Specpro-adoption-cases Digest.docx

G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.

F A C T S:

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, the consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person. It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.

Atty. Jose adopted Jen and Regina. Atty. Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario and the father of Joanne. Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married but left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them. They however, briefly reconciled and Rosario gave birth to Joanne. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. Jose, who was then 70 years old, filed a petition for adoption and alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. A Home Study Report was conducted and at the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily and that the children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death. The trial court approved the adoption. However, Rosario filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years and that Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent. Thereafter, Jose died. Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment of the decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption. They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent was fraudulent and that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. I S S U E: 1)

W/N Rosario and Joanne should have been given notice as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.

2)

W/N the adoption is valid

1)

Yes. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock. The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first

H E L D:

2)

No. Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid. For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

2)

W/N Herbert Cang abandoned his minor children

1)

No. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 H E L D: HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents. F A C T S: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Anna Marie however learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They agreed that the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of 1,000 and that the Anna Marie shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of Herbert Cang. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie where the court issued the divorce decree and also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor Cang children. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children. Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a decree of adoption. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption. I S S U E: 1)

W/N minor children can be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking.

2)

No. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999 TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents. F A C T S: Tomasa claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Pedro’s intervention. I S S U E: 1) W/N the marriage between the Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid 2) W/N defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob H E L D: 1) Yes. It has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. With regards to the loss of the marriage certificate, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. 2) No. Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial

court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. It was clear that Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents. F A C T S: Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon. After their marriage, minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. The spouses prayed for the declaration of the child Michael C. Mazon as their child for all intents and purposes; dissolution of the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and that the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL." The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. I S S U E: 1) W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption despite the fact that the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child. 2) W/N the prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry should be granted H E L D: 1) Yes. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case. 2)

No. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010 EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, Respondents. F A C T S: Eugenio was the registered owner of a parcel of land which was first registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents. A complaint was filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada, now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents alleged, among others, that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan to eject respondents from the subject property; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property. During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement. Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. The Provincial Adjudicator concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land. On the other hand, the DARAB held that the Mauricio’s are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.

The Court of Appeals issued a resolution regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute Librada, who died during the pendency of the case and affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. I S S U E: 1) W/N there exist a tenancy relationship between Eugenio and the respondents 2) W/N Eugenio can question the legal standing of Leonida as a party on the ground that she was a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir H E L D: 1) Yes. A tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding according to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act and Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. 2)

No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. Against these jurisprudential backdrops, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’ cause.

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. F A C T S: Petitioner Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s

surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court granted the petition. The petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name but was denied. The Republic, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother I S S U E: 1) W/N an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. H E L D: 1) Yes. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

H E L D: 1)

No. The rule provides that husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

G.R. Nos. 168992-93

May 21, 2009 (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

F A C T S: Petitioner Monina is married to Primo Lim. They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Ayuban. Monina and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. However, Lim died. Thereafter, Monina married Olario, an American citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. She then filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as well as Michael and Olario. The trial court dismissed the petitions. It ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. I S S U E: 1)

W/N the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt

2)

W/N joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated upon reaching the age of majority

2)

No. It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.

could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.

A.C. No. 10196

September 9, 2014

MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent. F A C T S: Nery filed a complaint alleging that she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Nery paid Sampana ₱100,000.00, in installment. Sampana, thereafter, sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and it was already published. When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Thus Nery met Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement but the demands were left unheeded. Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses. Sampana was found guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. I S S U E: 1)

W/N a certification must first be obtained before filing the petition for adoption

H E L D: 1)

No. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal profession.

over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

G.R. No. 192531

November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents. F A C T S: John was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the SSS. However, SSS denied the claim because she was no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL. The Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the ruling of the SSS. I S S U E: 1)

W/N the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP

2)

W/N petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise.

H E L D: 1)

Yes. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law.

2)

Yes. Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent. True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance at a better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.