Worry About Afghanistan And Pakistan

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE WELCOME AND MODERATOR: JESSICA MATHEWS, PRESIDENT CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE SPEAKER: DOUGLAS ALEXANDER, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, UNITED KINGDOM THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2009 12:30 P.M. 1776 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, NW

Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery JESSICA MATHEWS: Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. My name is Jessica Mathews, president of the Endowment. We are honored today to host a generous supporter of and friend to Carnegie, the Right Honorable Douglas Alexander, MP, the UK’s Secretary of State for International Development. Secretary of State, you visit Washington at an important time in the discussion about future policy in Afghanistan, armed with on-the-ground insight, we look forward to hearing from you. Douglas Alexander is no stranger to North America having won a scholarship to study in Canada in 1984 and another to Penn University in 1988. During this time he managed to also work on Michael Dukakis’ campaign and for a democratic senator here in Washington. So he knows American politics as well as American policy and we’ll be coming back to that issue in our discussion. Like our founder, Mr. Carnegie, Douglas Alexander was born in Scotland; became a member of parliament from there. Later, he took on a coordinating role in the Labor Party in the 2001 general election and was subsequently appointed minister with the department for trade and industry. He later rose to cabinet rank in several positions including as secretary of state for transport, and for Scotland, which he held simultaneously – a trick which I have never heard of an American cabinet member pulling off. And when Gordon Brown became prime minister two years ago, he appointed Douglas Alexander to his current position. The secretary of state is joining us fresh from his latest visit to Afghanistan, as all of you who listen to NPR in the morning, I think, know. And there, as you know, of the 42 countries involved in trying to stabilize that country, the U.K. is the second-largest contributor, both of troops and of development aid. On Sunday last, the secretary of state met with President Karzai and traveled to Helmand province on Monday to visit troops and development projects there. So his visit focused on the strands of all three elements of the approach that he has been advocating; that is, the political, the military, and the development. I’m hoping that we’ll hear a good deal more of that. We know that this is going to be no mean feat. For a country with 34 provinces, a history of extremely weak central government and one that ranks 174th in the world – one of the very poorest countries ranked that way on the development index. But as Afghanistan prepares to vote in the presidential elections in a few weeks time, and NATO forces have gone on the offensive in the South to clear villages and towns of Taliban forces, we are all aware both of the enormous price that the United States and Britain have paid in blood, in political capital, in effort and in money in attempting to spark development there. To describe the stabilization of Afghanistan as a formidable challenge seems to be an understatement and yet the costs of doing nothing have been clear to all in the US, UK and beyond since September 11, 2001, and underscored repeatedly since.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery Armed with practical experience and on-the-ground, we very much look forward to hearing from you. Welcome. (Applause.) DOUGLAS ALEXANDER: Jessica, thank you very much, indeed, for that kind introduction. And can I begin by saying what a genuine privilege it is for me to be able to speak here today at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which I understand 99 years ago this year was established, of course, by my fellow countryman – but which today continues to enjoy an enviable reputation, here and abroad, for the international leadership on foreign and strategic affairs. This is, of course, an institution rich in history but with a clear contemporary resonance, dedicated as it is to international peace and cooperation. So it is apt that my remarks today are focused on the situation in Afghanistan, the border of which was recently described by President Obama as the most dangerous place in the world. As we’ve just heard, I began this week in Afghanistan – first in Kabul where I met President Karzai and a number of his ministers together with other candidates for the office of presidency; and then next, in Helmand, I met British and American commanders, the provincial governor and teachers and doctors seeking to deliver basic services to the local population there. Reflecting on these conversations and many others have left me with a clear sense of how critical a moment this is for the future of that country. More than seven years after the Taliban was removed from power, it has proved to be a season of hard fighting on both sides of the Durand line. And while my remarks today are focused on Afghanistan, I of course recognize that we cannot achieve our goals in that country while our enemies operate from sanctuaries across that border, and for this reason we must support Pakistan in its efforts to fight extremism and terrorism within its borders. Now, in recent weeks, British, American and Afghan troops have been engaged in offensive combat operations against Taliban strongholds in Helmand province. At the same time, across the border, hundreds of soldiers have lost their lives in Pakistan’s offensive against militants in tribal areas. And more than 2 million Pakistani citizens have been forced from their homes. And, yet, at exactly the same time, as I saw for myself when I met a group of first-time voters this week in Musa Kala, across Afghanistan preparations are underway for presidential elections in just over three weeks time, which will determine the political direction of the country for the next five years. So I judged against this backdrop that it was an appropriate moment to come here to Washington to discuss the development work we must undertake if we are to align effectively the military, diplomatic and development efforts of the international community in pursuit of our shared goal of preventing the return of al-Qaida to the base from which they launched their murderous attacks on September the 11, 2001. This April, our prime minister, Gordon Brown, announced a comprehensive United Kingdom strategy to improve stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today I want to suggest that, in line with that strategy, in addition to the continued and necessary military action and the diplomatic

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery and political paths described by my colleague, the foreign secretary David Miliband, at NATO on Monday, we must support these approaches with an even stronger and deeper development effort as an international community. And as I will argue this afternoon, that stronger and deeper development effort requires from the international community a new agenda for action: working more through the Afghan government and less around it; strengthening sub-national governance; prioritizing growth and employment; and better coordinating international donor activity. Underlying this challenging four-point agenda is a straightforward understanding: If we are to achieve our shared goals for greater security through a successful counterinsurgency strategy, it is vital that we both strengthen the state and weaken the Taliban. Now, of course, Afghanistan remains a highly insecure and violent society. Whilst in the North and the West of the country the situation is relatively more secure, in the South of Afghanistan, the number of violent incidents has risen significantly in the course of this year. The insurgency is being countered militarily by a series of recent operations which aims to clear areas from Taliban control, secure them from attack and then enable Afghan authorities to bring basic services such as access to justice to the local population. In recent weeks, we have seen a concerted offensive by British and American troops in Helmand through Operation Panther’s Claw and Operation Khanjar. Operation Panther’s Claw, which launched five weeks ago in Helmand, has involved over 3,000 troops from the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Denmark and Estonia. And as a result of the operation, up to 100,000 more people – about 10 percent of the population of Helmand – will now be brought back under Afghan government control. The success of this operation will allow greater movement between the important centers of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk; it will allow many more people to be able to vote in the upcoming elections. And as Brigadier Tim Radford, the commander of Taskforce Helmand, told me earlier in the week, within 48 hours of ground being taken by the British forces, civilian stabilization experts were beginning their work in the Babaji area: engaging with key leaders, organizing community shuras and beginning the task of providing cash-for-work programs. So military progress, despite the tragic loss of casualties, has been made. But that progress, of course, as I’ve said, has come at a heavy price. And today I want to pay fulsome and humble tribute to the actions and sacrifices of British, American and other coalition service men and women alongside the Afghan armed forces and security services. This week I have had the immense privilege of spending time with some of the members of the British armed forces who are on active service in Afghanistan. And in meeting with these men and women of all ranks, I was moved by both their continuing professionalism and their dedication to the mission in the face of great risks and real dangers. The 42-country NATO mission, of course under a United Nations mandate, of which these brave men and women are part, is fundamental to the task of tackling the insurgency. Indeed, it is only through sustained military pressure that the security conditions will be created for the political

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery processes and developmental progress that are required. These political processes are frankly challenging to discuss but vital to deliver. Indeed both British and U.S. military commanders – brave and battle-hardened as they are – have themselves identified that there is ultimately no solely military solution to defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan. In writing his observations on his time in Iraq, General David Petraeus noted that – and I quote directly, “Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations” and, indeed, that the ultimate success depends on local leaders. That insight was, of course, echoed here in Washington in the confirmation hearing of General McChrystal, now the ISAF commander in Afghanistan, before the Senate’s Armed Services Committee in June. He stated, and, again, I quote directly, “We need to create in Afghanistan a state that would not allow the return of safe havens...I think that means it’s going to have to be a government that...may have some former Taliban.” These views from military commanders have influenced the approaches of both President Obama and Prime Minister Brown. Secretary of State Clinton, who yesterday welcomed and endorsed the approach set out by my colleague, the foreign secretary, on Monday, has herself made clear that we must support the government of Afghanistan both to confront the extremists of alQaida and the Taliban, and to separate them “from those who joined their ranks not out of conviction but out of desperation.” So both of our governments understand the desperation described by Secretary Clinton cannot solely be answered by military action or even political processes. It can, however, be answered by a comprehensive approach embracing development for development can address the pent-up grievances, unrelenting poverty and lack of opportunity that contributes to people resorting to violence. And it is clear that today such desperation still stalks whole communities across Afghanistan. For whilst our headlines and broadcasts inevitably and appropriately focus upon our armed forces’ engagement in the country, it is often forgotten that Afghanistan – as we have heard in the introduction – remains a desperately poor and unjust country. A tragic legacy of poverty, civil war and war-lordism coupled with the current Taliban and al-Qaida insurgency means over half of Afghans live below the poverty line, 40 percent remain unemployed and violent incidents have risen by 60 percent in Helmand this year alone. Indeed to give just one example from Helmand, only two or three criminal cases are handled by the court in Gereshk each month. It is little wonder, therefore, that on Monday, when I met teachers in Musa Kala and farmers in Lashkar Gar, they all made the same single plea: for security. For so great is the fear and the threat of violence that security and justice matter as much, if not more, than the provision of other basic services in the eyes of many ordinary Afghans. This prioritization of security however, is not unique to the circumstances of Afghanistan. Indeed, such views underpinned the World Bank’s critical 2000 report “Voices of the Poor,” which captured the views of 60,000 poor people across the globe and highlighted that safety, security and access to justice are among the top concerns for poor people – and highlighted the full detrimental

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery impact that their absence has on the lives of those living in poverty. This is why my department, the department for international development’s newly published white paper has placed such a strong emphasis on getting the building blocks of security in place first in all fragile states. And in the distinctive circumstances of Afghanistan, working to address the insecurity and impoverishment of the population is, of course, vital to our shared counterinsurgency efforts – for the lack of security suffered by the population of Afghanistan is both a cause and a consequence of the poverty that underpins the desperation afflicting the Afghan population. And while the presence of the international community to support the Afghan people resisting the insurgency is and will remain vital for some time, ultimately a stronger state at local and national level is required to deliver that basic security. The gradual replacement of international forces with the Afghan army and police is therefore vital to ensure that security and justice are in place on a sustainable long-term basis. Yet to sustain support and legitimacy, the essential functions of any state must clearly extend beyond solely security. So far from being peripheral to our shared mission, actions to strengthen the capacity of the state to deliver basic services to the population – including a stronger economy in which they can make a decent and lawful living – is central to our task. Such a comprehensive approach to building a more capable state is the surest foundation on which to convince local people in the areas affected by the insurgency to reject the Taliban and embrace a different future for their communities and for their country. We should, therefore, be in no doubt about the scale of these challenges in a nation where poverty is widespread and where narcotics still encourages criminality and, in part, funds the insurgency. Yet nor should we be despondent. In less than a month we will see the first Afghan-led elections in a country where, as Rory Stewart of Harvard University recently reminded us, “Every Afghan ruler in the 20th century was assassinated, lynched or deposed.” And in recent years since the last elections there has been some progress in delivering basic services that improved the lives of many Afghans. The United Nations estimates that 5 million refugees have been able to return home since 2001. This year’s cereal harvest is likely to be a record. And, crucially, increasing numbers of girls and boys are now going to school. Education is, of course, a vital investment in the future of any community, but in Afghanistan it brings broader benefits to a society where insurgents are recruited amongst the illiterate and impoverished, and communities are isolated by generations of poverty and conflict. So it is not coincidental that since 2007 the Taliban and its allies have bombed, burned or attacked more than 530 schools across the country. As Thomas Friedman described it in his New York Times column just last week, “This is the real war of ideas” for Afghanistan is a country where, as the education minister told me, the insurgents still behead teachers to terrorize and intimidate them out of their work to educate girls. But just as the Taliban close schools down, we are, as an international community, helping Afghans to reopen them, as I saw for myself in Musa Kala on Monday. With international support, more than 6 million children are now enrolled in school in Afghanistan, up from 900,000 boys under the Taliban when educating girls was deemed unlawful –

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery and around a third of those in school today are young girls.

Other services beyond education have improved also. Basic health care now covers 82 percent of the country. Forty thousand more Afghan children will see their fifth birthday than was the case in 2002. And women are starting to play a more active part in Afghan society. To take just one example, over 60 percent of the 450,000 Afghans benefiting from a small loans scheme which my department supports today are women. So after the coming elections, we need to speed up the pace with which Afghans take responsibility for their own affairs, both civil and military. But we will not succeed unless the Afghan state wins its battle with the Taliban for the support and loyalty of the Afghan people. And important though they are in themselves, and part though they are of a comprehensive approach to tackling the insurgency, better health and education will not be sufficient on their own to secure popular support and overcome decades of mistrust towards the state. We know what concerns the Afghan people: criminality and no redress from the justice system; corruption, bribery and insecurity in a country where for too long, too many provinces has seen the cultivation and processing of illegal narcotics as the main source of economic activity. Afghans – like people everywhere – want stronger, more accountable and more responsive governance. And the people of Afghanistan will next have that opportunity to choose their government in just under four weeks’ time. The outcome of these elections offers the international community a significant opportunity to better align its shared offer and better articulate its shared ask of the Afghan government. And that agenda for shared action should, I believe, cover four areas. Firstly, an international community needs to do more through the Afghan government and less around it. Today just 20 percent of international aid is currently channeled through government systems, and the government itself raises only 7 percent of national income in revenue, one of the lowest rates anywhere in the world. Just $750 million in national revenue for a population of 25 million – indeed the budget for the U.S. commander’s emergency response program, CERPs, which I support because it’s financing vital reconstruction work around the country – is far greater than Afghanistan’s annual tax revenue. International donors currently provide 80 percent of the national budget. So it is surely in our common interest to ensure that it is well spent but also to help the Afghans raise more of their own revenue. Some of the most important ministries including but not only finance, rural development and agriculture are now making real progress. The people of Afghanistan are entitled to see reformers backed and reinforced at the heart of an inclusive and representative political system. And we can expect that if they are, results will follow because we have seen what they have already done in sectors like education. As part of our supports through government, we need to invest in the national institutions that can help provide the checks and balances necessary to ensure the accountability and responsiveness of the government to its own people. Key anti-corruption bodies, like the high

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery office for oversight and the control and audit office need to be reinforced not to account to us, but to the people of Afghanistan themselves. We need to support these mechanisms to empower citizens, in turn, to demand real change. So I welcome the recent U.S. decision to spend more through Afghan government systems. In particular, I applaud Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s leadership on this front, and hope and anticipate that others will want to follow this lead. Of course this approach carries risks, but the risks of not working to strengthen the state are greater still for as we have seen elsewhere, the people of Afghanistan need to see their government rather than foreign powers delivering improvements. The bottom line is that the government in Afghanistan must outperform the Taliban in providing services including security and justice to the people of that nation if the insurgents are to be rejected and the insurgency defeated. Secondly, we need a government that can help fulfill the core national functions effectively and also deliver services and maintain the rule of law at the provincial and at the district level. Given the history, size and diversity of Afghanistan, power and authority has to be delegated to the local level. But this has to be done within a consistent national framework both so that people have a sense of their nation as a whole and so that what government does responds to varying local circumstances and priorities. This means sorting out the roles, responsibilities and accountability of governors, line ministries, and local councils – and how they are all supported by the donor-funded provincial reconstruction teams. Provincial and district governors need to be appointed on the basis of their ability to do the job, and given the resources they need to deliver policing, justice, basic services and employment opportunities to their people. Anyone who doubts the importance of this needs only to see as I did in Helmand this week where Governor Mangal’s leadership the province has had a record result in terms of wheat production, in part because, with funding from the international community including the British government, his Food Zone program has helped persuade 32,000 local farmers to plant wheat rather than opium. Thirdly, as an international community, we need to focus more attention on economic growth and critically the creation of legal livelihoods and jobs. In the immediate term, four out of 10 working-age Afghans are in need of work today. And in the longer term, as we undermine the insurgency militarily and politically, former fighters will need to be reintegrated into legal livelihoods and local communities. As Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has said, the sector with the best potential to create the necessary millions of new jobs is of course agriculture. So we should all get behind the government’s efforts to deliver a critical mass of the services and inputs like seeds and fertilizers that local producers require. There is however a platform on which such initiatives can take hold. The Afghan economy has grown at up to 10 percent most years since 2001 from an admittedly desperately low base. And even in 2009, in the midst of the global downturn, growth is projected at 9 percent.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery Accelerating growth requires first the maintenance of macroeconomic stability with advice and support from the IMF and the World Bank. It also requires policy change to make it easier to start a business and to safeguard better property rights together with a sustained effort to build better national and local infrastructure – especially power, water and roads – so that producers can reach markets within and beyond the country’s borders. Finally, progress on each of these vital agenda items will be slowed by fragmentation and accelerated by better coordination of the international aid effort. The Afghan national development strategy, launched in Paris last year, does provide the framework for these efforts. It is, of course, natural and right that the countries contributing troops to the ISAF effort should want to focus part of their effort in the provinces and districts where their troops are serving. In Helmand, along with our immediate stabilization work backing up our troops, my department is delivering jobs, infrastructure, health and education services across the province. But we also need to provide support at the national level too to ensure that hard-won tactical military success contributes to strategic progress on our broader objectives. The U.N. Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, under Kai Eide’s leadership, has the key role to play. Over 50 countries and many international organizations have pledged their help to Afghanistan. All of our efforts will be more effective if we allow the United Nations to play a stronger coordinating role in the time ahead. This agenda for action that I have outlined today – working more through the Afghan government and less around it; strengthening sub-national governance; prioritizing growth and employment; and better coordinating international donor activity – is straightforward to articulate but will be hard to deliver. The agenda is clear but so too is the scale of the challenge. But I believe it is a challenge which the international community must now rise to. The service and sacrifice of our armed forces in Afghanistan has, of course, been immense. But that heavy cost has been borne because what happens in Afghanistan matters to us all. Strengthening and deepening our development efforts is a vital part of our comprehensive approach to countering and defeating the insurgency. In Afghanistan today, we face common challenges and share a common commitment. And if we now take the right steps we will not only help the people of Afghanistan secure their future, but ours as well. That is our shared challenge. That is our shared responsibility. And working together, I believe it can be our shared achievement. Thank you very much, indeed. (Applause.) MS. MATTHEWS: Thank you, Secretary. Let me turn now to the audience. There are microphones. Please introduce yourself and please be crisp with your questions or comments. Who would like to begin? Right here on your right. Q: Thank you. Thank you very much for sharing your vision. My name is Eva Weigold Schultz. I’m the executive director of the US-Afghan Women’s Council, which is a public-private partnership to direct resources to advance Afghan women. And I’d be interested in hearing some of your thoughts about not only the work that your government is doing to help promote women in Afghanistan but thoughts, as we go forward in helping to grow the economy and develop sectors like the agricultural sector, that women are proportionately beneficiaries of the economic growth.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery MR. ALEXANDER: I think there are a lot of ways in which we can take the work in other countries where investing in women across the country bears and brings disproportionate benefits. When I met Richard Holbrooke in a private capacity before he was appointed to his present ambassadorial role, just about two years ago, we met in New York. And I was about to make my first visit to Afghanistan and asked his advice in terms of what I should do to get a feel for the country. He said, the first thing you need to do is to meet the women parliamentarians in Kabul. He said, if you meet them, you will both be inspired by the work that they are doing and appreciate the skills, the challenge that is faced in Afghanistan. And I took the opportunity that he suggested to me. And whether it was the women that I met then or the women that I have subsequently met who are benefiting from the microfinance project that I described, I believe that women will have a very key role in the future of the country. In particular, I think we need to look at the business opportunities that we can provide for women. As I say, on a recent visit, I visited a range of different small businesses being operated by women in Kabul and they were very clear that there is still considerable capacity – not just in Kabul but across the country – which is not being tapped effectively by the international community. So whether it be in relation to microfinancing, whether it be in ensuring that the voices of women are heard, not just in the Afghan parliament but also in decisions that are taken across the country, I think there’s a key role there. And I think, frankly, we could do more to draw on the lessons and expertise which we’ve gotten from development work elsewhere into the civilian effort in Afghanistan now and into the future. Q: Hi, there. I’m John Glenn from the German Marshall Fund. Thank you for a really nice and comprehensive presentation. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about the British debate on their views towards Afghanistan today. We read in the papers that support for the war in Afghanistan is wavering, especially after the deaths of young British soldiers. And how is the government responding and articulating its vision of what we need to do in Afghanistan, and trying to attract public support? MR. ALEXANDER: Well, of course, there is public concern when casualties are taken. And we have suffered tragic losses in what’s been a very challenging and difficult time in Afghanistan in recent months. But I see this as an elected politician as well as a government minister. Opinion polls come and go. I would not doubt the fact that the British people understand why we joined the international coalition effort, and why it is important in terms of Britain’s national security that we prevail with the international community in Afghanistan. They have asked challenging questions in relation to the support for our troops, and it is right that that debate takes place. But I think underpinning the headlines and the discussions that have taken place in recent weeks and recent months is a question that I sought to address in my remarks today, which is to assure the people of Britain that there is a comprehensive plan, including military service and military sacrifice, but extending beyond that.

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And in that sense, the speech that I made today echoes and reflects the insight which informed the strategy that our prime minister set out in the House of Commons in April, the foreign secretary set out at NATO on Monday. And in that sense, the fact that each of us – not simply the defense secretary – are making that case, I think, speaks to the fact that all of us feel a shared obligation, not simply to support our troops, both directly but also in terms of the comprehensive approach, but also continue to explain and make the case to the British public why the cause that we are engaged in, in Afghanistan is central to Britain’s national security. MS. MATHEWS: Can I follow up? Time clearly becomes a critical – if not even a very critical – political factor both in Britain and in the United States. What is your sense of how long it will take for our publics, in the best case, to feel that we are making progress worthy of the sacrifice? Can we get there quicker, or as quickly enough as the politics demand? MR. ALEXANDER: That depends on the progress. There’s one argument and one debate around timing of drawdown of troops. And my answer today is the answer that I’ve given elsewhere: that I think we are better to talk about an end state than an end date because we know the end state to which the international community is working and which we need to deploy our efforts, which is to ensure that we have a stable Afghanistan with a government that is capable of exercising its security functions in a way that both better protects its own population, better secures the region and offers greater international security. The securing of that outcome is dependent not simply on the support of the international community but the actions of the Afghan government. I applaud the efforts that are being made to strengthen the Afghan national army in particular because I think that will be fundamental to the capacity to hand over authority and responsibility on security. And if I drew one lesson from my visit there this week, it is absolute centrality of personal security to the local populations. And I think in that sense, the public debates here in the United States and in the United Kingdom will, in part, reflect the continuing issue of Britain and the United States’ national security, but will also turn on the extent to which we are able to convince our publics that there is a credible plan, the commitment and will to deliver against that plan and the international resources to meet that effort. And that’s, as I say, part of the reason for this speech today, and it’s part of the reason for the other communications the government ministers in the United Kingdom have been making in recent days. Q: My name is Harun Ahmed and I’m representing PAL-C, which is the Pakistani American Leadership Center. And you described the border – that you cited – as one of the most dangerous places in the world. And as you may know, there are millions of refugees spilling over into Pakistan every day. Will any of the aid or any of the political stability you cited be targeted towards those areas or, perhaps, the North-Western Frontier Province of Pakistan? MR. ALEXANDER: Well, if you look at the work of my department, Pakistan is now our second-largest bilateral aid program anywhere in the world. And this year we, in light of the level of internal displacement, have made significant contributions to the humanitarian efforts that are required.

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There is more work to be done in relation to that continuing humanitarian challenge, but Britain, of course, is but one actor in relation to support for Pakistan. And I know that there are other countries who are also considering what further support can be provided. It is also fair to acknowledge that these areas are extremely challenging environments in which to work. And if you are to move beyond the humanitarian response to both the reconstruction phase and the longer-term development work, then it’s right to acknowledge that these are very, very challenging environments. But in that sense, I know that it is an issue of which we are focused on and I know a number of other international partners are focused on. MS. MATHEWS: Yes? Q: I’m Dana Marshall with Dewey & LeBoeuf. Minister, could you describe a little bit whether the European Union is providing any sorts of trade preferences to the border area of Pakistan, Afghanistan, something that might be parallel to this reconstruction opportunity zones initiative that the United States is trying to conclude for that area? MR. ALEXANDER: It is inherent in the nature of the European Union that the United Kingdom is but one of 27. And, in that sense, I wouldn’t be able to speak with the full authority of the European Commission on this issue given that there are continuing discussions. But I do know, both from my time as trade minister and, latterly, in terms of discussions around Pakistan, that Britain continues to look very carefully at this issue and to make the case for what we can do within the European Union. There have been significant steps taken in terms of access to European markets over a number of years. But it is an issue which we continue to look at. And it’s right to recognize it’s certainly very high on the agenda for the government of Pakistan in terms of its dialogue and debate both with ourselves and with other European governments. When I met President Zardari recently, it was one of the key issues that he pressed that we support within the discussions that are ongoing within the European Union. MS. MATHEWS: Might I just follow up with – the prime minister, on being asked about further increases in the British level of effort, has made reference to the level of effort by other members of the EU. Are you satisfied with that level of effort on both the military and development fronts? And if not, is there a plan to try to enhance it? MR. ALEXANDER: In terms of the approximately 9,000 British troops serving in Afghanistan at the moment, we are quite significantly the second-largest provider of international forces after the United States. And in that sense, it is in the nature of an alliance such as NATO that we look to our partners to share the burden of responsibility. It has been the case at the last meeting of the NATO council and will continue. The NATO secretary general made this case in further meetings; that we will continue to discuss with our partners within NATO what scope there is, not simply for troops to be engaged in combat operations, but critically in the training of the Afghan national army. I was engaged in some discussions here in Washington in the last couple of days, and it is very evident as American forces engage in and arrive to deliver training for the Afghan national army

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery that there will be further opportunity for other NATO partners to contribute to that part of the mission. That is, as I say, the subject of ongoing discussions, not simply between ourselves and the United States but also with the other partners in the NATO council. MS. MATHEWS: Next question – yes, in the back. Q: Grant Smith at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. Minister, how does the trade of narcotics fit into the agenda that you have outline? And is there – (inaudible, audio difficulty) – in the Afghan government now or – (inaudible) – after the recent change in U.S. policy in this area? MR. ALEXANDER: It was on one of my earlier visits to Afghanistan where one of our commanders in the field said that he had started his time of service in Afghanistan thinking of two dinner plates; with the insurgency being one dinner plate and the narcotics being the other. He said, you now need to think of these two plates sitting on top of each other because, actually, it is through the growth and production of narcotics that the insurgency is being funded. And the networks are tight and very close. In that sense, it is a key element of the work that we are doing in Afghanistan – to try and address this continuing challenge. Some progress has been made. We’ve moved from a position where only two provinces were poppy-free to a situation, if I recollect, where 18 are poppy-free today. The experience internationally of other countries such as Thailand is that this process will take time. It is a complex and challenging undertaking. But at the heart of that complexity, it has always struck me that there’s a fairly simple equation which is: Where you have the security and the rule of law about which I spoke earlier, it is an easier – or should I say less difficult – undertaking to remove opium production and narcotics. Where that is contested, it is significantly more challenging. And that’s why, in terms of the figures last year and the previous year in Helmand, given the insurgency, we face a particular challenge. Having done the job of international development secretary for two years, I’ve had the opportunity to speak to different United States ambassadors in Kabul on this very subject. And in that two years I’ve seen a quite significant reorientation of the United States’ effort. In that sense, I think there is a greater degree of alignment today in terms of the international coalition’s efforts than perhaps was the case at times in the past where there was a very live debate around issues like chemical spraying. I discussed the situation with Richard Holbrooke on Sunday evening. And there is broad agreement in terms of the steps that we need to be taking in order to counter the threat of narcotics. But I also think we need to acknowledge that the international community, including the United Kingdom, is the key partner of the government of Afghanistan. And, as in so many areas of policy, we can help. But, ultimately, the responsibility rests with the government of Afghanistan to take forward the work in relation to counternarcotics, albeit with the support and encouragement of the international community. MS. MATTHEWS: Tom? Q: Thank you very much for the speech. Here in Washington there’s been an ongoing debate both with respect to Iraq and also Afghanistan in the last six, seven years about the relative

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery relationship between the Pentagon and civilian agencies involved in reconstruction efforts. And I think there’s an ongoing debate about that which the Obama administration is also planning to address in a sense. What has been the British experience, particularly in Afghanistan, with respect to how to find the proper balance between the engagement of a civilian agency like the department for international development in the reconstruction effort; working alongside the ministry of defense and the British armed forces? Are there things we can learn from your experience as we go forward with this debate here in Washington? MR. ALEXANDER: The first point I would make would be since at least 1776 there’s been fairly different institutional architecture here in Washington than in London. And in that sense, while I think our experience and our structures in Whitehall can be of interest, there’s not a direct parallel given a whole range of differences from the nature of the presidential system to the relative structures of the cabinet systems. My sense is that there has been a huge amount of learning undertaken both in the Department of Defense and elsewhere in the United States system of government in recent years in terms of this whole issue of civilian effect of stabilization. And my sense is that there are some quite outstanding experts in stabilization who with pride wear an American military uniform. And in that sense I wouldn’t want to suggest that stabilization is the province either of civilians or of the military. I think that what you’re looking for is an effective partnership informed by the right learning. From the British point of view, I took real pride on Monday when I met with Tim Radford, the commander of Taskforce Helmand, when he spoke so positively about the degree of coordination there has been in the stabilization effort in Helmand. It is a civilian-led provincial reconstruction team. I didn’t simply speak with our own military commanders, but sat with U.S. Marine colonels as well, and they said unequivocally their experience in Helmand had vindicated that there can be effective coordinated action between civilian stabilization workers and civilian effect with the military. But it’s right to recognize that the kinetic phase of a campaign operates at times on a different time scale from not simply the immediacy of stabilization but the longer-term challenge of development. And in that sense, I think it is vital that not only are we engaged immediate stabilization efforts where our troops are engaged, but also undertaking the at times slower and challenging process of building the capacity of the state, which is why I think it is important that as well as committing our funds in Helmand, we are also committing funds through the national system of government because you could have tactical military success and still see a degree of strategic failure if we were not able simultaneously to be building the capacity of national institutions while securing the ground that our troops have won. MS. MATHEWS: The gentleman there. Q: I’m Clay Ramsay, Worldpublicopinion.org. I’m often interested in discussions of Afghanistan that agriculture of itself often doesn’t seem to get its own heading in these discussions.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery And so here we have a quite poor country yet with regions of it that have a great agricultural past that were renowned for their orchard production, very dependent on irrigation; the kind of network that is always broken down by conflict – irrigation network. So I wonder if you would just make a few remarks about agriculture as a field of development for this very poor country that can’t feed itself. MR. ALEXANDER: With respect, I sense from your question you haven’t had a conversation with Richard Holbrooke in the last two or three days. It is a constant refrain of that particular ambassador that we need to do more and better in relation to supporting the agricultural sector in Afghanistan. And I take the points that you make both about the history of agricultural production within Afghanistan. And it is not simply an issue in relation to food security and economic growth, per se. It is also critical as a source of employment as I sought to draw out in my own remarks. My sense is that there will be a very significant upscaling of the effort to support agriculture in the months and years ahead. And if that was implicit in my remarks, it is only because I am so certain that is the case on the basis of the discussions I’ve had with the administration. Q: Marina Ottaway, Carnegie Endowment. You touched very briefly upon the issue of the possibility of reintegration of Taliban elements in the government. Could you tell us a little more about that, about what the discussions are? Is it the possibility of a deal with the Taliban or just amnesty for individuals who come in from the cold – or what form this might take? Thank you. MR. ALEXANDER: It’s an issue which was discussed at much greater length by my colleague, the foreign secretary, on Monday. As I say, it’s a difficult issue to discuss when the service and sacrifice of our troops have resulted in casualties in recent weeks and recent months. But I think it’s an important element of the conversation and I think it – as I said in our radio interview on Monday – reflects the good sense and judgment of the British people that it is an important part of the debate and the discussion around Afghanistan. While I was with President Karzai on Sunday, the night before he had spoken at an election rally in Kabul. And the top priority he identified for the future was a process, a peace process as he described it, involving discussions with not simply Pakistan but also all the elements represented within Afghan society. And in that sense, my own reference to it in my remarks today does not reflect the attempt of the international community to impose this discussion on the Afghans. Every candidate with whom I met for the presidency raised this issue and discussed it. It seems to me that there has been some limited effort to date led by the Afghan government in relation to drawing over individual fighters and local commanders in Musa Kala. The present governor is a former Taliban commander. But President Karzai was certainly keen to emphasize the fact that this was an issue he wished to give more thought to. I think it is clear that we need to sustain the military pressure on the Taliban because there are elements within the Taliban who are wholly irreconcilable, who are allied closely with al-Qaida,

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery and for whom there is no rationale for renunciating (ph) violence or accepting the Afghan constitution. But as Secretary Clinton has made clear, there are others who appear to have joined the insurgency in part out of desperation. And if we can support the government of Afghanistan in its efforts to draw over those elements within the Taliban then that is something that we support. The broader issue in terms of at the level of commanders, I think, is not an issue that I would feel equipped to discuss today because I’m not clear as to what President Karzai, if he is reelected, or the other candidates if they are elected, would see as being the sequencing which would both strengthen the capacity of the state to deliver basic services, sustain the military pressure and build up the Afghan national army and ultimately take forward political processes. But my sense is it will continue to be a feature of the case that they make, both domestically and internationally. MS. MATHEWS: I wonder if I could just, in closing, then, follow up a bit. We tend in this country often to put too much emphasis on the mere fact of elections, and particularly in postconflict situations. On the other hand, as we’ve seen in Iran, elections can be a pretty important moment. What are your expectations about the upcoming elections in Afghanistan and what will you be most looking at, in terms of the outcomes, in assessing where we stand after that? MR. ALEXANDER: Well, I think it tells you something: that I don’t know who’s going to be the next president of Afghanistan. In that sense, in an incredibly challenging security environment, there is a very real contest underway with different candidates with different platforms who are presently campaigning. This will be the first genuinely Afghan-run elections after the international community’s facilitating of the elections five years ago. And in that sense, simply the process of the elections, albeit that there are real security challenges, will be significant. But I think at least as significant is the opportunity it provides for the candidates to set out their program for government because we have not seen the development of what would be recognizable political parties in recent years to a member of the British public or the American public. But on the other hand there are distinctive elements to the programs that are now being offered by individual candidates. So the first point would be the fact that these are Afghan-led and Afghan-run elections I think are significant. Secondly, the fact that it is genuinely a contest is significant. Thirdly that the candidates are setting out distinctive positions which will profoundly affect the future of the country over the next five years is significant. But also I would hope that we would see significant numbers of Afghans choosing once again to exercise their democratic right because in and of itself that is to stand in defiance to the intimidation that the insurgents and the Taliban offer. MS. MATHEWS: Secretary, I think you’ve left us certainly better informed and perhaps even wiser as well. And we are very, very grateful to hear your vision of the future and your report from the front. And we thank you and look forward to welcoming you back here. MR. ALEXANDER: Thank you very much. (Applause.) (END)