Worldmun2007, Historical General Assmebly, Study Guidea

Historical General Assembly Contents Opening Statement Introduction History of the Committee Topic Area A: 1967 Statement of the Ptoblem History of the Problem Past UN Actions Proposed Solutions Questions a Resolution Must Answer Suggestions for Further Research Guide to Position Papers Bibliography Endnotes

Geneva, Switzerland 2007

March 26 - March 30

Dear Delegates, Welcome to the Historical General Assembly at WorldMUN 2007! My name is Shaheer Rizvi, and I’m thrilled and excited to be your Director. Writing up this study guide has been a tremendous learning experience for me; I have no doubt that we all will benefit tremendously from the debates and discussions in committee. It is my hope that all of you will come away from WorldMUN with a better understanding of how the world works. Before we turn back the clock to 17 June 1967, and delve into the complex and weighty issue at hand, allow me to introduce myself. I am a junior at the College, concentrating (Harvard-speak for “majoring”) in Economics, with a focus on economic development. A native of Pakistan, I grew up in the sunny (i.e. mind-bogglingly hot) city of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. I enjoy reading Tolkien, the beautiful game of cricket, and contemplating the meaning of Life, the Universe and Everything. I first sampled Model UN as a freshman here at Harvard, and decided to be involved because I truly believe it has the capacity to bring a ray of hope into an oft-bleak world. Without further ado, I hope you spend some time reading through this study guide, researching the issues, and thinking deeply about the issues we will soon discuss face-to-face. I look forward to a challenging time in committee, and can’t wait to see you all in March! Sincerely yours, Shaheer Rizvi 355 Leverett Mail Center Cambridge, MA 02138 Cell: +1.617.894.3949

HGA Director: Shaheer Rizvi [email protected]

Historical General Assembly

Opening Statement OpeNING sTATEMENT Introduction

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n this committee, we will be turning the clock back to 17 June, 1967. We find ourselves in the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly. This session has been called in order to respond to the issues that have been raised by the so-called “Six Day War” that recently took place between Israel and neighboring Arab countries. While the countries are currently observing a cease-fire, it is crucial for the nations of the world to come together and find solutions that will lead to a lasting peace. Since this is a venue in which the Arab countries and Israel discuss issues alongside the other nations of the world, this General Assembly has much potential to arrive at such solutions. It is not going to be an easy task, however. Some of the issues we will be discussing have already been the subject of several UN resolutions. These issues, however, are far from having been resolved. The complexity of this war and its precursors means that it is very difficult to isolate specific segments to be the focus of sustained attention. Nevertheless, we must try to address all aspects of this issue and come up with comprehensive solutions that address both short- and long-term issues. The urgency of the need for comprehensive solutions cannot be stressed enough. This is an issue that is not just relevant to the countries within the region. Religious overtones guarantee that nations around the globe have a significant stake in ensuring a peaceful resolution to this Harvard WorldMUN 2007

conflict. Foreign powers have long brought their politics into the region. We will see these dynamics play themselves out within this emergency, and so it will be no easy task to arrive at a solution. But attempt we must. History of the Committee

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t the end of World War I, the victorious Allied Powers established the League of Nations in order to arbitrate conflict and ensure international peace and security. It was, however, constantly beset with problems. The absence of the United States seriously weakened it, and it was unable to take action in the face of serious threats to world peace and security. In the 1930s, it was incapable of preventing aggression on the part of the Axis Powers, which resulted in World War II. It ceased its activities, having failed in its purpose of preventing a future world war.

In 1946, it was replaced by a new organization—the United Nations.1 The foundations for the future United Nations were laid before the United States even entered the war. On 12 June 1941, the Inter-Allied Declaration was signed in order to promote the idea that free nations needed “to work together, with other free peoples, both in war and in peace.”2 Two months later, the Atlantic Charter was signed by United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, which proposed a set of principles designed to maintain peace and security through international collaboration; a little more than four months after this, representatives of the 26 Allied nations pledged their support for the Atlantic Charter by signing the “Declaration by United Nations.”3 Following discussions at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, D.C. and modifications

Close-up of the UN Charter, with Egypt signing in the background. San Francisco, 26 June 1945. History General Assembly 

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Opening Statement from the Yalta Conference, on 25 April 1945, representatives from 50 countries convened at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, U.S.A.4 These representatives came from all of the countries that had declared war on the Axis before March 1945 as well as those that had previously signed the Declaration of the United Nations,5 with the lone exception of Poland which was unable to attend the conference but was still permitted to become an original member of the UN. Delegates discussed and made decisions regarding the affirmation of Security Council veto power among the permanent members (namely, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Republic of China; of course, issues for discussion could be raised by any member of the General Assembly), the status of colonial areas and the

distribution of trusteeships, and the status of regional and defense arrangements. Finally, the UN Charter was adopted unanimously and signed on 26 June 1945 and subsequently promulgated on 24 October 1945.6 The structure of the United Nations was outlined in the Charter, which included as its principal organs the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Secretariat. The GA consists of all member states of the UN, each of which have one vote, although each member state may send up to five representatives to any GA convention.7 It is the main deliberative organ of the UN, and meets in regular yearly sessions, held under the watch of an elected president. Decisions on important

Mrs. Roosevelt holds a Declaration of Human Rights poster, Lake Success, New York, November 1949 Harvard WorldMUN 2007

issues, such as matters related to peace and security, and granting or withdrawing membership in the UN, require a two-thirds majority. Other issues are decided by simple majority. The functions and powers of the GA, as outlined by the Charter, include: • to consider and make recommendations on the principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms regulation; • to discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except where a dispute or situation is being discussed by the Security Council, to make recommendations on it; • to discuss and, with the same exception, make recommendations on any question within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations; • to initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and international collaboration in economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields; • to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation, regardless of origin, which might impair friendly relations among nations; • to receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other United Nations organs; • to consider and approve the United Nations budget and to apportion the contributions among History General Assembly 

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Opening Statement members; • to elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the members of the Economic and Social Council and additional members of the Trusteeship Council (when necessary); to elect jointly with the Security Council the Judges of the International Court of Justice; and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, to appoint the SecretaryGeneral.8 Apart from the regular yearly session, the GA may also meet in special sessions as required. As the Charter states, “special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.”9 Of particular interest to this issue is Resolution 377 (Uniting for Peace) which empowers the GA to convene an emergency special session for the purpose of recommending collective measures, including the use of armed force, in the event that the Security Council is unable to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security “in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”10 A number of important measures have been taken by the GA since its first session, held in Central Hall, Westminster, London with 51 countries in attendance. Among these significant accomplishments are: • the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948. This document outlined the framework from which the United Nations would judge human rights issues, and • the First Emergency Special Harvard WorldMUN 2007

Session of the General Assembly, which met on 7 November 1956 on the Suez Canal crisis and, on 5 November decided to establish the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), the first UN peace-keeping force. Three subsequent emergency special sessions were held about various crises as well. We finally arrive at the present nexus, with a Fifth emergency special session having been convened at the request of the USSR. Topic Area A: 1967 Statement of the Problem

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he 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, which involved the United Arab Republic (UAR), Israel, France, and the UK, left in its aftermath an uneasy peace in the troubled region of the Middle East. Tensions rose dramatically on 18 May 1967 when the UN peacekeeping forces that had been deployed to secure the Israel-Egyptian border were removed at the request of UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who then began remilitarizing the border. Nasser formed an alliance with Syria and Jordan, while Israel observed apprehensively. A pre-emptive air strike was finally launched by Israel on 5 June 1967, targeting Arab airfields and completely destroying the UAR air force. This marked the beginning of what came to be known as the Six Day War. By the end of the first day of the war, the UAR military had been completely routed, and by the third day, the Israeli army had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Arab losses vastly outnumbered Israeli losses, and the war ended quickly, with

Israel emerging as the clear victor. In the end, Israel had taken control of Syria’s Golan Heights, UAR’s Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, and Jordan’s West Bank—including the entire city of Jerusalem.11 It is now 17 June 1967, and the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the GA has been called in order to find a lasting solution that will lead to sustainable stabilization of the region. While a cease-fire was signed on June 11, all signs suggest that it is only a matter of time before the region may again erupt in war. As a result of the Six Day War, Israel’s territory has tripled, and about one million Arabs have been placed under the direct control of Israel in the newly captured territories. It will be no easy task, but the General Assembly must comprehensively address all aspects of this complex issue. It is crucial that since the aim of this emergency special session is to find a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, debate must take into consideration the history of the region, including relevant previous conflicts and incidents. The world is watching and waiting apprehensively; can the United Nations live up to its potential and solve the problems of this troubled region? History of the Problem

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or a conflict as complicated and convoluted as the Arab-Israeli conflict, picking a starting point in time is difficult, and one can get lost in a maze of ancient historical narratives. For our purposes, we must focus on the relatively modern period. Hence we begin near the end of the nineteenth century, in the throes of the Ottoman Empire. History General Assembly 

Topic Area A production for the purpose of Early Jewish Settlements and Arab exports. During this period, Palestine Opposition witness a marked increase in foreign The Ottoman Land Law of settlements and colonies—French, 1858 propelled the development of Russian, and German. Despite the private property in Palestine, which initial low proportion of Jewish resulted in increased agricultural agricultural settlements, the first

Theodor Herzl, founder of modern political Zionism and first president of the World Zionist Organization, whose pamphlet The Jewish State (1896) posited that a world council of nations should settle the Jewish question. Harvard WorldMUN 2007

Historical General Assembly of which was founded by Russian Jews in 1882, those settlements turned out to be the most influential ones, foreshadowing future Zionist attempts to build a Jewish national home.12 Simultaneously, tensions between the Jews and Arabs arose. Several Arabic newspapers began to be circulated in Palestine before 1914 that displayed a strong sense of Arab nationalism and a desire to put an end to Jewish immigration. Even in the face of strong anti-Semitism, Zionist colonies in Palestine rose from 19 in number in 1900 to 47 in 1918. In 1914, the population of Palestine was still predominantly agricultural, and Jews made up slightly greater than 12 percent of the population, while Arabs, mostly Muslim and some Christian, accounted for the rest.13 World War I: Conflicting Agreements and Statements During World War I, the Great Powers made a number of decisions about the future of Palestine, without taking into account the wishes of the indigenous population.14 The British, coordinating with France, Russia, and Italy during the war and immediately thereafter, signed secret agreements and made public declarations that complicated the postwar situation. With regard to the area of Palestine in particular, contradictory promises seemed to have been made in both agreements and statements. These conflating promises are contained within the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1915-1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.15 The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence refers to an exchange of letters between Sir History General Assembly 

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Topic Area A Henry McMahon, then British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sherif Hussain of Mecca, then ruler of the Hejaz who was perhaps the most prestigious and powerful Arab figure at the time. The exchange took place from July 1915 to March 1916. Through the Correspondence, the British made certain commitments to the Arabs in return for their support against the Ottomans.16 In these letters, the British expressed sympathy for Arab claims to Arabicspeaking parts of western portions of the Ottoman Empire and spoke of the independence of the Arabs and the possible re-establishment of an Arab caliphate under Hussein. The Arab Revolt, which began in June 1916 and was led by Sherif Hussein’s son Feisal, was a direct result of the Correspondence. It is notable that the Correspondence was not a formal agreement, but Hussein and other Arab notables assumed that the British would honor their commitments.17 At the same time as the HusseinMcMahon Correspondence was taking place, Britain was holding secret discussions with the Allies about the future partition of the Ottoman Empire.18 By May 1916, Britain, France, and Russia had reached an agreement whereby most of Palestine was to be internationalized. The areas of the Levant and Iraq were to be divided into zones in which the British and French would exercise either direct or indirect influence. According to the agreement, semiindependent Arab states or one unified state could possibly be established in areas of indirect control. These provisions of the agreement, named the Sykes-Picot Agreement after the chief negotiators, contradicted the Harvard WorldMUN 2007

terms of the Correspondence that had preceded it.19 In 1917, the British took military control of Palestine and Transjordan, subsequently issuing a statement which further complicated the situation. This statement, which came to be known as the Balfour Declaration, was in the form of a letter penned by Arthur Balfour, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and addressed to Lord Rothschild, head of the British Zionist Organization. In the letter, the British government declared its intention to “favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” However, it also declared that in seeking this objective, nothing would be done to prejudice the “civil and religious rights of existing nonJewish communities in Palestine,” or the rights and political status of Jews in other countries.20 While the Balfour Declaration aroused the hopes of Zionists, the constraining stipulation that sought to preserve the rights of the “existing non-Jewish communities” caused it to fall short of their expectations because they sought the reconstitution of Palestine as “the” Jewish national home. The motives of Britain in issuing this statement included the hope that it would rally worldwide Jewish opinion, especially in the United States, to the side of the Allies, and that through this shift, they could exert influence in the strategic Suez Canal area. Needless to say, the Arabs saw the Balfour Declaration as encouraging the establishment of a Jewish sovereign state in Palestine, and they were determined to resist this.21 Palestine

Under

the

Mandate In the aftermath of World War I, Palestine lay devastated by the destruction, famine, and epidemics. Harsh punitive measures were taken by the Ottomans against Arab nationalists before several major battles were fought at Gaza and Jerusalem and the area was occupied by the British. Important Arab political figures issued resolutions opposing and rejecting the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, at a peace conference held by the Allies in San Remo, Italy, the former territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire were distributed and the hopes of Arab nationalists collapsed. Syria and Lebanon were mandated to France and Palestine to Britain. Faysal I, son of Sherif Hussain, was forced to give up his newly founded kingdom of Syria, which had included Palestine. As a result of this turn of events, antiZionist riots broke out in the Jewish quarter of Old Jerusalem in April 1920, which were to be followed by more serious riots during the mandate. After the confirmation of the mandate at the conference in San Remo, in July 1920 Britain installed a civilian administration. The Balfour Declaration continued to affect immigration levels as it was implemented; in August of 1920 a quota of 16,500 Jewish immigrants was declared for the first year. In December, Palestinian Arabs met at a congress in Haifa where it was established that there would be an Arab Executive to represent their interests. While the Arab Executive was never formally recognized and later dissolved in 1934, it did British prescribe the basic policy of the History General Assembly 

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Palestinian Arabs until 1948. Hence, Balfour Declaration had not meant would not exceed the absorptive it was demanded that Palestine was that Palestine as a whole would “be capacity of the country. an autonomous Arab entity and the converted into Jewish National In July 1922, the League of Nations approved the mandate instrument for Palestine, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration. The mandate officially came into force on 29 September 1923, and Britain was entrusted with ensuring that the political, administrative, and economic conditions within Palestine would “secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home…and the development of self-governing institutions.”23 A Jewish Agency was to be formed under the mandate in order to advise the administration on such matters, and ideas of Jewish immigration and close settlement were to be encouraged “while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.”24 The period of the mandate brought with it numerous problems and challenges. Both the Palestinian Arabs and Zionists realized that the future of the area after the mandate would be determined by size of population and ownership of land. Zionists attempted to increase both, while the Arabs sought to slow down or halt both, invariably leading to violent clashes. While the resources of Palestine were limited, there was general economic growth within both the Jewish and Arab populations as the region gradually became more urban. While one might naturally expect that there was likely mutual Balfour Declaration, 2 Nov 1917 influence and interchange between Jews and Arabs in the urban centers, Jews had no rights to it. Determined Home, but that such a Home should it was in fact quite limited because Arab opposition forced the British be founded in Palestine.”22 The the two groups rarely interacted. In government to issue a White Paper document was promulgated in order rural areas, Jews and Arabs almost in June 1922 which clarified that the to assure that Jewish immigration never came in contact. Harvard WorldMUN 2007

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Topic Area A Political development in the British Mandate in Palestine diverged from the development of other mandate areas. While Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon saw many delays and false starts, certain institutions of selfgovernment eventually emerged within those areas. In Palestine, however, the Jewish and Arab communities rarely cooperated, except sometimes at the local and municipal level. Efforts by the High Commissioner to develop self-governing institutions at a “national” level consistently failed. Jewish immigration mostly leveled off (sometime falling below emigration) in the 1920s, and there was relative peace on the ground. In 1929 however, as a result of antiSemitic outbreaks in Europe and the worldwide economic depression, Jewish immigration rose once again. An incident at the Wailing Wall set off riots that resulted in the death of nearly 250 Arabs and Jews and left more than 500 wounded. As a result of a study of land and immigration issues, the British issued the Passfield White Paper, which called for a halt to Jewish immigration. Protests from Palestinian Jews and London Zionists forced Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald to issue an explanatory letter nullifying the provisions of the Passfield White Paper.25 In the early 1930s, events in Europe once again began to have a profound effect on the situation in Palestine. The rise of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany, and governmentsponsored anti-Semitism in Poland, Hungary, and Romania led to new waves of Jewish immigration into Palestine. By 1936, the Jewish population of Palestine has increased to almost 400,000 or 30 percent of Harvard WorldMUN 2007

the total population. Outbreaks of violence against Jews continued to occur from 1933 to 1935, in the face of the growing reality that Jews might eventually outnumber Arabs in Palestine. However, the Arab population of Palestine also grew rapidly. This situation came about mostly due to natural increase, although there was also some inflow of Arabs attracted by the capital infusion resulting from the immigration of middle-class Jews and British public works. Nearly 90 percent of the Arabs during that time were still employed in the agricultural sector, but this composition was quickly evolving, with the result being that more Arabs were beginning to work on the edges of the rapidly growing urban centers. This shift in the composition of Palestinian economic and social life was to have a profound long-term impact. A boycott of Zionist and British goods was imposed in November 1935, with the Arab political parties demanding the end of Jewish immigration, the prohibition of land transfer, and the establishment of democratic institutions.26 In December, the British advocated the establishment of a Palestinian constitution and a legislative council. However, that proposal was firmly rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs would have had a majority under this constitution, but the British would still have retained superior authority. The Arabs also rejected it because Jews would have been represented on the council, which was an unacceptable proposition for Arab leaders. The Jews rejected it in turn because they would still function as a minority, and because the British

proposal included restrictions on land purchases. Both houses of the British Parliament attacked the program and it was in the midst of all of this turmoil that the great Arab Rebellion began, acting as an expression of an Arab nationalist sentiment that had recently been growing rapidly.27 The Arab Rebellion and World War II The Arab Rebellion of 19361939 began with a few spontaneous acts of violence by a nationally and religiously motivated group whose leader was quickly killed by the British. The group’s acts of robbery and the murder of three Jews did however spark widespread chaos. Arab groups in Jaffa and Nablus declared a general strike, and “national committees” in other towns assumed this task as well.28 At this point the Arab political forces, casting aside their differences, came together to form an Arab High Committee, which was presided over by the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin alHusayni. Simultaneously, Arab rebels took to attacking Jewish settlements and British installations in the northern areas of Palestine. By the end of the year, the revolt involved Arabs in the whole of the Mandate, and Britain had to dispatch more troops to bring some semblance of order to the area. By 1939, the Zionists had armed more than 15,000 Jews in the Haganah that had been recognized by the British as a legitimate Jewish defense force. A royal commission of inquiry, headed by Lord Robert Peel, was sent to investigate the situation. It finally declared in a report issued in 1937 that the Mandate could not continue and Britain’s obligations to History General Assembly 

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Topic Area A both the Arabs and the Jews could not be reconciled. For the first time, it was proposed that the area be divided into separate Jewish and Arab states.29 The Jews cautiously accepted the proposal. The area proposed to be under their control was much larger than current Jewish landholdings, and would encompass the forcible transfer of the Arab population from the proposed Jewish state. To the Arabs, this proposal was absolutely unacceptable, and as a result the violence within the region worsened during 1937 and 1938. In September 1938, the British District Commissioner for the Galilee was murdered and the British declared martial law. The Arab High Committee and the Supreme Muslim Council were dissolved, with the British arresting many officials. AlHusayni fled the country, eventually settling in Berlin. The rebellion was unable to sustain itself, as the rebelling members suffered massive casualties and lost most of the traditional leaders. The general strike was called off in October 1939. The rebellion was largely a failure for the Arabs of Palestine; they were never able to recover from the losses, and Zionist self-reliance had quickly matured.30 Meanwhile Europe was on the verge of war, and the situation for the Jews in Europe was becoming increasingly desperate. Britain was forced to reassess its role and policies in Palestine. The Woodhead Commission was established to examine the practicality of partition. In November 1938, the Commission proposed an alternative partition proposal, which would have reduced the size of the Jewish state that proved Harvard WorldMUN 2007

to be unacceptable to both parties. An attempt to find a compromised solution caused a roundtable conference to be held in London, after which a White Paper was issued that was heavily supportive of Arab demands. The document provided for a Jewish home to be established within an eventual independent Palestinian state. While this was largely favorable to the Arabs, they rejected the White Paper due to mistrust of the British government and the fact that it extended the Mandate beyond the ten-year period. The Zionists were infuriated with the paper. Zionist and British policies were to clash very soon. On the ground in Palestine, the reality was that the strength of Jewish institutions had been rapidly increasing and progress toward a Jewish state had been quick. Between 1922 and 1940, the Jewish population in Palestine had grown from 83,790 persons to about 467,000 persons or nearly one-third of the total population in the region.31 In September 1939, World War II began, and Zionists desperately began to try to increase Jewish immigration into Palestine. The British, however, resisted such a measure in line with the pro-Arab stance in their last White Paper. For the Jews, it was a desperate state of affairs. European Jews faced the threat of terrible tragedy, with practically nowhere else to go. No event better epitomized the chaos than the sinking of two ships – the Patria and the Struma – which were carrying many Jewish refugees. As a result, a terrorist group called LEHI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), also known as the Stern Gang, began to launch attacks against the British. This rogue action culminated

in the assassination of Lord Moyne, Deputy Minister of State for Middle East Affairs, in Cairo on 6 November 1944.32 The Palestinian Arabs remained fairly quiet during World War II. Al-Husayni had managed to reach Germany and attempted to incite the Arabs toward supporting the Axis cause. But most Arabs supported the Allies as approximately 23,000 soldiers enlisted to fight alongside the British. Since the Arabs were still reeling from the wounds of the rebellion, their strategic position visà-vis an independent Arab state did not change much as a result of the war.33 On the other hand, the Jewish community and the Zionist cause strengthened considerably during the war. The Jewish Agency and the Haganah were able to have a Jewish brigade formed in tandem with the British. A Jewish munitions industry developed to manufacture antitank mines for the British army. The Holocaust only strengthened the resolve of the Zionists for the formation of a Jewish state. Importantly, the support of American Zionists was now rallied and vastly increased. A Zionist conference was held in May 1942 in New York City, where David Ben-Gurion, then-chairman of the Jewish Agency, successfully gained support for a program which demanded unrestricted Jewish immigration, a Jewish army, and the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth. The United States was to play a crucial role in the region in the coming years.34 After the end of World War II, the realization of the severe brutality of the Holocaust upon the History General Assembly 

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Topic Area A

They took the view that any attempt at making amends should not happen at their expense. The perception was that increasing Jewish immigration into the area and the development of a Jewish state brushed aside their right to the land.36 Another important development was the October 1944 meeting of Arab heads of state in Alexandria, Egypt where they issued a statement declaring their collective position on the issue. The Alexandria Protocol signified the beginning of neighboring Arab countries taking more of a direct interest in Palestine. The Arab character of Palestine was emphasized, and while it expressed that the fate of European Jews was regrettable, they emphasized that injustice for Palestinian Arabs was not the solution. The League of Arab States was formed in March 1945, and an Arab Higher Executive for Palestine was formed to allow Palestinian leaders to speak for their people.37

Three Jewish children are on their way to Palestine after being released from the Buchenwald Concentration Camp at the end of World War II. discovery of the Nazi extermination camps rallied further support for the Zionist cause from US politicians. In particular, US President Harry S. Truman requested in August 1945 that the British admit 100,000 Jewish Holocaust survivors into Palestine. In December, the US Senate and House of Representatives asked for unrestricted Jewish immigration Harvard WorldMUN 2007

into Palestine, while taking into consideration its absorptive capacity.35 It is important to note, however, that while the Jews were clearly severely wronged by the Holocaust, and as the world leaders involved, however tangentially, sought to employ a moral responsibility to set this right, the Palestinian Arabs considered themselves victimized as a result.

Enter the United Nations: the Proclamation of Israel Jewish immigration into Palestine was, once again, the topic of focus. The Arabs were determined to halt it completely and form an Arab state. The British opposed it as well, since its main policy after World War II was to secure British interests in the region – the cooperation of Arab states was crucial to achieve this. The US State Department supported the British, but President Truman was adamant that Jewish survivors of the war should be allowed to enter Palestine.38 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin announced in November 1945 the formation of History General Assembly 10

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Topic Area A an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. This action resulted in a basis for discussions between Britain and Arab and Zionist representatives in London. During this time, unauthorized immigration of Jewish refugees was quickly increasing, accompanied by attacks by the Irgun and other underground Zionist forces. The Arab representatives met in June 1946 in Syria, and adopted resolutions threatening British and American interests in the region if the Palestinian Arabs did not get their due rights. In the face of this, Britain sought to disentangle itself from the situation. They had emerged from World War II victorious but tremendously weakened. After a final conference called in London failed to arrive at a solution, on 14 February 1947, Britain finally bowed out and referred the question to the newly formed United Nations.39 The Palestinian question was among the first discussed by the UN, and has proven to be a constant source of debate within the organization. There was much hope that public debate and private bargaining would now be used to resolve such international conflicts. The UN General Assembly met in April 1947 and a Special Session was called at the request of Britain to consider the Palestinian question. This first Special Session established a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to study the situation and make recommendations and consisted of eleven ‘neutral’ countries including Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. The Jewish Agency cooperated Harvard WorldMUN 2007

fully with the committee while the Palestine Arab Higher Committee boycotted the proceedings. However, delegations from some Arab League states represented the Arab cause. UNSCOP presented its report on 31 August 1947, at the second regular session of the General Assembly. UNSCOP members unanimously agreed that the British mandate ought to be terminated, independence should be granted to Palestine, and that a transitional period be instituted. However, of the vital question of the future shape of Palestine, a majority of seven states recommended partition into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and the internationalization of Jerusalem. A minority of three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) proposed an independent federal state, while Australia abstained on these issues.40 The majority report received Jewish approval, despite its shortcomings. Jewish leaders determined it to be preferable to the alternative of the minority report and believed that it provided for two essentials: sovereignty and continued immigration. The Arabs vehemently rejected both reports. In essence, the reports stated that the claims of the Jews, most of whom had been in the area for less than thirty years, were equal to those of the Arabs, many of whose ancestors had been there for centuries. The Arab League threatened all-out war if either report was approved. The British wished to remain neutral, and desired that the GA decide the issue; they did not want to anger the Arabs and increasingly fierce Zionist attacks caused them to desire to leave Palestine as soon as possible. For

various reasons, both political and ideological, Truman supported the majority plan. Hence, the Zionists and the Americans worked hard to influence the outcome of the vote in favor of the majority plan. After receiving the UNSCOP report in September 1947, the GA designated an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of all members of the UN to consider the two proposals. Toward the end of November, it passed an amended version of the majority plan for GA consideration. In the final plan, the Arab state was to occupy 4,500 square miles and contain approximately 800,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The Jewish state was to occupy 5,500 square miles and contain 538,000 Jews and 397,000 Arabs. The GA adopted the recommendations of this amended plan on 29 November 1947. It voted in favor of the partition plan by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions. All Muslim countries as well as India, Yugoslavia, and Greece voted against partition. The United States and the Soviet bloc, along with France, Australia, and several other states, supported the partition. This result was a virtual assurance of the eventual establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Mandate was to be liquidated on 15 May 1948, and a legal framework had been defined, around which the Yishuv (the body of Jewish residents in Palestine) could establish a state, and the Haganah could rally its forces.41 Soon after these events occurred in the UN, fighting broke out throughout Palestine. Zionist forces were mobilized. Efforts to bring in more Jewish immigrants History General Assembly 11

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Topic Area A strengthened. The Arab League pledged its support to the Palestinian Arabs and organized a military force of 3,000 volunteers. By March, Jerusalem was virtually controlled by the Arabs. The US government was alarmed at the continued fighting, and stated its opposition to forcibly implementing a partition. The UN Palestine Commission reported that it would be unable to carry out partition. In response, the United States called for efforts to partition to be suspended, proposed that a truce be declared, and that the problem be further considered by the General Assembly. In the face of these developments, the Zionists redoubled their efforts and made vast inroads during April. During this time however, the Arabs were badly demoralized by the death of an Arab national hero, Abd alQadir al-Husayni, and the infamous massacre by Irgunists and members of the Stern Gang of civilian inhabitants of the Arab village of Dayr Yasin. The efforts of the Arabs to prevent partition collapsed.42 Conditions for partition were crystallizing on the ground. President Truman began to waver on the issue and agreed that Palestine be placed under temporary UN trusteeship. It was essential to the success of the Yishuv that the British leave as planned on 15 May, and despite some rumblings within the Security Council and the meeting of the second Special Session of the GA to discuss trusteeship, the British acquiesced to the plan. On 14 May 1948, the last British High Commissioner, General Sir Alan Cunningham, left Palestine. At 4:00 PM on that same day, David Ben-Gurion declared the existence Harvard WorldMUN 2007

of the State of Israel. Within a few hours, the US government had extended de facto recognition, and the Soviet Union had followed with de jure recognition.43 On May 15, the regular armies of Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt entered Palestine. The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the Palestine Refugee Crisis The 1948 War consisted of a series of campaigns interspersed with truces. It lasted until December 1948. On 14 May, the GA passed a resolution calling for the placement of an UN mediator in Palestine. The designated mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, worked with the Truce Commission that had been established by the Security Council in order to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Bernadotte was successful in arranging a truce, which lasted only a month. On 16 September, Bernadotte recommended that Jerusalem be internationalized, with the Negev region being given to the Arabs and Galilee being given to Israel. He crucially recommended further that Arab refugees be allowed to return home. He was assassinated by the Stern Gang the day after offering these recommendations. Fighting broke out once again following Bernadotte’s death, but soon a ceasefire was signed on 1 December between King Abdullah of Transjordan and Israel. Under the able supervision of Bernadotte’s successor, Ralph Bunche, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan all signed armistice agreements with Israel. The armistice agreements explicitly clarified that they were not meant “to establish or recognize any territorial, custodial or

other rights, claims or interests of any party.”44 Israel emerged from the war successful on numerous fronts. By increasing its land area by about 20 percent, it now controlled almost 80 percent of the former Palestine mandate west of the Jordan. King Abdullah of Transjordan occupied and annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem, later renaming his country the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Egypt retained the Gaza Strip.45 The Palestinian Arab community now found itself split into numerous fragments. About 70 percent of the Arab population of Palestine found themselves homeless after the war. The UN estimated that, in early 1949, there were about 726,000 Arab refugees from Israel-controlled territories.46 Most moved to Jordan, while others went to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iraq. Around 210,000 were now in camps in Gaza, and 150,000 remained in Israel. The Israeli government was not willing to grant the refugees the right to return. This issue was to become one of the major bones of contention between Israel and the Arab states.47 The formation of Israel meant that, effectively, Palestine no longer existed. The West Bank was now part of Jordan, while the rest of Palestine became part of Israel. Communities were rent apart as the Palestinian Arab refugees were widely dispersed. Refugees with skills were able to find employment in major cities. However, most of the refugees were peasants and unskilled workers who had no other choice but to live in refugee camps, which were set up with the help of the UN Relief and History General Assembly 12

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Topic Area A Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA). These camps provided the refugees with a place to live, but conditions were far from pleasant.48 The armistice agreements signed in 1949 only ensured an uneasy, temporary peace. The temporary borders set up by the armistice agreements were far from quiet.49 Israel would only talk about allowing refugees to return if it was granted recognition by the Arab states and if they entered into direct peace negotiations with Israel. No Arab state was willing to recognize Israel, far less work toward a lasting peace with it. It was only a matter of time until Israel and the Arab states would be up in arms again. 1956: The Suez Canal Crisis The year of 1954 saw the rise in Egypt of Gamal Abdul-Nasser, who was to have an important role in shaping events in the region. Nasser came into power as a result of a military coup that ousted King Farouk who had been installed and controlled by the British. One of Nasser’s main aims was to free Egypt of outside influences, and thus allow Egypt to be ruled by its people.50 The Suez Canal Crisis was triggered in July 1956, with Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. His decision was made when America and Britain decided not to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam, because of their frustrations with, among other things, Nasser’s growing ties with the Soviet bloc. The Suez Canal had been controlled by British and French interests through the Suez Canal Company. Britain and France responded to Nasser’s actions Harvard WorldMUN 2007

Security Council members meeting on 5 October 1956. by secretly preparing to go to war, recruiting the help of Israel.51 Acting in accordance with a carefully coordinated plan by the three nations, Israel invaded Egypt on 29 October 1956. Egypt responded to ensure the breakout of full-scale war. Britain and France announced that they would enter, ostensibly in order to enforce a cease-fire ordered by the UN. Most believed their intention was to ensure their continued access

to the region through the Suez. However, they were forced to turn back almost as soon as they had arrived at the Egyptian ports, due to internal opposition, threats from the Russians, and diplomatic pressure from the US.52 The British and French troops left the Suez in December 1956, while Israel withdrew in March 1957. Nasser emerged victorious, and began to be perceived all over the History General Assembly 13

Topic Area A Arab world as a hero and a champion of Arab nationalism. While Israel regained shipping rights to the previously-closed Straits of Tiran, Britain and France came out of the war without having regained access to the Suez Canal, and having lost most of their influence in the Middle East as a result.53 The UN agreed to station the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF), with the permission of Egypt, at Sharm al-Sheikh and between Israel and Egypt in Gaza.54 After the British, French, and Israeli troops had withdrawn, UNEF served “as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.”55 For the ten years it remained on the ground, it was able to oversee a relative peace. It was a welcome relief to the international community to see such efforts.

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Historical General Assembly The Six-Day War The decade after the Suez Canal Crisis saw Israel having impressive political, military, and economic growth. The Palestinians, on the other hand, were dispersed and disillusioned and their leadership was ineffectual. The actions of Britain and France during the Suez Canal crises resulted in their being discredited in the region; this power vacuum was filled by increasing Soviet and US influence in the region, as the Cold War entered the Middle East. An arms race was initiated in the region. The Soviets loosened ties with Israel and sided with the Arabs, supplying them with arms. The US counteracted this by helping Israel enhance its military capacity.56 Border agitations ensured that it was only a matter of time before the beginning of another war. The group known as “Fatah” carried out its first significant raid from Syria in January 1965. Under the leadership of General Salah Jadid, Syria supported the Fatah guerillas and the Syrian army occasionally fired at Israeli farmers from the Golan Heights. Jordan and Lebanon, on the other hand, made serious

attempts to curb such incursions from their territories.57 As tensions rose, Egypt and Syria signed a joint defense pact in early November 1966 at the encouragement of the USSR. Israel undertook a major military assault against as-Samu and neighboring Jordanian towns on 13 November. This attack was summarily condemned by the world community with the US supporting the Security Council resolution censuring Israel.58 It did not initially look as though Nasser was going to respond to the Israeli acts. The turning point came however when, on 13 May, the Soviets informed Nasser that Israeli troops were amassed near the Syrian border, poised for a large scale attack.59 The next day, Cairo announced that the Egyptian armed forces were on maximum alert, and combat units crossed the Suez into Sinai. On 18 May, UN Secretary-General U Thant received the Egyptian request for a withdrawal of the UNEF.60 The Secretary-General accepted that it was Egypt’s right to ask for a withdrawal of the forces from its sovereign territory, and immediately took steps to have them move out of the area. He asked Israel if they would accept peace-keeping forces on their territory, in order to act as a buffer. Israel refused.61 On 22 May, Nasser announced that the Gulf of Aqaba was closed to Israeli vessels or any vessels that were carrying goods to or from Israel. The next day, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol declared that such interference would be considered as an act of aggression against Israel. US President Lyndon Johnson publicly denounced Nasser’s actions, while History General Assembly 14

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Topic Area A privately urging Israel not to respond with military action. 62 The Soviets were similarly urging restraint on the part of the Egyptians.63 Open warfare, however, was imminent. King Hussein of Jordan flew to Egypt to sign a defense pact and place his troops under Egyptian military authority in the event of hostilities. The Israelis formed a national unity government, with Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense.64 While US State Department officials sought to prevent any conflict, Israel received encouragement from CIA and Pentagon officials to attack.65 The Six-Day War broke out on the morning of 5 June 1967, with a pre-emptive air strike by Israel. Almost all of Egypt’s air force was destroyed in this attack; this effectively decided the outcome of the war.

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After this strike, Israeli ground troops resoundingly defeated the Egyptian army, seizing control of the Gaza Strip and the entire Sinai Peninsula.66 Israel asked King Hussein to stay out of the war. Once it was clear, however, that Jordanian shelling was not going to stop, Israel took immediate action. It decided to grasp the “historic opportunity” at hand; Jerusalem was theirs for the taking. The Israelis captured the Old City of Jerusalem, as well as the entire West Bank.67 Their attention was then turned to Syria, and the Golan Heights were in their possession when the hostilities finally stopped. The war lasted a mere six days, but the map of the region has been drastically altered. Israel is now three times larger than it was in 1949, and 1.3 million Palestinians are now under Israeli control in Gaza and the West Bank.68 O n 13 June 1967, the SecretaryGeneral received an urgent letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The letter requested that an emergency special session of the General Assembly be convened “to consider the question of liquidating the consequences of Israel’s aggression against the Arab States and the immediate withdrawal of

Israel troops behind the Armistice Lines.” The fifth emergency special session had thus been convened on 17 June 1967.69 Past UN Actions

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he United Nations has, since practically its inception, been intimately involved with the question of Palestine. When the UN was founded in October 1945, Palestine was being administered by the UK under a rapidly-deteriorating Mandate.70 On 25 February 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin “hurled Palestine into the arena of the United Nations.”71 At the UK’s request, the first special assembly was convened on 28 April 1947, during which the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established. UNSCOP was made up of 11 member states and after a two and half month investigation, made two proposals about the future of the area of Palestine. The majority proposal recommended that the area be partitioned into an Arab and Jewish state, with special international status for the city of Jerusalem under the administrative authority of the UN; the three entities would be linked through an economic union. The minority proposal on the other hand recommended a federal structure unifying two Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem as its capital.72 It was a testament to the difficulty of the situation that the 11-member UNSCOP had itself been unable to agree on one solution. When the issues were placed before the GA, a two-month long debate ensued. Finally, the landmark resolution 181 (II) was adopted on 29 November History General Assembly 15

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Topic Area A 1947, which approved the majority UNSCOP plan with a few changes. The UN Palestine Commission was set up to carry out the GA’s recommendations. The Jewish Agency was dissatisfied about the territorial limits but nonetheless accepted the solution. The Palestinian Arabs and Arab States rejected it completely, citing the fact that the UN Charter granted people the right to decide their own destiny; in their minds, the Arabs of Palestine were being robbed of this right.73 Violence erupted in Palestine upon the adoption of resolution 181 (II). The Security Council called for another special session of the GA, while it established the Truce Commission on 23 April 1948 to help bring about a ceasefire. The GA dissolved the Palestine Commission and decided to appoint a mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, to work with the Truce Commission in promoting a peaceful settlement.74 When the 1948 war broke out, fighting was halted during a fourweek truce called for by the Security Council. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) helped the UN mediator supervise it. The truce did not hold for long, and fighting broke out again until the Security Council was able to successfully order a ceasefire on 15 July. By July 1949, armistice agreements, supervised by UNTSO observers, were signed between Israel on one hand, and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other.75 On 11 December 1948, during its third regular session, the GA adopted another vitally important resolution, which focused on ways to solve the Palestinian problem. Harvard WorldMUN 2007

Resolution 194 (III) declared, among other things, that peace-loving refugees should be permitted, at the earliest practicable date, to return to their homes. Those who chose not to return were to be compensated accordingly. The resolution also called for the demilitarization and, again, internationalization of Jerusalem. A three-member UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine was established to assume the functions of the UN mediator.76 The Commission established separate talks at Lausanne in 1949 with Israel and the Arab states. The meetings ended inconclusively however, with Israel insisting that the territorial question be solved first, while the Arab states pressed for the refugee problem to be first addressed. The Commission maintained that the unbending attitudes on both sides made implementation of the provisions of resolution 194 (III) nearly impossible. It took on the task of identifying Arab refugee property, which was completed in 1964.77 The task of providing for the immediate needs of these refugees, meanwhile, was given in December 1949 to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In May 1950, UNRWA took over all other operations put together by international voluntary agencies.78 The consideration of resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III) during this emergency special situation is vital. It is important to note that when Israel successfully obtained membership in the UN on 11 May 1949, its undertaking to implement the provisions in these two resolutions was explicitly mentioned.79

An emergency special session of the GA was called to respond to the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. It eventually deployed the first UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), on Egyptian soil. UNEF oversaw stability in the region until May 1967, when their removal was one in a string of crucial events that led up to the Six-Day War.80 The Security Council remained intimately involved with the events of Six-Day War, meeting in emergency sessions on a daily basis.81 During the course of these sessions, four cease-fire resolutions (Resolutions 233 through 236) were issued that led to the relatively stable ceasefire currently in place. A further resolution (237) was issued on the humanitarian aspects of the problems that have arisen, asking the respective governments to abide by the Geneva Conventions in their treatment of prisoners of war and their protection of civilian persons in time of war.82 It also called upon Israel to ensure the “safety, welfare and security” of the civilians in the land now under their control, and to facilitate the return of all refugees who had fled as a result of these hostilities.83 Proposed Solutions

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hile a cease-fire is now in place, tensions are still running high. Unless concrete measures to move to a permanent resolution of the issues involved are quickly made, it is likely that violence will, sooner or later, erupt once again. Both sides are accusing the other for beginning the war, with the Arab states still resolutely refusing to acknowledge Israel. It seems impossible that meaningful History General Assembly 16

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Topic Area A bilateral talks between the two sides will take place any time soon. Thus the General Assembly promises to provide the best venue for discussion and deliberation in which all peaceloving nations can contribute to a long-lasting and permanent solution. Israeli forces are currently on the sovereign territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan, the already-difficult refugee situation has now been made even worse, and Israeli control of the Holy Places in Jerusalem has made the situation particularly volatile. The various countries in the General Assembly must find ways to collaborate and work together, so that strong and effective policies may be advocated by this body. This list of solutions should not be taken as authoritative or comprehensive, but is rather meant to give you a sense of the range of solutions that need to be considered by this Assembly. • The GA could condemn Israel for being the aggressor, and demand that Israel immediately withdraw to the previously established armistice lines before any meaningful diplomatic talks can be begun. • The GA could censor the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan for being the aggressors. It would insist on Arab recognition of Israel, and significant assurances from the Arab states that they will engage with Israel in a meaningful diplomatic way, before taking any steps to ameliorate the situation and ask Israel to withdraw to older positions. • Neither side is censored and the withdrawal of Israeli troops is linked to both sides taking steps towards living in peaceful co-existence Harvard WorldMUN 2007

with each other. • Threats such as economic sanctions imposed by member countries and/or removal from the UN can potentially be used to force Israel or the Arab states to comply with GA demands. • Another peace-keeping force can be deployed along the armistice lines, with a revised mandate that does not require the permission of host countries. • The GA could once again push for the internationalization of the city of Jerusalem, perhaps in conjunction with deploying interim peacekeeping troops to oversee the transition to a civilian administration. • The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization could be substantially strengthened and a special representative of the SecretaryGeneral appointed to the region. • A resolution could chart out a strict timeline for bilateral talks between Israel and the Arab States under the supervision of designated mediators. It could also detail repercussions if either side fails to cooperate. • The GA could declare that the most important issue is that of the refugees, and issue a resolution to first address this issue before the consideration of any of the other issue.

elememnts into their resolutions. • Which nation was the aggressor? Was Nasser’s closure of the Straits of Tiran an act of war, considering the content of Security Council Resolution 95 (1951)? What about the defense agreement with Jordan? Was Israel’s attack a preemptive strike, or a justified response to Egyptian aggression? Should a resolution point an accusatory finger at either side in the first place, or should it simply ignore this question? • Should Israel withdraw from occupied territories unconditionally? Or should this withdrawal be linked with certain conditions, such as Arab recognition of Israel’s existence? Is it a contravention of the UN Charter for such negotiations to take place in a state of occupation? Which lines should Israel withdraw to in the first place? • Should the UNEF troops have been withdrawn? Could they have been kept on the ground against the will of UAR? Would it be wise to try to again deploy troops in the area in order to deal with the current impasse? If so, should the mandate of these troops be changed in order to make them more effective than those of the UNEF? • Has the UN presence in the region been ineffective? Should it be changed? If so, what type of tangible changes can be implemented? Questions a Resolution Must • The United Nations has Answer repeatedly stressed the right of return of refugees since the problem arose in hese questions are intended to 1948. Why has it repeatedly failed to guide you as seek to work together solve this problem? Have the Israelis to form the most comprehensive and/or the Arab States failed in their resolution possible. The dais staff will obligations to solve this issue as look favorably upon those resolutions member states of the United Nation? that attempt to encompass these If so, are there concrete measures that

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Topic Area A can be taken to ensure these member states comply with UN resolutions? • Israel is positing that the movement of refugees during the Six Day War was unprovoked and that they migrated of their own volition. Does this have any bearing on their right of return? • Are the measures that Israel is taking to change the status of the city of Jerusalem justified? Should the GA continue to call for the internationalization of Jerusalem? If yes, the resolution should detail the specifics of this internationalization, focusing on whether any differences from the previous plans are now warranted. If not, how should the UN address the issue of Jerusalem? • What are the pragmatic steps that the UN should take to ensure implementation of this plan? Should deadlines be set and imposed on the Arab States and Israel?

troops were the casus belli for the war. Long-standing issues such as that of the refugees can only truly be solved if the Arab states stop their state of belligerency toward Israel. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan The three nations are reeling from a resounding military defeat and the loss of critical territory. To them, Israel’s pre-emptive air strike was completely unjustified, and the GA should reprimand Israel and demand that it immediately pull back from the territories it has occupied. All Arab refugees, old and new, must be granted the right of return.

The US and the USSR In the lead up to the Six Day War, American-Soviet rivalries entered the battleground of the Middle East. The Soviets provided military equipment to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, while the US counter-acted by increasing Bloc Positions military aid to Israel. This rivalry is expected to play a strong role in the inding out more about the General Assembly. nuances of your country’s position is absolutely essential to being able Western Europe and Latin America to contribute well to the debate in By and large, these nations committee, so please take some time favor a settlement that will ensure to research your country’s specific long-term peace, without necessarily history. Take the following only as apportioning blame. Many also rough guidelines that will give you consider Arab recognition of Israel a sense of other countries’ positions crucial to a final settlement of the and give you a starting point for your issue. own country’s position. Non-aligned countries Israel The United Arab Republic is Having achieved a clear and very prominent among the nonastonishingly complete military aligned countries, and can thus be victory, Israel is determined to use its expected to wield strong influence gains to attain Arab recognition. It is among them. adamant that the Arab states’ closure of the Straits of Tiran and amassing of Muslim-majority countries

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Particularly alarmed by Israel’s actions in Jerusalem, most of these countries stand staunchly behind the Arab states, and desire explicit condemnation of Israel’s actions, and an immediate withdrawal from the newly occupied territories. Suggestions for Further Research

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ongratulations for making it through the guide, hopefully it has given you a lot of the information that you will need to discuss the issues in committee. You should certainly not consider this entirely comprehensive, however. Some extra research of your own is quite essential: 1. You must aim to come into committee with a good understanding of your country’s positions – past and present – on the issue. Read up on your country’s recent history leading up to 1967. Does it have any special interests in this region? Does it have strong ties with the Arab states or Israel? Is there something going on in the country at the current time that would persuade it to act in a particular way? 2. I also highly recommend that you spend some time with the past UN resolutions that have been passed on the issues of this region. Precedent is important, but seek out flaws – theoretical as well as practical. Be sure to spend some time with the 1947 UNSCOP majority proposal, GA resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III), and other relevant documents, such as the 1949 Armistice Agreements and the Geneva Conventions. These documents are easily accessible online. 3. I have tried to make the history section of this guide as History General Assembly 18

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Topic Area A thorough as possible, so that you can spend your time focusing on the above two areas of research. If you wish to delve deeper into a certain incident or period, however, I would recommend looking first in A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Ian J. Bickerton. It was an invaluable resource that I used throughout the writing process, and if you wish to delve even further into an issue, an excellent list of sources for further reading is provided after each chapter. I wish you the best of luck preparing for committee. The time you spend now doing research will really pay off once we’re in committee and we are discussing and debating this difficult issue. Please email me with any questions you may have, and I look forward to meeting you in Geneva! Position Papers

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ach delegate is expected to submit a position paper before conference begins. We will set up a public forum on the website where you can post your position papers. The underlying purpose for doing so is to aid all delegates because the position papers will be published to everyone. This process encourages you to begin to consider potential alliances and collaborative partners for your time during conference. Position papers will allow you to summarize your own research on the topic of the events surrounding 1967 into a position consistent with the one of the country you would have represented. Each position paper should present a clear and concise statement about your country’s current position Harvard WorldMUN 2007

regarding the situation at hand. Please refer to the study guides and the other research that I suggested when formulating your country’s position. If your country is neutral, say so, but specify which particular arrangements it would accept or reject during the debate. You should briefly summarize the key issues your country is concerned with regarding the topic, and highlight particular issues on which it is willing to negotiate. Staying on policy while at conference is particularly important and I will look favorably upon those delegates that took the time to do the research that ensures they do so. Most importantly, you should justify your own position as your country’s representative, referring to relevant treaties, resolutions, past actions, and other documents. You should cite all the sources used in whatever manner you find appropriate. Please remember, however, that the position that you state in your paper will not be binding—during committee session, you can change your position if new arguments lead you to consider an issue from a different perspective. However, if that does occur, again, it will need to be in line with what your country would have done under the circumstances. Your position paper should also have a paragraph where you address any common criticisms your country has faced for its positions, how it has dealt with them, and how you intend to handle them as a delegate. This assignment will allow your fellow committee members to find out about you and your country’s policies in more detail, which will enhance the quality of our debate.

Position papers for each topic should be 1-2 pages long and cover all of the aspects mentioned above. Timely submission and quality of the position papers will be a factor in awarding the WorldMUN Diplomacy Awards. Bibliography 1) “Milestones in United Nations History.” United Nations. . 2) Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder: Westeview Press, 2004. 3) The Question of Palestine, 19791990, United Nations, New York. 4) “United Nations.” Encyclopædia Britannica. 2006. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. . 5) The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, 1917-1988, United Nations, New York, 1990. 6) The Status of Jerusalem, United Nations, New York. 7) Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967. Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York. 8) “UN General Assembly 60th Session Background.” United Nations. . 9) Charter of the United Nations. Chapter IV. 10) United Nations GA Resolution 377. Uniting for peace. 11) “Mideast 101: The Six Day War.” CNN.
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Bibliography tuchman.1967/>. 12) “Palestine.” Encyclopædia Britannica. . 13) “Herzl, Theodor.” Encyclopædia Britannica. . 14) Bickerton, Ian J, and Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Updated 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005. 15) “Balfour Declaration.” Encyclopædia Britannica. . 16) Smith, Charles. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Fourth Edition. Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001. Endnotes 1. “Nations, League of.” Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Available from 2. “Milestones in UN History,” available at . 3. Ibid. 4. “United Nations,” Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Available from . 5. Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. Boulder: Westeview Press, 2004, page 10 6. Ibid. 7. Charter of the United Nations. Chapter IV. 8. Note that this information was Harvard WorldMUN 2007

directly quoted from the UN Background Information on its official website. < http://www. un.org/ga/60/ga_background. html>. 9. Charter of the United Nations. 10. United Nations GA Resolution 377. Uniting for peace. 11. “Mideast 101: The Six Day War.” CNN. . 1 2 . “ Pa l e s t i n e ,” E n c y c l o p æ d i a Britannica Online. Available from < http://www.search.eb.com/eb/ article-45065>. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Bickerton, Ian J, and Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Updated 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005., 37 1 6 . “ Pa l e s t i n e ,” E n c y c l o p æ d i a Britannica Online. 17. Bickerton and Klausner, 37-8 18. Ibid., 39 19. Ibid., 40 20. Ibid., 41 21. Ibid., 47 22. Cited in Smith, Charles. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Fourth Edition. Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, page 156 2 3 . “ Pa l e s t i n e ,” E n c y c l o p æ d i a Britannica Online. 24. Ibid. 25. Bickerton and Klausner, 51-2 2 6 . “ Pa l e s t i n e ,” E n c y c l o p æ d i a Britannica Online. 27. Bickerton and Klausner, 51-3 28. Ibid., 53 29. Ibid., 53-5 30. Ibid., 55 3 1 . “ Pa l e s t i n e ,” E n c y c l o p æ d i a

Britannica Online. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Bickerton and Klausner, 70 3 7 . “ Pa l e s t i n e ,” E n c y c l o p æ d i a Britannica Online. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Bickerton and Klausner, 83-4 41. Ibid., 84-7 4 2 . “ Pa l e s t i n e ,” E n c y c l o p æ d i a Britannica Online. 43. Bickerton and Klausner, 90-2 44. The Question of Palestine, 19791990, United Nations, New York.,, 12-3 45. Ibid., 101 46. Bickerton and Klausner, 104 47. Ibid., 106 48. Ibid., 110 49. Ibid., 117-20 50. Ibid., 122 51.“Suez Crisis,” Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Available from (cited 4 November 2006) 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Bickerton and Klausner, 131 55. “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I),” available from . 56. Bickerton and Klausner, 138-43 57. Ibid., 143-5 58. Ibid., 147 59. Smith, 282 60. Bickerton and Klausner, 148 61. Smith 282 62. Bickerton and Klausner, 148-9 63. Smith 283 64. Bickerton and Klausner, 149 65. Smith, 285 History General Assembly 20

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66. Bickerton and Klausner, 149-50 67. Smith, 285 68. Bickerton and Klausner, 151 69. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967. Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 219 70. The Question of Palestine, 19791990, United Nations, New York., page 3 71. Smith, 190 72. Question, 4-5 73. Ibid., 10 74. Ibid., 11 75. Ibid., 12-3 76. Ibid., 13 77. Ibid.13-4 78. Ibid., 82 79. Ibid., 14-5 80. Ibid., 17 81. Yearbook, 174-88 82. Ibid., 189-90 83. Ibid., 191

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