 256.The constituent elements of the Complaint present factors believed to be sufficient to ask the Commissioner and the Commission to afford as broad an interpretation of Canada’s Charter when applying it to this Complaint. Part 8 Crown Reliance on the Conviction of KAPOUSTIN; fair comment or qualified privilege 257.Any reliance of before the Commissioner by DOORNBOS or the R.C.M.P. on the August 2002 criminal conviction of KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria is questionable in its relevance and groundless, although understandable. 258.The facts of the criminal proceedings and treatment of KAPOUSTIN in a Bulgaria's prison can exist only in aggravation not mitigation of the Complaint against DOORNBOS, this is true due to the judicial fact that a Bulgarian Criminal Court of Appeal acquitted KAPOUSTIN (and his Company LIFECHOICE) of all criminal fraud charges and allegations as found in the R.C.M.P. indictment of July 7 th 1995. KAPOUSTIN was convicted for having lawfully transferred funds belonging to his Company LIFECHOICE to a foreign company and that company is alleged to having failed to repay the transferred amount to the Company LIFECHOICE. THERE IS NO ELEMENT OF FRAUD IN THE CONVICTION of KAPOUSTIN. 259.It would be of significant for the Commissioner to review as an authority the European Court judgement in, inter alia, Lukanov v. Bulgaria, 2-20-1997; Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 10-28-1998; and Nikolova v. Bulgaria, 3-25-1999. Of particular significance is Lukanov v. Bulgaria, here a former Prime Minister of Bulgaria was arrested and indicted on exactly the same form of allegation as KAPOUSTIN. 260.Any untrue, false or injuriously offensive words spoken by a Crown servant, in private or publicly, in the course of his duties in Bulgaria where he represents to others as if fact, although knowing it not be true that, inter alia, KAPOSUTIN involvement and conviction in the sexual molestation of children, his religious beliefs and Jewish faith, and the criminal nature of KAPOUSTIN companies in British Columbia or Bulgaria, all prove to be nothing more than a vicious, deliberately false and calculated verbal attack by a Crown Servant, DOORNBOS on KAPOUSTIN who has no public persona. 261.Such words are actionable against the crown, and there can be no of defence fair comment, qualified privilege or saving exception under an enactment on the part of the Government of Canada. 262.The words spoken by a Crown servant, the defendant DOORNBOS, form the basis for the plaintiffs' allegations against the Government of Canada, among them slander and libel.

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.10

What, If Any, Relevance to the Trial Court Surrounding the Criminal Proceedings

263.A review of the Respondent government's charges and sentence under the criminal law, "lex loci delicti", of Bulgaria are made relevant to the present facts of the case before the trial court only insofar as the character of the accusations and nature of the sentence may affect the processes of a trial court of Canada, and the individual rights of a party under the law of the "lex fori". 264.Of particular significance to the enquiry here are the facts of the case that document the defendant Bulgaria obstructing the Speaker's access to a trial court of the province in pursuit of his claims. 265.The Complainant is asserting that neither the character of criminal charges, or nature of any sentence under the "lex loci delicti" of Bulgaria do not, and cannot, permit the defendant government's agencies to hinder, or otherwise limit the fundamental civil rights of a person deprived of liberty when acting under the "lex fori" of a trial court in Canada. 266.In the alternative, the Defendant Bulgaria having wrongly claimed before the trial court that persons deprived of their liberty are also deprived of other fundament civil rights, i.e. to appear before a civil court to prosecute or defend their legitimate interests and property rights against the defendant Bulgaria. The court is asked to refer to the May 9 th 2001 letter of the defendant Bulgaria [see Vol 1, Tab. No. 9 of the Plaintiffs Factum]. 267.A principal of law relied on by the plaintiff before the trial court holds that a person whose liberty has been deprived continues to retain his or her civil rights as naturally flow from principles found in international law binding on both the "lex loci delicti" of the defendant Bulgaria, and the "lex fori" of the provincial trial court. International law recognising as equal to other citizens the legal rights of a prisoner to access a civil proceeding before any court of a member state, Canada included. 268.The course of the proceedings before the trial court show the Complainant as only asserting his fundamental civil right of access to this, or any, court's processes and jurisdiction. That such right cannot be limited by the defendant Bulgaria, its officials, agencies or instrumentalities, since no such limitation is prescribed in the law of the "lex loci delicti" of Bulgaria. 269.If any such limitation on the rights of the Speaker, or other persons deprived of liberty were to exist as national law, such law would be in conflict with the accepted principles and obligations of international conventions and therefore invalid. 270.Having said the above, then how can the events of the criminal proceedings relevant to the defendant Bulgaria limiting the Speaker's other civil rights? They cannot. 271.The attempts by the defendant Bulgaria to justify the restrictions it has placed on the Complainant are doomed to fail before any court of law in Canada or any international tribunal.

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Part 9 Respondent's Reliance on its Criminal Prosecution of Speaker. 272.The Complainant considers now, as he did in his written pleadings before the trial court, that the facts surrounding his arrest and the related charges are immaterial to the proceedings in Canada except as they might aggravate or alternatively mitigate any damages the plaintiffs suffered in British Columbia. 273.It is nonetheless worthwhile to briefly comment on the history of Speaker's prosecution, arrest and treatment by the Respondent, only in so far as the defendant Bulgaria, in its written pleadings, has undertaken to make these facts material to the present proceedings before the trial court and relies on them to support its argument of immunity. 274.On February 28th 2001 a Ms. Maya Dobreva, Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul ("Dobreva") for the Respondent's embassy in Canada, in sworn written testimony, introduced to the trial court facts of the Defendant Bulgaria's criminal prosecution of the Speaker. 275.The foresaid information was allegedly provided to Dobreva by a third party, a Mr. Dimitar Tonchev, the then Deputy Minister of Justice, Republic of Bulgaria. 276.The statement of Dobreva appears to rely on the defendant Bulgaria's sovereign right to criminally prosecute whom it likes, and relies on the existence of its criminal prosecution of the Complainant as adequate cause to invoke its state immunity and deny jurisdiction to a court of Canada. 277.In her affidavit Ms. Dobreva traversed such immaterial averment as the nature of the criminal charges brought by the state of Bulgaria against the Complainant in 1995, and the participation of the Crown in the prosecution, location and arrest of the Speaker. This has been detailed above. 278.Ms. Dobreva failed to provide any factual particulars as to what information or assistance was provided by the Crown to the defendant Bulgaria. 279.It appears to this Complainant that the controversy raised by Ms. Dobreva over the jurisdiction of a court of Canada is a moot issue if, as Dobreva asserts, the Crown jointly conducted investigative actions in and outside of Canada with the defendant Bulgaria. 280.According to the said Dobreva, both governments participated in the prosecution and arrest of this Speaker, having done so on information, and charges, originating from the Crown in British Columbia. 281.The fact of the Crown having participated in the indictment, arrest and extradition of the plaintiff (Kapoustin) are alone sufficient to bring a part of the plaintiffs' claims within the jurisdiction of a trial court of the province, and to make the defendant Bulgaria a legitimate party to any proceeding before a trial court of the province, notwithstanding its sovereign immunity.

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282.If this Complainant understands the common law, and the principles of international comity, it is not for the Commissioner to make any judgement on the criminal charges raised in the Dobreva statement for the defendant Bulgaria. 283. 284. Part 10What Are the Facts of the Criminal Case The Defendant Bulgaria Relies On? 285.The Speaker, at the risk of being redundant, believes it for the sake of clarity to be worth repeating the facts of the criminal proceedings initiated by the Republic of Bulgaria against the Complainant in the context of the civil proceedings initiated by the plaintiffs in Canada. What follows are fact confirmed by the defendant Bulgaria absent of the following details. 286.On July 7th 1995 Government of Canada, in a letter to the Respondent, provided it with R.C.M.P. conclusions, including a statement of facts allegedly collected in British Columbia, of what the R.C.M.P. concluded was the Speaker's criminal activities in Canada and in Bulgaria. The letter goes on to identified to the Respondent that the R.C.M.P. had concluded that the activities of the Complainant and his "LifeChoice" companies are an international criminal organisation operating in Canada and Europe. The R.C.M.P. concluded that Speaker's activities were criminally qualified under Canadian law as a major fraud and money laundering businesses operating in British Columbia and elsewhere. 287.The foresaid letter made conclusions of a connection between criminal activities in British Columbia to the Speaker's activities and company in Bulgaria. The Government of Canada requests the defendant, the Government of Bulgaria, to prosecute the Complainant and his company on the evidence and conclusions provided in the letter, on doing so to then forward any operative information to the Attorney General of British Columbia. 288.On July 8th 1995, defendant government of Bulgaria officials use the facilities of state owned, or controlled, mass media agencies to publicly distribute the oral, and written, R.C.M.P. conclusions and information on this Speaker's allegedly criminal activities, his charges and his convictions in British Columbia. None of the defendant Bulgaria's public statements and distribution of the information originating from the Crown proved to be true. 289.On July 17th 1995, as a direct result of the conclusions and request provided by the Crown, the defendant Bulgaria instructed its agencies to take legal action against the Speaker, his company and any companies or persons associated to him. The defendant Bulgaria agreed to act on the Crown request to criminally prosecute the Speaker, having ordered the Main Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Bulgaria to bring charges and arrest the Speaker.

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290.The defendant Bulgaria also proceeded to order its scientific and commercial enterprises to terminate all joint commercial activities and contracts with the plaintiffs connected to the Speaker. 291.Commencing on or about July 1995 the Defendant Bulgaria ordered its tax, customs and police agencies, to seize all the plaintiffs’ assets, tangible and intangible, and documents in Bulgaria. The said agencies having placed the plaintiffs’ property under the control of private parties appointed by it. 292.On October 26th 1995 the defendant Bulgaria had its national police services, know as the "National Investigative Service" ("NIS"), seizes the remainder of the plaintiffs’ assets and records in Bulgaria. The Defendant having charged the Complainant of the crime of embezzlement through a "pyramidal fraud", and relying solely on the previously mentioned the July 1995 representations of the Crown. 293. Part 11Complaints to the Government of Canada 294.In affidavits before the trial court members of the Speaker's family allege that throughout the period of the Speaker's 6 years of incarceration they have repeatedly and bitterly complained to the Government of Canada officials that agents of the defendant Bulgaria having breached Canadian criminal law in or connected to British Columbia. 295.Family members allege agents of the defendant Bulgaria made repeated attempts to extort money from family and friends in Canada, either by telephone or through intermediaries visiting Canada. 296.The money sought from the plaintiffs in the province was in exchange for ending the physical and psychological torment of the Speaker. The defendant Bulgaria's police, and prosecution officials, promising the Speaker's safe treatment while in detention, and even possible release on the payment of substantial sums of money. 297.The plaintiffs in British Columbia became deeply distressed and anxious about the Speaker's safety, this caused severe mental, even physical torment to each plaintiff having to endure such attempts at extortion, knowing they could not pay the defendant Bulgaria's agents the amounts of money necessary to end, what they knew to be the cruel treatment of the Speaker. 298.The plaintiffs claim to have maintained a record of each such complaint, including diary entries, dozens of letters and press statements that suggest the beating, and drugging, of the Complainant during his solitary confinement in Bulgaria. 299.This Complainant first complained of his drugging in a small note smuggled to a consular officer, one Jamie Bell, in August of 1997, having publicly complained of his beatings to

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Canadian authorities and the press only after his solitary confinement was ended. The plaintiffs claim the Crown failed to take concrete steps. 300.That plaintiffs allege, as facts in aggravation of the damages they seek, that the beatings and drugging the Complainant endured had a sinister purpose connected to the May and July 1995 demands of the Crown for information on money allegedly in British Columbia banks. 301.During the Speaker's beating, and other interrogations, it became apparent to him that there was an ongoing criminal investigation in British Columbia connected to the Bulgarian prosecution and investigation. These were things that at the time the Complainant knew nothing about and were impossible for him to connect. 302.Only later did it become apparent to the Complainant that he was being repeatedly beaten, deprived of sleep, and apparently drugged, in an effort to force him to disclose the whereabouts of this money required by the Crown in British Columbia. 303.On or about August 1998 the beatings and other cruel punishment suffered by the Complainant abruptly ended. 304.Facts of the case before the trial court show the physical violence, and mental torment, as having ended only a short time after the defendant Bulgaria received a fax from Crown servant, the defendant DOORNBOS, advising that the Crown would close its 1995 criminal investigation in the province. The cause given was the defendant Bulgaria's failure in providing the data first sought after by the Crown in May and July of 1995. 305. Part 12A Question of Law, Not Facts 306.The question before the Commissioner appears more one of law, Charter principles and the accountability of Crown Servants to the Charter and the laws of Canada when acting on behalf of the Crown outside of the territorial limits of Canada. 307.There is also a constitutional question on application of the Charter and projecting the protections of the Charter beyond the territorial limits of Canada. 308.Do the Charter protections extend beyond the borders of Canada and should the Canadian sense of what is right and justice apply to the treatment of Canadian outside of Canada? 309.There seems no reason to dispute the veracity of the Bulgarian copies of R.C.M.P. correspondences; the DOORNBOS signature as it appears on certain official Bulgarian police and court documents or the Bulgarian language translation of the July 7th 1995 “INFORMATION”.

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310.DOORNBOS did what has been alleged as FACT in this Complaint, the question must be as the following. 311.Is everything that DOORNBOS did lawful? 312.With the exception of the Arar case, few other parallels can be found in the Canadian experience or in Canadian case law that can be said to be "on all fours" with the circumstances of the KAPOUSTIN complaints and those made by Mr. Arar to this Commissioner. 313.The Arar case and KAPOUSTIN bring questions before the Commission that are within the ambit and legal context of interpreting Canada’s Charter. 314.The fundamental question to for the Commissioner to posit upon is if the Charter rights and protections of a citizen of Canada extend beyond the territorial limits of Canada and are elemental protections that representatives of the R.C.M.P. are legally bound and accountable to even when acting outside of Canada. 315.In my case and that of Mr. Arar we have evidence of an R.C.M.P. that considers Charter protections extend only to those citizens of Canada still in Canada. Crown Servants, and the R.C.M.P. limit by the Charter only when its officers are acting within the territory and jurisdiction of Canada and its courts. R.C.M.P. interpretation of Charter protections is that they do not apply outside of Canada. 316.It appears from the KAPOUSTIN facts and evidence and that of Mr. Arar that the R.C.M.P. is not of the opinion that the actions of its officers outside of Canada are to be restricted according to Canada’s laws. The rights, freedoms and protections of the Charter do not extend to a citizen of Canada once he or she is beyond Canada’s territorial limits. 317.For years the R.C.M.P. has considers that its’ Officers, like DOORNBOS, are is free to act as they see fit and without consideration of the Charter or the laws of Canada, only so long as there is no breach of those laws in Canada. 318.The factual and circumstantial particulars of this and the Arar complaint now before the Commissioner appear unfamiliar and the issues previously untested by the Commission. There appear few parallels. Part 13Parallels in Canadian Case Law 319.However, some parallels can be drawn from Canadian case law and some conclusion made from these parallels. 320.In some cases before courts of Canada citizens of Canada have asked the Honourable Justices of Canada to consider how their Charter rights, freedoms and protections might be affected outside of Canada.

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321.One examples is the Sowa v. Can. (2000), 143 B.C.A.C. 223 (CA); 235 W.A.C. 223 and Gwynne v. Can. (1998), 103 B.C.A.C. 1 (CA); 169 W.A.C. 1], having as Complainants prisoners petitioning Canada’s courts to protect their fundamental rights by considering how those rights would be abused by and in a foreign state. 322.In Gwynne, supra, the Commissioner will be given valuable insight into the life of a prisoner in an Alabama prison. The physical and psychological experiences described in Gwynne supra are not at all that different from those of KAPOUSTIN. The court was asked by Canadian citizen, Gwynne, to consider his earlier experiences and mistreatment in a foreign prison and that experience and possible future mistreat to be "weighed in terms of the Charter" [see: Gwynne Supra, Goldie, J.A. at §30 323.In Gwynne supra, a court of Canada had to consider foreign law, and to consider Canada's international treaty obligations together with Charter and non-charter issues related to a prisoners fundamental human and civil rights. Among such rights is a right to a meaningful judicial review of a prisoner’s complaints. The Commissioner here is asked to do the much the same as the court did in Gwynne supra, but under somewhat different circumstances and having other objectives. 324.This Complaint asks the Commissioner to consider how and if the rights of a citizen of Canada are violated by the R.C.M.P. when it acts in and contacts with a foreign state holding a citizen of Canada on a request for prosecution, facts and data provided by the R.C.M.P. 325.In Complaint before the Commissioner, unlike Gwynne, the complaints and the petition originate from outside of Canada, and from a prison internationally recognised as being far [see Conditions in Bulgarian Prisons] worse than what Gwynne recalled at §62 of his affidavit in Gwynne supra as a: "….memory… so terrible that I live in constant fear.", Gwynne asking the Court at §63 of his affidavit: "if you have any compassion, not perhaps for me as a person, but for my wife who has waited for twelve years hoping for a small ray of sunshine to come into our lives, if you have any compassion at all, I would ask that you take seriously the inhumanity of my past treatment…". 326.The Commission will find parallels in this Complaint to what Gwynne wrote in his Affidavit. 327.On January 2nd 2001 in affidavit No. 1 of Mr. Robert Kap, the father of KAPOUSTIN, Kap told the British Columbia Supreme Court in docket No. S004040, at §9 of his affidavit that: "…as reported in the daily newspapers in the city of Sofia, Republic of Bulgaria, my son has been beaten and tortured by officials of the Defendant, Republic of Bulgaria and I and the Plaintiff's family exist in a state of constant anxiety and fear for my son… ". 328.This fear and concern was also expressed in the July 1st 2001 affidavit of Mrs. Tracy Coburn Kapoustin, the wife of KAPOUSTIN, Ms. Kapoustin wrote to the British Columbia Supreme Court in docket No. S004040 at §9 to §10: 19178560.doc

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"9. I have and continue to experience deep emotional and physical anxiety over the personal injury caused my son by the Defendant and am in constant anguish over my utter helplessness in the past and at the present moment to end or relieve my son’s sorrow and pain. And the Defendant still persists in acts connected to my son and I in the province that I do verily believe to be unlawful, abusive, unreasonable, cruel, and inhuman. Such acts further aggravating and adding to the personal injury, damages and losses my son and I have already wrongly sustained. "10. That my persistent emotional trauma and unstable health is as a direct result of what I do verily believe to be the utterly unreasonable and abusive conduct of the Defendant and the unlawful and often cruel and inhuman acts that it continues to inflict on myself and my family.

329.The words of the wife and father of KAPOUSTIN, like those of Gwynne before the court, should act to amplify to the Commissioner that justice and humanity remain ideals imperfectly practised in many parts of the world, even in Canada, and the United States. 330.As it can be seen from Gwynne supra, despite all the constitutional protections offered, the ideals of humanity, equality and justice still fail to be fully practised, even in the two most advanced of democracies of the free world. 331.What then can be said for the agencies of a former totalitarian state, the Republic of Bulgaria? Part 14Relevance of the Cited Gwynne Supra 332.It is requested the Commissioner apply to this Complaint the same reasoning, mutatis mutandis, as did the learned Goldie, J.A. in Gwynne supra and the circumstances of complaints brought before him against the responsible Minister. His Lordship applied the following reasoning to the complaints of Gwynne against the Minister when writing at §24: "I conclude the standard of review in this court is one at the high end of deference accorded to tribunals subject to judicial review…[sic]….Canada is a party to a considerable number of these treaties and its interests are often those of a requesting state. See: Operation Dismantle Inc. et al. v. Canada et al. , [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; 59 N.R. 1; 13 C.R.R. 287; 18 D.L.R.(4th) 481; 12 Admin. L.R. 16, at p. 450-454 for a discussion of analogous problems arising out of the conduct of foreign relation." And at §29: "If this matter revealed no other circumstance than service of the unexpired portion of an admittedly harsh sentence, but one imposed by law, and the allegation of procedural unfairness on the part of the Minister, I would not be prepared to conclude he had exercised his discretion in a manner which would permit this court to interfere on either Charter or non- Charter grounds." Again at §30:

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"But the matter does not stop there. Mr. Gwynne's affidavit of his incarceration in Alabama (annexed to my colleague's reasons for judgment) and the supporting materials reveal conditions that were degrading, dangerous and apparently endemic within the prison system of that state. It is the cumulative effect of the combination of the harshness of the sentence and the apparent conditions under which it is to be served, including the prospects of parole which may have been diminished almost to the point of irrelevance by virtue of his escape, that must be weighed in terms of the Charter requirements." [Emphasis Added - Mine]

333.As in Gwynne, the Commissioner is asked to consider the aggravating affects seen in the "supporting materials [that] reveal conditions that were degrading, dangerous and apparently endemic within the prison system” of a foreign state, Bulgaria. 334.The present complaint concerns those prisons under the control of the government of Bulgaria, and the "cumulative effect of the combination of the harshness…and the apparent conditions under which" the Complainant is placed by Bulgaria. 335.The Commissioner is asked by KAPOUSTIN to closely examine the deleterious affects such conditions have on the time needed in bringing the present complaints against DOORNBOS, and the subsequent quality of the actual Complaint itself. 336.More important, the Commissioner is asked to consider the following question. 337.Did the R.C.M.P. and the responsible Ministers under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, chapter M-13.6 (R.S. 1985, c30 (4th supp.)) 1988, c.37 know of the conditions of prisons and of judicial corruption in Bulgaria when allowing the issuing of the July 7th 1995 R.C.M.P. “INFORMATION” and requesting that Bulgarian police and prosecutions officials arrest and criminally indict KAPOUSTIN? 338.Did the R.C.M.P. and the responsible Ministers know that having KAPOUSTIN arrested and remanded to the custody of Bulgarian police was equivalent to the Government of Canada consenting to unlawful and indefinite term of detention under conditions far more despicable than those ever seen by Gwynne and the torturing of a citizen of Canada for information requested by the R.C.M.P.? Harshness, brutality, indifference, oppression and corruption the hallmarks of prisons in the former communist Eastern European countries, among which the defendant Republic of Bulgaria is counted. 339.This is something the R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS knew and should have considered as a consequence of the unlawful official request to Bulgarian authorities that they “prosecute KAPOUSTIN” on the R.C.M.P. indictment of him and the “police facts” sworn to by DOORNBOS in the July 7th 1995 “INFORMATION”. 340.The learned Commissioner is asked to also weight the rights in Canada and under the Charter and laws of a Canadian citizen remanded to a foreign prison and to foreign

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custody due to the R.C.M.P. issuing a criminal indictment requesting the prosecution of a citizen of Canada. 341.The Commissioner is asked to find as a court of Canada found in Gwynne, that there are sufficient factual grounds to grant this Complainant a hearing before the Commission and for fundamentally the same reasons that Gwynne and Arar experienced. 342.However, the circumstances of KAPOUSTIN are unlike Gwynne or Mr. Arar since the circumstance of KAPOUSTIN and his family remain in the present tense having not yet formed a part of his past. 343.As much as the Complainant might wish to have the lawfulness of his arrest, and detention by a foreign State tested by a court of Canada he recognises that to not be possible. Clearly this issue is not open to this or any trial court in Canada to determine. However, it is reasonable to make averment to such facts only in aggravation of those points as legitimately are laid before the trial court. 344.The arrest and continued detention of the Complainant, its reasons, lawful or unlawful are not nor are intended to be points of the plaintiffs’ law suit. Most definitely they are not the object of the intended appeal here. Such facts are substantive only to an understanding of the plaintiffs' full case, and if any, to its merits. 345.Furthermore, the Complainant does not dare to suggest for the Commissioner to extend or otherwise impose Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms beyond its boundaries to that of a foreign State. The Charter issues raised here are limited to those occasions or circumstances where s. 32(1) of the Charter is applicable and s. 24(1) can be invoked by the Complainant. The case law found in recent years shows the Supreme Court of Canada closely examined Charter claims relating to Canadian government actions beyond the boundaries of Canada [see: Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841; 225 N.R. 297; 124 C.C.C.(3d) 129; 158 D.L.R.(4th) 577, Distinguished: R v Terry, (1996) 2 S.C.R. 207; R. v. Harrer, (1995) 3 S.C.R. 562:; referred to: Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); R. v Edwards, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 128;R. v. Belnavis, (1997) 3 S.C.R. 341; R. v. Stillman, (1997) 1 S.C.R. 607; R. v. Dyment, (1988) 2 S.C.R. 417; R. v. Feeney, (1997) 2 S.C.R. 117; Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission) (1990) 1 S.C.R. 425; Comité paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v. Potash, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 406; R. v. Mckinlay Transport Ltd., (1990) 1 S.C.R. 627; R. v. Plant, (1993) 3 S.C.R. 281; R. v. Collins, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 265], its case law appears to strongly suggest that the Charter cannot be applied to acts committed by servants of the Crown on foreign territory with the exception being only if such acts have a direct affect on the Charter or other legal rights and obligation of citizens of Canada who are in Canada. 346.What does the preceding reasoning of the high court mean to case now before the Bar? Apparently the Charter can be applied in respect to all Crown acts outside Canada alleged as directly or vicariously affecting the legal and property rights of the plaintiffs Nicholas, Tatiana, Tracy and Robert as family members of the Complainant who remained in 19178560.doc

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Canada. It also appears from the above cited case law that the Charter applies to all Crown acts directly or vicariously affecting the plaintiffs’ property rights and other civil interests in or connected to Canada. 347.Complaints of these particular constitutional questions are at present not the subject of the appeal. Presently the Complainant is far from asking the Commissioner or any court of Canada to impose its judicial will on the legitimate pursuits of the Crown or a sovereign state or its representatives outside of Canada. Yet having said that, a certain emphasis must be placed on the Appeal Court's interpretation of "legitimate" and "lawful", as these are live issues that concern the activities of a servant of the Crown outside of Canada when, in co-operation with agents of the Defendant Bulgaria, acted to knowingly cause injury and to interfere with the plaintiffs legal rights and property interests in or connected to the province. 348.The Charter, applied retrospectively to acts of the Crown, appears to apply in the case before the trial court.

As to the Crown and Canada 349.The proceedings before the trial court are without doubt complicated by the matrix of facts and international circumstances of a law suit involving, in part, acts of the Crown in, and outside, of Canada. 350.Of significance to the present discussion are the principles found under UDHR Art. 12 and 28, and the Crown's involvement with the defendant Bulgaria in Sofia, Bulgaria as well as in Vancouver, British Columbia. Due to the Crown's direct as well as vicarious involvement with the Defendant Bulgaria it appears that an international obligation exists for the Crown to provide a remedy from "arbitrary interference", and attacks on the "honour and reputation," [see above: "Facts of the Case: Malicious Prosecution; Defamation: Criminal Extortion"] of the Appellant. The attacks are alleged as having been perpetrated by the Defendant Bulgaria at the instance as well as with the assistance of the Crown. 351.The principles of international law as well as Canada's constitution appear to require a remedy to be "fully realised" in the lex fori of the provincial court, notwithstanding the foreign lex loci delicti of the Crown's acts. The court's practice and procedure applying discriminatory standards to the Appellant strongly suggests a bar on judicial redress against the Crown. This property as well as social barrier limiting a distinct groups right to continue or defend in a suit at law against the Crown as well as others will gone for as long as the Lieutenant Governor permits the Court Rules Act to exceptionally prejudice the fundamental rights of the group. The Lieutenant Governor having not recognised imprisonment as "afflictive" in nature omitted to provide a practice and procedure for individual assessment of a prisoner's special needs as well as quantitative supplemental accommodations to address those needs.

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Applying the Charter to Administrative Law or a Quasi-Judicial act 352.The Complainant finds himself, as a lay person, confronted by an intriguing problem as to what exactly should he apply the Charter to? And, does the Charter Apply at all? 353.The rational approach for a lay person begins with a reading of his statutory right to engage the Charter as well as apply for relief. This begins with s. 24(1) of the Charter, and forms a part of previously cited s. 8 of the Constitutional Questions Act [RSBC 1996] c. 68. Section 24(1) of the Charter reading as follows: Charter Section 24(1) provides: "24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. There natural follows a need to find some respected authority that will support the Complainant's suppositions to what the Charter may be applied. For better or worse the Complainant developed his own order of hierarchy. The first of issue to be established having turned on if the Charter could be applied to impugned legislation. The question to be satisfied is if not only is it reasonable to apply the Charter, but is it a part of the practice generally to do so. The Complainant first turned to the explanation by Mr. Peter W. Hogg, in his Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) when discussing where application of the Charter is appropriate, at 34-11 he wrote: "... the limitations on statutory authority which are imposed by the Charter will flow down the chain of statutory authority and apply to regulations, by- laws, orders, decisions, and all other action (whether legislative, administrative or judicial) which depends for its validity on statutory authority."

354.In order of hierarchy, according to the Complainant's reasoning, there is a question of applying the Charter to a common law rule employed under the impugned Legislation. Here the Complainant turned to what case law he had available to him and found the learned Cory J. when writing for the majority in Manning v. Hill (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) 129, discussed the Charter and common law at pp. 152-153: "(2) Section 52: Charter values and the common law "(a) interpretating the common law in light of the values underlying the Charter "(i) Review of the decisions dealing with the issue

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"This court first considered the application of the Charter to the common law in Dolphin Delivery, supra , [1986], 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174]; It was held that, pursuant to s.32( 1) of the Charter, a cause of action could only be based upon the Charter when particular government action was impugned. Therefore, the constitutionality of the common law could be scrutinized in those situations where a case involved government action which was authorized or justified on the basis of a common law rule which allegedly infringed a Charter right." [Emphasis Added - Mine] "However, Dolphin Delivery, supra , also held that the common law could be subjected to Charter scrutiny in the absence of government action. In emphasizing that the common law should develop in a manner consistent with Charter principles, a distinction was drawn between private litigants founding a cause of action on the Charter and judges exercising their inherent jurisdiction to develop the common law. At p.198 this was written: "Where, however, private party "A" sues private party "B" relying on the common law and where no act of government is relied upon to support the action, the Charter will not apply. I should make it clear, however, that this is a distinct issue from the question whether the judiciary ought to apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution . The answer to this question must be in the affirmative . In this sense, then, the Charter is far from irrelevant to private litigants whose disputes fall to be decided at common law." [Emphasis Added - Mine]

355.At pp. 153-154, Cory J. endorses the dicta of Iacobucci J, who writing for the court in R. v. Salituro (1991) 6 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at p.301: "Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since disappeared. None the less, there are significant constraints on the power of the judiciary to change the law. As McLachlin J. indicated in Watkins, supra , in a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the legislature and not the courts which has the major responsibility for law reform; and for any changes to the law which may have complex ramifications, however necessary or desirable such changes may be, they should be left to the legislature. The judiciary should confine itself to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society."

356.At. P.156 Cory J. again referred to the dicta of Iacobucci J. in R. v. Salituro , supra, at p.307: "The courts are the custodians of the common law, and it is their duty to see that the common law reflects the emerging needs and values of our society."

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"Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the courts making those incremental changes which were necessary in order to make the law comply with current societal values. The Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape our democratic society and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts to make such incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary to have it comply with the values enunciated in the Charter. ... "Courts have traditionally been cautious regarding the extent to which they will amend the common law. Similarly, they must not go further than is necessary when taking Charter values into account. Far-reaching changes to the common law must be left to the legislature." ...

358.Then at p.157 Cory J. set out the framework to be used in a Charter analysis of the common law in a private dispute: "It must be remembered that the Charter "challenge" in a case involving private litigants does not allege the violation of a Charter right. It addresses a conflict between principles. Therefore, the balancing must be more flexible than the traditional s.1 analysis undertaken in cases involving governmental action cases. Charter values, framed in general terms, should be weighed against the principles which underlie the common law. The Charter values will then provide the guidelines for any modification to the common law which the court feels is necessary. ... The party who is alleging that the common law is inconsistent with the charter should bear the onus of proving both that the common law fails to comply with charter values and that, when these values are balanced, the common law should be modified. It is up to the party challenging the common law to bear the burden of proving not only that the common law is inconsistent with Charter values but also that its provisions cannot be justified." [Emphasis Added - Mine.]

359.Last in the Complainant's order of hierarchy, as well as the last in the chain of events leading to the intended appeal, are the consequential orders or decisions grounded in the common law rule flowing from s.1 of the impugned Legislation. Here, the practice and procedure of applying a discriminatory standard relies on a common law rule having engaged the coercive power and compulsory over an individual in the nature of an order fixed by a Master or Chambers Judge. Mr. Hogg in his Constitution Law (supra) writes that it is this power of coercion that provides the source for application of the Charter, (p. 34-12):

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"The Charter applies to the exercise of statutory authority regardless of whether the actor is part of the government or is controlled by the government. It is the exertion of a power of compulsion granted by statute that causes the Charter to apply."

360.The learned Cory J. in Manning supra concluded the Charter applied to the common law notwithstanding if s.32 (1) was engaged, here the Complainant believes government action was involved for the following reasons. 361.The nature of the Master's order, its purpose or aim can only be to advance the governmental scheme developed under s.1 of the impugned Legislation for regulating the courts services, and provides a second element of s.32 (1) operating to engage the Charter. The Complainant's reasoning is garnered from a reading of the Supreme Court of Canada in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1997), 151 D.L.R. (4th) 577, there the court decided to broadly apply the Charter under the circumstances of an administrative or quasi-judicial decision or order, mutatis mutandis, not unlike the Master's order and Chamber Judge decision in the case at bar. This is due in large part to the direct, and indirect, public dimension of their roles when carrying out the government's scheme of regulations, regardless of whether the actor is part of the government. 362.In Eldridge supra, the court held the Charter should apply to the decision by a hospital not to supply interpreters to patients who were unable to hear. In writing for the Court, the learned La Forest J. concluded the Charter applied to non-governmental or quasigovernmental agencies if the impugned act is truly "governmental" in nature (p. 608), finding the Charter applied to those acts which implement the governments regulatory scheme. The hospital in question was considered by the court to be carrying out a governmental policy in determining services under the governing medical services legislation and thus was subject to the Charter. 363.On the basis of Eldridge, supra, it appears reasonable to conclude the Charter will apply to any administrative order or quasi-judicial decision by a Master or Chambers Judge undertaken to directly or indirectly advance a governmental regulatory scheme. The scheme here is a discriminatory standard determined as a practice and procedure under the Court Rules Act, the Legislation governing the services, as well as practice and procedure in maintained those services by what appears to be the application of a common law rule. Like the hospital administration in Eldridge, supra, interpreting government policy when determining what services are to be made available to whom, here the Master and Chambers Judge are similarly acting to interpret what courts services are to be made available to whom and under what conditions. To advancement the governments scheme certain sanctions can be and are applied as prohibitions or limitations on how someone may obtain court services. This is judged against presumed group characteristics and services prove conditional on meeting a certain reverse onus. In the case at bar, and unlike Eldridge, supra, the sanctions here on application to indigent persons deprived of liberty abroad prove to be absolute in their affect of depriving a person of one or more fundamental right or liberty.

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364.The available facts under the present case strongly suggest the Order's only apparent benefit to be to the provincial court budget, having only advanced the government scheme for conserving the material and human resources of the provincial courts. The interests of justice do not appear to be served, notwithstanding they significantly affected. This leads, a posteriori to the Complainant's assertion that s. 32(1)(b) of the Charter is engaged, and the Commissioner asked to consider the implications to the practice in general of any administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial act prohibiting or limiting rights otherwise guaranteed to all members of society. 365.It is on the basis of the immediately cited Canadian authorities that the Complainant first arrived at his conclusion the Charter applied not only to the impugned Legislation but to all other interconnected rules or actions undertaken that lead to the breaches of a priori law he has alleged.

Discussion 366.Complainant's principal difficulty, has been and continues to be the unavailability in a Sofia prison of literature and adequate case law on how exactly to interpret the different parts of the problem under the present analysis. Common sense and reason are not always adequate tools in the interpretation of law as well as how it is practised and why. The lay person, or common man if such a term is still allowed, often believes he has certain rights and liberties only to discover that he either does not or does only under certain conditions. It is suspected that this particular difficulty of understanding what ones rights actually as to what one believes they are proved to the father for lady justice to give a very dry birth to professional advocacy. 367.In the present enquiry the difficulties have arise from the only too apparent fact that the impugned Legislation (the Court Rules Act) proves a very broad document giving wide powers to the Lieutenant Governor of the Province in council to create compulsory practice and procedure rules. There is little in the way of negative restrictions as well as positive obligations to directly impugn the Legislation. 368.To bring the present preceding before the Commissioner within the context of a constitutional challenge it was necessary the Complainant turn to the affects of the Legislation through the practice and procedure created, as well as omitted, under it. 369.Some of the rules to regulate practice and procedure are set down as provisions of the SCBC Rules of Court. However, it is clearly impossible for the Rules to determine a practice and procedure provision for each different matrix of fact, law and individual circumstances that court officers must confront each day having to find a nexus to some common provision under the Rules. That nexus in the case at bar was Rule 41(16.5) (b). 370.It then appears that where an exact practice and procedure rule is wanting under the Court Rules Act, Rules of Court, there exists a common law rule to compensate as well as accommodate the purpose or aim of the impugned Legislation. It is the order fixed in a common law rule that provides the starting point for the Complainant's grievances. 19178560.doc

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371.The consequential order leading to the Complainant's grievances has, as previously discussed, a nature of an administrative or quasi-judicial practice and procedure. 372.However, the practice and procedure are ones having engaging the statutory power of compulsion available to a Master or a Chambers Judge without engaging any of the judicial safeguards requiring the reviewer to judicially determine the facts, circumstances or to determine the applicable statutory or common law. 373.What has occurred in the case at bar, and appears to occur in the practice generally or alternative must occur if given the same set of facts and circumstances, is for an individual Complainant or petitioner to be judged solely against presumed group characteristics. There is no accommodation for persons to be assessed according to their own abilities and no accommodation standard for those who cannot meet the minimum physical or financial characteristics of the presumed group. 374.If the foresaid is true, and there is much to suggest that it is, then the Charter applies, and further analysis and argument must now proceed to the other Charter questions. All enquiry now turning on whether an absolute right or liberty having been wrongly withheld or unreasonably restricted - s.7 - or whether or not the prescribed limits on individual rights - s. 15(1) - that form a part of the "practices and procedures" of the Court Rules Act and the "government's objective" of the court's operating cost and speed, are reasonable s. 1 - in a free and democratic society.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ASPECT 375.Particularly significant and poignant are the words of Mitchell J.A for the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal in P.E.I. (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) v. Rankin (1991), 30 M.V.R. (2d) 122 having observed at the end of his reasons for judgment of the Court, at 124: 376."The Charter neither provides constitutional protection for all human activities nor a remedy for every grievance." 377.From this insight the Complainant developed his Charter questions and the direction of his analysis. Is the activity - liberty - of seeking in a suit at law judicial redress for a wrong a liberty provided constitutional protection? Furthermore, is it a citizen’s constitutional right to continue or defend his family's as well as his own property and legal interests in a civil proceeding before a court of law? Are such rights constitutionally prohibited or otherwise restricted in someway on the occurrence of a citizen having lost his property, livelihood and self-determination to the State? Is the Charter as well as the common law insensitive to the hardships and difficulties in Canada of that distinct Canadian minority made up indigent citizens imprisoned abroad? Is the Government of Canada, as represented by the Ministry of the Attorney General, entitled to vacate its otherwise positive constitutional obligation to protect, within the boundaries of Canada, the rights of all Canadian citizens? Notwithstanding that they are indigent and imprisoned abroad. Is the Government of Bulgaria, represented by the Ministry of Justice, entitled to offend Canada as well as its laws and the rights of a Canadian citizen it has deprived of 19178560.doc

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liberty and property? Are the courts of Canada entitled to vacate their otherwise positive constitutional obligation to make an accommodation for those persons who, through no fault of their own, are unable to appear? Notwithstanding that the jurisdiction of the incarceration is outside the province or Canada. Are the principles of judicial economy more sacrosanct than those of the Charter as well as of international law? A principle argument of the Complainant is that speedy and cost effective dispensation of justice is not always a fair and equal application of justice to persons having lost their selfdetermination, livelihood and property. 378.A review of the exact events leading to the Order of the Master as well as the wording of the order itself and the decision of the Chambers Judge are required to provide a factual foundation for the Charter grieves of the Complainant. How the Charter Applies.

379.In the case of an impugned legislative act the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, considered a the two-step approach in determining if legislation offends a Charter right. The approach was followed in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 244-45. First it is necessary to determine whether the activity in question falls within the sphere of conduct that is afforded Charter protection. If so, then to consider whether the purpose or the effect of the impugned legislation is to restrict a freedom enshrined as a right. Charter Interpretation of Statutes.

380.The approach to be taken when interpreting the impugned Legislation was enunciated by Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd Ed. 1983), at p. 87 he writes: "Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament."

381.In Law v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497; 236 N.R. 1; 170 D.L.R. (4th) 1, an analytical framework was developed where a violation of the Charter was alleged. The Complainant has taken the approach in Law, supra, when evaluating his claim under s. 7, that he is denied a right and liberty protected by law, and of discrimination under s. 15(1), that he is treated unfairly, and exceptionally prejudiced on application of the Legislation to him more than others. The court in Law considered it should make and answer three broad inquiries, writing at para. 88: "(A) Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics?"

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"(B) Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated and analogous grounds? and "(C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration?" Charter 15.

382.Returning to the criteria in Law v. Minister, supra. 383.The Complainant has established evidence to prove the answer to (A)(a) in the case at bar, is "YES", the impugned Legislation maintains or at best permits a discriminatory standard to be applied to all persons. The standard, by a reverse onus, indirectly draws a formal distinction on two of the Complainant's personal characteristics, property and his power of self-determination. The facts and common sense prove the answer to (A) (b) to as well be "YES", the impugned Legislation clearly fails or omits taking into account the already afflictive and disadvantaged status of the Complainant as an indigent Canadian citizen deprived of his liberty abroad. Personal characteristics that must imminently result in substantially different treatment than that expected by other Canadians who are able to meet the Legislation's presumed group characteristics. 384.The answer to (B) must as well be "YES", given that for so long as the grounds enumerated in (A) are true, and the reverse onus maintaining the discriminatory standard remains in effect. The Complainant is absolutely prohibited first as a practical matter of his imprisonment and then from affects of the reverse onus, from petitioning the court as well as limited in any future action to continue or defend in the proceeding. 385.As to item (C) in Law, supra, the burden of an impossible reverse onus is an absolute one when having engaged the statutory power of compulsion or coercion. To directly sanction, or indirectly penalise or punish a person for not doing something that they are prevented by the State and others from doing is wrong. The withholding of a fundamental right or liberty in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics must be wrong when derogating from rights or liberties otherwise guaranteed by the Charter as well as principles of international law. 386.The prohibition and limitations placed on the Complainant by the Legislation prove an undeserved sanction, penalty or punishment, having left the Complainant and others to question his worth or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society. It is the opinion of the Complainant that all indigent Canadian citizens deprived of their liberty abroad are nonetheless equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration within

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Canada and by its courts as is any other person. Having an equal right to continue or defends his civil or property rights before the courts, notwithstanding that the impugned Legislation, by omitting a negative restriction in the prohibition or limiting application of a discriminatory standard as well as omitting a positive obligation to provide an accommodation standard after first assessing individual abilities. 387.Whatever the reasons for the affects, they are nonetheless undeniable and prove the Legislation as directly or indirectly acting to withhold from indigent prisoners their equal right to be heard and apply the law to their claims or the equal possibility to derive benefit from the law as well as the judicial review process and procedural fairness when in pursuit of a remedy for their complaints before the trier of the facts. 388. 389.The Complainant places reliance on this two step approach as had been applied in both the cited cases. The Court there was considering the right to freedom of expression (s. 2(b)) but the prescribed method of analysis appears to be of general application and useful to the present enquire into s. 15(1). 390. 391.Following the two step approach of the Supreme Court of Canada found in Irwin, supra, the first question may be formed as follows; Whether the activity of an indigent prisoner in prosecuting his law suit before the courts of law is a civil activity protected under s. 15(1) of the Charter; the second question is whether the purpose or the effect of the Rules (Act) is to restrict that kind of activity. Interpreting the Charter.

392.In considering this question the Complainant relied on the general proposition the Charter is a purposive document, to be granted a "large and liberal interpretation", see: Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 156-57; Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at 766-67, and that the Courts should extend the benefit of Charter rights in a generous and wide manner. Using the words of Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344: "The interpretation should be, as the judgment in Southam emphasizes, a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection."

Does The Charter Apply? 393.S. 7 Rights and Liberties

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394.This argument has evolved rightly or wrongly from an interpretation of relevant federal legislation as well as the principles of international law cited earlier. On the surface of these international commitments of the Federal Government, as well as federal legislation, all persons have what appear to be certain absolute rights and liberties. It is expressly forbidden to directly or indirectly limit or withdraw such rights except as prescribed under statutory law, and then only reasonably. 395. 396.Charter. 397.On reading of limited case law available to the Complainant, it was found the Court of Appeal to be more than slow to strike down administrative law practice and procedure regulations as developed under s. 1 of the Legislation as unreasonable, leaving such determinations to the Lieutenant Governor in Council or the Chief Justice of the SCBC. Having recognised such reticence the second question raised later on is the courts duty to consider whether the impugned Legislation as well as common law rule when applied in certain circumstances, was sensitive to the s. 7 and s. 15(1) Charter rights of incarcerated and indigent citizens, contrasted with the wider mandate conferred by the Charter to that conferred by the provincial Legislation. 398.Section 1 of the Court Rules Act grants broad powers to the Lieutenant Governor in Council powers, sufficiently so that "practice and procedure" under the impugned Legislation can encompass a comprehensive body of regulatory measures governing the administration of the courts and the practice generally in British Columbia. From time to time a Registrar, Master or Chambers Judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia is called on to perform a role under the Legislation that has an administrative or quasijudicial character. That role allows for a discretionary right to apply an administrative or quasi-judicial sanction, penalty or punishment. 399.Of interest to the present enquiry is the occasion of a Master or Chambers Judge making a determination and fixing an order guided by the dominate purpose or aim of an economic and just application of provincial court resources. The Duty Master, taking on an administrative role, i.e., determining what pre-trial application are to be heard, and the means or mode required for its hearing. Such a role appears, if not wholly administrative, then at least not wholly judicial. There is no statutory provision under the Legislation fixing a practice and procedure to be followed for a judicial assessment of a person's abilities as well as a review of any individual circumstances as judged against presumed group characteristics. This apparently left to the common law.

Section 52 Charter Values And The Common Law. 400.The present enquiry into the Complainant's second grievance seeks to develop an argument sufficient to have the Court find a common law practice and quasi-judicial procedure to be of no force and effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The practice in question violating the Charter when it adds a further sanction, penalty, or 19178560.doc

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punishment to an already existing restriction on a citizen's fundamental rights and liberties as imposed under criminal law. It is claimed such a common law practice and procedure is unfair, having unreasonably punished indigent prisoners by further depriving them of rights and liberties that are otherwise absolute and inviolable. 401.The sole issue to be resolved by the Commissioner under this second grievance is whether the combined effects of indigence and a pre-existing criminal sanction - loss of liberty - having in some unfathomable way collectively acted to create a common law offence of absolute liability or strict liability sufficient to engage the application of a sanction, penalty or punishment not found to be found in criminal law or prescribed under another head of law.

In The Case at Bar.

402.What is significant to the case at Bar and this enquiry results from the "particular government action" authorised or justified on the basis of what appears a common law practice and procedure under s.1(2)(b) of the Court Rules Act, Rules of Court Rule 41(16.5)(b). The action engages the statutory power of compulsion or coercion to advance the provincial governments regulatory scheme to bar a citizen (the "Complainant") from any further procedural possibility to pursue his judicial remedy in a suit at law as well as to restrict him from continuing or defending in the proceeding solely until his appearance or that of a legal representative before the court. The Complainant relies on the following words of Cory J. in the cited Manning, supra, should the Honourable Court interpret an order so fixed by a Master or Chambers Judge to not be a government action. Continuing at pp. 152-153: 403.The Commissioner is asked to recall that there is nothing to dispute the fact that the Complainant is physically prevented from appearing before the court as well as his having no financial resources to secure a legal representative. Furthermore, it is incontrovertible fact that the Defendant Bulgaria refuses to conduct, under custody, the Complainant to and from the court as well as it is arguable fact the same defendant having used physical and psychological coercion to deter the Complainant as well as other plaintiffs from continuing or defending in the proceedings. The Complainant, while complaining of the Defendant Bulgaria's conduct as questionable he did not raise a Charter issue to the private law questions at issue in the suit at law against the Defendant foreign State. 404. [16] The germane provisions of the Charter relating to defamation law are set out in s.2(b), which reads: "2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ...

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(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;" ...

405.This administrative or quasi-judicial role of a Duty Master or Chambers Judge under the Lieutenant Governor's "practice and procedure" direction is significant as it forms the basis of the Charter grievance as well as the earlier question on the constitutional validity of the impugned Legislation. However, this enquiry must turn on a determination of what are the absolute rights and liberties of all citizens, notwithstanding the status of the person as one already deprivation of liberty. From there it must proceed beyond the Legislation's statutory purpose and intend. Examining instead the indirect affects that lead to the Complainant's second grievance. 406.The Legislation or alternatively the common law practice surrounding the impugned enactment proves a form of additional sanction, penalty or punishment exiting in addition to as well as in aggravation of that already provided for under criminal law. Jointly and severally both the Legislation and apparently common law practice a further derogation of protected rights and liberties solely on the basis of an existing element of deprived of liberty. The additional sanction, penalty and punishment, solely affects indigent prisoners and is the result of a practice and procedure of a Master or Chambers Judge advancing the provincial governmental regulatory scheme as applied to the just and economic use of its courts' resources. 407.It is both at once intriguing and confusing to the Complainant to find the conspicuous absence of a written statutory provision(s) under the Legislation's regulations and rules as established by the Lieutenant Governor, having allowed the direct or indirect barring of a person from court as well as restricting a person from continuing or defending a proceeding solely due to the observable fact the person cannot meet presumed group characteristics. It then follows that any Charter question is too premised on an apparent common law - quasi-judicial - practice that solely on the basis of property and social status determines an additional sanction, penalty or punishment to be added to that already in place under criminal law. The Charter analysis relevant to the present enquiry are of those rights and liberties considered to be absolute and guaranteed within the ambits of s. 1, s. 7, and s. 15(1) of the Charter that read:. Charter "Section 1 provides: "1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Section 7 provides:

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"7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Section 15(1) provides: "15(1). Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."

408.In the United Kingdom the constitution is unwritten. It can only be found in common law, statute and Professor A.V. Dicey's constitutional conventions. Thus, in a sense, British libel and slander laws stand free from explicit constitutional limitations apart from potential future interpretations pursuant to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights.

Is There A Deprivation Of A Liberty Protected By S. 7 Of The Charter? Submission of the Appellant

409.The appellant submitted that it is not only "absolute rights" or "fundamental liberties" that are protected by s. 7 of the Charter. While recognizing that no liberty or right is absolute, it is asserted that once a person is granted a "general liberty" or right, such as the right to be “heard” by the Court, it becomes a right protected by s. 7 of the Charter. The fact that the "general liberty" is subject to regulation by the Rules of the Court does not reduce the "general liberty" to a mere privilege. 410.Alternatively, it can be argued that being “heard” by a Court of law in a civil proceeding is not a "fundamental liberty", a "general liberty" or any other type of right or liberty protected by s. 7 of the Charter. Permission to be heard or for an incarcerated person to be transported to the Court are regulated activities which are a privilege - not a right or a liberty protected by s. 7 of the Charter. Discussion Frivolous Prisoners.

411.Comparing provisions of s. 7 of the Charter with the provisions of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution Nemetz C.J.B.C., for the majority, at 140 stated: " I adopt, however, those American authorities which do not confine the definition of liberty to mere freedom from bodily restraint. In Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), 347 U.S. 497, Chief Justice Warren said, in part: "`Liberty' under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue and it cannot be restrained except for proper governmental objective" (my emphasis). I am in respectful agreement with this general doctrine.”

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412.Nemetz C.J.B.C. was considering a question that the Complainant finds a lesser “right to liberty” than that of having his having a right to appear before of Canadian Court of Law; "Liberty" under the Charter cannot be taken to create an absolute right to drive. Age, infirmity and other impediments may restrict the granting of drivers' licences. However, once the licence is granted there becomes attached to it the general liberty to employ one's skill and ability - in this case the ability to drive. Accordingly, such liberty constitutes a right under the Charter and a person cannot be deprived of it except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

413.Chief Justice Nemetz concluded that the provisions of s.214 (2) offended the principles of fundamental justice and deprived the appellant of his right or his general liberty under s. 7 of the Charter to drive a motor vehicle. He held that the "road-side suspension law" contained in s. 214(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act was unconstitutional. 414. In R. v. Neale, [1986] 5 W.W.R. 577 (Alta. C.A.), on the Crown's appeal the Alberta Court of Appeal the Court wrote of “liberty” at 584-5: "Liberty" of the person in the Canadian Charter is directed to, or has as its purpose, the protection of persons in a physical sense. The particular function of liberty in the trilogy of life, liberty and security of the person touches on the right of free movement. A person chained in a prison is subject to what the Queen's Bench judge would describe as "actual physical restraint", clearly a deprivation of liberty under s. 7. But equally, a person ordered not to leave his home would be deprived of liberty under s. 7 because the right of free movement is restricted. He is denied the use of his physical ability to move himself. Whether by chains or by threat of legal sanction, the deprivation occurs. Broadened Scope of s. 7 of the Charter

415.[95] The Supreme Court has in some circumstances broadened, the scope of the liberty protected by s. 7, this was noted by McEachern C.J.B.C. in Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 303. At 334 he referred to it as "the emerging, preferred view in the Supreme Court of Canada". 416.[96] In B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 the scope of the liberty protected by s. 7 was considered. That case is significant to the present enquiry in that it also deals with the question of temporary custody. In the present instance at bar the Complainant in order to appear before the trial court has on a number of occasions request the Defendant Bulgaria to place him in temporary custody of Canadian authorities until the end of any trial. In B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 Canadian police placed a child in temporary custody away from the parents who are members of the Jehovah Witness faith. For religious reasons the parents had objected to certain medical procedures being carried out on their infant daughter because the procedures would entail the giving of a blood transfusion. The Ontario Children's Aid Society intervened and obtained an order granting temporary wardship during which medical investigations were conducted. Medical opinion indicated that exploratory surgery was necessary and it would possibly require a blood transfusion. The temporary wardship was extended by Provincial 19178560.doc

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Court order. The exploratory surgery was performed. The child received a blood transfusion. The temporary wardship was terminated and the child was returned to the care of her parents. The parents asserted that their liberty interests under s. 7 were infringed by the actions of the Children's Aid Society. There were three separate reasons for judgment that dealt with the scope of s. 7. 417.[98] Lamer C.J. reiterated the view he had expressed in previous decisions that s. 7 should be restricted to circumstances where the physical liberty of the individual was involved. At 340-41 he stated: “With due respect for the contrary opinion, I am still convinced that the nature of the rights guaranteed by s. 7, taken as a whole, and the close connection established between those rights and the principles of fundamental justice, necessarily mean that this constitutional protection is connected with the physical dimension of the word "liberty", which can be lost through the operation of the legal system. In a majority of cases, therefore, this protection is specific to our criminal or penal justice system and is triggered primarily by the operation of that system. . . . In my view, the principle that must be adopted is that generally speaking s. 7 was not designed to protect even fundamental individual freedoms if those freedoms have no connection with the physical dimension of the concept of "liberty". There are other provisions in the Charter that perform that function.

418.[99] La Forest J., with whom L'Heureux-Dub‚, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. concurred, briefly summarized the general issue raised in the appeal by stating, at 351: This appeal raises the constitutionality of state interference with child-rearing decisions. The appellants are parents who argue that the Ontario Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 66, infringes their right to choose medical treatment for their infant in accordance with the tenets of their faith. They claim that this right is protected under both ss. 7 and 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

419.[100] After reviewing a number of authorities in connection with the scope of s. 7 La Forest J. observed, at 368: 420. The above-cited cases give us an important indication of the meaning of the concept of liberty. On the one hand, liberty does not mean unconstrained freedom; see Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (per Wilson J., at p. 524); R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (per Dickson C.J., at pp. 785-86). Freedom of the individual to do what he or she wishes must, in any organized society, be subjected to numerous constraints for the common good. The state undoubtedly has the right to impose many types of restraints on individual behaviour, and not all limitations will attract Charter scrutiny. On the other hand, liberty does not mean mere freedom from physical restraint. In a free and democratic society, the individual must be left room for personal autonomy to live his or her own life and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance.”

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421. [102] The joint reasons of Iacobucci and Major JJ., with whom Cory J. concurred, focussed more on the liberty interest of the child than the alleged liberty interest of the parents. At 431, Justices Iacobucci and Major stated: 422. We note that La Forest J. holds that "liberty" encompasses the right of parents to have input into the education of their child. In fact, "liberty" may very well permit parents to choose among equally effective types of medical treatment for their children, but we do not find it necessary to determine this question in the instant case. We say this because, assuming without deciding that "liberty" has such a reach, it certainly does not extend to protect the appellants in the case at bar. There is simply no room within s. 7 for parents to override the child's right to life and security of the person. 423. In any event, there is an immense difference between sanctioning some input into a child's education and protecting a parent's right to refuse their children medical treatment that a professional adjudges to be necessary and for which there is no legitimate alternative. The child's right to life must not be so completely subsumed to the parental liberty to make decisions regarding that child: . . . [Emphasis in original] 424. [107] On the basis of these decisions it is apparent to the Speakers that a more expansive scope of the liberty interests protected by s. 7 has been advocated by some members of the Supreme Court. 425.[108] It is recognized that the liberty interests protected by s. 7 may not necessarily be restricted to the physical liberty of the individual. In appropriate circumstances, those interests may embrace liberties that are fundamentally or inherently personal to the individual and go to the root of a person's dignity and independence. 426.[109] The broadened scope of the liberty interest protected by s. 7, as expressed by some of the members of the Supreme Court appears to extend to those matters that are fundamental or inherently the right of an individual before a Court of civil law. In the opinion of the Speaker, the right to be heard and to appear before the Court is a matter that goes to the root of a person's dignity and independence and to hold otherwise would trivialize the liberty sought to be protected by s. 7. In the Speaker’s view, the right or privilege to appear at trial is a liberty protected by s. 7 of the Charter and flows naturally from international law. The Crown and the Defendant State Bulgaria must observe this right of the Speaker. Ergo, the Master and Chambers Judge are required to extend their jurisdiction in such a way as to secure such rights, and any Rules of Court of practice that acts to obstruct such rights must be deemed ultra vires on a division of powers analysis and for it does act to deprive this Complainant and other incarcerated Canadian citizens of a liberty protected by s. 7.. 427.. The intended point on appeal turns on a fair question: Is the affected group exceptionally prejudiced by the impugned enactment? Exception prejudice was enunciated in the cited Smith v. Ontario supra. The extrinsic facts before court below support the Complainant's proposition that there is a reviewable error made in the Duty Master as well as His Lordship Edwards, J. declining to accede to Complainant's petitions 19178560.doc

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that he be permitted to continue or defend only in writing or that the Defendant Bulgaria and the Crown conduct him to and from Court. 428.The Complainant holds that the Duty Master as well as His Lordship Edwards, J. both incorrectly held not to vary the way in which an incarcerated petitioner might comply with an order under Rule 41(16.5)(b). Both determined that "spoken to" prescribed a practice and procedure of maintaining a discriminatory standard solely based on presumed group characteristics of self determination and property. The court unreasonably placing a reverse onus on an indigent person deprive of liberty to appear or retain legal counsel. The Appellant believes application of the Meiorin test to the case before the Commissioner makes his points arguable. 429.Should the Commissioner find the practice and procedure maintaining a reasonable discriminatory standard, the Appellant then argues the alternative; that application of the discriminatory standard to indigent persons deprived of liberty fails the s. 1 Charter test for reasonableness solely due to its exceptionally prejudicial affects. The limits prescribed, if in fact they are such, unreasonably limiting the s. 7, s. 15(1) and s. 24(1) Charter rights of impoverished citizens of Canada when deprived of their liberty. 430.The Appellant makes a further claim of a second reviewable error in the decision of His Lordship Edwards, J. when declining his jurisdiction to accede to hearing an s.24 (1) Charter complaint in writing. .11

The Existing Judicial Consideration of the Rules

431.Concerning the apparent prohibition against complaints being spoken to in writing by an incarcerated party. 432.It was an abrogation of judicial duty for the lower court to not undertake a Charter analysis of the impugned Rule, and it is suggested that the Commissioner should undertake that Charter analysis now. The Complainant is not able to refer the court to any case where legislation initially held valid was later successfully challenged constitutionally, but considers that the case should now be decided on the issues that have been properly joined and argued. 433.The present enquiry should proceed along what appears to be the traditional lines established in case law for any Charter analysis: Does the Charter apply at all? Does the impugned practice and procedure indirectly offend the right of equality - s. 15(1) - on application to an indigent person deprived of his liberty? If so, does the application of the impugned practice and procedure offend beyond such reasonable limits as can be demonstrated to be justified in a free and democratic society - (s. 1)? The Complainant has considered each in turn.

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Does the Charter Apply? To the Court Rules Act.

Argument 434.A Master or Chambers Judge applying his coercive powers of limitation under the Court Rules Act, without making any distinction between a person physically handicapped or, as in the present case at bar a person deprived of his liberty and indigent, and a person physically able and at liberty, does thereby indirectly discriminate and prejudice the legal interests of a distinct and clearly disadvantaged person or group. 435.The outstanding question the Complainant is attempting to resolve here turns on one point and one alone that is the Master's absolute prohibition against complaints to be "spoken to" in any other form except in proprio persona of the petitioner or a lawyer before the court. This is absolute, the impugned enactment providing no provisions for exception of persons deprived of their liberty and having no financial resources to retain an attorney. 436.In the Duty Master's order, or the later decisions rendered and the subject of this enquiry, nowhere is the rationale provided for the applying Rule 41(16.5) to an incarcerated and indigent Complainant. 437.Little more discussion seems necessary to reach a conclusion that the Duty Master, in the case at bar, acted administratively, and not judicially, exercising the statutory powers granted to him under the Supreme Court Act to issue an "order" as a part of his quasijudicial role in administering the courts processes. The "order" apparently is only to enforce this administrative "practice" of the courts, and to require a petitioner present his complaints, in proprio persona, before the court. Apparently, the "procedure" does not require a Master to judicially review the facts or law relied on by the petitioner. That said, another question then arises; did the petitioner have a right to have his complaints judicially reviewed? 438.Availability of Judicial Review 439.To answer this question the Complainant turned to the Judicial Review Procedure Act [RSBC 1996] c. 241: "Definitions

"1 In this Act: "application for judicial review" means an application under section 2; Application for judicial review

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"2 (1) An application for judicial review is an originating application and must be brought by petition. "(2) On an application for judicial review, the court may grant any relief that the Complainant would be entitled to in any one or more of the proceedings for: "(a) relief in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari; "(b) a declaration or injunction, or both, in relation to the exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise, of a statutory power. "Error of law "3 The court's power to set aside a decision because of error of law on the face of the record on an application for relief in the nature of certiorari is extended so that it applies to an application for judicial review in relation to a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power of decision to the extent it is not limited or precluded by the enactment conferring the power of decision. "Power to set aside decision "7 If an Complainant is entitled to a declaration that a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power of decision is unauthorized or otherwise invalid, the court may set aside the decision instead of making a declaration. "Defects in form, technical irregularities "9(1) On application for judicial review of a statutory power of decision, may refuse relief if "(a) the sole ground for relief established is a defect in form or a technical irregularity, and "(b) the court finds no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred. "(2) If the decision has already been made, the court may make an order validating the decision despite the defect, to have effect from a time and on terms the court considers appropriate. "No time limit for complaints "11 An application for judicial review is not barred by passage of time unless "(a) an enactment otherwise provides, and "(b) the court considers that substantial prejudice or hardship will result to any other person affected by reason of delay. "Summary disposition of proceedings

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"13 (1) On the application of a party to a proceeding for a declaration or injunction, the court may direct that any issue about the exercise, refusal to exercise or proposed or purported exercise of a statutory power be disposed of summarily, as if it were an application for judicial review. "(2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the proceeding for a declaration or injunction includes a claim for other relief. "Sufficiency of application "14 An application for judicial review is sufficient if it sets out the ground on which relief is sought and the nature of the relief sought, without specifying by which proceeding referred to in section 2 the claim would have been made before February 1, 1977.

440.The Complainant believes that there existed a statutory duty of care by the Master to judicially review petitions made by a prisoner for any interlocutory order or such other procedural relief or judgment. The Master allowing the prisoner's complaints according to the circumstances of the petitioner, the court finding a reasonable judicial remedy and procedural remedy to the limitations imposed by such circumstances as indigence and the deprivation of liberty. The order, as stated earlier, was unreasonable in that it placed a reverse onus on a petitioner seeking the procedural relief from an "afflictive state", such relief first necessary to having his complaints heard. The Master directing an indigent person retain an attorney to speak to an indigence application is mildly somewhat paradoxical, as it is equally unreasonable to place a reverse onus on a prisoner to find his own way before the court from a penitentiary. The Master had placed no onus on the state agency responsible for these factors and a party to the proceedings. 441.On appeal of the Master's order and request for judicial review, it appears that the principle, if any, procedural grounds for the Chambers Judge to refuse such a review of the Speaker's petition are to be found under s. 9(1) (b) above, the petition as made having failed to show adequate grounds. The purpose of the present application before the Commissioner is to demonstrate the alternative, that the Master's order was unreasonable and therefore substantially wrong and a miscarriage of justice. The petitioning plaintiff/prisoner should have been provided the judicial review requested, notwithstanding technical irregularities or the like. 442.What Standard of Review to be applied to Complaints of "detached" Members of Society; 443.The Complainant alleges the Duty Master failed to observe a proper standard of judicial review when dispensing with the Complainant/Prisoners various interlocutory petitions. This reasoning on the Speaker's part is on valid if review was available to the Complainant as he alleges above. 444.Issues of availability of judicial review, the standing of the Complainant to seek review, and the timeliness of the application are questions of jurisdiction. If judicial review of the

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complaints returned by the Master was available to the Complainant as a plaintiff, then the scope of review and whether the Master erred are questions of law. The standard of review of the ruling of the Chambers Judge is correctness. 445.The Complainant hopes to persuade the Court of Appeal to disagree with the conclusion of His Lordship Edwards, J., finding it to have been an error in judgement to have allowed, as a condition to judicial review hearing, the requirement that an indigent prisoner either appear before the court or hire a lawyer to do so, His Lordship wrongly holding that a Rule 53(6), Rules of Court, application and an s. 24(1) Charter complaint are not open to judicial review under the Rules of Court if persons are unable to appear or retain an attorney solely on account of imprisonment and indigence. 446.The Complainant reasons that a person deprived of liberty makes his or her application for judicial relief as an attempt to speak in a prosopopoeia form to the court. The government does not afford prisoners any other practical possibility. Ergo the legal effect of the Master's order was unreasonable since it asked the impossible, therefore the Chambers Judge judgement was in error, the order and decision denied the Speaker, a prisoner, a Charter guaranteed right to prosecute or obligation to defendant his interests in a law suit before the trial court. 447.It was instructive to the Complainant to read the learned L'Heureux-Dubé, J., in R. v. Power (E.) , [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601; 165 N.R. 241; 117 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 269; 365 A.P.R. 269; 89 C.C.C.(3d) 1, at 15 [C.C.C.], from where it appears that prosecutorial discretion also "is especially ill- suited to judicial review". The finding in Osiowy v. Linn, P.C.J. (1989), 77 Sask.R. 1; 50 C.C.C. (3d) 189 (C.A.), and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that the discretion of the Attorney General to stay a private prosecution is not reviewable "in the absence of some flagrant impropriety on the part of the Crown officers" (per Vancise, J.A., at 191 [C.C.C.]). This case law leads the Complainant to reason that the discretion exercised by the Duty Master under the impugned Rule 41(16.5) (b)) is in many ways analogous to the prosecutorial discretion found in the criminal process, and to be especially ill suited to appellate review. The language under which the Duty Master made his decision required the Master only make a choice between making an order (Rule 41(16.5)(a)) on the application or requiring the application "spoken to" (Rule 41(16.5)(b)) in proprio person of the Complainant. This requirement is applied to all persons at the discretion of the Master. However, equal application does not guarantee equal results on application to all circumstances, and on application to prisoners the effect of application defeats the intent of the legislation, practical limitations of prisoner demand that a prisoner to first prosopopoeia before the court. 448.The Duty Master's order in effect terminated any further possible prosecution or defence of the law suit by the Complainant before the trial court. The Chamber Judge had already made the same determination.

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.12

Judicial Review

449.Availability of Judicial Review is discussed in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re , [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; 221 N.R. 241; 106 O.A.C. 1, at 41 [S.C.R.], Iacobucci, J., speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada, referred with approval to the approach to statutory interpretation enunciated by Driedger in Construction of Statutes (supra), writing for the court: "He recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone" and goes on to cite R. v. Hydro-Quebec , [1997] 1 S.C.R. 213; Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp. , [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411; Verdun v. TorontoDominion Bank , [1996] 3 S.C.R. 550; Friesen v. Canada , [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103. 450.The Supreme Court of Canada in Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioner s of Police and Ontario (Attorney General) , [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311; 23 N.R. 410 and Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board , [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602; 30 N.R. 119, held that judicial review is available with respect to any decision affecting rights, liberties, privileges, or property, irrespective of its classification as an administrative or quasi- judicial function: see Knight v. Board of Education of Indian Head School Division No. 19 , [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653; 106 N.R. 17; 83 Sask.R. 81 and Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; 243 N.R. 22. The Complainant had a right to a judicial review of his complaints conducted according to circumstances of his imprisonment. 451.In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. supra, the learned Iacobucci, J found, as the Complainant is attempting to enunciate here, cannot be interpreted "on the wording of the legislation alone" as found in the rules the Chamber Judge refused the Complainant a judicial review of his appeal from the Master's unreasonable order. In Nicholson supra, and Knight supra, the Supreme Court of Canada held that "judicial review is available with respect to any decision affecting rights, liberties, privileges, or property, irrespective of its classification as an administrative or quasi- judicial function". The Master order and application of the said Rule 41(16.5) (b) to the Complainant was a quasi-judicial decision. It acted to deter, in fact to absolutely deny, a prisoner, this Speaker, from the availability of his right to judicial review of complaints or complaints. .13

Does the Impugned Act (Rules) Offend Section 15(1)?

452.The Speaker, before proceeding to the s. 1 Charter question, as the Honourable Court recall the September 9, 1999, reason released by the Supreme Court of Canada in Public Service Employee Relations Commission (B.C.) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union , [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3; 244 N.R. 145; 127 B.C.A.C. 161; 207 W.A.C. 161 ( MEIORIN). Madam Justice, McLachlin, J. (for the full court), in her reasons did once and for all abolished distinctions between "direct" and "indirect" discrimination. Again on December 16, 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Superintendent of Motor Vehicles (B.C.) v. Council of Human Rights ( B.C.) , [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868; 249 N.R. 45; 131 B.C.A.C. 280; 214 W.A.C. 280 ( Grismer). McLachlin, J. (for an unanimous 7 judge court), enunciate that [at p. 880, quote unverified by the speaker]: 19178560.doc

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"Meiorin announced a unified approach to adjudicating discrimination claims under human rights legislation. The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination has been erased. Employers and others governed by human rights legislation are now required in all cases to accommodate the characteristics of affected groups within their standards, rather than maintaining discriminatory standards supplemented by accommodation for those who cannot meet them. Incorporating accommodation into the standard itself ensures that each person is assessed according to her or his own personal abilities, instead of being judged against presumed group characteristics. Such characteristics are frequently based on bias and historical prejudice and cannot form the basis of reasonably necessary standards. While the Meiorin test was developed in the employment context, it applies to all claims for discrimination under the B.C. Human Rights Code." "Once the plaintiff establishes that the standard is prima facie discriminatory, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the discriminatory standard is a BFOR [a bona fide occupational requirement] or has a bona fide and reasonable justification. In order to establish this justification, the defendant must prove that: "(1) it adopted the standard for a purpose or goal that is rationally connected to the function being performed; "(2) it adopted the standard in good faith, in the belief that it is necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose or goal; and "(3) the standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose or goal, in the sense that the defendant cannot accommodate persons with the characteristics of the claimant without incurring undue hardship." [See also: Entrop et al. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (2000), 137 O.A.C. 15; 50 O.R.(3d) 18 (C.A.).] [Emphasis and [ ] Added - Mine]

453.The present appeal is brought as a case of indirect discrimination affecting a specific group to which the Complainant belongs. It was so argued before the Chambers Judge and is done so again now. The Complainant does not believe that the abolition in MEIORIN of a distinction between direct and indirect discrimination will greatly affect the result of his appeal, however the words and reasons found there give substance to his analysis and arguments. 454.It is for these reasons the Complainant suggests this first factor: Whether the point on appeal is significant both to the litigation before the trial court and to the practice in general can be disposed of by relying on the previously cited Smith v. Ontario (AG) supra. The intended point advances to the Court of Appeal a theory that the Complainant is a member of a small group of incarcerated and impoverished Canadian citizens that are "exceptionally prejudiced", more than any other citizen, in the application of the impugned Rule 41(16.5)(b), Rules of the Court.

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455.Do the Impugned Rules Offend Section 15(1) Beyond the Extent of the Freedom Guaranteed Under Section 1? 456.The next, and penultimate, question that can be applied to the impugned rules and the order appealed, is whether the prohibition imposed, here on a indigent prisoner, can be said to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society such that the offended freedom is beyond Charter guarantee. It appears that the liberal interpretation afforded the Charter on the authorities ensures that most constitutional challenges to legislative prohibitions will be fought on this question -- the s. 1 question. 457.In the Speaker's view on the first question of s. 1 of the Charter, does not include limits beyond those prescribed in law or by the sentencing court. This is substantially defeated in the cases where the fundamental rights of equal justice has been considered in the context of national legislation and international law that prohibits a government agency from limiting a prisoners access to a court of civil or criminal law. If such legislation exists it has been consistently struck down as unconstitutional even though it served to only prohibit an abuse of process or serve the interest of economics and efficiency. However, when such legislation is so broad that it results in distinguishing between those who are and those who are not to access law in the province where the Rules were made such legislation is intrinsically wrong. 458.There is sound reason why the prohibition that complaints only be spoken to in person or through counsel should fall within the sphere of the limits on freedom enshrined in s. 1. Of course, whether, they should be restricted, and the extent to which they should be restricted, arises later in the Charter analysis under s. 1. 459.On the second question to be addressed at this point in the analysis -- neither the purpose nor the effect of the impugned Rules is to prohibit incarcerated and indigents their access to the courts is, in my view, only well well-founded as to the issue the effect and not the purpose. The Complainant considers this line of authority sufficient for him to believe the first question disposed of and what must be addressed in determining whether the impugned Rules offend s.1. of the Charter. 460.Of course the question now arises of whether indigent prisoners should in fact be restricted, and the extent to which they should be restricted, this comes later in the Charter analysis under s. 1. The Speaker's position on this second question is, at this point in the analysis; that the purpose of the impugned Rules is not to prohibit indigent prisoners from the civil activity of prosecuting their law suits to the fullest extent possible under the law; it is the effect however that proves prohibitive. Is the Speaker's position well-founded? 461.The Complainant contends that the reasonable limits imposed by government on incarcerated citizens’ rights are to deprive him or her of their liberty in pursuit of the common purpose of protecting society and providing some remedial social benefit. That the government’s right to limit the Charter right of liberty is not an untrammelled freedom to limit a prisoners other Charter guarantees. Having been deprived of a right to liberty cannot be regarded as granting a freedom to other government agencies to pursue a policy 19178560.doc

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having a result to further limit other rights under law, if it were so, such a freedom would render illusory and wholly ineffective the s. 15(1) Charter rights that are held to be in the public interest. Such a practice by government would ensure that only those citizens remaining at liberty or alternatively having financial resources are considered be equal before the courts of law. 462.The importance of this aspect of the analysis was enunciated by Dickson C.J.C. in Big M Drug Mart, supra, at 331: "In my view, both purpose and effect are relevant in determining constitutionality; either an unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional effect can invalidate legislation. All legislation is animated by an object the legislature intends to achieve. This object is realized through the impact produced by the operation and application of the legislation. Purpose and effect respectively, in the sense of the legislation's object and its ultimate impact, are clearly linked, if not indivisible. Intended and actual effects have often been looked to for guidance in assessing the legislation's object and thus, its validity.

463.At least with respect to the impugned parts of Rule 41, it appears to the Complainant that one intended purpose was to prohibit abuses of the courts resources and to serve justice by requiring certain complaints be brought in proprio person of the Complainant before a Master or Judge and then "spoken to", the impugned part of Rule 41 promulgated as one constituent element in the administrative dispensation of frivolous complaints. The purpose of the impugned Rules is plainly to create a barrier or prohibition to frivolous procedural activity by lay litigants and to limit the courts need to process such complaints. But even if that is not right, the unquestioned effect of Rules 41(16.5) (b) on its application to the indigent prisoner is to prohibit him or her from prosecuting their law suit to the fullest extend provided for in law, this prohibition having no regard, as indicated, to the merits of any such returned application, instead it relies on an appearance presence before the court. Indeed, on application to an indigent prisoner, such a prohibition is virtually absolute in its effect. 464.The view from the Speaker's perspective as a lay litigant and the effected party, is that on any application of the Rules of Court by a Master or Chambers Judge, there should always be adopted a broad purposive approach [see: Interpretation Act c. I-21 R.S., c. I-23 Section 12] to give full effect to the intent of any provision found in the Rules [see, mutatis mutandis: Association of Professional Engineers, Geologists and Geophysicists ( Alta.) v. Interprovincial Pipeline Ltd. (1988), 88 A.R. 395 (C.A.)] and the possible effects of its application. 465.This purposive approach, the Complainant believes, should be employed in the present enquiry on interpreting the intent and the effect of the impugned provision ( Rule 4(16.5)(b)) of the Court Rules Act [RSBC 1996] c. 80, Rules of Court, or alternatively any decision or practice (the Duty Masters Order) grounded on the impugned part of the provision applied. Always bearing in mind the considerations given by the Supreme Court of Canada to any such analysis of intent or effect.

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466.A point on appeal is that the impugned enactment proves an absolute administrative deterrence. It appears, from the case at bar, that this deterrence is the standard practice of a Master or Chambers Judge and indirectly discriminates only against a person deprived his liberty and property. Such person is provided no procedural remedy by the impugned enactment, and is refused the means to prosecute or defend as a party to a law suit before a trial court of Canada. There can be no doubt to the Complainant as to the significance of the point to the proceeding before the trial court. .14

Vagueness

467.Vagueness is an additional factor that influences the Speaker's present inquire into the impugned Rules, a law may be so vague as to be found to be unconstitutional if it "so lacks in precision as to not give sufficient guidance for legal debate", or "does not sufficiently delineate any area of risk, and thus can provide neither fair notice to the citizen nor a limitation of enforcement discretion" as enunciated by Gonthier J. in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 at 639, 643. The Court says at 630: "For the sake of clarity, I would prefer to reserve the term "vagueness" for the most serious degree of vagueness, where a law is so vague as not to constitute a "limit prescribed by law" under s.1." and at 632: "As was said by this Court in Osborne and Butler, the threshold for finding a law vague is relatively high. So far discussion of the content of the notion has evolved around intelligibility." Again at 627 the factors to be considered in determining whether a law is vague: "(a) the need for flexibility and the interpretative role of the courts; "(b) the impossibility of achieving absolute certainty, a standard of intelligibility being more appropriate; and "(c) the possibility that many varying judicial interpretations of a given disposition may exist and perhaps coexist.

468.A further analysis is found in Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031 at 1070, Gonthier J. added a further feature: "Vagueness must be assessed within a larger interpretive context developed through an analysis of considerations such as the purpose, subject matter and nature of the impugned provision, societal values, related legislative provisions, and prior judicial interpretations of the provision.'

469.Vagueness was considered with overbreadth in R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, there the Supreme Court of Canada said at p. 792:

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"Overbreadth and vagueness are different concepts, but are sometimes related in particular cases. As the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Zundel (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 129, at pp.157-58, cited with approval by Gonthier J. in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, supra, the meaning of a law may be unambiguous and thus the law will not be vague; however, it may still be overly broad. Where a law is vague, it may also be overly broad, to the extent that the ambit of its application is difficult to define. Overbreadth and vagueness are related in that both are the result of a lack of sufficient precision by a legislature in the means used to accomplish an objective. In the case of vagueness, the means are not clearly defined. In the case of overbreadth the means are too sweeping in relation to the objective."

470.The Complainant believes the words found in Rule 41(16.5) (b) that "complaints be spoken to" are most certainly and intentionally vague, when applied to the circumstances of an indigent prisoner the words become ambiguous, confusing and "so lacks in precision as to not give sufficient guidance for legal debate” as to the method "complaints be spoken to" by an indigent prisoner. There few such methods are found among the provisions of the impugned Rules as to how an indigent and imprisoned person is to comply with the words. It is this reason the Complainant believes the factors enunciated by Gonthier J. in R., supra, items (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied. At least to this Complainant he can say the impugned part of Rule 41 is "vague" since it puts forth no identifiable or intelligible means of compliance for a prisoner stripped of his self-determination and living in poverty. .15

S. 1 Overbreadth

471.Another argument is overbreadth and this comes down to a concern by the Complainant that at any time a person is deprived of his or her liberty by way of judicial order or sentence, he or she, following the loss their liberty, does not under any provision of the impugned Rules or other enactment retain those procedural possibilities or civil liberties available to other citizens, such as the right to represent oneself in a law suit or to prosecute ones civil claims or complaints before a Master or Judge, the impugned Rules, as law, are so over broad as to omit procedures for indigent prisoners to have a means to comply with that law, and are unable to regain their civil liberties to sue or respond in a law suit or other procedural rights before the court until regaining their liberty or a Master or Chambers Judge reached the opinion in proprio motu that a prisoner is a significant party to his or her own law suit to be order summoned under provision of Rule 40(40), Rules of Court as a witness to the proceedings. 472.At the risk of being redundant this is truth and heart of the present inquiry, prisoners who bring law suits, whether they may or may not have a reasonable claim or possibility for their law suit to succeed before the trier of the facts, are nonetheless absolutely prevented from pursuing or responding to any such claim before the courts, notwithstanding the merits. This process of deterrence of prisoners in prosecuting civil law suits appears to be predicated on the assumption that all "complaints be spoken to" only in the person of the prisoner or a lawyer, otherwise not at all or until such time a Duty Master or Chambers Judge decides otherwise.

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473.Any overbreadth analysis must look at the means in relation to its purpose. Are the methods chosen necessary to achieve a state's objective? Here the Duty Master, and it can be said the "State", pursued a legitimate objective under the impugned Rules. However, its is the State that has allowed the impugned provisions of Rule 41(16.5)(b) to be much to broadly applied to all members of society, far more than what is necessary or even possible to accomplish the objective of the Rules as previously mentioned. This overbreadth affects individuals, even groups, in different ways, and results in the case of indigent prisoners in the principles of fundamental justice being violated because the individual's rights will have been limited for no reason. The effect of overbreadth is that in some complaints the law is arbitrary or, as is the case here, the effect is disproportionate. 474.What is at issue in the enquire here is the balancing of the State interest against that of the individual, see inter alia authorities: Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, per Sopinka J., at pp. 592-95; R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, per La Forest J., at p.298; R. v. Lyons, supra, per La Forest J., at pp. 327-29; R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, at pp. 402-3; Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at pp. 538-39; and Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143, at pp. 151-53. However, where an independent principle of fundamental justice is violated, as the right to natural justice, then the balancing of the interests must take place under s.1 of the Charter, see as authority: Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, at p.517; R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. p.933, at p.977. 475.The Complainant argues in the alternative that if s.1 could not justify such a violation on the basis of the vagueness or overbreadth arguments, it could on the basis of onus. In Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 at 292, Madam Justice Wilson said: "Obviously, where other means present themselves which would achieve the same objective with less intrusion upon entrenched constitutional interests, such means are to be preferred."

476.In Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 889: "[T]here must be a proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the rights and freedoms in question and the objective, and there must be a proportionality between the deleterious and salutary effects of the measures" The Speaker's position that Rule 41(16.5)(b) on application to an indigent prisoner cannot be said to be proportional to its legislative objective, this reasoning comes from applying a negative test. The deleterious effect is that there is a real potential that persons who do not poses their liberty freedom or property are being curtailed simply because of the negative test itself. That is, because they were simply unable, given their lack of resources, their liberty, funds, etc., to discharge the burden that Rule 41(16.5) (b) places upon them. 477.This deleterious effect on the Complainant or any person having the same status obviously far outweighs any benefit that the courts or might society receive. In the

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Speaker's lay opinion a reformulated positive test would, from his perspective as the effected party, could just as successfully achieve the legislative objective. 478.A question to the Court of Appeal might well be the amount of deference it should give to the Rules. The court in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney-General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, appears to say that the deference afforded to the State might vary if the competing interests are between individuals or groups or, the state and an individual as it might be in an ordinary criminal law case were the deference is generally greater [see: R.S. MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 and in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.] 479.Rule 41(16.5) (b) imposes no greater as onus on the effected party except to "speak" to his or her application. The Complainant has recognised this throughout his analysis and argument. What he argues is this seemingly benign requirement of this provision creates the "effect" of a reverse onus on presentation of this requirement to indigent prisoners who are physically (no liberty) or financially disadvantaged, and unable to do more than furnish evidence or information as necessary in writing for a judicial review, and the Master or Chambers Judge should be satisfied with this as the only affordable possibility to the prisoner. The following from R. v. Lyons (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at p. 45, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 is helpful: "It is also clear that the requirements of fundamental justice are not immutable; rather, they vary according to the context in which they are invoked. Thus, certain procedural protections might be constitutionally mandated in one context but not in another." 480.As has been discusses early imprisonment is a distinct and afflictive state. On application of the impugned Rules this distinction imposes a disproportionate burden, obligation or disadvantage that is not imposed upon others. In other words, as the Complainant has claimed previously it is discriminatory. 481.According to the learned Afforest J. that is not the end of the matter. Writing in Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at p. 529: "Not all distinctions resulting in disadvantage to a particular group will constitute discrimination. It would bring the legitimate work of our legislative bodies to a standstill if the courts were to question every distinction that had a disadvantageous effect on an enumerated or analogous group. This would open up a s. 1 inquiry in every case involving a protected group.

482.Further analysis is required, and with respect to an s. 1 inquiry the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 135-39. Rocket, supra, and RJRMacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 ("RJR") provides instructive structured illustrations in the context of violations of freedom of expression, s. 2(b). This structured analysis appears to apply to the present enquire, and provides two central criteria that the Complainant considers he should address: rationality and proportionality.

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483.Before proceeding it is significant to identify what, exactly, is the freedom the impugned Rule is supposed to limit. Here the process is complicated by the fact that no freedom is offended by the impugned part of the Rules except in the rare occasion of its application to a prisoner who happens to be indigent or seeks to act before the court in his or her own behalf. Only then does the offence against the Charter guaranteed freedoms of s. 15(1) manifest itself in the effect of the application. Only then does it become subject to s. 1 analysis. 484.The Complainant found, mutatis mutandis, the conclusion of the Honourable Cromwell, J.A. most illuminating as to the difficulties of prisoners, in R. v. Wood (J.D.) (1999), 180 N.S.R. (2d) 110 (CA); 557 A.P.R. 110, His Lordship of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal said; "The appellant is not represented by counsel and, therefore, it being a prisoner's appeal, it is the responsibility of the Crown to prepare the appeal book for use of the court." In a civil proceeding the Crown, rightly, has no such burden, but instead a duty to avoid legislation so vague or overbroad as to have a deleterious effect only on a prisoners' fundamental rights. 485.This, according to R. v. Oakes supra, requires that first the legislative objective must be rationalized as being sufficiently pressing and substantial to justify the limitation imposed on the freedom impaired. The second raises three questions aimed at a determination of whether the measures chosen are proportional to the objective, those are : 486.

Are the measures rationally connected to the objective;

487.Do the measures impair the freedom in question in the least drastic manner necessary to achieve the objective; and, 488.Do the benefits derived outweigh the inherently deleterious effects of the infringement on the enshrined freedom. 489.The need for a flexible application of the Oakes test in the context of each case, was discusses in RJR, McLachlin J., writing for the majority, described the s.1 inquiry as follows (para. 133): "That the s. 1 analysis takes into account the context in which the particular law is situate should hardly surprise us. The s. 1 inquiry is by its very nature a factspecific inquiry. In determining whether the objective of the law is sufficiently important to be capable of overriding a guaranteed right, the Court must examine the actual objective of the law. In determining proportionality, it must determine the actual connection between the objective and what the law will in fact achieve; the actual degree to which it impairs the right; and whether the actual benefit which the law is calculated to achieve outweighs the actual seriousness of the limitation of the right. In short, s. 1 is an exercise based on the facts of the law at issue and the proof offered of its justification, not on abstractions. [Emphasis Added - Mine]

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490.The Complainant has only his reason and logic to rely on for justification. His constitutional claims are a matter of the evidentiary proof found in the opprobrious effect that the impugned prohibition has affected when the Duty Master applied the impugned rule to a prisoner as he would have any other person. 491.Here the Speaker, as a lay litigant admits his confusion as to what authority bears the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, the extent to which a Charter freedom of a prisoner when offended is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society [see: Oakes, supra. (pp. 136-37)] Thus, in defending the Rules or in the application of the impugned rule to an indigent prisoner, it appears that some authority must come forward and prove that all of the elements of the two criteria repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada as in are satisfied. But, unhappily, this approach to what appears to be the pivotal question here is absent from the order made by the Duty Master or the decision of the Chambers Judge. It seems to the Complainant somewhat superficial to deny so absolutely to a prisoner what are his fundamental civil rights and to do so without benefit of explanation or regard to the legal effect of the order on application of the impugned rules to a person so obviously unable to comply. 492.In RJR, McLachlin J. considered that the degree of deference to be afforded a lawmaking body must depend on the social context in which the rights are limited, with a caution that deferential scrutiny may sometimes mean no scrutiny at all (para. 136): "... care must be taken not to extend the notion of deference too far. Deference must not be carried to the point of relieving the government of the burden which the Charter places upon it of demonstrating that the limits it has imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable. Parliament has its role: to choose the appropriate response to social problems within the limiting framework of the Constitution. But the courts also have a role: to determine, objectively and impartially, whether Parliament's choice falls within the limiting framework of the Constitution. The courts are no more permitted to abdicate their responsibility than is Parliament. To carry judicial deference to the point of accepting Parliament's view simply on the basis that the problem is serious and the solution difficult, would be to diminish the role of the courts in the constitutional process and to weaken the structure of rights upon which our constitution and our nation is founded." [Emphasis Added - Mine]

493.The Speaker's reasoning and interpretation of the language used by the learned McLachlin J. leads him to the conclusion that the same must hold true in respect of the Duty Master or the Chambers Judge on application of the impugned rule to an indigent prisoner. Having carried their judicial deference to the point of abdicating their constitutional duty to the Speaker, both having simply accepted the view that the impugned Rules applied to all classes of person, showing no deference to the evidentiary facts proving circumstances of a physical, property or other afflictive limitations that, like imprisonment, acted as the primary "non-government" prohibition to the realising their s. 15(1) Charter rights.

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494.Thus while the importance of regulations and admirable goals of the impugned Rules should be considered in the s. 1 analysis, McLachlin J. held in RJR it does not relieve either the government or the court of the burden of demonstrating its justification and application. Here the application of the impugned rule to indigent prisoners is clearly an invasive one, and there is nothing to prevent the Commissioner from striking such rule down or its application under such circumstances if necessary. 495.The Complainant has taken a position that his evidence relating to international law and the foreign jurisdiction of the Respondent is irrelevant and therefore admissible in the present enquiry. Given the nature of an s. 1 inquiry the Complainant believes such an analysis must be undertaken as well by the Court of Appeal, the evidence referred to by Complainant is entirely probative of whether the extent to which the impugned Rules infringe on his s. 15(1) Charter rights in Canada before a Canadian court can be said to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Here the conduct of the Respondent Bulgaria, as a "free and democratic society" is evidence that establishes the existence of similar rules and obligations for the Respondent government equal with those of the government and courts of Canada and necessary to maintaining standards of equality under law in both the jurisdictions of Bulgaria and Canada. Any similar practice as that giving rise to this constitutional challenge and appeal have been found to be an impediment to the fair and equal dispensation of justice in the Republic of Bulgaria, with no offsetting public interest benefits. There is no evidentiary reason that the Complainant can advance that would suggest to him that there are for some reason distinguishing considerations justifying the absolute prohibition on an indigent prisoner in himself prosecuting his law suit up to and including any trial before a court of British Columbia or Canada for that matter-- our free and democratic society. 496.Such laws of the forum, "lex fori", while separate are not mutually exclusive to the jurisdiction of either state and it is reasonable for the Speaker, if granted leave to appeal, to apply both of the "lex fori" to of Canada and Bulgaria to the point on appeal. 497.This is not a wholly unreasonable proposition. On first reflection the effect and omission of remedies to prisoners under the impugned Rules appear to run in opposition to the constitutional and international law guarantees afforded prisoners found in both Canadian and Bulgarian legislative acts. 498.The Complainant now returns to the two criteria of rationality and proportionality. .16

Rationality

499.A legislating body will rarely fail to demonstrate that an impugned prohibition has a pressing and substantial object., legislative assemblies even more rarely make rules that are prima facia irrational and devoid of any sound objective. Big M Drug Mart, supra, where the legal imposition of Sunday as a day of rest was abolished as contrary to the spirit of the Charter, appears the significant exception in the case law.

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500.Even if the Complainant as a lay litigant cannot comprehend the full legislative history or legal rational behind the impugned rules, he can at least see that Rule 41(16.5) (b) is rational. This criterion can therefore be immediately disposed of in the affirmative; the rule in question has a rational intent consistent with the Court Rules Act's statutory mandate. The Complainant accepts that the first of the two criteria can be said to be satisfied. 501.However, it is the argument of the Complainant that impugned Rule 41 falls far short of the second of the two criteria on the evidence of its effect when applied to indigent prisoners. It is this which the Court of Appeal is asked by the Complainant as petitioner to decide as a point which is unquestionably of very great importance to the Speaker's litigation before the trial court, and the Complainant believes the practice in general. .17

Proportionality

502.At the outset of my s. 1 inquiry, there were three questions to determining if the measure employed by the Duty Master in application of the impugned part of the Rule is proportional to its objective. A rational connection has been established to its application. The objective is accepted as rational. 503.The question now is whether the measures employed on an indigent prisoner furthered the objective of the Court Rules Act, Rules of Court, in a rational way. Here the Speaker's answer to the Court of Appeal must be a flat and absolute: No. The most laudable of goals can not save an ineffective or irrational attempt to achieve them. Under no circumstances can it be an effective or rational application of a measure of administrative or judicial discretion to apply a Rule having as its' sole rational or objective to require an appearance before the court of a person no longer possessed of his or her self-determination, or to have a person possessed of no property retain an attorney to appear, its application having as its' sole effect only to virtually deny the existence of a prisoners s. 15(1) Charter rights before the courts. There appears to be no public benefit to do so. 504.Can it be said that the second burden is borne by the Duty Master of the court to establish that the measure he employed when applying the impugned part of the Rule to a prisoner was only to achieve its objective in the least intrusive manner that will serve the purpose of the Rules. Again, the Complainant asserts to the Commissioner that the application of the impugned rule by the Duty Master fails to meet the onus it bears. There is adduced no evidence to discharge the Duty Master or the courts constitutional burden and duty to the Speaker. The court is faced with unanswered evidence based on the experiences in the Bulgaria with the Respondent government and the conduct of its agencies. This evidence brought before the trial court appears to the Complainant to be utterly defeating to any possible argument that the purpose of Rule 41 was satisfied in the least intrusive manner. 505.The Complainant had submitted to the trial court that the Rules of Court, and principles of international law, offered far less drastic and more nuanced means of securing the Court Rules Act and the Duty Master's goal far better than a blanket prohibition by him

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against any hearing of all pre-trial application made by an indigent prisoner except in that manner prescribed by the court in virtually all other circumstances. 506.The third and final element the Complainant must analyse as a part of this enquiry is the balancing of the benefit achieved by the application of the impugned Rules against the negative effect of the infringed s. 15(1) Charter freedom on a prisoner. This appears as the least developed and most difficult jurisprudence because it is either non-existent or usually redundant. As McLachlin J. stated in RJR (para. 175): "Having found the requirement of minimum impairment is not satisfied it is unnecessary to proceed to the final stage of the proportionality analysis under s. 1 -- balancing the negative effects of the infringement of the rights against the positive benefits associated with the legislative goal. A finding that the law impairs the right more than required contradicts the assertion that the infringement is proportionate."

507.It is difficult for the Complainant to rationally conclude that the application of impugned part of the Rules to an indigent prisoner is proportional to its objectives. Indeed, on the evidence the Complainant has adduced and the clear effect of such an application on him, it becomes only too apparent that the application of Rule 41(16.5) (b) to a prisoner is not proportional. It follows that the virtually absolute infringement on a prisoners s. 15(1) Charter rights created on application of the impugned part of the Rule cannot be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. 508.Simply put, the court cannot have it both ways. It cannot be heard to say that the interest of justice requires an application be "spoken to" but then not provide the means to the Complainant to be heard. Nor can it say that it is necessary to prohibit the Complainant from being heard in writing so in the one instance to achieve the objective of economic and efficient dispensing of justice to best serve the public interest but in the other fail to consider the legal affect on an s. 24(1) Charter application. 509.There is no evidence that the objective of the Rules could not have been met by permitting the complaints to be spoken to in writing. The court is no stranger to such a practice when it is the only means made available to a party and will see the objectives sought to be realized. It offers a far less drastic and more nuanced means of securing the goals of the Rules than a blanket prohibition against written complaints from virtually all indigent prisoners no matter where he or she is incarcerated. 510.Further, the impugned Rules fails to consider or provide any quantitative as opposed to qualitative means of relief needed by the particular disadvantaged group the Complainant identifies with. No where is there a means provided in the impugned legislation to permit incarcerated and indigent Complainants to participate in civil proceedings, advancing or defending their claims before the trial courts, if need be in writing only. 511.The alternative further "effect" of the impugned legislation is to continue to require all prisoner complaints to the trial courts be "spoken to" in proprio persona of the petitioner

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or legal counsel, a practice clearly prejudicing the s. 15(1) and s.24 (1) Charter rights of persons whose appearance before the court is made physically and materially impossible by the government. A prisoner cannot meaningfully apply under s.24(1) of the Charter, any such petition becoming a meaningless exercise in futility as the court will require, as the Chambers Judge here has done here, that such s. 24(1) complaints as well be "spoken to" in proprio persona of the Complainant or a lawyer. 512.All in all, to this Speaker, it would appear that as long as the impugned parts of the Rules continue to be applied to prisoners without regard to the proof of the circumstances of their imprisonment and poverty then the effect of the impugned Rules will inevitably and always be an unfair and unequal one that derogates from the principles of natural justice the Rules are intended to protect. 513.For analysis of this second factor the Complainant attempted a different approach relying on the fact the order was made on the basis of the impugned part of Rule 41, Rules of Court, and the Court Rules Act [RSBC 1996] c. 80. 514.here is no direction or guidance under the Rules of Court about the conduct of a judicial review in camera on an application where the Complainant has afflictive circumstances (i.e. a prisoner) and is unable to comply with the format of the hearing as practised by the Duty Master under Rule 41(16.5) (b) or the format of review as practices by Chambers Judge under Rule 53(6). There is no express requirement under Rule 53 that Chambers Judge hold a "hearing" as part of his review although one is implied under subrule 53(8) of the Rules. If a Chambers Judge elects to receive further submissions from a Complainant in the context of an informal hearing, there is nothing in the Rules, the purpose of the review, the nature of the issue, or the impact of Chambers Judge's decision on the Complainant that imports a right to be represented by counsel under a Rule 53(6) appeal or to receive reasons for Chambers Judge's decision. At least none that this Complainant can comprehend. 515.The Speaker's position, and the point here, is that the Duty Master did not observe the principles of fairness in the manner in which he conducted the proceedings and arrived at the decision to return all the Speaker's complaints. The task of the Chambers Judge, on appeal was, in the Speaker's opinion, in fact twofold. First, His Lordship Edwards, J. had to determine whether judicial review was available in the circumstances of an indigent prisoner unable to retain counsel when applying for, inter alia, a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter. Second, if it was available, His Lordship had to determine whether the Duty Master had owed a duty of procedural fairness to the Complainant and, if so, the content of that duty and whether it had been observed. 516.The learned L'Heureux-Dubé, J., when she considered the factors appropriate to determining the content of the duty of procedural fairness in a given set of circumstances by an agency or tribunal, could be applied, mutatis mutandis to the present case. At paras. 23 - 27 she referred to the following relevant factors: (i) the nature of the decision; (ii) the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; (iii) the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected; (iv) 19178560.doc

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the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and (v) the choice of procedure made, in this instance by the Duty Master or the court itself, particularly where the statute leaves that choice up to the Master or Chambers Judge. She said at 840-841 [S.C.R.]: "I should note that this list of factors is not exhaustive. These principles all help a court determine whether the procedures that were followed respected the duty of fairness. Other factors may also be important, particularly when considering aspects of the duty of fairness unrelated to participatory rights. The values underlying the duty of procedural fairness relate to the principle that the individual or individuals affected should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, and have decisions affecting their rights, interests or privileges made using a fair, impartial, and open process, appropriate to the statutory, institutional, and social context of the decision."

517.The Speaker's position is one of reasonableness, he is asserting his interests were adversely, and under the circumstances of his imprisonment and poverty unreasonably, impacted by Duty Master's order and the Chamber Judge's decision. The corresponding duty of fairness would, in the Speakers view, not be limited to the informal hearing resulting in the in camera decision to return all the complaints and require an indigent prisoner produce a legal representative before the Master. The afflictive circumstances of the Speaker's imprisonment caused the proceedings to involve what became a final determination by the Duty Master, and then the Chambers judge of the Speakers rights under law, as a prisoner, to prosecute his law suit. It placed the Speaker's family, their reputation, their well being, property or other rights in jeopardy: see, mutatis mutandis, Kane v. Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia , [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105; 31 N.R. 214, at 1113 [S.C.R.]; Hutfield v. Fort Saskatchewan General Hospital District No. 98 (1986), 74 A.R. 180 (Q.B.). 518.To balance his reasoning the Complainant considered Pagliaro v. College of Psychologists (Alta.) (1997), 214 A.R. 217 (Q.B.), where the court there held that no duty of procedural fairness was present in cases where substantive rights, such as employment, are not affected. Going on to say that if there was a duty of fairness it would be at the low end of the spectrum, such that notice of the hearing and the opportunity to be heard would be sufficient to satisfy the duty. Here the proceedings before the Duty Master, and on appeal under Rule 53(6) the Chambers Judge, concerned substantive rights of the person that flow from the principles of international law into the legal framework of Canadian society, such that far more was required than a notice and hearing. In the Speaker's analysis of what is significant is that even this "low end of the spectrum" of duty to fairness, requiring “a notice and hearing" as referred to in Pagliaro supra, and as contemplated in Rule 53(8), was not satisfied by the Chambers Judge. 519.It appears both the Master and the Chambers Judge reached a conclusion that all prisoners who make complaints in civil proceedings will have the possibilities to appear or if unable to appear, then the financial resources necessary to comply with any requirement to retain an attorney. There is no evidentiary justification or case law for either the learned Duty Master or Chambers Judge having reached such a conclusion. 19178560.doc

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520.The Reasonableness of the Affect of the Duty Master's Order; 521.The thesis advanced is that the impugned order is unreasonable under the circumstances of imprisonment and poverty. It is therefore in principally wrong, for having as its immediate affect a quasi-judicial or administrative deterrence to all men and women, as the Speaker, whose self-determination has be taken from them by a person holding them prisoner. The Complainant is effectively excluded from "participatory rights" in his own law suit, the impugned order acts as a barrier denying even the remotest possibility to seek a procedural remedy as relief from the practical difficulties of a prisoner to bring his legitimate claims before the trial court. This effect is solely the result of his status in society as an indigent and imprisoned person. It is appears on the surface to be not an unreasonable proposition to suggest that the impugned order, possibly the Court Rules Act [RSBC 1996] c. 80, Rules of Court, as having unfair effect that limits incarcerated citizens from fully acting out their on right to sue, as well as their right to defendant a when sued. 522.The learned Iacobucci, J., in Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act v. Southam Inc. et al. , [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; 209 N.R. 20, at para. 57 discussed reasonableness and explained the difference between two standards the Complainant is applying to the present review and did so in the following terms: "The difference between 'unreasonable' and 'patently unreasonable' lies in the immediacy or obviousness of the defect. If the defect is apparent on the face of the tribunal's reasons, then the tribunal's decision is patently unreasonable. But if it takes significant searching or testing to find the defect, then the decision is unreasonable but not patently unreasonable."

523.The Complainant argues that the Duty Master's order is not only "unreasonable" but is in fact, according to the analysis of Iacobucci, J., made "patently unreasonable" on the evidence available to the Master of the Speaker's imprisonment and indigence. 524.As a statutory delegate of authority, the Master had a duty to act reasonably and the failure of His Lordship, when issuing an order that neither accept to consider relevant factors of the plaintiff's personal circumstances amounts to an unreasonable decision [see mutatis mutandis: Oakwood Development Ltd. v. St. François Xavier (Rural Municipality), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 164; 61 N.R. 321; 36 Man.R (2d) 215; [1985] 6 W.W.R. 147; 18 Admin. L.R. 59, Madam Justice Wilson said at p. 69 that "the failure of an administrative decision-maker to take into account a highly relevant consideration is just as erroneous as the improper importation of an extraneous consideration", and further citing as authority Lord Denning in Baldwin & Francis Ltd. v. Patents Appeal Tribunal , [1959] 2 All E.R. 433, at 447 (H.L.), where he said that "if a tribunal ... fails to take into account a vital consideration which it ought to have taken into account, then its decision may be quashed on certiorari and a mandamus issued for it to hear the case afresh".] 525.Also see, mutatis mutandis Service Employees' International Union, Local 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses' Association et al. , [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382; 41 D.L.R.(3d) 6, Dickson, J. (as he then was), said at pp. 11-12:

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"A tribunal may, on the one hand, have jurisdiction in the narrow sense of authority to enter upon an inquiry but, in the course of that inquiry, do something which takes the exercise of its powers outside the protection of the privative or preclusive clause. Examples of this type of error would include acting in bad faith ... [and] failing to take relevant factors into account."

526.In Danson v. Labour Relations Board (Alta.), Alberta Union of Provincial Employees, Booth and Palmateer (1983), 47 A.R. 274; 27 Alta. L.R.(2d) 338 (Q.B.), Wachowich, J., adopts the above quotation and adds at p. 343: " ...the failure of a decision-making body to consider relevant factors can be 'patently unreasonable'." As further authorities see: Hawco, J., in Witral Holding Ltd. v. Assessment Appeal Board (Alta.) et al. (1996), 189 A.R. 233, at 238 (Q.B.), finding that "[t]he failure of the Board in this case to take the evidence above referred to into account is also sufficient, in my respectful opinion, to grant the Complainant's order." Rooke, J., also agreed in Foothills Provincial General Hospital v. United Nurses of Alberta, Local 115 et al. (1993), 140 A.R. 321, at 330 and 339-340 (Q.B.), as did Fraser, J., in Seneviratne v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local No. 583 et al. (1992), 130 A.R. 241, at 246 (Q.B.). 527.The Complainant can certainly sympathise with the frustration the Duty Master or any judicial officer must feel in the face of complaints made by lay litigants. To be required, in camera, to review and rule on all such complaints having once been filed with the Registrar is admittedly an inefficient use of time for a Master or Chambers Judge, inevitably leading to delays in the hearing of complaints having greater qualitative merit. The Master's order to have such complaints "spoken to" by the Complainant as Complainant is on the surface a reasonable one. This was discussed earlier. 528.However, this type of judicial discretion is of the technical, non-substantial type which the Complainant argues is outside the concept of the Court Rules Act and intent of the Rules to limit wasteful procedures. It fails to deal with complaints on their merits and becomes clearly unreasonable because of the practical inability of any indigent prisoner to bring his complaints before the Master and "spoken to"; even a motion under 24(1) of the Charter is as a result made impossible. In such cases it becomes inevitable, where imprisonment acts as a physical deterrent, that such an order of the Master will infringe a basic legal right. 529.There was a burden on the Complainant as the Complainant/Prisoner to adduce evidence before the Master to support his motions and requests for procedural relief, he met that burden. There was adequate evidence put before the Master to allow him, acting judicially, to come to a conclusion that any order requiring an indigent prisoner to appear before the Master or hire an attorney had to be a "patently unreasonable" one. 530.The Duty Master was inflexible, His Lordship exercise of a statutory discretion and as a matter of law he may not fetter the exercise of that discretion by the adoption of an inflexible policy, see: Lloyd v. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles (B.C.) (1971), 20 D.L.R.(3d) 181 (B.C.C.A.), Veysey v. Correctional Service of Canada (1990), 109 N.R. 300; 43 Admin. L.R. 316 (F.C.A.), Kupczak v. Alberta et al. (1993), 146 A.R. 103; 13 Alta

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L.R. (3d) 284 (Q.B.) and Apotex Inc. v. Ontario (Minister of Health) et al. (1995), 77 O.A.C. 360; 30 Admin. L.R. (2d) 259 (Div. Ct.). The Complainant does not advance a thesis that the adoption of a general policy that "complaints be spoken to" in proprio persona of the Complainant or his lawyer equates with the adoption of an inflexible policy, only that it is essential is that each case be considered individually on its own merits. The case presently before the Court of Appeal is demonstrative or an "inflexible" as opposed to "general" policy. 531.Duty of Procedural Fairness 532.Although called an "appeal from Master", the right conferred on the Complainant by under Rule 53(6) is no more than a right to have the administrative or quasi-judicial decisions of the Duty Master under Rule 41(16.5)(b) reviewed by a Chambers Judge. It is, in the Speaker's view, simply an extension of the administrative or quasi-judicial processes of the court. In such a case the Rules do not expressly or impliedly require a formal or even an informal hearing. A Complainant who elects to seek a judge's review of such a decision by the Duty Master is apparently not permitted a judicial review or to submit additional written or oral material by way of written explanation or elaboration of his appeal. It proves, from the Chambers Judge's decision in the case before the bar, that an indigent prisoner as Complainant is not entitled at this stage to seek any alternative procedural relief in bringing his motions, he is required to either bring his complaints for relief before the court or is to be represented by counsel or is subject to a general stay on all his motions until he appears before a Master or Judge in order to substantiate the complaints or complaint. Nor is a Complainant , here the Speaker, entitled to reasons for the Chambers Judge decision to confirm the determination of the Duty Master. 533.What was before the Chambers Judge was an application for judicial review under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms founded upon an alleged infringement by application of Rule 41(16.5) (b) to an indigent prisoner by the Duty Master Crown of the right of the Complainant under the Charter, inter alia to make full answer and defence on a Rule 14, Rules of Court motion filed by the Respondent Bulgaria. 534.In Knight , supra, L'Heureux-Dubé, J., observed at 682 [S.C.R.] that the concept of the duty of procedural fairness there was discussed in the context to be followed by a tribunal. The finding was that such duty is variable and its content is to be determined "by reference to all the circumstances under which the tribunal operates". She elaborated in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, there the parties had found that a duty of procedural fairness applied to the proceedings leading to the impugned decision. She said at 837 [S.C.R.]: " The existence of a duty of fairness, however, does not determine what requirements will be applicable in a given set of circumstances. As I wrote in Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19 ... at p. 682, 'the concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable and its content is to be decided in the

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specific context of each case'. All of the circumstances must be considered in order to determine the content of the duty of procedural fairness ... " Although the duty of fairness is flexible and variable, and depends on an appreciation of the particular statute and the rights affected, it is helpful to review the criteria that should be used in determining what procedural rights the duty of fairness requires in a given set of circumstances. I emphasize that underlying all these factors is the notion that the purpose of the participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision- maker." [Emphasis Added - Mine]

535.Key to the Speaker's points on appeal is the principle enunciated in Knight , supra, by the learned L'Heureux-Dubé, J., that the duty to fairness must be "flexible and variable", appreciating the given set of circumstances, in the case at bar the relevant afflictive circumstances are imprisonment and poverty, the particular "rights affected" are the prisoner's' "participatory rights" to "put forward their views and evidence fully and then considered" by the Duty Master or on appeal the Chambers Judge. The point on appeal is that the Speaker's "participatory rights" are unreasonably limited by the impugned order and act. 536.As additional grounds for his appeal the Complainant asserts that there existed a constitutional duty of the learned Chambers Judge to at least review and apply the facts of the case to his Charter complaints. If the facts merited the complaints then His Lordship had a duty to exercise the court's jurisdiction and secure for the Complainant his Charter rights and those guarantees provided in international law. The comity of nations not withstanding a Charter or international law challenge. 537.In not doing so the Chambers Judge in the trial court erred in principle in the exercise of his discretion to refuse the courts' inherent jurisdiction to allow an incarcerated citizen to apply to the court in the only medium left to him or her. The Speaker's circumstances as a prisoner permitted him only one means of access to the court and of communicating his complaints to the Chambers Judge. All other avenues to apply under s. 24(1) of the Charter for an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances were closed to the Complainant by the Respondent. 538.The Complainant respectfully advances the theory that questions raised are substantial to the practice of law generally. The controversies arises over the lower courts' apparent failure not only in the case at Bar, but generally to refuse to secure or to allow for the practical means necessary to incarcerated Canadian citizens to (1) pursue their legitimate civil claims and (2) to apply under s. 24(1) Charter by the only medium left open to them by the state. This refusal to allow citizens to prosecute their civil complaints or apply

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under s. 24(1) of the Charter appears to be solely because of their status as impoverished prisoners. 539.The impugned order's effect derogated from the rights of the Speaker, it invokes an s. 15(1) Charter question in that the unintended effect of the rule or enactment is to indirectly and unintentionally discriminate against the equal rights of a small group of citizens to: (1) access the courts of Canada: (2) prosecute their claims before the court: (3) obtain a hearing of their Charter grievances, and: (4) obtain relief from wrongs they have alleged in writing before a justice of the court. The group in question is discriminated against in the courts literal application of the rule (Rule 41(16.5) (b)) solely due to fact that the depravation of their liberty prevents them from acting in persona before the court, and their poverty denies representation in proprio persona of an attorney. 540.The Charter question turns on the practical as opposed to theoretical equal rights of prisoners under s. 15(1) to pursue civil claims before a court of Canada. The substance of the intended appeal first suggests that the order on appeal had the affect, if not the intent, to create a practical legal barrier to an incarcerated and indigent citizen's complaints to the Court. 541.The earlier constitutional question turned on the practical barrier being unintentionally legislated into the rule (Rule 41(16.5)) or enactment (Rules of Court) complained of as acting against the lawful right of incarcerated and indigent citizens to prosecute their civil claims and to apply under s. 24(1) of the Charter. Application of the impugned rule or legislation has resulted in an unintended practice of the courts to discriminate against a party solely because the party applying before it happened to be an impoverished prisoner and as such their application could not be "spoken to" in proprio persona of the prisoner or of a paid legal representative. 542.To put it simply, it is a given that the object of the Rules of Court is to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determinations of all proceedings before the court. The Complainant has attempted to appreciate this fact in all his complaints. The real question becomes one of priority. Is "speedy and inexpensive" to take precedence over "just"? There existed in the case at bar a special onus on the trial court, especially where individual litigants are representing themselves, that any order made by the Master and later the Chambers Judge should have reflected the legal effect of the order made. 543.In the Speaker's naive view of the workings of justice there was a requirement of the court not unlike that in an in absentia pre-trial proceeding. While the Master or Chambers are not to look at all the material, or review all of it in detail, as the trier of the issues might, there existed such unusual circumstances in the complaints themselves that it should have come, ex proprio motu, to the court's attention. The facts of the Respondent's conduct, and Speaker's incarceration and indigence having given the Master and later the learned Chambers Judge sufficient cause to pause and reflect on the legal effect of the order on the Speaker's s. 15(1) and s. 24(1) Charter rights.

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544.It was suggested that the order and Rule create barriers to equal justice and the practice generally, raising the potential for conflict between the purposeful dispensation of equal justice and administrative considerations of the court. 545.If the impugned order and Rule violates s. 15(1) and s. 24(1) rights guaranteed by the Charter. The Speaker's conclusion is, confined to the absolute prohibitions for which the order provides as opposed to what he considers a fundamental frailty in the Rule being overly broad. The Rule amounts to what is a blanket prohibition, real or apparent, against virtually any indigent prisoner's civil application whatsoever from being heard, extending, as they do, to prohibiting them to apply under s.24(1) for Charter relief of any kind before a Master or Chamber Judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. 546.It does not follow, and the Complainant emphasizes that it would be wrong to imply that there are no reasonable restrictions on the how complaints are to be "spoken to" by prisoners that could be demonstrably justified in this province. That is obviously not the case, but, to the extent the Court sees fit to prohibit complaints, it must promulgate order and interpret the Rules in such a way that can, if necessary, be properly proven to be both rationally based and proportionally implemented. 547.As to what part, or if at all, the whole of the impugned Rule 41(16.5) (b) must be struck down as invalid pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution act, 1982 is a matter beyond the Complainant and should, with deference, be left to the Commissioner to act as it may see fit based on its assessment of the extent of the restrictions should be placed on incarcerated and indigent Complainants in civil proceedings before the courts that is dictated by this constitutional challenge. 548. Part 15 Part 16Factors Existing In Aggravation of the Circumstances 549.While not of primary significance to the present enquiry it is nonetheless worthy to draw attention to certain facts existing in aggravation of the Charter rights alleged to be breached by a practice and procedure employed my the R.C.M.P. in my case and that of Mr. Arar. 550.The following factors must impact on what standard of review the Commissioner is to apply on a Complaint submitted by a citizen of Canada who is still a prisoners' under the very circumstances as have been immediately described above, and as are set in SECTION A FACTS. 551.Among the factors that KAPOUSTIN believes must be considered are the "allegation(s) of procedural unfairness " on the part of the Minister, Ministry of the Attorney General, and grounded allegations of, inter alia, a possible malicious prosecution of KAPOUSTIN by the Crown.

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552.Not unlike those circumstances to be found in Gwynne supra, the Commissioner here is asked, mutatis mutandis, to consider the Charter, and other constitutional implications, of a decision(s) or inaction by the Minister, Ministry of the Attorney General of Canada (the "Minister"). 553.This Commissioner is asked to consider the implications of a Crown Servant and the R.C.M.P. making a written request, and providing data, to Bulgaria authorities for the arrest and prosecution of KAPOUSTIN, a Canadian citizen. 554.The Crown is documented as having criminally indicted KAPOUSTIN before a foreign state with a view to his arrest, and the seizure of his company records and assets in aid of a criminal investigation in the province of British Columbia. 555.A further factor is the transfer to a Canadian prison of KAPOUSTIN. The Complaint now before the Commissioner raises a question and constitutional implication of (1) the R.C.M.P. having acted to secure the arrest, detention, prosecution and conviction of a citizen of Canada on the grounds of an indictment and information provided by a Crown Servant to Bulgarian authorities, and; (2) that after 8 years of trial KAPOUSTIN is finally acquitting of the July 7th 1995 Crown indictment of him before Bulgarian authorities, that (3) the Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs of Canada are still refusing to aggressively undertake to secure from the Government of Bulgaria the transfer of KAPOUSTIN to Canada. 556.From the foregoing factual circumstances arises a further question. Why did the Minister refuse admit the existence of or act to intervene on behalf and in aid of a Canadian citizen wrongly indicted and charged by a Crown Servant and the R.C.M.P.? There are complaints by KAPOUSTIN and his family to the Attorney General [see above 1] of Canada concerning the allegedly criminal misconduct by a Crown Servant while on duty outside of Canada. However, despite these complaints the Ministers of Justice and Foreign Affairs of Canada repeatedly demurred from observing or securing for KAPOUSTIN in Bulgaria or Canada his constitutional and legal rights as a citizen of Canada under international law and Canada’s treaties to which the Republic of Bulgaria is a party. Why? 557.The Ministers also refused to reply to the earliest written complaints of the Complaint against the R.C.M.P. These start as early as 1996, and left KAPOUSTIN no alternative but to bring a civil action against the Crown Servant alleged to have perpetrated crimes against him and his family. The civil complaints before the trial court of British Columbia are brought in the nature of a criminal proceeding against a Crown servant, the defendant Derek A. DOORNBOS, and others. 558.Each of the KAPOUSTIN complaints requested the Minister intervene in facilitating the transfer of this Complainant to Canada. Such a request, although procedurally possible under the laws of both Canada, and the Republic of Bulgaria, and in accordance with the principles of international comity and reciprocity between nations, was an admittedly unlikely possibility in the absence of the Minister's intervention.

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559.The Commissioner is not asked by KAPOUSTIN "to go into the weight the Minister is required to give the issues arising under treaties [see, Goldie, J.A. at §24 in the cited Gwynne, supra]. However, the Commissioner is asked to consider the foregoing circumstances in aggravation of those complaints brought here, and the primary point of this Complaint; the accountability of the R.C.M.P. and DOORNBOS to the Charter and for unlawful acts committed against citizens of Canada who are outside of Canada. 560.This Complaint to the Commissioner must therefore turn on the national and international obligations of the Government of Canada, its agencies, institutions and instrumentalities, it’s elected and appointed officials, Crown Servants, and employees to observe and extend to all citizens of Canada in and outside of Canada what are their fundamental rights and protections under Canada’s laws and its Charter. This includes the right of KAPOUSTIN as a citizen incarcerated in a foreign prison to bring and have his complaints heard by the Commission, and if need be a civil or criminal court of Canada. 561.The present Complaint finds a citizen of Canada and 8 year prisoner of a foreign state attempting to secure for himself, before the Commissioner in Canada, his legal right to a review of his complaints and a procedural administrative or judicial remedy to aid him in the prosecuting of his claims, and those of his wife, son, father and recently deceased mother against a Crown Servant and official of the R.C.M.P. 562.The British Columbia law suit and the present complaints each proved a test of physical and mental stamina of the family of KAPOUSTIN who continues to suffer from the post traumatic stress of his first years of beatings and torture as reported in the Bulgarian media. 563.As a Canadians, KAPOUSTIN and his family seek to lawfully prevail against what they consider to be unlawful and morally corrupt actions of DOORNBOS and the R.C.M.P. for having secured a foreign state to arrest and prosecute a citizen of Canada, imprison and beat him. This only to aid in the collect of information and data for a criminal investigation in Canada. 564.This Complainant seeks to raise a proposition to the Commissioner that there exists a constitutional duty of the Commission and other agencies, institutions and instrumentalities of the Government of Canada to secure the rights of a citizen of Canada at least in Canada and notwithstanding that he is still incarcerated in a foreign prison when the R.C.M.P. have been the primary and initiating cause of that imprisonment. 565.The proceedings before the Commissioner and the present complaints each represent a test of some very serious questions. 566.Has the Government of Canada allowed the R.C.M.P. to become an oppressive agency? Permitting it to use foreign police and prosecutors as a proxy to violate with impunity and without fear of recourse the fundamental rights of citizens of Canada traveling or living abroad?

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567.Are Crown Servants and the R.C.M.P. not accountable the Charter; the laws or courts of Canada; or to the citizens of Canada so long as those citizens are not in Canada? SECTION JComplainant's Reasoning. Part 1 Objectives 568.Reason is a most admirable trait and one unique to the human species. It is found to varying degrees in all individuals, and is based on ones education, experience and ultimately the very personal barrier of our own respective intelligence. Among reasonable, educated and intelligent members of society different concepts can be quickly, clearly, and efficiently exchanged. 569.The object of the present complaint can be efficiently and quickly disposed of as long as the reasoning of KAPOUSTIN is not overly flawed and conforms in some part to the reasoning found in the practice of law. 570.The single objective of the intended Complaint is to secure from the Commissioner the right of a citizen of Canada imprisoned abroad to have his complaints and arguments, heard. 571.KAPOUSTIN has used what little reason remains to him after 8 years of imprisonment in Bulgaria. 572.From the prevailing international law, and laws of Canada, and Bulgaria, it appears to be within the legal right of KAPOUSTIN to demand; (1) the possibility to fully prosecute this complaint and other claims in Canada; (2) to have his arguments heard, in writing if necessary, and to; (3) obtain a decision from the Commission that makes its determination on the merits of the available facts, evidence and arguments. 573.Reason suggests that there can be no justice if one party is allowed to deny another party the right to be heard. It appears, at least in principle, to be inherently wrong and this Complaint should be heard notwithstanding the absence of KAPOUSTIN from Canada. Any limitations on such a right appears in law only in the case of a Complaint found to be vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of the Commissions processes. Thus, in the absence of such a finding, the right for KAPOUSTIN to prosecute this Complaint from outside of Canada appears to be an unequivocal one. 574.In the Complaint before the Commissioner KAPOUSTIN has produced "documentary evidence" [see: Interpretation Act c. I-21 R.S., c. I-23, s. 1] in support of his allegations of wrong. This Complaint relies primarily on such documentary evidence in proving complaints against DOORNBOS, the R.C.M.P. and the Government of Canada to not be frivolous or vexatious as they might on first blush appear. Part 2 Rights Relied On.

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575.Among the guarantees found within the ambit of s. 15(1) of the Charter, and of significance to the present enquiry, is the insistence of KAPOUSTIN on his right, as an indigent person deprived of his liberty, to be allowed some means to "equally" access the Commission or Canada's courts of justice. This seems reasonable as it is a fundament, a priori, requirement of justice for all parties in Canada to be found equal under law. Any limits to be placed on such rights, i.e. access to the Commissioner or a court of law in Canada are to be prescribed only in law and inherently are subject to a test of reasonableness under s. 1 of the Charter. 576.KAPOUSTIN believes, and this Complaint asserts that his right to prosecute or defend his claims against a Crown Servant, and to have his arguments reviewed by the Commission or later judicially by a court of law, are not subject to limitation solely on account of his indigence and his deprivation of liberty abroad. 577.It is unreasonable that there can be permitted to exist an order, enactment or practice of the Commission or a court of Canada that acts to limit, or deny to one person, directly or indirectly, his or her legal right to have their complaints heard by making a distinction between citizens of Canada who are imprisoned abroad, and those citizens of Canada imprisoned in Canada. Such an order, or enactment, should one exist must be as a principle and practice, intrinsically wrong one and therefore invalid. The rights of KAPOUSTIN as a citizen of Canada before the Commission in Canada must be the same as the rights of any other citizen of Canada, notwithstanding that KAPOUSTIN is by his circumstances to be found outside of Canada. 578.If that foregoing reasoning is grounded in the common law, then a "constitutional remedy" is available to this Complainant under the Constitutional Question Act [RSBC 1996] c. 68, s. 8(1). Part 3 Prior Petitions 579.The past complaints and petitions of KAPOUSTIN have sought out such remedies as may be seen to be reasonable under the circumstances of his combined disabilities of indigence and incarceration, as claimed by KAPOUSTIN as the party affected by the unlawful and irresponsible actions of a Crown Servant, DOORNBOS. Any relief KAPOUSTIN sought from the Solicitor (Attorney )General and Minister of Justice for Canada, or the Minister for Foreign Affairs Canada have the legal affect of being seen to do justice to all parties and to be applicable in the specific circumstances. 580.If reason is to prevail then justice cannot be seen to be done by any order, legislative enactment or practice of the Commission or a court of law in Canada that as its effect is to deny one party, KAPOUSTIN, the relief appropriate to his difficult circumstances. The international community, and Canada, having recognised imprisonment as an "afflictive” social status.

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581.It is asserted that prison is a difficult and harsh place from which to conduct ones affairs, much less to prosecute or defend ones Complaint before the Commissioner of a court of Canada. Part 4 Background to Bringing the Complaint 582.Much of the Complaint was prepared and written by KAPOUSTIN while in solitary confinement. The confusion and disorientation arising from a solitary confinement that started on September of 1996 and proved a long and uninterrupted period of physical and psychological torment has had a severe negative impact on the state of mind and health of KAPOUSTIN. 583.The natures of the problems in bringing the Complaint are diverse in character, slowly overcome. Among the many difficulties experienced there was KAPOUSTIN inability to access records or other documents while in prison and still under the Bulgarian control. KAPOUSTIN written requests to Bulgaria authorities for access to evidence under its control are routinely refused. 584.It is documented KAPOUSTIN that at the time of preparing this Complaint Bulgaria denied authorities were obstructing and denying him the facilities needed to affect exchanges of information, facts or to collect evidential materials necessary to the successful prosecution of this Complaint and the civil claim against DOORNBOS and State of Bulgaria. 585.It common knowledge, and a part of the international human rights record of the Bulgaria, that attempts by prisoners to bring legal action, civil or criminal against officials of the Bulgaria, its instrumentalities or agencies, are usually met in prison with severe physical and psychological consequences for the prisoner. The experiences of KAPOUSTIN can confirm such practices. 586.Such circumstances would have a more profound effect in bringing this Complaint against the Crown in Canada. It had been, and remains today, impossible for KAPOUSTIN to determine, exactly among other things; the name of all the officials contacting DOORNBOS, ordering the arrest of KAPOUSTIN or having abused the due process rights of KAPOUSTIN; or undertaken quasi-criminal acts against KAPOUSTIN or property due to the DOORNBOS request to Bulgarian authorities prosecute KAPOUSTIN and LIFECHOICE. 587.A reasonable person, in the absence of the Bulgarian state's cooperation, simply could not fully realise, or hold, the information necessary to formulate in this Complaint exactly who, within the government of the Bulgaria, ordered or approved, inter alia the arrest of KAPOUSTIN. 588.Other practical difficulties exist, among them the problems of language and the refusal of the Bulgarian justice and prison officials to allow KAPOUSTIN to interact or come in contact with his interpreters, and thereby making independent action impossible.

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589.The above are facts that are before the British Columbia Supreme Court under Docket Nos. S004040 and S005440 documented in the Affidavits of, inter alio, Ms. Marianna Radoulova, Anatol Lukanov, Robert Kap and Ada Gogova as placed before a Master of the Court on August 24th 2001. Part 5 Speaker's Arrest and Extradition 590.On November 22 1995 the defendant Bulgaria agency, the National Investigative Service (NIS), ordered police investigator, the defendant S. Georgiev, to issue the international warrant for the Speaker. Defendant Georgiev relied on the exact words found in the July 1995 Crown request to indict the Speaker. 591.Here significance must be attached to the fact that there is no participation whatsoever by any judge or court in the preparation or authorisation or issuance of a warrant for arrest. Up to very late in 2000 decisions on matters of habeas corpus having been within the exclusive ambit of police and prosecution officials who formulated the charge, issued warrant, affected the arrest and prosecuted the case in the absence of judicial supervision or review. This practice and procedure was later legislatively amended in 1998, and again in 2000, after a number of European Court (EC) of Human Rights judgements against Bulgaria, beginning with the seminal case of Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, Judgement of 28 October 1998 Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1998, [see among others: Nikolova v. Bulgaria Judgement of 25 March 1999, Reports of Judgement and Decisions 1999]. 592.The Speaker's first judicial review of his arrest did not occur until more than two years and two months after his arrest. Furthermore, there existed at the time of the Speaker's arrest no procedure for appellate court review of a detention order issued by the prosecutor or a district court judge. 593.The charge brought by Bulgarian police (NIS) in November of 1995 was an alleged embezzlement by the Complainant as an "official" (director) employed by the Speaker's company in Bulgaria. 594.The court will recall it was a servant of the Crown, Defendant DOORNBOS, having contacted the defendant Bulgaria in May and July of 1995, and wrongly accusing the plaintiffs' companies as part of an international criminal organisation operating out of Canada. 595.It was known at the time of the Crown's indictment of the plaintiff Kapoustin, that its charges were legally and factual unsupportable, in point of law or fact completely groundless. 596.The seminal case on this particularly question of fact, an alleged misappropriation, and law, a collective decision by a management body, was reviewed by the EC of Human Right in Lukanov v. Bulgaria, judgement of March 20 1997, Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1997-II. There the court found against the Respondent Bulgaria for bringing

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accusations of embezzlement against one official for what had been a collective decision approved by all responsible officials, none of whom had independently lodged any complaint. In the cited EC judgement the transaction involved public funds, in the Speaker's circumstances the transaction involved private funds the patrimony of which, by the defendant Bulgaria's own admission, must devolve to the plaintiffs' company in British Columbia by way of their 100% ownership of the Bulgarian company's shares. 597.On February 6th 1996, the Complainant was arrested by German police while in transit to Greece at Frankfurt International Airport on the very same data as provided by Crown having been embodied in the defendant Bulgaria's international police warrant. 598.According to the sworn statement of Ms. Dobreva before the trial court in this proceeding, the Speaker's location, and arrest, are possible only thanks to the assistance provided by the Crown and an agency of the Government of Canada. 599.On February 12th 1996, while detained by German police, the defendant Bulgaria raised new charges against the Complainant of misappropriation of his company's funds by documentary fraud, general fraud, and income tax evasion. 600.On or about August 1st 1996 the Speaker, was hospitalised at the order of prison medical staff in Germany and placed on intravenous feeding. 601.On September 2nd 1996, at the order of the German federal prosecutor, prison medical staff removed the Speaker's intravenous feeding. German police officers arrived at the prison and carried the Speaker, unconscious, to an awaiting vehicle. 602.After a medical examination at Frankfurt international airport the Complainant was taken by airport ambulance, then physically carried to an awaiting Bulgarian Balkan Airlines aircraft. On arrival in Sofia, Bulgaria, the Complainant was hospitalised by the defendant Bulgaria for an additional 16 days. 603.On September 18th 1996 the Complainant was relocated by the defendant Bulgaria to a solitary confinement facility at a police detention facility in Sofia, Bulgaria, he remained there alone. The cell was unventilated, having no natural light. What was available was a 60 Watt yellow incandescent bulb. The Complainant experiencing his first beatings here. 604.On or about the end of October, early November, the Complainant was again relocated to another facility where he was isolated. His cell there differed little from that of the previous facility except for toilet facilities and some natural light. The beatings continued, and the Complainant reported to Canadian authorities having been drugged on more than one occasion. He remained in isolation here for an additional period of two (2) years. 605.The average maximum detention in such facilities is typically six (6) months. The Complainant continues to hold the defendant's record for the longest period in solitary confinement at a police arrest facility since 1991.

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606.On September 7th 1998 the Complainant was moved by the defendant Bulgaria to solitary confinement facilities located at the Sofia Penitentiary where he remained an additional 6 months with intermittent stays at the prisons infirmary. 607.This Complainant remains remanded at the Sofia Central Penitentiary awaiting a final verdict. .18

Speaker's Arraignment and Trial

The Indictment On December 10th 1998 the defendant Bulgaria brought final charges, having entered an indictment for an embezzlement aided by a fraud. It was alleged by the defendant Bulgaria that the Complainant had misappropriated funds he had first defrauded from 4831 individuals. The alleged subject of the indicted crime, embezzlement, was the same subject of the preceding crime, the fraud, it being alleged that to get the funds to be embezzled later the Complainant had to first defraud others of the funds. Needless to say the Complainant and his attorneys at the time were completely confused by the indictments legal construction. The Complainant argued estoppel, contending that since the subject of the alleged two misappropriations was one and the same property, the act of misappropriation by embezzlement could not be linked to the preceding unrelated act of misappropriation by fraud.

The Trial and Conviction 608.On April 16th 1999, three (3) years and three (3) months after his arrest, the Complainant was arraigned for the first time before a justice of the Sofia City Court. 609.The district court allowed bring new elements in the indictment different from those brought at the time the Complainant was arrested on February 7th 1996 and for which Germany later extradited the Complainant on September 2nd 1996. 610.A repeated defence thesis during the Speaker's arraignment was that an alteration of the extradition elements of the charge violated international law -the European Convention on Extradition - in the absence of the extraditing state - German - consent. 611.On January 14th 2000, the defendant Bulgaria withdrew the April 16th 1999 indictment and original accusations against the Speaker, raising instead a new charge, having different circumstantial and factual elements but the same criminal code qualification, the presiding judge allowing the new charges. 612.On March 13th 2001 the Sofia City Court convicted the Complainant of embezzlement of his company’s funds and sentenced him to 23 years of hard time. The maximum sentence for embezzlement is 30 years. The only victim of the crime identified by prosecution and the convicting court was the plaintiffs' wholly owned subsidiary company, "LifeChoice" incorporated by the plaintiffs and the Complainant in Bulgaria.

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The Acquittal 613.On August 2nd 2001, on appeal, the Complainant was acquitted of the charge of embezzlement, the appellate court ruling that the first court had erred in law and in fact when allowing the new charges and elements of embezzlement as brought on January 14th 2000. 614.The Commissioner re-qualified the factual elements as having the character of a general fraud and convicted the Speaker, sentencing him to 9 years. The maximum sentence for fraud is 10 years.

Supreme Court of Bulgaria - Protest and Appeal 615.On August 20th 2001 the defendant Bulgaria ordered its prosecutor to protest to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bulgaria that the appellate court had erred in law and fact when acquitting the Speaker. The defendant Bulgaria seeking the Supreme Court of Bulgaria to declare the acquittal invalid, setting aside the appellate decision and returning the Complainant for a new trial before the first or second instance courts. 616.On August 22nd 2001 the Complainant appealed his innocence, and the Commissioner having in part erred in law when, inter alia failing to observe applicable principles of international law on bringing new elements to a charge of fraud different from those for which the Complainant had been extradited. Having also erred in fact when finding, inter alia, that the Complainant had personally affected, at different times and places, each of the alleged misrepresentations, through intermediaries, and thereby having alone defrauded more than 2,500 individuals. 617.As of October 7, 2001 six (6) years and five (5) months have passed since the defendant Bulgaria acted on the July 7th 1995 request of the Crown to prosecute the Speaker, its criminal investigation. Five (5) years and nine (9) months have passes since the Speaker's arrest. 618.As of the moment of this memorandum there is no final verdict or determination on what charges the Complainant will ultimately be sentenced on, or retried, by the defendant Bulgaria. Such an indeterminate judicial state of an accused is consistent with the practice of the defendant Bulgaria.

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SECTION KPractices of the Defendant Bulgaria Existing In Aggravation of

the Claims

CHAPTER IVARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS

SECTION AThe Arguments Evolution 619.The use of exclusion in achieving simplicity, and clarity, can only belie the complexity of issues, and the difficulty of the questions to be answer. 620.No pretence is made to fully understanding the relevant law as it may apply to the issues raised. However, not withstanding the inadequacy of the present Writer the attempt must nonetheless be made. 621.This effort may prove incompetent in its individual parts. However, collectively the course and development of this Writer's layman reasoning appears to be consistent with the self evident propositions that flow naturally from the principles of international law. 622.This Writer believes that his rights as a citizen of Canada are wrongly limited by a Master or Chambers Judge when petitioning a provincial court from prison. This limitation solely due to his indigent property status, and the loss of his self-determination. 623.Ultimately, the significant issues rose in discussion, and the present complaints, must in the end turn on a comparative review on what the common law, and Canada's enactments have to say about "reasonable limitations" on the rights of a citizen having an "other status" to equally access the civil courts and justice. Particular emphasis is placed on discussing the international status, in Canadian society, of an indigent citizen deprived of his liberty abroad. 624.A central controversy in this enquiry arises from the occasion of a practice, and procedure of the trial court found by the Complainant to indirectly apply unreasonable limits on his legal rights, and those of others having an "other status" in Canadian society. The imitations are imposed by reverse onus and result solely due to the observable fact of a person’s status as an indigent prisoner. 625.In the present discussion the Writer approaches the problem first from the a priori rights of all members of a free and democratic society. Developing from such self evident propositions his own reasoning, and conclusions that evolve a posteriori, from the facts and circumstances of the case at Bar. The observable facts demonstrate, when placed against the self evident propositions advanced under the principles of international law,

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and common law practice of Canada, that unreasonable limitations are being imposed on a distinct group solely due to their status in society. 626.To advance the Writer's hypothesis that his a priori rights are unreasonably limited it is first necessary to illuminate the similarities to be found under both the national laws of Canada and Bulgaria. Significant, although not surprising, is that both national laws guarantee the same fundamental a priori principles of civil and human rights. Central to this discussion is the observable fact of both national laws having applied these a priori rights equally to proceedings before the courts in suits in law - civil - as to those having criminal causes of action. The governments of both Bulgaria, and Canada, having imposed negative restrictions on their agencies, instrumentalities and courts from unreasonably limiting fundamental individual rights, and creating a positive constitutional obligation, and duty of the courts under the respective lex fori to guarantee fundamental a priori rights to all persons found to be under the sphere of duty of either one of the two governments. 627.It is compelling to recall that the civil and socialist law traditions of the Republic of Bulgaria have in principle attempted to embody the same a priori rights as historically found in the common law. However, recent history and a posteriori reasoning show that principle has yet to become fully integrated into Bulgarian practice. An analysis of the Defendant Bulgaria's observance of its international obligations to individual rights, and the rule of law is discussed later. 628.This discussion examines the historic and current conduct of the Defendant Bulgaria as a contributing factor to the unreasonable limitations of the Complainant's a prior rights having ultimately a factor affected his procedural possibilities as a party before a trial court in British Columbia. 629.In aggravation of this Complainant's circumstances is the defendant Bulgaria's cooperation or lack of co-operation with the plaintiffs during the course of the proceedings before the trial court. The defendant Bulgaria's practice of using physical, or other means of coercion against persons it has deprived of liberty are representative of this Complainant's own experience of having the said defendant interfere with, or attempt to deter, him from prosecuting his law suit, or appeals, before the court in British Columbia. Each such incident on record is representative of a breach of the trial court's processes, Canadian law, and the defendant Bulgaria's positive international obligation and duty to guarantee all persons their individual rights. Central to the discussion is a consideration of what amount of coercive influence is reasonable on the part of defendant Bulgaria, as a "private person", to limiting a plaintiff's a priori rights in a suit at law before a court of Canada. 630.Significant to this discussion is the legal obligation of all "private person(s)" appearing before a court of law to not use interference, hindrance, obstruction or other forms of coercion to obtain any advantage in a private law proceeding before a court of Canada. It is recalled that a state party appearing in a private law proceeding, appears only in the capacity of a "private person", having rights, and obligations equal to, and not more than, 19178560.doc

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any other party, including the person it has deprived of property and liberty. This leads inevitably to a discussion on a Master or Chambers Judge constitutional duty to judicially examine, on petition, any complaint alleging a coercive act(s) by a party interfering with the legal rights of the other party proceeding in a suit at law. 631.What is immediately significant to any enquiry into coercive activities of a State's agencies is the incontrovertible principle that a State must be aware of, and accountable for, the actions of its officials, agencies, and instrumentalities. Equally incontrovertible is the fact of international jurisprudence showing Bulgaria as not yet integrating this fundamental principle into its practices as have the other free nations of Europe [As authority see European Court in Lukanov v. Bulgaria, judgement 20-2-1997 at §40 par. 2]. 632.The historic and current practices of the defendant government of Bulgaria, its officials, agencies, and instrumentalities provide compelling causus to bringing all three of the complaints now before the Appeal Court. For these reasons the Writer has undertaken to bring the defendant Bulgaria's conduct under analysis, and within the ambit of the Appeal Court's jurisdiction when considering this Writer's complaints to extend time, recognise his indigence, and ultimately grant him the relief he seeks in his intended appeal. 633.The main issue here is of course the a priori rights of a litigant, and what limitations on those rights are reasonable in a suit at law before a British Columbia trial court. The significant factor appears to be the litigants "other status" in Canadian society, that of an indigent person deprived of liberty, and the practice and procedure having employed a reverse onus to limit a persons procedural possibilities to prosecute, or defend claims, notwithstanding the suit at law is against a foreign state. 634.From this point forward the purpose of this Writer's discussion attempts to logically prove his thesis of the Charter placing a negative restriction on a Master, or Chambers Judge as well a positive obligation, and duty to being responsive in guaranteeing the fundamental rights of persons having an "other status" in Canadian society. The common law courts were conceived to be sensitive to all administrative or executive body practices, and procedures that derogate from the fundamental rights of persons having afflictions, and disabilities, the courts responsive as defenders of their fundamental liberties. The Writer advancing within his thesis, a hypothesis. That on the observable conditions of a petitioner having no property means, and no access to the court solely due to an afflictive "other status", these conditions aggravated by allegedly coercive acts of a defendant, among them obstruction of the processes of international justice. Are conditions that act together in creating a positive constitutional obligation and special standard of care and duty a Master or Chambers Judge when applying any practice and procedure affecting the fundamental a priori rights of the petitioner? The Complainant's a posteriori reasoning is as follows. Part 1 Law and Enactment Relied On. 635.The Writer's argument will turn on the one point raised earlier: Are the equality rights of a prisoner before a civil court in some way limited, internationally or nationally, by law or 19178560.doc

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enactment in such a way so as to permit a Master or Chambers Judge of the provincial court to refuse to hear, or otherwise act positively on a written application of a indigent prisoner for judicial review, and relief as a party to a suit in law. 636.To fully develop his reasoning the Writer elected, more for himself than the Commissioner, to first review the historic development of fundamental, a priori, rights found under international law. Later examining how such guarantees are incorporated, jointly and severally, into the national legislation of both Canada, and the defendant government Bulgaria. 637.After having examined these a priori propositions of international law, the Writer then attempts to place them into the context of his judicial complaints under the lex fori of Canada, and his fundamental rights under the lex fori of the defendant Bulgaria as an indigent prisoner. 638.International Conventions - A Chronology 639.Through the course of the proceedings before the trial court, the Complainant as a litigant and prisoner has had to rely on certain principles of international law found to be binding jointly and severally on the governments of Canada and the Defendant, the Republic of Bulgaria. 640.What follows is a chronological review of international instruments, and national enactments conceived for protecting the fundamental rights of all persons, notwithstanding the particular territory or jurisdiction of the State where such person may be found. Certain of the documents reviewed are conceived with the particular intention of establishing what are reasonable legislative and judicial limitations to the fundamental rights of persons deprived of their liberty. The provisions cited below are what the Complainant believes relevant to his thesis. The Complainant having emphasised the particular part of a provision directly applicable to the development of his arguments. SECTION BA Priori Part 1 The Rights of Individuals 641.The foregoing body of international law represents both the negative restrictions on the State as well as positive obligations, and duties of its national courts, as guarantors, to all persons of those fundamental rights considered a prior as established through the process of international comity. The community of nations having created a clear set of self evident propositions on fundamental civil and human rights considered sine quo non in guiding member States, and the national courts when determining the rights of all individuals. 642.In particular there is created among the cited international agreements a set of principles to guide member States in the treatment and fundament guarantees to all persons deprived of liberty. The documents reviewed thus far having provisions allowing for prisoners to

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obtain their rights, or fulfil their obligations before the court in a suit in law. It sine quo non a negative restriction the State to not be seen to revoke, deny, or limit such rights beyond what is necessary to public safety, and solely on account of a person's status as an indigent prisoner. This self evident proposition notwithstanding that the rights and obligations in question are before a court of foreign jurisdiction. 643.It is equally a self evident proposition, and sine quo non positive obligation and duty of a State to guaranteed to all persons, including those it has deprived of liberty, their a priori right to develop a judicial remedy to their complaints, and to attend or be represented at judicial hearings in proprio persona before any court having competent jurisdiction to make a determination of their legal or property interests. 644.There appears little within the provisions of international law, or its practice, that would appear to suggest any argument even remotely plausible for an alternative to the cited negative restrictions as well as positive obligations of a State once ratifying the cited international agreements, and having incorporated the a priori principles found there into the national law. 645.The previously cited body of international law, and the a priori principles found there, have long ago been made an integral, and immutable part of the historically pattern followed by the peoples of Canada, England and the United States. These self-evident propositions are woven into the very fabric of the common law. 646.What is significant to the present enquiry is that the cited international law embodies new negative restrictions, as well as positive obligations of the defendant, Republic of Bulgaria to individual rights. It worthy to recall in this discussion that the defendant Bulgaria's commitment to the right of the individual is directly opposed to its historic development as a civil law nation. First as a monarchy, then as a fascist, and most recently as a socialist state. Each historic permutation having been geared towards a limited form of "structural" judicial review rather than the protection of individual rights. 647.The Defendant Bulgaria's historic practice of legislature supremacy in law as opposed to that of judicial review continues today. Its current practice of rejecting the notion of judicial precedent producing a diffuse system of limited judicial review inevitably having radically inconsistent decisions rendered on identical constitutional issues [see as authority: Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 34 (1971) at p. 53-66]. This inconsistency is particularly observable on judicial application of international law, and the a priori fundament rights that constitutionally [see: Constitution Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 5§4 reprinted in Blaustein and Flanz, Constitutions of the World] flow into Bulgaria's national law. This has produced significant problems for persons deprived of liberty by the Defendant Bulgaria to secure from its agencies, instrumentalities and institutions their fundamental rights. There exists a powerful tension between Bulgaria's positive obligation and international duty to protect individual rights, and the capability of its agencies or institutions to provide that protection effectively [see as authority: The Judicial Role in Bulgaria's Struggle for Human Rights," by Albert Melone and Carol Hays, p. 248]. 19178560.doc

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Part 2 Access to A Court 648.It is incontrovertible that non-judicial agencies of a State are directly responsible for a prisoner's care, and the compliance of prison officials with the requirements of the previously cited international law. 649.The previously cited Prisons and Reformations Act, Corrections and Conditional Release Act, and Correction Act embody the negative restrictions as well as positive practices, and procedures to be observed by all responsible agencies of Canada when determining the fundamental a priori rights to be denied or limited a person deprived of liberty. 650.The previously cited constitutional law of Bulgaria, and by incorporation all Bulgaria's international treaties, conventions or declarations, as well as its Law On Execution of Punishments and Criminal Code of Procedure are the full embodiment of the negative restrictions, as well as positive practices and procedures, to be observed by all responsible Bulgaria agencies when determining the fundamental a priori rights to be denied or limited to a person deprived of liberty. 651.The international proposition of a judicial "remedy", and access to "competent judicial… authorities" are guaranteed, and intended as the positive obligation and duty of the State under Article 2§3 of the cited ICCPR. 652.The Complainant reasons, a posteriori, there to be a further and fundamental element incorporated into any interpretation of the positive obligation and duty of a State to provide access to a "remedy" as flows naturally from international law. Articles 6, 7 and 10 of the UDHR, and Articles 2, 14§1, 16 and 26 of the ICCPR are to guarantee to all persons the sine qua non element of a "fair and public hearing" in any judicial determination of their rights and obligations in a suit at law, notwithstanding their property status or deprivation of liberty. On the basis of which it is only reasonable a person deprived of liberty first petition the State agency having a positive obligation and duty to secure for him the means to physically access a court of competent jurisdiction when having to prosecute or defend his interests. Here, the competent judicial authority to determine the Complainant's judicial remedy and his legal and property rights in Canada is incontrovertibly a court of the province of British Columbia. 653.The positive expectations of a person deprived of liberty to be conducted by the State to any hearing or trial where his legitimate interests may be negatively affected is more than a reasonable one. The Writer recalling the cited UDHR as particularly significant when interpreting reasonableness, the international community having declared at Art. 29§2 that "In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition for the rights of and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." 654.The self evident proposition that a prisoner retains, a priori, the right of access and attendance to court in a suit at law is made reasonable by virtue of the very nature of 19178560.doc

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incarceration as recognised by the international community. Canada and Bulgaria having both made allowances under national law for the temporarily absence of a prisoner, with or without escort, to attend in person any hearing or trial judicially determining his rights, and other obligations under a suit at law. A proposition reinforced by Principle 36§2 of the United Nations 1988 resolution on a Body of Principles for Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment that declares: "The imposition of restrictions upon such persons which are not strictly required for the purpose of detention or to prevent hindrance to the process of investigation or the administration of justice, or for the maintenance of security and good order in the place of detention shall be forbidden." 655.In 1990 the United Nations additionally adopted the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners. Of significance to the present enquiry is the declaration in Article 5 that "Except for those limitations that are demonstrably necessitated by the fact of incarceration, all prisoners shall retain the human and fundamental freedoms set out" in the UDHR and the ICCPR. 656.Canada and Bulgaria have as well embraced, at least in principle, the international tenets found in the previously cited Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners (SMR). Significant to this enquiry is Principle Rule 61 declaring that positive "Steps should be taken" by responsible State agencies "to safeguard, to the maximum extent compatible with the law and the sentence, the rights relating to civil interests….of prisoners." 657.From the foregoing it would appear a prisoner retains his a priori rights in a suit at law. The State having in principal agreed to negative restrictions, and in practice positive obligations. It the duty of the judiciary to see the rights of prisoners when seeking a judicial remedy from the courts are equal to the rights of other members of society, except only in so far as they must be limited under a provision prescribed under law or by virtue of a sentence. However, as we have seen, the prescribed limits under a sentence cannot be seen to unreasonably to limit a prisoner's sine quo non right to legal redress for his grievances, and to access the competent judicial authority to do so. There appears to be no exception, notwithstanding that the court of competent jurisdiction is beyond the territorial reach of the State. 658.It appears that the significant body of law, and principles reviewed thus far strongly suggest the following. That the application of any practice or procedure by a State judicial or non-judicial authority is wrong when having an affect that directly or indirectly restricts a prisoner's fundamental rights or obligations before a court. The international community having voiced strongly that it is not justifiable in a free and democratic society to have an administrative practice, or procedure, limiting the legal and procedural rights of one individual solely due to the fact of his or her other status, having lost of their self determination - liberty - and property. Any such practice or procedure must be impugned and found invalid by virtue of its affect. 659.On the basis of the above, that Complainant believed he had a right and the Defendant State of Bulgaria a positive obligation to any person it deprived of liberty, to seek from the 19178560.doc

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agency of the Ministry of Justice, of the Republic of Bulgaria, to undertake its positive obligation to arrange conduct custody of the Complainant to a judicial hearing. It is to be recalled the hearing in question is one where the Complainant's legal, and property interests were to be affected, having been fixed by the government of Bulgaria before the foreign jurisdiction of British Columbia. 660.The Defendant Bulgaria's recognition of the provincial court of British Columbia as being the only judicial authority able to make a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties is of significant to the later enquiry. Part 3 Reverse Onus and Procedural Fairness. 661.In the proceedings before the trial court in British Columbia the Defendant Bulgaria, in the case of this Complainant, abnegated the foresaid positive international obligation and duty. 662.The Ministry of Justice, Republic of Bulgaria, Deputy Minister Dimitar Tonchev, advised the Complainant on four different occasions [see Vol. 1 Tabs 5, 11, 12, and 14 of Plaintiffs Factum as filed] of the following. That Bulgaria has no positive international obligation, or duty to allow or secure for a Canadian citizen person deprived of liberty, what are, a prior, legal rights guaranteed under international law whenever there is a suit at law before a court having competent jurisdiction. Canada and Bulgaria having no bi-lateral agreement to allow the Complainant access to a Canadian court of law. Conduct in custody to British Columbia was impossible. It finally up to the trial court of British Columbia to decide to act on any positive obligation and duty, if any, that Canada might have to its citizen's a priori rights in a suit at law. Canada's positive obligation and duty flowing from its national and international commitments to its citizens. 663.On having abnegated its positive international obligations, and duty to guarantee individual rights for which Bulgaria is accountable under its international agreements, the said defendant Bulgaria has wrongly placed a reverse onus on the Complainant and Canada. 664.This reverse onus required the Complainant, a person deprived of his property and liberty by the said State, to attempt to engage from prison, the trial court of British Columbia, and government of Canada, to act where in fact international agreements appear to require agencies of Bulgaria to act. 665.By virtue of its action or inaction, the Defendant Bulgaria knowingly placed a reverse onus on a person it has deprived of liberty. The prisoner required to undertake what is otherwise a State's positive obligation and duty. Its agencies expected to provide a prisoner the means of accessing the judicial authority competent to determine his rights and obligations in a suit at law. 666.The forgoing made it necessary and reasonable for the Complainant to attempt to develop a judicial remedy to the Defendant Bulgaria's refusals and its reverse onus. To do so the

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Complainant complained directly to the trial court of the coercive measures employed by the defendant Bulgaria. Petitioning the Master to judicially review his complaints as a citizen of the province, and party to a suit at law in the province. The Complainant seeking a judicial review and reasonable remedy to the defendant's - Bulgaria - reverse onus, and coercive acts obstructing, or hindering the Complainant in his lawful right to effectively access the trial court. It stressed to the Master that in the absence of form of procedural relief the Complainant's prosecuting, or defending his legal interests before the court would be nearly impossible. 667.Application to the provincial court relied on what was believed to be an incontrovertible principle in law of the trial court in a suit at law, as the lex fori of the proceedings, having inherent jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact affecting the procedural fairness of any hearing or trial. Having this in mind the Complainant relied on a Master or Chambers Judge having, a priori, a constitution duty and positive obligation to judicially review his petitions from prison. The Complainant believing only the nature of the judicial remedy to be discretionary, if there was to be one. Part 4 A Priori Rights in a "Suit in Law" 668.The foregoing leads naturally to a question in the mind of the Writer; Can either the government of Bulgaria, or that of Canada, deny the means and facilities necessary to its indigent foreign prisoners to fully prosecute, or defend, a law suit brought before a foreign court? 669.Also aroused in the mind of this Complainant was if the common law interpreted the a priori principles of international law as incorporated under the Canadian Bill of Rights, Human Rights Act and Constitutional Act, to apply only to criminal proceedings, and not to a suit at law. 670.The a priori principles of international law reviewed strongly suggested to this Complainant the Sate having the same negative restrictions as well as positive obligations in a suit at law as it does in a criminal proceeding. The previously cited ICCPR proved particularly significant to the present enquiry, Article 14§1 reading: "All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of ….his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing." 671.The ICCPR has legally, and morally, bound the judicial, and non-judicial officials of agencies, or instrumentalities of the governments of Canada, and Bulgaria, to an incontrovertible positive obligation, and duty to apply to any "suit at law" - a civil proceeding - the same a priori rights having earlier been set out in the UDHR. 672.The ICCPR ended all confusion, at least in the Complainant's mind, and providing him the international instrument necessary to his establishing a nexus between his "suit at law" in British Columbia, and his incontrovertible a prior rights under international law as an indigent person deprived of his liberty when party to a civil proceeding. Ending the

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apparent confusion on the right of a prisoner to demand participating in the prosecution or defence of a suit in law. 673.The ICCPR is significance in another way. There does not appear within its text any exception, or saving provision, permitting a State to derogate from, or unreasonably limit a person in the exercise of his procedural rights, or obligations, in ”a suit at law" solely due to the fact he is a person deprived of liberty. 674.The cited international agreements all have one overriding a priori principle as a negative restriction on all democratic governments in unreasonably limiting or denying the fundamental rights, or obligations of a person, whether engaged in a criminal proceeding or a suit at law affecting a person's legitimate legal and property interests, notwithstanding that person to be the States prisoner. SECTION CA Posteriori 675.The cited international agreements clearly indicate the fundamental human, and civil rights that should be guaranteed to all persons by the respective national laws of each State, intended to by their very nature to be self evident propositions. However, these a priori propositions are open to being broadly interpreted, and their application to particular set of circumstance can only be reasonably established from the observable facts. 676.Pivotal to this discussion, and the later complaints, is the status of prisoners in a democratic and free society. As identified earlier this status is inherently afflictive, one that is morally and legally liable to direct and indirect discrimination. 677.A person's status in society is a significant factor in determination of his rights. Property or other status may pose significant barriers in the exercising of the fundamental rights other citizens of a democracy otherwise take for granted. The positive international obligations and duty of a State, as opposed to negative restrictions, is to be sensitive and responsive to those persons having a property or other status that derogates from their fundamental a priori rights i.e. to develop a judicial remedy before a court in a suit at law. 678.Later, a positive judicial obligation and constitutional duty of the courts appears to develop on complaint of a person, or distinct group of persons against the State or some other party. The courts appear required to judicially determine, a posteriori, if rights and obligations under law to a particular person, or group of persons, somehow result in direct, or indirect discrimination solely due to a disadvantage of property or other status. Any such a determination is only possible on a review of the facts and circumstances placed in evidence before the court. Only afterward, is it possible to discuss the positive obligations, and duty of a government and the courts to a person having a status so different from others that it acts to negatively impact on his a priori rights. Part 1 A Prisoner's "Other Status"

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679.International law includes a negative restriction strictly forbidding a State to use a "distinction of any kind" based on property, nationality or other status to limit a persons a priori right to access a judicial remedy. 680.The elements significant here to determining "other status" are those of a persons "property", here indigence, and his "self determination", here deprivation of liberty. The issue being what affect such elements have on the practice and procedure to be followed in a suit at law. 681.Therefore it is significant to the present enquiry to determine the status of an indigent prisoner in society as one requiring a positive obligation, and duty from the judiciary to be responsive in guaranteeing the a priori rights of all persons having this "other status" when petitioning the courts for a judicial review and remedy. 682.While prisoners are not distinctly incorporated into the seminal UDHR, and the later ICCPR as having "other status", it nonetheless appears reasonable to conclude, a posteriori, the drafters of these declarations having prisoners in mind when broadly including "other status" at the end of "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social status…". 683.Clearly other status must be one given a sufficiently broad interpretation to encompass within its ambit any individual, or group of individuals having some distinct nature, or character. One sufficiently afflictive, or disadvantageous to a particular group that there exists a real, or perceived potential for direct, or indirect discrimination solely due to it members having a status different from the rest of society. The potential for the abuse of individual rights, and freedoms of indigent persons deprived of liberty within the Republic of Bulgaria are discussed in some detail previously under in Part 1: Statement of Facts: Practice. 684.The Complainant's analysis and argument, a posteriori, relies on the court accepting the proposition of a prisoner belonging to a distinct, and disadvantaged group having the acquired "other status", within the context found under UDHR Article 2, when declaring: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of…property.. or other status.”, and ICCPR Article 2§1 that declares "…the present Convention undertakes to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised…without distinction of any kind such as…property…or other status." 685.Independently the elements of "property” and "self determination" are not enough to derogate, or otherwise limit, the a priori rights of a person to develop his legal remedy in a suit at law. The following reasoning appears to apply to judicial practice and procedure in both Canada and Bulgaria: 686.A person having no property may appear before the court in a suit at law, in proprio persona, to personally prosecute, or defend his legal and property interests before the court. If sufficiently disadvantaged it is possible to seek the court to waive its costs. 19178560.doc

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687.A person deprived of self determination by a State on having been deprived of liberty, yet retaining property, may engage a legal representative to appear on his behalf in a suit at law to prosecute, or defend his legal and property interests before the court. Alternatively, where it is necessary for some reason for the prisoner to attend, the State has a positive obligation and duty to allow or secure a reasonable and necessary means for him to appear and protect his interests before the court. 688.A special set circumstances are created on a person having no property, and no self determination. The State then incurring a special positive obligation, and duty to secure the means for its prisoner to appear and protect his interests before the court. 689.It is proposition No. 3 above that provides the a posteriori reasoning to find indigent persons deprived of liberty as owned by the State a positive obligation and duty due to their distinct "other status". 690.The two elements of a person's property status - indigence - and self-determination -deprivation of liberty - interact to inevitably produce a distinct group whose members are observably acquiring a "other status" different from that of the rest of society. Quite possibly the same a posteriori reasoning operated as a motive for the drafters of the UDHR to formulate Article 6, requiring all ratifying State governments to guarantee to those persons having "other status" their "recognition everywhere as a person before the law". Going on to require under Article 10 (UDHR) the State to guarantee "full equality to a fair and public hearing….in determination of his rights and obligations…", rights and obligations being given as broad an interpretation as possible to include, inter alia, procedural rights, or obligations before a court of law, as well as legal rights, or obligations, that sound in contract, or in tort. 691.Determining a person or a group "other status" in society will not resolve itself only from the self evident propositions of Canada's national law as flow naturally from the principles of international law. These propositions are immutable, and very broadly interpreted. Instead the answers needed for the present enquiry are to be found from the observable facts found in the present suit at law before a trial court of British Columbia. 692.The facts in the proceeding before the trail court have demonstrated the immutable a priori propositions of individual rights under Canadian and international law are not always seen to be observed as a positive obligation and constitutional duty. This conclusion appears ex proprio motu from an order of the Duty Master or a decision of the Chambers Judge failing to recognise an indigent person deprived of liberty as having acquired a distinct, and afflictive "other status" disadvantaged in Canadian society. 693.The governments of Canada, and Bulgaria, both clearly have a positive obligation, and duty to a person having an "other status" under international law. The present Complainant, an indigent person deprived of liberty, is therefore equally entitled to the guarantees of international law in either of the two states as would be any other person. Part 2 A State's Positive Obligation and Duty To A Person Deprived Of Liberty. 19178560.doc

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694.As has been discussed earlier, there is inclusive with any of the other positive international obligations of Canada, and Bulgaria, the duty of government agencies to secure the means for a person of "other status" - deprived of liberty - to access justice. The right to have petitions, and arguments heard and judicially decided is sine quo non a right in any adversarial proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction. Where the person is a prisoner, the responsibility in securing that right belongs to the State. 695.It follows naturally from the previous discussion that a State's law makers have the responsibility to set out practices, and procedures for agencies and instrumentalities to observe in practice what has been set down in principle. Both judicial and non-judicial bodies are required to react responsively to the State's positive international obligation and duty to guarantee to prisoner “recognition". 696.In principle, as we have seen, there exists a negative restriction to a State limiting a prisoner's fundamental rights beyond what is necessary for public order and safety or solely due to the competent jurisdiction, forum conveniens, happening to be a foreign trial court - British Columbia. What is of significance here is the obligation that exists to be react positively and responsively to circumstances that indirectly limit fundamental rights solely due to the "other status" of the person. 697.There appears to be no rule under law, practice or procedure that proved a legal obstruction under Bulgaria or Canadian law or the SCBC Rules of Court and the principles of international law, for one party, a Canadian citizen and resident of the province, to be barred from a provincial court of British Columbia solely due to having been deprived of his liberty in the Republic of Bulgaria by the other party, the Defendant government of Bulgaria. 698.Furthermore, there appears no provision under international law, or the laws of Canada or Bulgaria, that might exculpate either of the two governments, or the trial court of British Columbia from allowing, or the positive duty of securing, a prisoner his access to the trial court. 699.Clearly, at least to this Complainant, both Canada, and Bulgaria, have made international commitments to guarantee to any person, including this Complainant, a right of access to a court - Canada - and to "full equality to a fair and public hearing" before the court, notwithstanding that the Complainant is a prisoner of one state, the defendant Bulgaria, and a citizen of the other state, Canada. The international community recognising the principles of international law “shall be applied to all persons within the territory of any given State". 700.The foregoing is consistent with the Speaker's reasoning that there exists a set of homogenous international legal principles applicable to the "lex fori" of the trial court of Canada, and the international obligations and duties of the defendant foreign state, Bulgaria.

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701.Significant to the present enquiry, and worthy of special consideration, is the negative restriction found under Article 2 of the UDHR. It requires a State to make "no distinction…on the basis of…jurisdictional…status of the country to which a person belongs…" when determining persons' fundamental rights and obligation, or the competence of a judicial authorities' jurisdiction to determine such rights and obligations. This appears to make moot any argument that the foreign or international jurisdiction of a court acts as a bar in any way to the fundament rights of a person before that court, notwithstanding they are deprived of liberty and refused access. 702.This positive obligation and duty of a Canada or Bulgaria are not limited to the nationality of the person affected or on whose territory that person is to be found. This was given broad consideration in Principle 5§1 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment as previously cited by the Speaker. 703.When applying the discussion's a posteriori reasoning thus far to the circumstances of the case now at bar the following appears. The Complainant having lost his property and self determination due solely to acts of the Republic of Bulgaria placed a special positive onus, and duty on Bulgaria, to make available the means necessary for him to prosecute, or defend his interests from its prison. This positive onus was owed to the Complainant as a person having "other status", notwithstanding his nationality as a Canadian citizen, or for having named the State of Bulgaria as a defendant before the foreign jurisdiction a British Columbia court. 704.However, as has been previously identified, the defendant Bulgaria has, in the case of a Canadian citizen, abnegated its international commitment by refusing its positive obligation and duty to a foreign prisoner. The foregoing causes this Complainant to recall the following recurring theme found throughout all the cited international agreements, the responsibility of an independent judiciary. 705.The a priori principles of international law provides that the national law of a State must allow a judicial remedy to all persons whose fundament rights are believed directly or indirectly derogated by a practice and procedure of a State. 706.Figuring significant in this is ICCPR Article 2§3(a) reading, in its relevant part there to be "an effective remedy, not withstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity", the judiciary named as one of the competent authorities charged with the obligation, and positive duty to ascertain, a posteriori, if government agencies have observed their negative restrictions as well as positive obligations when discharging their duty to guaranteeing a prisoner his a priori rights before the a court of law. 707.The foregoing suggests Canada as having a joint and several obligation, and duty, to this Complainant - as its citizen - equal to, or greater than, that of Bulgaria, to be responsive and to act positively- jointly or severally with or without Bulgaria - to see that its citizens "rights and obligations" in "a suit at law" before a court in Canada - are guaranteed to 19178560.doc

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him. This conclusion is arrived at first from multilateral agreements that clearly express the a priori rights and freedoms as set forth earlier are made available everywhere, and second on the basis of the applicable laws of Canada. Part 3 Positive Obligation and Duty of Bulgaria 708.This was discussed in detail earlier under the heading of A Priori: Access to A Court. However, before proceeding to a discussion on developing a judicial remedy before a court of the province, it seem reasonable to enquiry into the positive administrative obligation and duty of the State of Bulgaria to a foreign person having "other status" on its territory. 709.The fact of international law as it exits, and the defendant Bulgaria having observably ratified that law, strongly suggests, a posteriori, Bulgaria to have the positive obligation, and duty to observe such law in practice. 710.Applying these a priori principles to the present case at bar places the onus squarely on the defendant Bulgaria to secure, or allow the Complainant's appearance before a Canadian court. This responsibility going exclusively to the non-judicial agencies of the State of Bulgaria charged with the positive obligation of guaranteeing the rights of a person imprisoned on Bulgarian territory. 711.It is to be recalled that the penal administration agency of the defendant Bulgaria is its Ministry of Justice, Republic of Bulgaria, having the positive administrative obligation and duty to be sensitive and responsive in guaranteeing the fundamental right of a prisoner to attend to, prosecute or defend his interests in a suit at law. 712.To confirm this positive obligation and duty of Bulgaria to prisoners only requires recalling Article 31§5 of the Bulgarian Constitution that reads "Prisoners shall be kept in conditions conducive to the exercise of their fundamental rights which are not restricted by virtue of their sentence", and Article 57§1 of the Constitution declaring that a persons "fundamental rights shall be irrevocable." These two constitutional principles are confirmed under the cited Bulgarian Law on Execution of Punishments, Chapter Two Article 23 on the Legal Status of Incarcerated Person. 713.Clearly, in principle the Complainant enjoys the full rights of any other person in a suit at law. However, in practice it is equally as clear that the defendant Bulgaria is unprepared to make good on its international commitments. For this reason the Complainant turned to the provincial court to develop a judicial remedy. Part 4 The Master's Positive Obligation 714.The discussion has made apparent, at least to the Complainant, that there exists a body of international law that sets out the positive obligations and duties of State governments. Incorporated in the obligation and duty of a State is the self evident proposition that all persons are to have the possibility to develop a judicial remedy. It sine quo non the right

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of every person to have his grievances judicially reviewed in an equal, and open adversarial hearing before a court of law. 715.It flows from international law that the national - provincial - courts have jurisdiction, and a positive obligation to be sensitive, and a duty to be responsive in observing the equal rights of all persons' party to a "suit in law", notwithstanding the "other status" of one party as a prisoner of the other party, a foreign government. A court's practices and procedures acting to guarantee to all persons a fundamentally equal availability of the rights provided for under law in a "suit at law", notwithstanding the person belongs to a distinct and disadvantaged group having a "other status", i.e. indigent and deprived of liberty. 716.These a priori principles of international law are a part of the common law and the historic tradition of the Canadian sense of what is right. It suggests that there must exist a role for a Master, or Chambers Judge of the provincial court when observing the negative restriction extending equally to all persons the right to have their grievances adjudicated in a suit at law, to also observing as well a positive obligation and duty to act ex proprio motu in removing any obstacles to extending this or other fundamental rights to a person afflicted by a other status directly or indirectly affecting his rights. 717.The importance of the defendant Bulgaria's role in the proceedings before the trial court cannot be overstated. As a State it had a duty to observe the rights of the Complainant before the Honourable Courts of Canada no less than it is the duty of Canada's government were it similarly disposed. 718.The principles of reasonable limits on a prisoner's fundamental rights are discussed in the previously cited Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 36(2), the international community agreeing on the negative restrictions to be observed by a member state to include not placing "restrictions upon such a person which are not strictly required for the purpose of the detention". 719.The Complainant can find no saving provision or principle under the cited principles of international law and comity that appear to permit an agency of a foreign state to directly, or indirectly, interfere with the judicial processes of another state, or for that matter to interfere with the standard minimum limits for prisoners as recognised by the international community. 720.The most comprehensive of the international documents dealing with the positive obligation and duty of a state to its prisoners happens to be the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (known as the Standard Minimum Rules), adopted by the U.N. Economic and Social Council in 1957. It should be noted that although the Standard Minimum Rules ("SMR") are not a treaty, they constitute an authoritative guide to the binding treaty standards recited above. Part II Principle 57 is most instructive:

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"Imprisonment and other measures which result in cutting off an offender from the outside world are afflictive by the very fact of taking from the person the right of self-determination by depriving him of his liberty. Therefore the prison system shall not, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in such a situation."

721.The said Principle 57 clearly expresses what the Complainant attempted to identify in his written petitions to the Master and Chambers Judge of the trial court, "imprisonment and other measures which result in cutting off an offender from the outside world are afflictive by the very fact of….depriving him of his liberty". According to the SMRs governments should act positively to "minimize any differences between prison life and life at liberty which tend to lessen the responsibility of the prisoner" (see Art. 60). It is recalled the defendant Bulgaria having refused all the Complainant's petitions to observe its positive obligation and duty to him as its prisoner. 722.It is to be recalled that the Respondent Bulgaria's legislation on the subject of a prisoner's fundamental rights encompasses all those rights available to others except what is " not restricted by virtue of their sentence" [see: the cited Art. 31(5) Constitution of Bulgaria]. Other than this an "incarcerated person(s) may avail themselves of (enjoy) all rights established by law" and the Defendant Bulgaria's agencies forbidden to restrict such rights [see: the above cited Art. 23 Law on Execution of Punishments] solely due to imprisonment. 723.The Bulgaria's Criminal Code of Procedure (CCP), not unlike Canadian enactments, prescribes the possibilities for temporary escorted absences of prisoners, and incorporates into this one provision of its CCP the same principle found under of the Rule 40(40), Rules of Court. Admittedly even the practice and procedure prescribed under the Bulgaria CCP Art. 463 as previously cited are of little, or no practical use to guide a trial court. The defendant Bulgaria having never been called on to observe its international agreements, its legal landscape bereft of any substantive jurisprudence on the application or practice of the international law principles discussed thus far. 724.If the Master and Chambers Judge had difficulty with the lex loci delicti of the Complainant's imprisonment, they were at least familiar with Canadian legislation, and able to be guided by the principles to be found there. Unlike that of the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada's enactments are substantially clearer on the subject of temporary escorted absences of prisoners. This is reviewed earlier as a provision of s. 7.3 of The Prisons and Reformatories Act Chapter P-20 R.S., c. P-21. Prisoner's temporary absences directly incorporated as a right of prisoners in Canada for "reintegration into the community". 725.The Corrections and Conditional Release Act 1992, c. 20 goes even further under s.4 to instruct "the Service use the least restrictive measures" and that "offenders retain the rights and privileges of all members of society". Temporary escorted absences are provisions of s. 17(1), prisoners’ absences to be permitted for "administrative", "rehabilitative" or "reasons other than medical".

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726.The Correction Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 74 s. 15(1) further allows the Minister to request and authorise temporary absences of prisoners. 727.It can as well be seen from the Rules of Court, Rule 40(40) that the trial court has the jurisdiction to order the temporary absence of a prisoner as follows: "Order for attendance of witness in custody "(40) The court may order the attendance of a witness who is in the lawful custody of another person, including the custodian of a penal institution.

728.It is recalled that the Complainant's petitions to the Master and Chambers Judge had raised all the forgoing issues, having in part relied on Rule 40(40). The Complainant petitioned the Master to provide a subpoena or order for the Defendant Bulgaria to produce the Complainant. This would be seen by the defendant Bulgaria as the "paper(s) submitted by the other Country" [see the above cited: CCP Art. 463] to allow a "district court" of Bulgaria to consider the Complainant's request of temporary escorted conduct to appear before the court. Much of the Complainant's frustration is derived from being refused a judicial review of his requests for an escorted appearance before the trial court in British Columbia, despite that the minimum rights of persons deprived of liberty happen to include the possibly under both Bulgarian, and Canadian national law to bring and prosecute to the full extent of the law a civil claim. Even against the very State, or its institution and officials, having deprived him of liberty and property. 729.These respective provisions of the national laws of Bulgaria and British Columbia, and principles of international law, were are relied on by the Complainant when petitioning the Defendant Bulgaria, the Ministry of Justice, and then the Master and Chambers Judge of the provincial court. 730.Had the fact of the defendant Bulgaria being in breach of international law been established on hearing the petition of the Complainant, it would be bound to have raised appropriate and very real questions in the mind of the court as to the purpose of the coercive measures and interference employed by the said defendant. The negative restrictions as well as positive obligations and duty of the defendant Bulgaria under international law should not have been overlooked by either the Master or Chambers Judge on their review of the Complainant's complaints. 731.Principally what is immediately apparent to the Complainant is the following; (1) If the body of principles found in international and national laws are to be at all meaningful, then there must exist a duty of States, the likes of Bulgaria, and respected democracies the likes of Canada, to secure for persons deprived of liberty, their individual rights before courts of law; and (2) individual rights of persons deprived of liberty before the courts of law can only be guaranteed if agencies of the State allow, or provide this distinct and disadvantaged group the practical means for equally prosecuting, or defending, their claims before courts of law.

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732.To this Complainant it appears that for a State's - Canada - assistance to be meaningful it must go beyond allowing a prisoner his filing of an originating writ, or claim. The State's assistance must include the possibility of prosecuting or defending of rights and obligations through the pre-trial and trial proceedings, until there comes into force a final judgement taken by the respective court. 733.It appears, from the available body of law relied on by this Complainant, that both the governments of Canada, and Bulgaria, are required to secure for this Complainant his right to access some practical means of prosecuting, or defending, his legal interests in a law suit. It goes without saying that the alternative of hindering, or obstructing, the Complainant, a prisoner, is an unacceptable proposition, notwithstanding that it is in the States' interests to do so. 734.The onus appears to be on the government to identify the means to be allowed, or provided persons having been deprived of liberty to appear before the courts in a manner appropriate to their circumstance of imprisonment, and the danger they pose to society. 735.In the alternative, where a government - Bulgaria -refuses to conduct a person deprived of liberty before a court of law, the onus falls on it to identify, and provide an effective alternative to appearing in proprio persona before the court. Say electronically or in writing, and sufficient to allow for an adequate possibility of effectively prosecuting, or defending a law suit, again not withstanding that the government is named as a defendant. 736.For these reasons the Complainant petitioned a Master and a Chambers Judge, in the name of procedural fairness, to exert the courts inherent jurisdiction in Canada over the defendant Bulgaria. The court to require, in the name of international comity, the Defendant, Bulgaria to observe the negative restrictions as well as positive obligations as evidenced by its international commitments. The said Defendant to require its agencies to secure, or allow the Complainant, a Canadian citizen, his a priori fundamental rights as guaranteed to all persons deprived of liberty i.e. to develop his judicial remedy and attend to his rights and obligations before a court of Canada. 737.The Complainant, in written pleadings to the provincial trial court, expressed an opinion that the court had an enforceable right of jurisdiction over any legal representative of the defendant Bulgaria to be found in Canada. The very fact of Bulgaria having ratified the previously cited international documents allowing the court could seek Bulgarian cooperation on the subject of the Complainant's complaints of interference with his rights and obligations in Canada. 738.Furthermore the elements of the proceedings before the trial court, inter alia the plaintiffs' causes of action, the nature and character of the injuries they suffered, and the relief sought, are again prima facie evidence that the court of competent jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of the litigants proves be a trial court of British Columbia. The Complainant believes this makes the positive constitutional duty of a Master or Chambers Judge more apparent, it therefore standing to reason, a posteriori, the

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court to extend its jurisdiction to include the complaints and complaints of this Complainant, notwithstanding its prison origins are outside of Canada. 739.The Complainant argued to the trial court that the scope of a state's positive obligation, and duty, to persons deprived of liberty, appeared to be "on all fours" with his a posteriori reasoning. There can to be no reasonably justifiable derogation or limiting of the Complainant's rights in a "suit at law" solely because he is a prisoner, and happens to be a necessary party to prosecuting or defending his own interests and that of other plaintiffs before a court of British Columbia. 740.At the risk of being redundant the Complainant recited to the Master the practice and procedure of the Defendant Bulgaria's Criminal Code of Procedure, under Art. 436 allowing: "...persons detained in custody to be interrogated as witnesses or experts shall be allowed….on the grounds of the papers submitted by the other country…", and the allowances made under the Rules of Court, Rule 40(40) that reads: "The court may order the attendance of a witness who is in the lawful custody of another person, including the custodian of a penal institution." 741.No assertion was made before the Master, or is now made in the present enquiry, that a court of Canada exerts its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of Canada. Instead, the Complainant had suggested the Master be responsive to his circumstances, and act positively by providing a reasonable remedy. Only exerting the court's jurisdiction on a procedural matter - to subpoena and order the attendance of a person in custody of the defendant - Bulgaria to appear together before the court. Such an order appeared within the ambit of the civil proceedings before the Master, it requiring the court only exert its jurisdiction within Canada's boundaries. The defendant Bulgaria having legal representatives accessible to the court, and to be found in the province. 742.The laws of Canada do not appear to provide for, or allow a saving provision permitting a Duty Master or Chambers Judge to abrogate the courts duty to procedural fairness, and Canada's obligations, to a prisoner's a priori rights under international law. 743.The fact that indigent prisoners are not specifically designated under the Court Rules Act, Rules of Court, or other enactment of Canada, as persons of "other status" having an observable afflictive legal "disability” did not act as a bar to a Master or Chambers Judge in being responsive to the difficulties of the afflicted person. Omission from the Court Rules Act of persons having "other status" i.e. indigent prisoners does not alter the fact of the Master having a special duty to be responsive to the extraordinary difficulties of the Complainant by virtue of his circumstances. 744.The cited ICCPR Article 5§2 is more direct when stating: "There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent ".

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745.Having said the foregoing raises again another question. Why is the Speaker, a Canadian citizen, being restrained from accessing or being heard by a trial court in Canada, the jurisdiction where his property and other civil interests are most affected by the defendants? The answer, at least to the plaintiffs, is an obvious one. The defendant state fears a civil prosecution may lead to a public exposure of institutional abuses of human rights, official powers and corruption the likes of that reported by NGO's, the UN, the EC (European Court) and US State Department [see: Part 1: facts Existing In Aggravation of the Claim]. To the plaintiffs no other explanation is plausible. 746.The present enquiry's a posteriori reasoning also suggests a reason why the Master or Chambers Judge would not judicially review the Complainant's Charter and other complaints. Therefore a standing practice and procedure must exist in order for the Master or Chambers Judge to have placed a reverse onus on any party in a suit at law upon applying for judicial review of their application. The Master leaving it to them to secure their a priori rights, inter alia, of access to the court to have their application heard, and to develop their judicial remedy before the court. 747.The Master's reverse onus having two elements, either the Complainant must appear personally, or must secure an attorney to appear. The Master or Chambers Judge proving insensitive and unresponsive to any petitioning on extraordinary facts, or afflictive circumstances acting to involuntarily obstruct the petitioner from complying with onus imposed by the Master's Order. 748.The Master’s Order clearly observed the negative restrictions placed on the court to not deny the petitioner his right to develop a legal remedy before it, these restrictions flowing naturally from the cited international law and constitutional duty of the Master. However, the Master wrongly and unreasonably reversed the onus of the courts positive obligation to react responsively to all persons having an observable affliction. The Master failed to observe his and the Court’s positive constitutional duty to procedural fairness. Under the circumstances to observe his duty the Master was required, ex proprio motu, to act where and when it is becomes apparent that the a priori rights of an Complainant are about to be indirectly denied by the Master’s observing certain Rules of the Court or common practices in what are unusual circumstances. This resulted in an indirect discrimination based solely upon the other status of the Complainant in society who happens to be an indigent Canadian citizen deprived of his liberty in a - Bulgaria - prison. 749.The Complainant's circumstances, already aggravated by the Defendant Bulgaria are now made impossible by the Master's order. The defendant Bulgaria able to continue with impunity to interfere with the Complainant's right to develop his judicial remedy in Canada, and able to maintain its unwillingness to allow the Complainant access to the court in British Columbia in the absence of a Master of Chambers Judge order. 750.Could a Duty Master or the Chambers Judge of the trial court have therefore erred in judgement when placing a reverse onus on this Complainant to secure his a priori rights otherwise guaranteed to him by the international commitments of both Bulgaria, and Canada? 19178560.doc

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Part 5 Procedures, Conflicts and Comity 751.It is recognised, for the purposes of the enquiry to follow that the order or decision of a Master or Chambers Judge is discretionary, having followed a practice and procedure of the court in determining to have complaints "spoken to" by a petitioner or his legal representative. 752.It should be recalled the Complainant petitioned the trial court for some reasonable form of procedural relief from the defendant Bulgaria's obstruction of his a priori right as a person deprived of liberty to develop a judicial remedy, and to prosecute, or defend his interests in a suit at law. 753.It is reasonable to again recall the Complainant's complaint to the Commissioner before attempting to resolve the practice and procedure available under the Court Rules Act, or that applied by the Master to the observable facts before the court. The Master reasoning a posteriori, what is or is not to be an a priori right of an indigent litigant deprived of liberty. The intended appeal maybe summarised as follows: 754.First, a practice and procedure under the Court Rules Act, Rules of Court, is being impugned by this Complainant, it indirectly discriminating solely on the basis of a person's status of property and self-determination. 755.The Act is impugned due to an omission, it having failed to distinguish the governments negative restrictions from its positive constitutional obligations to persons subject to a regular form of indirect discrimination solely due to the inherent legal disabilities -disadvantages - i.e. as affects all indigent prisoners. 756.The Act is further impugned for failing to identify indigent persons deprived of their liberty as belonging to a distinct social group. The courts, on removing a person's right of self determination having created a distinguishable, and disadvantaged "other status" different from other indigent members of society. 757.This "other status" is one made inherently afflictive by an act of law, it therefore warranted a positive legislative remedy. 758.The difficulty arises from the present practices and procedures of the court not being sensitive to the afflictions, or responsive to the needs of the affected group. As a result all persons within this distinct, and disadvantaged group are unable to overcome the obvious indirect discrimination occurring solely due to their unmistakable "other status" in Canadian society. The impugned practice and procedure acts as an unreasonable barrier only to members of the group, it barring them from engaging the services of the provincial courts of law in prosecuting or defending their legitimate interests in a suit at law. 759.The groups Charter, and a priori rights as flow from the principles of international law are as a result unreasonably limited in a suit at law by the impugned Act. The present practice and procedures indirectly and unintentionally barring all members of the group from

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accessing the courts powers or obtaining a judicial remedy bar solely due to their poverty, and the distinct disadvantage of having been deprived of liberty. 760.Second, the observable facts and circumstances of this Complainant's "other status" make the Duty Master's order unreasonable, and Chambers Judge findings incorrect. 761.Both order, and decision are impugned for failing to recognise, or to be unresponsive to the petitioner's a priori rights as a member of a distinct, and disadvantaged social group existing within Canadian society. 762.The Duty Master erring in judgement when having failed to distinguish the courts positive constitution obligation and duty to procedural fairness to persons having "other status" from its negative restrictions to limiting the rights of parties in a suit at law. 763.The Master proved insensitive, and unresponsive to the inherent afflictions of the petitioner's "other status", and the affect to his procedural rights on the application of a practice and procedure of the Master in a suit at law. In electing to place a reverse onus on the Petitioner in place of the courts positive constitutional obligation and duty, the Master acted to effectively bar the petitioner's access to the courts procedural powers. 764.The legal affect of the Duty Master's order was to indirectly discriminate by making the court's services available to the petitioner only on condition of property - he must have the means to retain legal counsel - and on a condition of self-determination - he must be able to appear before the court. 765.The Chambers Judge, the learned Edwards J., erred on finding the Master's order reasonable. His Lordship's decision proved equally insensitive, and unresponsive to the petitioner's "other status" in Canadian society. Edwards J. apparently finding poverty, and the deprivation of liberty, a "other status" having no inherent disadvantage, or affliction derogating from, or otherwise indirectly discriminating in unreasonably limiting the petitioner's possibility to exercise his a priori rights. His Lordship failing to make the distinction between the negative constitution restrictions on the Master as opposed to his positive obligations to equality and procedural fairness. 766.The learned Master, and Chambers Judge, both erred in their a posteriori reasoning when finding the petitioner's poverty, and loss of self determination as posing no obstacle to his appearing before the court, or retaining a legal representative. The order creating a practical barrier that acted to indirectly discriminate by limiting the petitioner's rights as a person under law to prosecute, or defend his claims in a suit at law as a citizen of Canada. The Petitioner's a priori rights to a fair, and open adversarial hearing of the his complaints, and the facts denied to him by the Master solely due to this other status. 767.The Complainant attempted to resolve, from three standpoints, the Duty Master's order, and Chambers Judge Decision. It is significant to recall that the Complainant was not provided any written reasons for the Duty Master's order.

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768.The first possible point appears to concerns the procedural options available to a Master or Chambers Judge of the provincial court, the second a possible conflict between the national laws of Canada and Bulgaria acting as a bar to the available procedures, and the third and final point concerns the comity among nations. The defendant's status as a foreign State acting to bar the Master in exercising the courts inherent jurisdiction over its own processes.

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PREFACE

To the Honourable Ladies and Gentlemen Members of Parliament,

I have written and compiled this report from inside a Bulgarian prison cell. Bringing this report before members of Parliament would have been impossible if it were not for the assistance I received from Dr. Donald Kommers and other members of the law faculty at Notre Dame Law School and law students like Tom Messner and the other fine future alumni of Notre Dame who gave so much of their time in helping me. The report’s Writer is the victim of the practices he documents. As a citizen of Canada, the Writer believes the conducts documented in the report are unlawful and have directly and unlawfully derogated from the legal rights and Charter protections of the Writer. More significant is the ongoing risk that other naturalized citizens of Canada may suffer malicious prosecutions and torture because Crown servants and police agencies of Canada do not feel fettered outside of Canada by Charter covenants and pre-existing positive legal duties to Canadians who travel or work abroad. When preparing this Report the Writer considered that servants of the Crown have two fundamental obligations to him and other citizens of Canada. First, as crown servants the ethical obligation of protecting citizens of Canada. Second, as crown servants the legal obligation to observe the laws of Canada and its Charter protections. Such are the ethical and legal obligations of the Crown and they do not fall away once a citizen of Canada leaves the boundaries of Canada’s or when a servant of the Crown, no longer within Canada deals with officials and agencies of a foreign state. The Writer considers as a priori the principal that the ethical and legal duty of the Crown and its servants is first to serve and protect the rights and interests of citizens of Canada, in and outside of Canada. Not to place the interests of foreign officials and states above the natural law and other rights of Canada’s citizens.

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This a priori principle must form the premise for the Writer’s report. In its absence the complaints of this Writer become moot. That is not to say that the interests of democratic societies as a whole and the common social good are to be subordinated according to ones citizenship, the rule of law demands otherwise. However, the rules of official conduct and civil protections enacted under Canada’s national law and binding over Crown servants and agencies cannot come with territorial limitations. The same laws and oath that bind servants of government in Canada also bind them outside of Canada. Such oaths and Canada’s national laws, in particular the Charter, do not come with caveats that the rules of conduct and duty to protect the rights of Canada’s citizens is binding only within Canada. The Writer never expected for officials of the Republic of Bulgaria to observe his Charter or due process rights under Canadian law. However, he did expect members of Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and other Crown servants to observe his Charter rights and their legal duty to him as a citizen of Canada. Even beyond the boundaries of Canada. Regrettably, it was in 1999 that this Writer first learned a valuable and disappointing lesson in being a citizen of Canada. Protection from Canadian police abuse and malicious prosecution only extended as far as the borders of Canada. ARAR learned the same lesson in 2002. I ask the Honourable members of this Parliament to image the surprise ARAR must have felt and this Writer still feels when learning that our rights as citizens of Canada exist only for as long as we are in Canada. More shocking still was to learn that agencies of Canada still considered us “foreigners” and allowed our extradition preferred to our repatriation to Canada. The Honourable Members of Parliament may well be asking the following question. Why is this report being presented to parliament by the family and friends of a citizen of Canada still incarcerated in the Republic of Bulgaria? The answer is a simple one. No agency of the Government of Canada is prepared to assist this Writer or his family in exposing the truth or in defending the Writer’s legal and fundament rights in Canada or abroad. Even Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs demonstrated an unwillingness to act on irrefutable documents proving that the Writer’s arrest, prosecution and public humiliation and torture in the Republic of Bulgaria are directly the result of an agency of the Crown. So disclosure to Canada’s elected officials is now left to this Writer, his family, a close circle of friends, sympathetic elected officials and professionals. As a result, the report is presented to the Honourable Ladies and Gentlemen Members of Canada’s Parliament by the victim. When preparing this report the Writer posited the following questions. Is there a cover up?

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Objectively, it is only the Honourable Ladies and Gentlemen Members of Parliament who can eventual find the correct answer to this question. However, there is strong anecdotal evidence to suggest this to be the true in both in the Writer’s case and that of ARAR. The Honourable Members of Parliament can draw their own conclusions from the events documented in the Report and beginning sometime in February of 1995 in Sofia, Bulgaria. The Report clearly documents the following. How in May of 1995 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Liaison and Federal Executive Services and the Attorney General of Canada sent a representative to Sofia, Bulgaria to request Bulgarian police arrest and prosecute me. At the time I was still in Bulgaria. On July 7th 1995 this information was reduced to a written criminal indictment issued by the Crown against me. The indictment stipulates the exact nature of the crime the Writer is alleged to have committed in Bulgaria and the nature of the charges Bulgarian prosecutors are to bring against the Writer. In the indictment the Crown requests that after the arrest and prosecution of the Writer Bulgarian police are to obtain certain information from the Writer and vital to the Crown. In the indictment the Crown supplies Bulgarian prosecutors with it alleged are Canadian police facts about the crimes the Writer is said to have committed not only in Bulgaria, but in Canada and elsewhere. The Crown acted in a calculated fashion to create an atmosphere of intense officially and public enmity against the Writer, the Crown telling Bulgarian police and prosecutors that the Writer was inter alia “a well known in Canada and convicted for the molestation and raping of children”. This together with other maliciously untrue slanders and libels is repeated to other Bulgarian officials and later is reported in the mass media. Until 1999, the Writer believed the Reports of Canada’s involvement in his arrest and extradition, the published reports of Canada Foreign Affairs advising German and Bulgarian authorities that Canada was not interested in the repatriation of naturalized citizens of Canada like the Writer to be nothing more than the result of a to fertile an imagination of Bulgarian police investigators and prosecutors. This was also the Writers opinion towards the malicious slanders attributed by the Bulgarian media to Canadian police authorities. The Writer would be proven wrong. In April of 1999, during the course of the Writer’s criminal trial, when Bulgarian prosecutors presented the trial court with Bulgarian language copies of the secret Crown indictment issued in July of 1995 that the Writer first learned of the Crown’s direct involvement in having him criminally charged, arrested and extradited to Bulgaria.. This document, together with “evidence” collected in Canada was prepared and submitted by a Crown determined to have the Writer convicted and kept in Bulgaria. During course of his criminal trial, the Writer learned from the Bulgarian Ministries of justice and foreign affairs that no letters rogatory were issued to Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting legal assistance in a criminal investigation of the Writer. The Crown’s involvement and its evidence before a Bulgarian criminal court apparently not solicited by the Bulgarian government, but instead volunteered by Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Liaison and Federal Executive Services and the Attorney General of Canada. It was then, that the Writer and his family began filing

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complaints with Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Report also documents how in 2001 the Writer sent written complaints to Ann McLellan, Canada’s former Minister of Justice and Attorney General, and to officials of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and then Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy. At no time did Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of Justice and Attorney General address the facts proving the Writer had been charged by Bulgarian police and prosecutors at the request and on the initiative of the Crown. The Writer’s arrest, his extradition from German and his detention in Bulgaria each the result of a secret Crown indictment issued in 1995 and continued Crown involvement in the Writer’s prosecution until 1998. No agency of the Government of Canada was prepared to confront the facts or willing to put to a legal test the complaints of this Writer. The difficult question of why the Crown acted in complete secrecy and needed to have the Writer arrested and prosecuted in a Bulgaria remains unanswered and a mystery. Canada’s government agencies and its ministries all remained silent, that silence deafening and the Writer left to his own wits. In late 1999 and early 2000, the Writer was contacted by a journalist from the Globe and Mail who had learned of the secret Crown indictment from the family of the Writer. The story on the Writer and the Crown complicity in his arrest and torture was killed by an Editor for the Globe and Mail, even after investing several months in research. The reason given the Writer and his family was that the Globe’s Chief Editor had been contacted by senior officials of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Liaison and Federal Executive Services and the Attorney General of Canada who asked he kill the story. The Globe Editor complied because, according to the police information he received the Writer was “guilty and not worthy of sympathy”. In 2001 the Writer and his family filed lawsuits in British Columbia Supreme Court against Staff Sgt. Derek Doornbos, a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police claiming among other things a constitutional tort. It was also in late 1999 that the substantive and visible assistance from consular officials at Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and visits from Canada’s Ambassador to Romania, the Honourable David Collins and consular services official Jamie Bell also from the Embassy of Canada in Bucharest. Such visits to Sofia Bulgaria included intensive sessions with German consular officials who assured Canada’s Consul Bell that the Writer could not be tried in Bulgaria on any new accusation and the sentence, if any, had to be within the confines of a similar sentence had the Writer been tried in Germany, consular officials considered 9 years as a maximum prison term, anything else would precipitate protests from the Government of Germany and Canada. In March of 2001 the Writer received a first sentence of 23 years at hard labour. The Honourable Members of Parliament will learn how no protest from Canada or German manifested itself and how abruptly the visits and assistance to the Writer ended and the requests for capitulation began.

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After the departures of Ambassador Collins and Consul Jamie Bell, the new representatives of Canada’s foreign affairs to Bulgaria proved uninterested in the Writer’s case, particular the new Canadian Ambassador whom the Writer never saw. Also, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade repeatedly requested the family of the Writer convince him to drop any appeals against his criminal conviction and to also discontinue his civil and human rights complaints against the government of Bulgaria and a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International had no desire to confront Bulgarian or Germany government officials with the Writer’s complaints or to forcefully insist on his legal rights according to the terms of the Writer’s extradition from Germany in 1996, preferring instead to satisfy unreasonable Bulgarian demands and to keep the Writer’s story from the people and justices of Canada. Is this simply a coincidence? Or is it a subtle effort to continue what is a successful suppression of the Writer’s case? Like ARAR, the present incident proves to be another embarrassment for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Liaison and Federal Executive Services, the Attorney General of Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The latter’s policy of appeasement recently having failed too secure a Bulgarian agreement to transfer this Writer to a prison in Canada. Are the Governments of Canada and the Republic of Bulgaria in silent agreement to delay or avoid the repatriating the Writer to Canada? This is a deeply disturbing and alien question for a citizen of Canada to ask the members of this parliament. But as abstract a concept as this may seem, the unwillingness of the Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to act and the circumstances of the Crown involvement in the ARAR INCIDENT begs the question. Is there a secret or undeclared agreement between the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Bulgaria for the Writer to remain in Bulgaria and so kept from publicly prosecuting his claims in court against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Liaison and Federal Executive Services, the Attorney General of Canada and the Republic of Bulgaria? So abstract an idea requires that there be something of sufficient consequence to make someone or some agency of Canada prepared to undertake such unlawful collusion, the idea is far fetched and maybe only the seed of paranoia finding root in the fertile mind of a man to long imprisoned and separated from his family and country. But still the Honourable Members of Parliament must ask themselves this. Why in 1996 did the Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Liaison and Federal Executive Services and the Attorney General of Canada rely on cloak and dagger antics, secret indictments and foreign police and prosecutors to prosecute a citizen of Canada and question him? Is there an official culture and policy of appeasement within Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade?

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The ARAR AND SAMPSON INCIDENTS, together with the Writer’s case, each document before Parliament how representatives of Canada’s embassies and consular services in and outside of Canada insulate themselves from the suffering of Canada’s citizens incarcerated in foreign prisons. No consular official in the ARAR and SAMPSON cases or that of the Writer’s proved willing or prepared to confront foreign officials with the complaints of Canada’s citizens. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs never once having reacted proactively or positively by confronting foreign officials who violate the international legal and human rights of Canada’s citizens detained or incarcerated in their country. The advice of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to the citizens of Canada takes the form of subjugation and appeasement, not honour and dignity. The Writer documents in this Report how Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade prefers to leave such proactive and positive actions and confrontations to the families of Canada’s citizens and to any member of Canada’s parliament prepared to help a distressed citizen. The principle objective of the Department of Foreign Affairs appears only as an administrative one keeping records of how many citizens of Canada complain of malicious prosecutions, physical and psychological mistreatment and abuses indirectly are resulting from what is an ineffectual policy of “silent diplomacy” and has no concrete mandate to proactively pursue such complaints. Year after painful year citizens of Canada are being told to follow advice and to “trust their government and the experience of its officials”. The only apparent experience of officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa is how to avoid confronting foreign officials. The Honourable Members of this Parliament will find instead a documented preference at foreign affairs to confront and distress Canadian families and not foreign officials. It is with practiced aloofness, that officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade repeat to Canadian families only what they are told by representatives of the foreign governments. Never are often questionable legal and factual representations of foreign officials put to any kind of legal or factual test by the Department of Foreign Affairs. When such representations are openly and reasonably challenged by Canadian families, then officials of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs fall upon an ancient mantra of sovereign right and immunity, the severity of their loved ones crimes, the consequences and risk of traveling or working abroad and the need to appease and not confront foreign officials. The Honourable Members of this Parliament will have the opportunity to read exactly how one Canadian family finds its confronted by Canadian officials who words appear more to defend the rights of foreign states and not those of the citizens of Canada they are torturing. Canadian families are repeatedly and incorrectly advised by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade that treaties are not legally binding on Canada’s bi-lateral or multi-lateral partners, and there is no recourse for the Government of Canada against those states refusing to observe or reasonably apply their treaty obligations to citizens of Canada. Nothing can be done except to satisfy the demands of foreign officials, no matter how unreasonable, ethically questionable and often unlawful.

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In the 7th year of the Writer’s trial, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade “strongly advised” he withdraw his most recent an appeal against a wrongful criminal conviction, and that he surrender all his other legal, property and human rights in Bulgaria. In addition, his family was asked to pay money to the State of Bulgaria. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade also “strongly advised” the Writer meet Bulgarian demands that the Writer “of his own free will” withdraw claims against Bulgaria made before the European Court of human Rights and before civil courts of Canada and the United States. The Writer was even asked by the Department of Foreign Affairs that he to provide a declaration to Bulgarian officials that he was not being coerced into giving these concessions. Officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade gave the reason for making such requests to the Writer and his family as securing “good-will” from the Bulgaria officials so that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade could get the cooperation of their Bulgarian counterparts in the transfer of a citizen of Canada. The report documents exchanges with officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, who advised the Writer that citizens of Canada giving up rights not restricted by virtue of a criminal conviction was an acceptable practice in international law. That these payments of money and the appeasement of these Bulgarian officials would give Canada’s foreign affairs officials the “diplomatic tools” they need to get the Writer home. Are other Canadian families asked to do the same? Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs has proven by his silence that Canada’s foreign policy is one preferring incarcerated Canadian citizens and their families capitulate and appease foreign states rather than expect Canada’s Foreign Minister and his office to demand or defend their rights for them. In the Writer’s case, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs has so far been unwilling to confront officials of Bulgaria’s government with the specific breaches of their written promises found in Bulgarian letters rogatory delivered to the governments of Canada and Germany. According to these letters rogatory, the Bulgarian cannot try or convict the Writer on an accusation’s elements different from that for which he was extradited in 1996. As a result of this Bulgarian promise the charge of embezzlement brought after the Writer’s his extradition is in breach of the Bulgarian letter rogatory agreement with the Government of Germany. Furthermore, the elements of the Bulgarian accusation of embezzlement against the Writer do constitute the elements of a criminal offence in Germany and therefore would not be extraditable. Even so Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs refuses to act. Instead, officials at Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade prefer instead to defend the actions and demands of Bulgarian officials as a sovereign right of the Bulgarian state, notwithstanding the unreasonableness and incompatibility of such demands with international or law Bulgaria’s basic constitutional law Why does Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs remain silent in the face of the fact of the Republic of Bulgaria agreeing to the transfer and parole citizens of other states but not a citizen of Canada? The Report documents letters rogatory and other Bulgarian correspondences between Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Bulgaria and this Writer. Repeatedly, the Writer

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is assured by Canada that Bulgaria will observe its treaty with Canada on transfer of sentenced persons and transfer the Writer to a Canadian prison. Recently, as is documented in this Report, the Republic of Bulgaria reneged on its written assurance and refused the only Canadian request to Bulgaria for a transfer for one of its citizens. Why? When Bulgaria is routinely approving other transfers for citizens other states. It remains to be seen if Canada’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs will bring an end to the culture of appeasement and insulation from confrontation with foreign officials that its officials have been allowed to enjoy at the expense of Canadian families. Such a practice having flourished for far too long and at a terrible human cost to ARAR, SAMPSON, this Writer and each of our families who have endured our pain. Will Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs take the more challenge approach by ending this culture, and replacing with one prepared to legally and diplomatically confront states like Bulgaria that consider their treaty obligations “optional” and the keeping of promises unnecessary when the Canadian government is unwilling to take recourse. If Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs decides to act, then he can bring this Writer home and possibly other citizens of Canada in similar circumstances. So, what of the facts? The Report documents in detail how agencies of the Crown acted outside the scope of their legislated mandate and breached the due process rights of naturalized citizens of Canada. Court documents collected in the Republic of Bulgaria by the Writer provide prima facie evidence that give both pith and substance to the Writer’s complaints. These copies of official Canadian government correspondences indict the Crown and Royal Canadian Mounted Police for what is now proven to be a malicious prosecution on untrue allegations of fraud and misappropriation alleged by the Crown to have occurred in Bulgaria. The Crown responsible for having uttered and made public maliciously injurious slanders designed and having the sole purpose of creating public enmity against the Writer and so aiding the Crown’s stated purpose of having the Writer arrested and prosecuted in Bulgaria. The Crown is responsible for the Writer’s public humiliation, his destroyed reputation and business collapse. The Writer’s inhumane 29 month detention in solitary confinement and repeated torture are directly a result of the Crown’s repeated demands for information from police agents and prosecutors in the Republic of Bulgaria. The documents identified in this report provide more than anecdotal evidence of what are clandestine and unregulated practices finding agencies of the Crown acting with both malice and forethought when violating the Charter rights and freedoms of naturalized citizens of Canada who travel or work abroad. The documents found in the Report reveal the Crown providing foreign police and prosecutors with specific criminal charges, factual motives and requests for the criminal prosecution of Canada’s citizens by foreign prosecutors.

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The Report reveals how the Crown acted in scienter with the police agents and prosecutors of a foreign state in the malicious prosecution and unlawful detention of a citizen of Canada on criminal charges and reasons formulated by the Crown. The official documents made a part of Report are a written record of how to aide an unrelated criminal investigation in Canada, the Crown turns a blind eye and a deaf ear towards the public humiliation and physical and psychological torture caused too naturalized citizens of Canada. The Writer’s case and the MAHER ARAR INCIDENT document to Parliament a willingness of the Crown to tolerate serious injury and harm coming to citizens of Canada. Public statements by Bulgarian prosecutors and police together with anecdotal evidence strongly support the theory that the Crown prefers to unburden itself of naturalized citizens whom it deems undesirable. The Crown readily extraditing ARAR and the Writer to face criminal charges in the countries they fled as children. Criminal charges brought at the written request of the Crown. Similarities to the ARAR Incident The Report asserts that the MAHER ARAR INCIDENT in the United States and Syria of 2002 and the MICHAEL KAPOUSTIN INCIDENT in Germany and Bulgaria of 1996 are neither isolated nor occurred within an official vacuum of the Canada’s Minister of Justice and Attorney General and Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. IN BOTH THE KAPOUSTIN AND ARAR INCIDENTS, Bulgarian and Syrian police FIRST acted solely upon secret written requests and criminal indictments prepared in Canada by the Crown and delivered in secret from embassies of Canada. In both incidents there are secret Crown indictments of naturalized citizens of Canada. Both Bulgarian and Syrian police and prosecutors relied on the Canadian police conclusions and data provided them. In the KAPOUSTIN INCIDENT German courts were provided Canadian police data through Bulgaria’s Attorney General and in the ARAR INCIDENT United States immigration officials arrested ARAR on Canadian police data provided through SYRIAN police. In both KAPOUSTIN and ARAR incidents the officials of Germany and the United States were told Canada was not interested in repatriating KAPOUSTIN or ARAR and told to proceed with extraditions to their “former homelands” of Bulgaria and Syria. The Report cites a number of official public statements made by Bulgarian police and prosecution officials and supporting the supposition that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada advised GERMAN and BULGARIA authorities that Canada was not interested in the return of KAPOUSTIN, a naturalized citizen of Canada. German and United States officials new the men would be subjected to brutal treatment, including physical and psychological torture and because of the nature of accusations against them would be keep indefinitely in solitary confinement without any possibility for a judicial review of their arrest and prolonged detention. Yet, knowing this both countries proceeded with extraditions that the government of Canada had requested.

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The KAPOUSTIN and ARAR INCIDENTS each demonstrate how the police and prosecution officials of the governments of the UNITED STATES, GERMANY, SYRIA and the REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA had each been blinded by the internationally reputed credibility and honest reputation of Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police and so failed to subject the Crown’s requests and indictments of KAPOUSTIN and ARAR to any proper legal tests. BULGARIAN and SYRIAN police and prosecutors, intoxicated with reputed credibility and honesty of Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police had moved quickly to arrest and prosecute these two naturalized citizens of Canada. However, in the fullness of time the Crown indictments proved to be nothing more than maliciously false criminal allegations, nothing more than fabrications or at best libellous misrepresentations of fact presented under the guise and mantel of official police work. Both KAPOUSTIN and ARAR are cleared of the original criminal accusations found in the secret Crown indictments and the cause of their arrest, questioning, and torture. In the KAPOUSTIN INCIDENT a malicious prosecution and wrongful conviction remains only because, through the words of trust offered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade the family of the Writer was convinced into withdrawing appeals against his criminal conviction. The report documents correspondences of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and strongly suggests that Crown servants routinely withhold information on these secret commissions given by the Crown to foreign police. The Honourable members of this Parliament knew nothing of such activities until first exposed in the ARAR INCIDENT. In the Writer’s case the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Bulgarian authorities have proven adept at successfully suppressing the Writer. In conclusion what can of the Writer say of his Report? Only that it objectively proves that beyond Canada’s borders and the inquisitive eyes of its courts and elected officials, agencies of the Crown have become blinded by their apparent and so far unregulated freedom of action. To the Writer’s limited knowledge there is no Canadian enactment or judicial precedent that directly binds or makes criminal or civilly liable an agency or servant of the Crown who does not observe Canada’s Charter protections or laws beyond its borders. With no legislative fetter to Canada’s Charter or its national laws or other legislated protections of its citizens, agencies of the Crown have undertaken a dangerous and questionable practice of secret foreign commissions and indictments that pursues naturalized citizens of Canada in the countries of their birth, most internationally recognized for the physical and psychological torture employed in arrest and prison. This Report, seen in the context of the ARAR INCIDENT, is more than casual proof of the internal culture within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police International Liaison and Federal Executive Services and the Attorney General of Canada that finds senior administrators and field operatives outside of Canada acting in secret scienter with foreign police agencies

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The Report presents to the Honourable Members of Parliament facts and other exigent circumstances that exist as distinct and separate elements and have not been clouded over or distorted by the Writer’s desperation, paranoia and personal suffering. The Writer leaves it to the Honourable Ladies and Gentlemen of Canada’s Parliament to decide. Arar...................................................................67, 71 arrest warrants...................................................32, 37 Attorney General of Canada....................8, 40, 41, 44 beaten.................................................................11, 47 British Columbia Supreme Court............................38 Bulgarian Criminal Code of Procedure...................37 Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Justice.....................30 Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.....................37 Bulgarian Minister of Interior.................................30 Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. .11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 30, 32, 34, 36, 47 Bulgarian National Investigative Service..........20, 36 Canada Foreign Affairs.....................................17, 37 Central Service for Combating Organized Crime...34 children....................................................................45 civil action.......................................................38, 115 Correction Canada...................................................20 Depositary Receipt..................................................17 Deputy Director of the National [Prosecution] Investigative Service...........................................33 Deputy Solicitor General.........................................32 Filchev.....................................................................30 fraud....................................13, 18, 20, 23, 30, 35, 45 FRG...................................................................28, 37 Genov......................................................................17 Georgiev 12, 20, 22, 23, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 45 Goldie, J.A.................................................68, 69, 116 Government of Canada.17, 23, 28, 29, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 56, 57, 58, 61, 64, 65, 78, 121

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Interpol......................................19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 32 investors................................................31, 33, 36, 37 Kabalarian...................................................35, 45, 46 Kirov........................................................................38 Levicharov.........................................................18, 19 LIFECHOICE..................................17, 18, 30, 31, 32 magistrate................................................................38 Mario Dimitrov.......................................................30 Ministry of Interior..................................................30 Miroslav Genov...........................................16, 17, 32 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. 17, 40, 48 National Investigative Service 31, 32, 33, 35, 65, 120 Note Verbal........................................................28, 34 Pharmaceutical........................................................34 Prosecutor Doichev.................................................32 R.C.M.P. S. Sgt. Vander Graff.................................34 rape..........................................................................45 Rashkov...................................................................33 Roumen Andreev...............................................32, 33 S004040.............................................................38, 68 Shearing...........................................18, 19, 35, 45, 46 Sofia District Attorney’s Office...............................30 swindler...................................................................45 tortured....................................................................47 transfer.....................................................................36 transfers...........................................13, 18, 22, 35, 36 Vancouver Proceeds of Crime Unit.........................36 Vangelov............................................................34, 35 victims.....................................................................36

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