Riding A Tiger: Making The Most Of The China Threat Theory In Outer Space.

Riding a Tiger: making the most of the China threat theory in Outer Space. Whoever controls outer space will also control the Earth. (Jianqun 2006: 71) ‘The peaceful objective of China’s space exploration program is undisputable.’ (Dangen 2006: 60) Introduction The future of the political environment in outer space is unclear. There are those analysts who foresee a future that is both benign and development-oriented, while others judge space exploration as unavoidably antagonistic. Ultimately, the future seems predicated on those actors who control space, and their behaviour in it. Compounding this uncertainty is the ambiguity surrounding China’s intentions in space. ‘That China is so large and complex that one can look there for proof of any thesis, and find it, complicates the situation’ (Johnson-Freese 2003: 52). The China threat theory and the peaceful rise theory are the diametric theses most frequently employed to describe China’s behaviour. The latter is largely a Chinese construct in response to the predominantly American claims of a Chinese threat. Modern history has witnessed a Chinese space program focused on countering these accusations, by promoting and emphasizing its peaceful objectives. January 11, 2007 witnessed a change in this posture, when a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile armed with a direct-ascent kinetic kill vehicle destroyed a defunct People’s Republic of China weather satellite (Mulvenon 2007:1). Even the most strident defenders of China’s peaceful rise struggled to explain this event in non-aggressive terms, while American advocates of the China threat saw their predictions finally confirmed. As this paper proposes, there has been utility for the U.S.’s adoption of the China threat theory and likewise, for China’s traditional response of claiming a peaceful rise. However, a possible explanation for China’s recent foray into space weaponry is that China is co-opting the China threat theory for its own benefit. As the only major space faring nation that the U.S. has excluded from its space cooperation strategy, China’s skilled use of the threat theory may indicate to the U.S. that the weaponisation of space has begun, and offer the alternative of binding non-proliferation agreements, ideally forcing the U.S.’s hand and compelling engagement. This paper begins its argument with a description of the U.S.’s traditional China threat theory in space, based on the dual-use nature of technology, China’s lack of transparency and technological transfer. This is followed by an account of China’s contention of a peaceful rise, based on exploration, self-sufficiency, and defensive military applications. Finally, the proposition of how China is utilising the threat theory to its advantage is presented. As the Chinese idiom suggests ‘if riding a tiger, it is difficult to get off’ (QiHu NanXia; Solomone 2006: 322), and China’s actions are not without possible consequence. Its use of the threat theory may have the unintended effect of solidifying the U.S.’s concerns, and elevating the risk of a determined arms race in space. In order for China’s use of the threat theory to work to its advantage, the U.S. must feel equally compelled to adopt a non-traditional posture, thus finally accepting the possibility of China’s peaceful rise. The U.S.’s Traditional Contention of China’s Threat in Space

Rather ironically, it was when China’s national strategy began to subordinate military development to economic development, and give precedence to domestic policies over external challenges, that the China threat theory was catalysed in the US. This strategy is embodied in the assertion of Wu Chunsi of Fudan University that: ‘Military and security considerations are certainly important to any country, but they are not the first priority in the current Chinese grand strategy’ (Blair & Yali 2006: 14). Rather, the Chinese leadership made a deliberate choice to undertake sweeping reforms that came to be understood as ‘Comprehensive Security,’ and had the unintended consequence of provoking the notion of China’s threat (Ong 2007: 4). In relation to China’s space program, the accusations of a China threat, came primarily in the 1990s from a small but influential group of congressional staffers, think-tank analysts and academics known as the “Blue Team,” ‘who vocally and voraciously viewed China as the next enemy’ (JohnsonFreese 2006: 42). Their perception of China’s threat in space was largely based on the dual-use nature of space technology, China’s political opaqueness, and fears of technological transfer. It has been estimated that upwards of 95 percent of space technology has the dual-use ability of serving both civil and military purposes (Johnson-Freese 2006: 40). This feature of the outer space political environment is additionally complicated by the fact that military space technology designed for defensive purposes often is also suitable for offensive attacks. Consequently, a premium is placed on knowing an adversary’s intentions in space, although such knowledge is impossible to gauge with complete certainty. American political and military analysts have instead chosen to focus on the more empirically oriented and conservative notion of China’s capabilities in space, rather than its intentions. The China threat theory has also pushed the intelligence community to adopt austere criteria for projecting threat, often basing policy on China’s ‘possible capabilities’ instead of its ‘likely capabilities.’ As a result there is ‘nothing China can do to convince American worst-case analysts that China could not possibly adapt its dual-use space capabilities for ‘possibly’ posing military threats to the United States’ (Blair & Yali 2006: 5). The difficulty for the U.S. in gauging both China’s intentions and capabilities is further problemitised by its ‘cultural proclivities toward opaqueness…’ and ‘a military “abhorrence” of transparency traced back to Sun Tzu’ (Johnson-Freese 2006: 39). The China threat is given strength by the closed nature of the political system, and this is exacerbated in ‘space-related areas by often excessive security concerns common to authoritarian states’ (ibid). The cumulative effects of the China threat theory have left interaction on military space issues sparse, providing few opportunities for insights into China’s space program, thus feeding China’s suspicions of the US’s hostile intentions as well as a continued rejection of engagement by the U.S. Sino-American relations worsened at the turn of the millennium as U.S. domestic and foreign policy increasingly expressed the China threat in concrete measures, often premised on the concern of technological transfer, or more accurately, China stealing technological secrets. The U.S. National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 decreed that satellites and other space materials be officially classified as munitions (making the U.S. the only country on earth to adopt such a stance) and falling under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), so as to protect American technology from easily exchanging hands with China (Xiaobing 2006: 74-75). This same year witnessed the publication of the Cox Commission Report, released by the U.S. House of Representatives, ‘which groundlessly alleged that China had stolen U.S. missile technologies’(Dangen 2006: 63). While, the Cox Commission report remains contested, there is

certainly evidence to suggest that many features of the Chinese space program did not originate indigenously. ‘That their Xichang launch site is at approximately twenty-eight degrees north latitude and [Kennedy Space Centre] is at 28.5 degrees north is not a coincidence. The Chinese picked a similar latitude to allow emulation of American post-launch trajectories, which were described in some detail in open-source U.S. literature. (Johnson-Freese 2003: 58). This example is a far cry from substantiating allegations of deliberate technological transfer or espionage, but it does confirm the Blue Team’s concerns of China’s possible competitor status. Finally, perhaps the most damning event for Sino-American space relations emerged in 2001 from The Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld. The report warned of the menace to America of a new “Pearl Harbour” and pointed out that the ‘United States was facing competition in space and warned against potential attempts by other nations to restrict U.S. space activities through international regulations’ (FAS 2004: 37). China’s Traditional Contention of a Peaceful Rise With an almost mantra-like quality, China has historically countered the claims of American threat theory analysts by emphasising the objectives of its peaceful rise. These objectives, according to Premier Wen Jiabao, include the short and long term promotion of Chinese development based on indigenous strength and hard work, safeguarding world peace, continued ‘opening-up,’ and neither interfering with, nor threatening any other nation (Jiabao, 2003). As to the credibility of the China threat, promoters of the peaceful rise attribute the misunderstanding to cultural relativity and rightly point out that few Blue Team members are experts on China. ‘Very few of the other Washington-based activists concerned about the Chinese threat have degrees in Chinese studies or speak Chinese’ (Kaiser & Mufson 2000). Space is an area that China sees itself as having once been dominant, but due to outside interference was prematurely surpassed. China is quick to remind the world that it ‘invented gunpowder, the “embryo of modern space rockets,”’ (Johnson-Freese 2003: 57) and now feels justified in regaining its place of distinction. Subsequently, as the American and Russian manned space programs were the embodiment of national spirit, China’s space program is more than just a technological feat. The Chinese people view exploratory ventures in space, like the Shenzhou manned space program similarly to the 2008 Olympic Games and its accession to the World Trade Organization, as symbols of the nation’s strength (Jianqun 2006: 68). American accusations that the Shenzhou program could serve the dual-use purpose of acting as a launch vehicle for an advanced ballistic missile are met with disbelief from the Chinese. They correctly point out that the Long March-2F carrier rocket used by the Shenzhou program is liquid-fueled and requires approximately 20 hours to fuel, which is little threat to U.S. and Russian mobile, solid-fuel strategic missiles, which can be launched in minutes (Dangen 2006:61). Unlike the U.S. which views the dual-use capacity of space technology as problematic, China is among a host of nations, including Europe, that view this capacity as an opportunity. China’s space program is an integral facet of its comprehensive development strategy despite clear military involvement; it became clear very early on that a well-developed space program was beyond the financial means of the military. Unlike the US, a lack of resources to devote to space has compelled the military to ‘substantially divest itself from development and production and become highly reliant on market oriented activities […]’ (Hagt 2006: 90). Fortunately, the ratio of financial input to output of space and supporting industries ranges from about 1:2 to 1:14 (Dangen 2006: 59). Civil space development and exploration have thus revitalized China’s share

of the international satellite launch market and ‘economic returns from Chinese industries related to the space program have already reached 120 billion RMB’ (Dangen 2006: 60). Additionally, the civilian applications of this technology are increasingly contributing to the standard of living in China, including precision navigation, meteorological forecasting, disaster warning, as well as space-tested seeds with dramatically improved yields that promise to help convert China’s vast 1 deserts into arable land (ibid) . In response to accusations that China is willing to steal technology from the US, to promote these development goals, China defensively argues that a guiding principle of its peaceful rise is self-reliance and attaining independent intellectual property rights for space technology. ‘Furthermore, it would be difficult to integrate outside technology with China’s own, as China has developed its own standards for rockets and satellites’ (Xiaobing 2006: 82). Despite the prevalence of civilian space technology, military involvement in China’s space program remains inevitable, particularly in light of dual-use technology. While China does not deny this, it does suggest that it wishes for its military space development to remain entirely defensive. ‘Chinese military thinkers are after all, still influenced by a particular strand in ancient military thought; the famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote around 400 B.C. that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting’ (Ong 2007: 6). Of the utmost importance to many Chinese officials is maintaining the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent. Consequently, the threat of space weaponisation must not be allowed to disturb the balance of the global2 non-proliferation regime. 3 In June of 2002, China, together with the Russian Federation submitted a working paper to the Conference of Disarmament (CD). The document acknowledged the dual-use nature of space assets as well as the fact that ‘it would seem impossible for the U.S. to give up its missile defense,’ (Chunsi 2006: 113) so while banning weaponisation, it allowed for the use of certain defensive and peaceful military applications. Although being well received by the international community, the U.S. has continually blocked efforts to develop these policies into legally binding treaties. After several decades of defending its peaceful rise, the January 11, 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test seems to be a dramatic change of behaviour for China. Advocates of the China threat were quick to interpret an implied offensive threat or worse, suggesting the possibility that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had become a ‘rogue warrior’ (Mulvenon 2007). But considering China’s growing dependence on it’s own space assets, making it possibly the most strategically vulnerable of all the major powers (Hagt 2006: 91), a more likely interpretation is that China increasingly finds less utility in the peaceful rise theory, and has found a means to coopt the China threat theory. In 2001 Rumsfeld’s Space Commission Report stated that space was destined to become the battleground of the future and that the U.S. would be remiss not to prepare. This year also marked the first U.S. space war game simulation, where the U.S. forces battled a large opponent threatening a small island neighbour about the same size and location as Taiwan (Johnson-Freese 2006: 52). Clearly, the passive role that China has maintained thus far has not served to encourage U.S. engagement or deflect U.S. hostilities. Russell Ong (2007) has suggested that overall, the China threat theory serves the utility of giving policymakers in the West ‘a convenient framework for formulating their China policies,’ and further, ‘provides some justification for those policymakers who wish to adopt a containment policy towards China.’ (10). It is in light of this fact that China has begun to discover its own utility in the China threat theory. China’s Adoption of the Threat Theory

The Chinese, with regards to outer space, have historically believed that, ‘the first and best option […was] to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from [weaponising]’ (Hui 2006:26). As Hu Xiaodi, China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs explained: ‘If any country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the prevention of space weaponisation, as suggested by China’ (Xiaodi 2001). John Bolton, then U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and non-proliferation, has countered these Chinese overtures by declaring to the CD that: ‘the current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. We see no need for new agreements’ (Hui 2006:29). The basis for this position can essentially be described as: since no state other than the U.S. possesses the capability, the need to pursue multilateral treaties banning weaponisation is redundant. China’s ASAT test is intended to provoke from the U.S. administration the same sense of urgency, and severity which the Chinese have long given to this issue. Emphasising the strategic urgency of binding legislation, Teng Jianqun (2006) accurately notes that the ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty took effect 30 years after the first use of nuclear weapons and its effectiveness has been severely weakened as a result.’ While this recent ASAT test may provoke an aggressive response from the US, it is likely that China’s use of the threat, is intended more to highlight the peaceful alternatives. In the weeks following the test, China frequently repeated the same phrase: ‘This test was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to any country… [China] opposes the weaponisation of space and arms races in space’ (Buckley 2007). These statements were quickly followed by the legal caveat that the ‘recent satellite-related test did not violate any international treaty’ (‘PRC FM Spokesman’ 2007). China has skilfully and legally applied the threat in such a way as to exaggerate the need and desirability of binding treaties preventing further ASAT tests. What China’s space program to date has indicated, is that the U.S.’s continued isolation and exclusion will only deepen China’s suspicion and resentment of the US, possibly pushing the commercial and civilian sectors of China’s space program to seek renewed alliances with the military (Chunsi 2006: 110). China threat theorists reject this interpretation of China’s behaviour. They instead suggest that China’s promotion of international treaties ‘is merely the gambit of a country still playing catchup, with the purpose of constraining U.S. political freedom to act in space while China continues to develop its own weapon systems to destroy American space assets’ (Hagt 2006: 92). They further note that since the CD has been in a state of suspended animation, without even a working agenda since 1996, China can comfortably propose treaties that it has no intention of ever conforming to. Ironically, this suspicion may be based on the U.S.’s prior experiences in which it developed the F-15 ASAT while simultaneously pushing the Russians to negotiate a complete ASAT ban (Hagt 2006). The accusations are also ironic considering it is the US, not China that is the principal country blocking the CD agenda. Should the American administration truly believe that China is using the treaty as a ploy, the U.S. is the only state capable of calling China’s bluff, and attempting to engage it (Hagt 2006: 96). The U.S.’s Adoption of the Peaceful Rise Theory In the sense that China may not be able to control the political fallout from its recent ASAT test, its manipulation of the threat theory is much like riding a tiger. Well before the recent ASAT test, Zhang Hui (2006) predicted that if Chinese efforts at multilateral agreements failed, it’s most likely response would be to counter and neutralize the threat posed by the U.S. weaponisation of space, most likely in the form of ASAT weapons. Further, he predicted that this

would inevitably lead to an arms race in space (25). If an arms race is to be avoided, provoked by China’s recent use of threat, America must likewise adopt a non-traditional posture. In this case the U.S. must find utility in the concept of China’s peaceful rise. This position will involve compromising its current pursuit of space hegemony, but ultimately is also more likely to serve U.S. national interests. Certainly, the antagonistic and suspicious nature of the current relationship will necessitate incremental revisions. However, as both U.S. and Chinese space activities can be classified into civil, commercial, defence and intelligence applications, it is likely that despite the dual-use character of the technology, cooperation on at least civilian and commercial projects is still possible (Chunsi 2006: 110). From an economic perspective, research indicates that the U.S. efforts to isolate and retard China’s space program have only ‘[stimulated] China’s indigenous space industry, [driven] European companies into closer cooperation with China, and hurt the U.S. aerospace industry on which the U.S. military increasingly depends’ (Blair & Yali 2006: 7). If the U.S. began to engage notions of China’s peaceful rise and make greater use of China’s launch capacity in the next five years, then it stands to gain possibly $8 billion USD worth of benefits and 16,000 job opportunities to the U.S. space industry (Xiaobing 2006: 82). The U.S. containment policy towards China has made it impossible for U.S. satellite manufacturers to take advantage of the increasingly cheap and reliable services in China. The nature of the ITAR treats any satellites, foreign or domestic, with any American-made components as falling under U.S. export restrictions. Consequently, countries from Europe to Russia to Brazil, ‘regard the American policy of isolating China’s space program as draconian, and the export restrictions as excessive’ (Blair & Yali 2006:10). Increasingly, the international space industry is shunning the U.S. market in favour of ‘“ITAR Free,” meaning that no components of U.S.-origin were used, and therefore the satellite [is] not subject to U.S. export laws’ (Johnson-Freese 2006b: 142). The U.S., unlike China, views space as a zero-sum game; this myopic assessment of outer space has been justified in the increasingly obsolete jargon of the China threat theory. In reality, isolating China’s military threat involves engaging China’s integration into the international community. The utility of encouraging cooperation and entertaining China’s peaceful rise is especially profound when considering the U.S.’s historic track record of emphasising the value of space cooperation. ‘Cooperation with Europe delayed European entry into the commercial launch sweepstakes until the U.S. overreached for control. Japan too was initially deterred from building indigenous launchers, instead licensing technology from the United States. The licensing agreements not only gave the U.S. control over what was launched, but reaped financial rewards for U.S. companies as well’ (Johnson-Freese 2006B: 144). Perhaps setting the greatest precedent, was the U.S.’s enlistment of Russia into the International Space Station, which thankfully ‘kept Russian rocket scientists from turning up on the international employment market as missile specialists’ (ibid). Finally, the advantages to the U.S. of the China threat theory, as well as space weaponisation are questionable. Evidence from the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research indicates that the strategic benefit of space-based weapons is highly exaggerated. In fact, ground-based weapons are in many ways more effective. ‘The high costs of developing, testing and deploying space weapons, the difficulty of subsequent calibration, maintenance and repair, and the arms race that would likely ensue compare especially unfavourably with the greater security, commercial and other benefits of a legally regulated weapons-free outer space’ (UNIDIR 2004: 14-15).

Conclusion In many ways the China threat theory represents a tiger that both the U.S. and China may find difficult to let go of. If China’s recent actions provoke a heightened military response from the US, China will be obliged to resort with counter threats, and the possibility of an arms race looms. Likewise, the threat theory has been such an intrinsic part of the U.S.’s containment policy towards China, both in international relations, and in outer space, that it may be difficult to embrace China’s peaceful rise. ‘Perhaps not coincidentally, space…remains one of the last venues of Cold War thinking, with assets considered so important that zero-sum thinking prevails’ (Johnson-Freese 2006: 51). However, international headlines increasingly indicate reasons for optimism and the possibility of improving Sino-American relations: ‘The two nations have been cooperating closely in the global war against terror, the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula, and on global security. Bilateral economic ties are closer than ever [… the] characterization of China as a stakeholder instead of strategic competitor is accurate’ (Xiaobing 2006: 82). The US, and now China, have found utility in exaggerating China’s threat, and it has thus far resulted only in further isolation and aggression. For the sake of peaceful relations on earth and in space, it is now time for the two nations to stop riding the threat theory and instead embrace the possibility of China’s peaceful rise. If these powerful nations can achieve mutual understanding and cooperation in space, there is hope that they might achieve it on earth as well.

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