Wills & Succession Case Doctrines.docx

WILLS & SUCCESSION CASE DOCTRINES 1.

Hemady vs Luzon Surety

Contracts; binding effect of contracts upon heirs of deceased party.—The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in the Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. The general rule, therefore, is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. 2.

Alvarez vs IAC

The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.—“The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive ‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. x x x” 3.

Union Bank vs. Santibanez

Civil Law; Settlement of Estate; Jurisdictions; Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.—Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. Wills; Partition; In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.—In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise or any other transaction.—It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among coheirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.

Filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.—The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: . . . This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. 4.

Spouses Santos vs Lumbao

Succession; Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest—whatever rights and obligations of the decedent have over a property are transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.—The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. 5.

De Borja vs De Borja

Civil law; Wills; Remedial law; Testate and intestate pro. ceedings; Rule of nullity of extrajudicial settlement prior to probate of will inapplicable to case at bar.—The doctrine of Guevarra vs. Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479, which holds that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will is against the law and public policy, is not applicable where the clear abject of the settlement was merely the conveyance by the heir of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or

eventual, in the estate of the decedent and not the distribution of the said estate among the heirs before the probate of the will. Remedial law; Testate and intestate proceedings; Settlement entered into by heir in his individual capacity does not need court approval.—Where the compromise agreement entered into by and between the various heirs in the personal capacity, the same is binding upon them as individuals, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into such agreement. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Civil law; Succession; Heir may sell her hereditary rights to coheir.—As owner of her individual share, an heir could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose, including another heir of the same defendant. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by Article 1088 of the present Civil Code. 6. 7.

Bonilla vs Burcena Balus vs Balus

Civil Law; Property; Succession; Inheritance; What consists inheritance; The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death; The inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.—The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. 8.

Uson vs Del Rosario

Descent and distribution; husband and wife; rights of lawful wife as affected by the new civil code.—The right of ownership of the lawful wife of a decedent who had died before the new Civil Code took effect became vested in her upon his death, and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Art. 657, old Civil Code; Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased can not be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of the lawful wife over the lands in dispute. While article 2253 of the new Civil Code provides that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Renunciation of Inheritance Made by Lawful Wife; Future Inheritance, Not Subject to Contract.—Although the lawful wife has expressly renounced her right to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such renunciation cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 6th ed., 123; Osorio vs. Osorio, et al., 41 Phil., 531). Donations by Deceased; Essential Formalities of Donation.— Assignments, if any, made by the deceased of real property for which there was no material consideration, should be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Art. 633, old Civil Code).

Assignments or donations which lack this essential formality have no valid effect. 9.

Go Ong vs CA

Special Proceedings; Mortgages; Where the real estate mortgage was constituted in petitioner's personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband, Sec. 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court requiring judicial approval of the mortgage is not applicable,—Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Fact alone that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is under administration is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage; Art 493 of the Civil Code applies where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it; Effect of alienation or mortgage with respect to the co-owners.—Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483) and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is under administration, While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would result in an injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]). 10. Reganon vs Imperial Interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased is attachable.—That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts, is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction. Civil law; Succession; Rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death.—The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death, and where the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the properties of his predecessor, and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter (Cuevas v. Abesames, 71 Phil. 147). 11. Blas vs Santos Wills; Succession; Contracts; Compromise; Future inheritance; When agreement to transmit one-half of conjugal share is a contract as to future inheritance.—-A document signed by the testator's wife, promising that she would respect and obey all the dispositions in the latter's will, and that she would hold onehalf of her share in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she might choose in her last will and testament, is a compromise and at the same time a contract with sufficient cause or consideration. Prescription; Actions; Accrual of cause of action upon death.— The action to enforce the wife's promise to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal properties, did

not arise until and after her death when it was found that she did not comply with her promise. Definition of future inheritance.—Future inheritance is any property or right, not .in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. 12. Nufable vs Nufable Civil Law; Wills; As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.—As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provision of the will. The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. 13. Austria vs Reyes Civil law; Succession; Testamentary succession; Institution of heir; Requisites for annulment of institution of heir for statement of a false cause.—Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. Where will does not state cause for institution of heir.—Where the decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs, the will cannot be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code. Such institution may be annulled only when it is clear, after an examination of the will that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Interpretation of will; Testacy favored.—Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. 14. Balanay vs Martinez Special proceedings; Testate succession; Probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity of a will before passing upon its formal validity.—The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. Invalidity of one testamentary disposition does not necessarily invalidate all other dispositions made therein.—The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made” (Art 792, Civil Code). Statement that testator owns “southern half of conjugal state is contrary to law because spouses are pro indiviso owners thereof.—The statement of the testatrix that she owned the

“southern half” of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. Provision in a will that testator’s estate be kept intact and legitimes of heirs be paid in cash is contrary to Art. 1080 of Civil Code where whole estate was not assigned to one or more heirs.—The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband’s lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code. ... The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of 20 years. Renunciation of inheritance by widower subject to limitation for his support and maintenance and preservation of his legitime.—Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate, it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected. Husband’s renunciation of hereditary rights and share in conjugal estate make these assets part of testator’s estate, but without prejudice to creditors and other heirs.—It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband’s conformity to his wife’s will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife’s estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. Preterition of surviving spouse who conformed thereto does not produce intestacy.—In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights. Testacy is prefereable to intestacy.—Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect. Probate court should not issue notice to creditors if only special administrator has been appointed.—A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 x x x clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special administrator. Courts; A court employee should not be appointed as administrator of decedent’s estate.—The probate court’s appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. x x x A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent’s estate. 15. Reyes vs Dimagiba 16. Nazareno vs CA

17. Heirs of Ureta vs Ureta Wills and Succession; Art. 842 of the Civil Code refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will and has no application to a disposition by Deed of Sale.—Article 842 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes. 18. Natividad vs Natividad Civil Law; Contracts; Statute of Frauds; Under the Statute of Frauds, an agreement to convey real properties shall be unenforceable by action in the absence of a written note or memorandum thereof and subscribed by the party charged or by his agent.—Suffice it to say that there is no partial execution of any contract, whatsoever, because petitioners failed to prove, in the first place, that there was a verbal agreement that was entered into. Even granting that such an agreement existed, the CA did not commit any error in ruling that the assignment of the shares of Sergio in the subject properties in petitioners’ favor as payment of Sergio’s obligation cannot be enforced if there is no written contract to such effect. Under the Statute of Frauds, an agreement to convey real properties shall be unenforceable by action in the absence of a written note or memorandum thereof and subscribed by the party charged or by his agent. As earlier discussed, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, consisting of respondents’ acknowledgment of Sergio’s loan obligations with DBP as embodied in the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as well as the cash voucher which allegedly represents payment for taxes and transfer of title in petitioners’ name do not serve as written notes or memoranda of the alleged verbal agreement. Interest Rates; The Supreme Court (SC) finds no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) that such interest should be computed from June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made a written demand for the payment of respondents’ obligation.—As to when the interest on the sum due from respondents should be reckoned, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that such interest should be computed from June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made a written demand for the payment of respondents’ obligation. There is no merit in petitioners’ contention that the reckoning date should have been September 23, 1994, the date when respondents executed the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, because there is nothing therein to prove that petitioners, at that time, made a demand for reimbursement. 19. Puno vs Puno Succession; Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation—the stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation; During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.—Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being

vested with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. A determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter.—Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance—to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives. 20. Reyes vs RTC Jurisdictions; Succession; Probate Proceedings; The status of heirs as co-owners of shares of stocks prior to the partition of the decedent’s estate does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation—unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation.—Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacia’s death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate’s partition, deemed co-owners thereof. This status as coowners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation. Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedent’s estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to recognition as such both by the corporation and by third parties. Where there is an absence of partition and transfer of shares, an heir cannot yet be considered a stockholder of a corporation, and the Court, therefore, cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring the case within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction.—Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement of the decedent’s estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done unless and until he has established his specific allotment (and prima facieownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia’s estate, there can be no definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. In sum, we find

that—insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacia’s shares) are concerned—Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring this case within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended. Rodrigo’s complaint, therefore, fails the relationship test. A Regional Trial Court, acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased; Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.—More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of Anastacia’s shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estate—an objective that, by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased. A relevant provision—Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court— that contemplates properties of the decedent held by one of the heirs declares: Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. [Emphasis supplied.] Worth noting are this Court’s statements in the case of Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 (2001): Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.