War Or Peace From Weapons Technology

Lamaadar, Alia. (2004) War or Peace From Weapons Technology: Examining the Validity of Optomistic/ Semi-Optimistic Technological Determinism. The McGill Journal of Political Studies. 2003/2004. If I could invent a machine, a gun, which could by its rapidity of fire enable one man to do as much battle duty as a hundred, than it would, to a great extent, supersede the necessity of large armies, and consequently, exposure to battle and disease be greatly diminished. I thought over the subject and finally this idea took practical form in the invention of the Gatling Gun. (Dr. Richard Gatling in Edwards, 1962, 233) In 1877 Dr. Richard Gatling invented a 250 shot per minute hand-cranked black powder machine gun. Not unlike Alfred Nobel, the creator of dynamite, or Dr. J Robert Oppenheimer, the scientist credited for the atomic bomb, Gatling hoped that he was creating a weapon that might bring humanity closer to peace. The theory of a weapon creating peace is not as paradoxical as it first appears and theories that explain major social phenomena as a consequence of technology abound. In the cases of war and peace, these theories are referred to respectively as pessimistic and optimistic technological determinism. Technological deterministic theories relating to the concepts of war and peace are contentious. The dichotomy of arguments range from those theorists who believe that technology drives war, to those who believe that the same forces have the potential to create peace. Immediately following the 1945 detonations of nuclear devices in the context of war, arguments in support of a technology capable of creating peace proliferated in tandem with these weapons. However, many of these theorists unwilling to embrace the polarized belief that technology determines global pacific tendencies, have adopted a more moderate stance. This view, herein referred to as semi-optimistic technological determinism, concludes that new technologies such as information warfare and precision weaponry are creating more peaceful wars; wars with less collateral damage, and more humane doctrines. When Gatling designed his machine gun he was quoted as saying that, “the inventor of such a machine would prove a greater benefactor of his race, than he who should endow a thousand hospitals” (Edwards, 1962, 233). Ironically, more than a century later Michael Smith, commenting on the tremendous ways in which this gun had shaped the nature of war, instead referred to it as “the first weapon of mass destruction” (Smith, 2003, 108). Those theorists who view weapons as catalysts for peace or, by the same token, as mitigations to the atrocities of war, often ignore the symptomatic effects of technology: those qualities which instead serve to confound the possibilities of peace. While stopping short of pessimistic determinism, this paper hopes to disseminate the numerous ways in which technology, specifically military weapons and their supporting systems, impede peace and compel wars. These products of technology include arms races, unpredictable enemy responses to technology, and human disengagement from war. Each of these symptoms serve to denounce the idea that weapons alone have the ability to create peace or more peaceful wars. Closer examinations of these forms of technological determinism reveal that they may, in fact, undermine more fruitful endeavors for peace. Theories of Optimistic Technological Determinism Supporters of optimistic technological determinism have grown exponentially in the decades following August of 1945, marking the American use of nuclear devices in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Since this time these supporters have fallen into two distinct categories. The first group, were those theorists whose beliefs were shaped by the dramatic recency of the events surrounding World War II. These individuals held the myopic belief that nuclear weapons represented the infamous pinnacle of military achievement—an unfair weapon of war and the denouement of modern weapons evolution. Nuclear weaponry was thus considered too heinous to ever be used again and too destructive to be bested by any future technology, leaving peace as the only conclusion. The position of the second group, is described by the “father of the atomic bomb” Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer as, “two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life” (Garnett, 1999, 36), and is often referred to as ‘Mutual Deterrence Theory’. The conjecture that nuclear weapons represent the fulfillment of mankind’s age-old prophesy of a weapon so terrible and unfair that it deters war (Roland, 1997), is preceded by a long line of technological ancestors. In reality, “every historical period seems to have had its share of unfair weapons…usually the objection brought against these weapons was that they caused ‘unnecessary’ suffering” (van Creveld,1989, 71). Historically the most common reason for a weapon to remain unused in Western civilizations was that it enabled their users to kill from a distance and from behind cover, thus obscuring the vital distinction between acts of war and simple murder. Early examples of this include the crossbow, red hot cannon balls, and explosives dropped from balloons (ibid). The latter was argued to be too dreadful for use because it killed both soldiers and civilians indiscriminately. Similarly, nuclear weapons allow for both distance from a target and indiscriminate damages to soldiers and civilians. The deaths of an estimated 100,000 in Hiroshima and 35,000 in Nagasaki (The Manhattan Engineer District, 1946), as well as the immeasurable number of people injured and the damages incurred, testified to the seemingly unsurpassable destructiveness of atomic weapons. This consequently justified beliefs that a human fear and repulsion of this technology should result in a dead-end for weapon evolution and war. We human animals have built-in fear reactions […] These reactions help us to protect ourselves [...] Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies […] Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large-scale conflict, a tinge of fear—sometimes more than a tinge—enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure (Lifton, 2001, 26). To those theorists immersed in the searing recency of atomic war, no worse scenario or weapon could be imagined and therefore peace became an inevitability driven by the moral fear of society’s own capabilities. This hope for peace was obliterated in November of 1952, when the first hydrogen bomb vaporized the Pacific island of Elugelab, a mile in diameter. Its power was equal to 10.4 million tons of high explosive, or about 700 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima (Broad, 2001). It became apparent that weapons development had not only continued, but had succeeded in creating a weapon with the potential for destruction far surpassing that of the atomic bomb. Confronted with the failure of their peaceful prophesy to be realized, many theorists abandoned the hope of weapons creating peace. Oppenheimer who had originally led the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos in the hope for peace, later reversed his opinion and contested the production of the H-bomb for the reason that “mankind would be far better off not to have a demonstration of the

feasibility of such a weapon” (Wolverton, 2002, 41). While faith in the notion of a technology so atrocious that it morally necessitates peace has largely been abandoned, the realist presumption of mutual deterrence continues to thrive. As a theory of technological determinism, mutual deterrence is based on a historical trend in conjunction with the realist supposition of actor rationality. Ruth Sivard documents this historical trend in her analysis of military history, World Military and Social Expenditures. Sivard compares global war casualties throughout the past five centuries and comes to the conclusion that with the invention of gunpowder, worldwide deaths in warfare quadrupled from an estimated 1.5 million during the sixteenth century to 6.2 million during the seventeenth. Compounding these figures was the occurrence of the industrial revolution which skyrocketed worldwide deaths in war to 20 million until midway through the twentieth century (Sivard, 1996). At this juncture Sivard observes a noticeable deviation to the trend; more than 84 percent of the casualties from war in the twentieth century occurred before 1950. The explanation for this trend, asserts Alex Roland and other optimistic technological determinists, is purely to the credit of technology. Had there been conventional war in the second half of the twentieth century on the scale seen in the first half, we could have expected more war deaths than occurred throughout recorded history up to the twentieth century. Extrapolating from Sivard’s figures, we can reasonably project that another world war […] could have killed 250 million people […] these people lived because of nuclear weapons (Roland, 1995, 68). This argument stems from the realist conviction that due to the unprecedented power of atomic and hydrogen bombs, there can be no effective defense against them. Thus, the only rational use of these weapons by a nation would be for the purpose of deterrence and preventing war, a position often referred to as ‘mutually assured destruction’ or ‘the balance of terror’. These theories solidified and found momentum during the Cold War, as tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in a substantial nuclear armament on both sides. Mutual deterrence was not a relationship that either the US or the soviets actively sought, rather it developed as a paranoid response to each developing a powerful nuclear arsenal. However, once it existed strategists and statesmen began to appreciate some of its virtues. Churchill expressed the sentiment that “it may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation” (Garnett, 1999, 36). And so these prophesies of technological determinism have been self-fulfilling and decades after the Cold War has ended, states continue to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure their security. Aside from failing to account for Murphy’s Law of probability, which posits that in any given system, if something can go wrong, it will, theories of optimistic technological determinism fail in a more significant way, demonstrated dramatically by Dr. Alex Roland: Now the cold war is over. What it has wrought may finally be viewed without the passions bred by fear. The great bloodletting engendered by the industrial revolution has peaked. We need to acknowledge this blessing and preserve the relative peace that it has brought—even if the price of that peace is to live in apprehension, even dread, of our own capabilities for destruction. (Roland, 1995, 69)

This statement inadvertently begs a question of tantamount importance to the theory of optimistic technological determinism: By what criteria does it evaluate the condition of ‘peace’? If evaluated as meaning the absence of war, certainly wars have continued to be fought in forms including, but not limited to the Falkland War, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf Wars, and the war in Bosnia. Roland categorizes these tragedies as “localized conflicts with relatively limited casualties,” but it is unacceptable to marginalize the loss of life and social implications of such conflicts. The only relatively convincing argument that can be made in favor of technology at this point in human history, though it has been less than sixty years since Hiroshima, is that there have been fewer large-scale conventional wars and a decrease in their subsequent casualties. In turn, this argument can no longer be reasonably described as optimistic technological determinism and is more appropriately referred to as semi-optimistic technological determinism. Theories of Semi-Optimistic Technological Determinism On a spectrum of hard and soft determinists, the semi-optimists lie somewhere in the middle-range. While these theorists do not hold that technology and military weapons have the ability to create peace, they do ascribe to notions of ‘cleaner’ and more peaceful wars as a result of technological advancements. Just as atomic warfare spawned a new generation of optimistic technological determinists, the advent of information warfare and precision guided munitions has renewed theories of semi-optimistic technological determinism. More than 2500 years ago the Chinese strategist and philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, embraced an approach to warfare based on the principals of superior intelligence, deception, and knowledge of the mind of one’s enemy (Henry, 1998, 123). While Tzu may have penned these principals thousands of years before the invention of the microchip, they are remarkably similar to the tactics of ‘information warfare’. Definitions of this term vary, but for the purposes of this paper an intentionally expansive definition has been adopted. Thus, information warfare is described as “activities by a state or non-state actor to exploit the content or processing of information to its advantage in time of peace, crisis, or war, and to deny potential or actual foes the ability to exploit the same means against itself” (Toffler, 1993, passim). Thus Tzu’s goal of winning wars in the imaginary system of the mind, is parallel to information warfare’s goal of triumphing within information systems. Current theorists therefore promise more bloodless wars fought in cyber-spaces, as well as precision weapons directed at the enemy’s decisive points at critical moments through information superiority, thus accruing far less collateral damage. The accuracy of PGMs [precision guided munitions] promises to give us a very different age, perhaps a more humane one. It is odd to speak favorably about the moral character of a weapon, but the image of a Tomahawk missile slamming precisely into its target when contrasted with the strategic bombardments of World War II does in fact contain a deep moral message and meaning. War may well be a ubiquitous part of the human condition, but war’s permanence does not necessarily mean that the slaughters of the 20th century are permanent (Friedman, 1996, xi). Unlike optimistic technological determinism these views do not contend that technology will in any way result in peace, instead they recognize the intrinsic challenges to peace in the international system and instead hope to lessen the destruction of inevitable conflict. In this sense, these theories

attempt to present a more realistic portrayal of technology while not abandoning optimism. However a more thorough critique of the effects of weapons technology, reveals that although semi-optimistic technological determinism may have its basis in the ideal of a more peaceful international system, as a military doctrine it has the potential to impede the possibility of peace. There are no less than three devices by which technology may undermine the possibility of peace by compelling the reality of war. Well documented examples of arms races throughout history have demonstrated several means by which these processes gain their own momentum, thus increasing the likelihood that states will go to war. Additionally when states find themselves in direct technological competition with an enemy there is an increased likelihood of unpredictable and provocative enemy responses. Finally, the very nature of new technology and its focus on distance from the enemy results in a social disengagement from war conducive to further conflict. Technological Momentum in Arms Races The development of weapons technology has become an intrinsic component of Western military doctrine. General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that his 1996 directive, Joint Vision 2010, provides “an operationally based template for how America’s armed forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint war fighting” (Dunlap, 1999, 25). Thus more ‘effective’ war fighting technologies take shape in the form of such novelties as information warfare and PGMs. The level to which technological development has become ingrained as strategy and has become self-propagating in the form of arms races, is idiomatically referred to as the ‘Frankenstein drive’. Robert McNamara has pointedly defined this autonomous impulse as having “a kind of intrinsic mad momentum of its own” (Thee, 1981, 102). Most of the arms races before 1945 were primarily quantitative races and although the previous two centuries were marked by tremendous qualitative innovation, the life cycles of these weapon systems was considerably longer than those after 1945 (Senghass, 1979, 120). The traditional, and even intuitive, explanation for arms races asserts that “particular armament measures of one side are directly geared to the armament measures of the opponent” (Senghass,1979, 120), however the reality of arms races is much more disconcerting. Instead it is often internal technological forces which drive arms races. The impulse to technological competition stems from the very size, expansion and goal setting of military research and development. Unlike any time period before it, modern warfare invades all scientific disciplines and environments—land, sea, deep-sea, space, jungles, desserts, and even cyber-environments—a pervasiveness which dictates that hundreds of thousands of scientists and engineers working on parallel problems, should be competing among themselves in the invention, development and perfection of new arms and weapon systems (Thee, 1981, 102). The internal arms race is further sustained through the selective allocation of funds granted to military research and development, as well as the structured rivalry between the different military services (army, navy, and air force) and various independent laboratories. These mechanisms ensure sustained internal competition which dictates optimum weapons efficiency, dramatic results, an immutable drive to continue and the fuel for other nations to rationalize their own internal competition. The dangers of this system were first given name by Dwight D. Eisenhower in his farewell Presidential address:

This conjuncture of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State House, every office of the Federal Government […] We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist (Thee, 1981, 106). The threats to peace of this so-called ‘military industrial complex’ are numerous. Midway through the Cold War, military research and development was absorbing the talents of an estimated half a million scientists around the globe, and military expenditures on technology and its development continued in the name of security and deterrence (ibid). Empirical evidence suggests that the consequence of this trend is that conflicts marked by a military build up, more frequently go to war (Sample, 1998). Eisenhower again elaborated on this dilemma in 1953: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, and the hopes of its children (Shuckman, 1996, 233). The greater the amount of finite resources dedicated to military technology, the greater the desire of the nation to justify their use. Thus, regardless of the nature of these technologies, be they ‘more humane’ or not, their development will necessitate their use, a fact made all to clear by the events of 1945. “In this way of looking at things the form of the technology does not matter. If you have a cornucopia in your grasp you do not worry about its shape. Insofar as it is a powerful thing, more power to it” (Winner, 1986, 45). Arms races have nevertheless been justified as the means by which more civilized weapons are created. Precision engagement for example is touted by Joint Ventures 2010 as a means to “lessen risk to [US] forces, and [to] minimize collateral damage.” However, the enemy’s interpretation of these weapons may well prove to be very different. The Unpredictability of an Adversary’s Response to High-Tech Attack Peaceful crisis management requires that each side maintain an accurate perception of the other’s intentions and military capabilities (Cimbala, 1999, 121). Even ignoring the role of technology, this becomes difficult in times of crisis due to the effects, not the least of which are psychological, of a competitive relationship and a threat-intensive environment. The complexity of and mutual ignorance surrounding new forms of high technology further aggravate this situation. As previously indicated, PGMs are considered by semi-optimistic determinists as the key to more humane warfare, however the notion of a ‘humane’ bomb may fail to be appreciated by the adversary that it is used against. In the ensuing period the enemy’s response may be unpredictable and aggressive, especially for those nations for whom high-tech weaponry is simply not economically feasible. Such nations may come to believe that nuclear weapons provide the best answer to the challenge posed by conventionally armed PGMs. Historically, Russian generals in particular have feared that in a general war Western nations might use these munitions to degrade Russian strategic forces. As a result Russian generals have indicated that Russia “should enjoy the right to consider the first use of [enemy] precision weapons as the beginning of unrestricted nuclear war against it”(Dunlap, 1999, 27). This statement indicates

another danger of high technology in war, namely that it may unintentionally lower the threshold of conflict. By providing the capability to employ coercion though means of non-lethal and lowlethal technologies such as information warfare and PGMs, an unpredicted response of a target to such actions, may lower the threshold of conflict. There is no clear definition of what constitutes “aggression” in information warfare, and what would therefore represent a breech of international law. Current UN Charters traditionally interpret “aggression” in the context of armed conflict and would therefore seem to allow peacetime data manipulations. Of course an adversary, not sharing this view, may react violently, thus initiating the cycle of violent escalation. (Bond, 1996, passim) Further, the possibly problematic co-mingling of military and civilian high-tech facilities and the infusion of civilians into formerly military positions, is a trend principally motivated by a desire to conserve defense expenditures. The ever-increasing sophistication of the technologies of war require the military to obtain external civilian expertise. This is reflected by 1997 US Department of Defense figures which estimate that 70 percent of their information technology transactions were being sourced to civilian vendors (Silverberg, 1997, 38). The increased military reliance on civilians presents an additional argument against technology as a means for more peaceful armed conflict. It has long been recognized that new technology which requires substantial civilian inputs has the unintended consequence of clouding that principal which is vital to laws of armed conflict: “the requirement to distinguish between combatants who could be legitimately attacked and, non combatants who could not” (Dunlap, 1999, 27). An unintended enemy reaction to high technology could be the assertion that civilians involved in this capacity are justified victims of war either in the context of offensive strikes or possibly as human shields. “Several potential US adversaries appear prepared to use non combatants to blunt the power of high-tech weaponry…when Western military action seemed imminent, Saddam Hussein covered his palaces…with non-combatant civilians in order to discourage PGM attacks by Western Forces (Slavin, 1997, 13A). The argument that PGMs will limit collateral damage, subsequently resulting in less bloody wars is a very simplistic and unrealistic portrayal of this technology. After all, precision has one meaning when applied to the field and quite another when applied to heavily populated urban areas. Social Disengagement from War “If disengaged from war’s harsh realities, a society can more easily indulge in the fiction of a clean war” (Shurtleff, 2002, 108). The term disengagement, in this context is attributable to Albert Borgmann’s device paradigm (1984, 40-48). It is the process by which technology transforms “things” into “devices” by splitting the means and the ends. In that transformation, machines begin to provide the means, and the ends thus adopt the role of a commodity (Shurtleff, 2002, 101). Stated less philosophically, the process of disengagement from war occurs when machines begin to be viewed as the devices by which peace is created. As a result, the notion of peace becomes commodified and subsequently quantifiable. The theory of semi-optimistic determinism demonstrates the effects of disengagement by its belief in technologies that may create more peaceful wars. Disengagement is not merely a byproduct of weapons development -- often it is the exact point. Disengagement, especially in the form of distancing, has the effect of making war safer for one’s own soldiers. Thus munitions which can be launched from a distance, and information warfare which is usually conducted without ever leaving the safety of one’s own soils, protects soldiers. However this distancing comes at a very

high price. “That is to say, as war becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the enemy not as humans but as blips on the screen, there is a very real danger of losing the deterrence that such horrors provide” (ibid). The deterrence referred to here is not a socially constructed one like ‘mutually assured destruction’, rather it is the innate human aversion to killing another human being. This aversion is best demonstrated by trigger pull studies taken from various historical armed conflicts. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, an army psychologist contends that in earlier wars a large number of soldiers were not firing at the enemy. “Grossman tells of muskets recovered during the US Civil War which were filled with layers of ‘buck and ball,’ suggesting that soldiers may have wanted to pretend to shoot, and so kept loading but faked firing” (ibid). As a means to combat this human aversion, the military forces have developed techniques of dehumanizing the enemy and weapons that distance the soldier from his victim. Disengagement has become more pervasive as history has progressed, especially when compared to Greek warfare as depicted in Homer’s the Iliad: “And he pitched Pisander . . . onto earth/ And plunged a spear in his chest—the man crashed on his back/ As Hippolochus lept away, but him he killed on the ground,/ Slashing off his arms with a sword, lopping off his head/ And he sent him rolling through the carnage like a log (Homer, 87). This comparison of hand to hand mortal combat, versus that of ‘push-button wars’ make it plain to see that as the military adopts a semi-optimistic approach to technological determinism, it is increasingly disengaged by technology; as such the most powerful deterrent to war is being lost. Even, Clausewitz was eager to emphasize that “war is not waged against an abstract enemy, but against a real one” (von Clausewitz, 1976, 161). Conclusions “I am tired and sick of War. Its Glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have never fired a shot, nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded, who cry aloud for blood, more vengeance, more desolation. War is Hell!” (Sherman, 1879). Weapons by definition inflict harm, and are the appendages of war. The notion of weapons development for peace belies and even sabotages fruitful endeavors for peace by fueling the instigators of conflict. Of even greater concern is the disengagement bred by technology, for while weapons harm, disengagement allows. By no means does this paper wish to convey a sentiment of pessimistic technological determinism, asserting that technology definitively results in war. Rather the aim is to elicit a more paced and considered interpretation of technology's role in this complex social phenomenon. A comprehensive literature review of technological determinism finds a noticeable repetition of the phrase “without anybody choosing it,” in reference to the effects of arms races, mutual deterrence, the centralization of systems, and qualitative weapons development to name a few. The most frightening aspect of technological determinism is the corrosion of hindsight and impotence it engenders. From Clausewitz derives the adage that, “no other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance [as war]” (von Clausewitz, 1976, 83). The variability of conflict ensures that no theories of determinism will ever completely elucidate the processes of war and peace. Instead, it is necessary to assert control over the scientific and social phenomenon that contribute to aggression and bloodshed. The creator of the hydrogen bomb once stated, “what we should have learned is that the world is small, that peace is important, and that cooperation in science…[can] contribute to peace” (Wolverton, 2002). This notion of science and technology as a means of cooperation rather than competition holds promise.

As weapons technology has served to confound peace, other malignant forms of technology have served to destroy global health and the environment, both of which must now be internationally repaired. If goals could be found by which technology and science could become mutually assured benefits to all nation states, cooperation might compel peace; ‘peace’ that is more appealing than the type bread by mutually assured destruction.

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