Graceful Degradation Of The Information Society: A Critical Examination Of Ict4peace

GRACEFUL DEGRADATION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF ICT4PEACE

A dissertation submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Humanities

2007 ALIA NOELLE LAMAADAR SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contents

-AbstractA more pacific global community, engendered through the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is the hopeful and indeed lofty goal championed by the practice and theory of ICT4Peace. A recent addition to the field of international development, there has been little effort to strenuously challenge the propositions and assumptions put forth by ICT4Peace. What is noticeably absent from the ICT4Peace agenda is an attempt at critical selfreflection, an endeavour to understand if its tools of the trade—the ‘new’ ICTs—having emerged from unique Western experiences, are apposite to areas of conflict in the developing world. The following research is intended to explore how the dominant discourse surrounding ICT4Peace possibly obscures alternative understandings of the effects of ICT in conflict-affected environments. Using discourse analysis this paper isolates the central themes and assumptions of ICT4Peace by examining its Operational, Programmatic, and Peace-building applications. This analysis highlights three dominant discursive themes—Neutrality, Liberalism and Positivity—each respectively perpetuating the assumptions that: (i) ICTs encourage equality; (ii) ICTs are democratizing; and (iii) ICTs promote grassroots involvement. A critique of these themes and assumptions indicates substantial dissonance between the social changes that ICTs are expected to engender and the actual demands of ‘failed states’. By neglecting to address these shortcomings, ICT4Peace offers an incomplete understanding of the potential effects of these tools, possibly to the detriment of already vulnerable societies.

-DeclarationNo portion of the work referred to in the dissertation has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

-Copyright Statementi. Copyright in text of this dissertation rests with the author. Copies (by any process) either in full, or of extracts, may be made only in accordance with instructions given by the author. Details may be obtained from the appropriate Graduate Office. This page must form part of any such copies made. Further copies (by any process) of copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the permission (in writing) of the author. ii. The ownership of any intellectual property rights which may be described in this dissertation is vested in the University of Manchester, subject to any prior agreement to the contrary, and may not be made available for use by third parties without the written permission of the University, which will prescribe the terms and conditions of any such agreement. iii. Further information on the conditions under which disclosures and exploitation may take place is available from the Head of the School of Social Science.

-DedicationAcademically, I am indebted to Dr. Rorden Wilkinson for inspiring the critical approach that I believe differentiates this research from most other examinations of ICT4Peace. Financially, I am indebted to Nancy Lamaadar, Courtney Abrahams, Richard Smallfield and Retta Peel for their 25 years of generosity and love. I am also forever indebted to Eoin Hennessy for igniting my interest in technology and for his constant pokes in the right direction. *And most of all I am indebted to my mother for everything, always.*

- List of Abbreviations – ADR – Alternative Dispute Resolution AEKW – African Education Knowledge Warehouse BaBe – Be active, Be emancipated CMC – Computer Mediated Communication CMI – Crisis Management Initiative CSIS – Centre for Strategic and International Studies GIS – Geographical Information Systems GooB – Government out of the Box program ICANN – Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross ICT – Information and Communication Technology ICT4D – Information and Communication Technology for Development ICT4Peace – Information and Communication Technology for Peace IDP – Internally Displaced Peoples ISP – Internet Service Provider ITU – International Telecommunications Union MENA – Middle Eastern and North African MtF – Mandate the Future NDI – National Democratic Institute for International Affairs NGO – Nongovernmental Organisation ODR – Online Dispute Resolution OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OLPC – One Laptop Per Child PDA – Personal Digital Assistant PFN – People First Network PSO – Peace Support Operations RAWA – Revolutionary Women’s Association of Afghanistan SMS – Short Message Service TFP – Technology For Peace UN – United Nations UNICTTF – United Nations Information and Communication Technology Task Force UNDP – United Nations Development Programme UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees VoIP – Voice Over Internet Protocol WAP – Wireless Application Protocol WiFi – Wireless Fidelity WSIS – World Summit on the Information Society

- List of Cited Websites African Education Knowledge Warehouse. http://www.schoolnetafrica.net/278.0.html. Burundinet. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/burundinet/. Cybersettle. http://www.cybersettle.com/info/main.aspx Ericsson Response Program. http://www.ericsson.com/ericsson/corporate_responsibility/ ericssonresponse/ Eyesondarfur. http://www.eyesondarfur.org. Facebook. http://www.facebook.com Global Voices Online. http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/. Gurtong Peace Trust Project. http://www.gurtong.org. Humanlink. http://www.hlink.org/mission.asp. ICT4Peace. http://www.ICT4Peace.org. Info-Share. http://www.info-share.org. Interlocals. http://www.interlocals.net. Internal Displacement. http://www.internal-displacement.org. IRIN. http://www.irinnews.org/. Mandate the Future. http://orgs.takingitglobal.org/547. Microsoft Office Groove. http://www.groove.net/home/index.cfm. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. http://www.ndi.org/about/ about.asp. People First Network. http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/. ReliefWeb. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc100?OpenForm. Reuters AlertNet. http://www.alertnet.org/. SmartSettle. http://www.smartsettle.com. Square Trade. http://www.squaretrade.com Swisspeace. http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/ research/index.html. Tech4Peace. http://tech4peace.org Videoletters. http://www.videoletters.net/set-1030.1005-en.html. Voxiva. http://www.voxiva.net Wikipedia. http://www.wikipedia.org WSIS. http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html

CHAPTER ONE - Preface ‘[We, the representatives of the peoples of the world], value the potential of ICTs to promote peace and to prevent conflict.’ (WSIS 2005: Para. 36) 1.1 Introduction With this passage from the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the foundations of what has come to be known as ICT for Peace (ICT4Peace) were laid. A more pacific global community, engendered through the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is the hopeful and indeed lofty goal embodied in both ICT4Peace and the notion of an ‘Information Society’. In the legacy of the Information Systems approach to development, ICT4Peace has become a growing field of academic and political interest. ICT4Peace and the WSIS celebrate the availability of technological services that were unthinkable even 10 years ago: satellites provide precise spatial awareness, cell phones encourage constant communication, and laptops with wireless connections to the internet allow for uninterrupted access to the ‘Information Society’. Conversely, satellite technology allows state militaries to gather intrusive and incriminating information, while terrorists can use cell phones as explosive detonators. These experiences – positive and negative – have bred a unique view of technology in the developed world. Avgerou (2002) refers to this as ‘techno-economic rationality’ and suggests that it is instrumental to how Western developed societies define problems and determine solutions (2). Of interest to this particular research is the problem of ‘failed states’ and the twin challenges of peacekeeping and peace-building. In their attempts to ‘promote the use […] of ICTs in humanitarian and peace operations’ (ICT4Peace 2007) and ‘establish the foundations for an Information Society for all,’ (WSIS 2007) what the WSIS and ICT4Peace have neglected to adequately address is if this unique rationality is appropriate for the 50 percent of the world’s population who have never used a phone (Kuster, Lin, Balzano 1997: 4), or the 80 percent who live in developing countries (Castells 2001), 23 million of whom have been killed as a result of war in the last sixty years (Dress 2005: 7). Western experiences and ‘techno-economic rationality’ embrace the ‘Information Society’ as a strategy, but like any strategy, it is also representative of a discourse, a particular way of imagining (Fairclough 2005) a new Global political-economic order. What is noticeably absent from the ICT4Peace agenda is an attempt at critical self-reflection, an effort to understand if the social assumptions and practices of the ‘Information Society,’ having emerged from ‘another context and other needs,’ (Dagron 2001: 31), are apposite to areas of conflict in the developing world. Danowitz et al. (1995) have aptly described this concern, suggesting that when ICT ‘is injected into cultures […] it comes loaded with an embedded virtual value system’ (28). Certainly, the foundations of ICT4Peace are heavily rooted in the West’s unique experiences with technological modernity. The following research is intended to address this concern and explore in what ways the dominant discourse surrounding ICT4Peace possibly obscures alternative understandings of the effects of ICT in conflict zones. The literature review in Chapter Two utilises discourse analysis to identify the ‘neutral, liberal and positive’ themes (Rohozinski 2003: 8) that dominate the ICT4Peace discourse, respectively perpetuating three assumptions: (i) ICTs encourage equality; (ii) ICTs and

transparency are democratizing; and (iii) ICTs promote grassroots involvement. The critique presented in Chapter Three is drawn from diverse research on social theories of technology, which as Kling (2000) has noted are ‘scattered in […] several different fields’ including communications, computer science, and some social sciences (217). Such a critique ultimately demonstrates that ICT4Peace initiatives, premised largely upon the assumptions isolated in Chapter Two, ignore many of the practical realities of conflict zones. By neglecting to consider 1 the shortcomings of a discourse premised on Neutral, Liberal and Positive discursive themes, ICT4Peace initiatives are naively designed and possibly harmful. Let it be clear that this research is not meant to discredit ICT4Peace as a valid endeavour. Instead it is intended to place attention where it has previously been absent, identifying the features of technology that the ICT4Peace discourse largely ignores. 1.2 Explanation of Terms ICTs are generally understood to encompass ‘the full range of the production, distribution and consumption of messages, across all media from radio and television, to satellite to Internet’ (Wilson 1998: 6). This research has attempted whenever possible to focus on what are often referred to as the ‘new’ ICTs, the digital, often wireless technologies, most relevant to the modern conflict community (Hattotuwa 2007). For the purposes of this paper, Hattotuwa’s (2004) broad understanding of ICT4Peace is adopted. As such ICT4Peace ‘is the use of enabling technologies to augment existing stakeholder interventions, enable hitherto marginalised actors to participate more fully in peace-building processes, empower grassroots communities and bring cohesion to […] peace-building and conflict transformation’ (12). ICT4Peace applications can generally be grouped into Operational, Programmatic, and Peace-building categories (Rohozinski 2003), although there may inevitably be some overlap between the three. Recognizing a distinction made by Laouris (2004: 69), this research only addresses those applications of ICTs used directly in the service peace; it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the military uses of technology. 1.3 A Note on Discourse Analysis Discourse has been found a useful category of study among social analysts and linguists alike. Herein, the more conventional linguistic definition is embraced, referring primarily to spoken or written language as opposed to semiotics or other non-verbal forms of communication (Fairclough 1993:134). In adopting discourse analysis, the following research subscribes to Fairclough’s (1993) interpretation as: analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality […] between (a) discursive practices, events, and texts and (b) wider social and cultural [processes…] suggesting that such linkages between discourse, ideology and power may well be unclear to those involved […]’ (135). Like all critiques that involve the identification and synthesis of a dominant discourse, subjective judgements on the part of the researcher are inevitable; subsequently, ‘there can be no “definitive” analysis of a piece of discourse’ (Thompson 2004: 6). However, whenever possible this essay has included exemplars and extensive citations to put the reader in a position to judge the validity of the author’s conclusions based on their own interpretation of the text, thus suitably

allowing for ‘the development of independent judgements concerning the analysis’ (ibid). As ICT4Peace is premised on the notion of an increasingly mediated global environment,–‘an environment that by definition cannot exist without its technologies of communication’ (Fairclough et al. 2004)– the need for analytical emphasis on the process of discourse conveyance is particularly relevant. Therefore as Fairclough has contended, discourse analysis must be understood not simply as the researcher’s subjective insights into spoken words but rather as ‘social analysis with a focus on the moment of discourse’ (Fairclough et al. 2004).

CHAPTER TWO - Review 2.1 Introduction to the Review Any examination of ICT4Peace is incomplete without a preliminary discussion of the historical theories addressing the relationship between man and technology. Although rigorous academic critiques of ICT4Peace are sparse, there is nonetheless a great tradition situated within the realm of critical development theory and social theories of technology that endeavour to problematise ‘the grand narratives that have defined development thinking’ (Wilson 2001: 2; see Escobar 1988 as an example). Escobar urges critical dissection of the technological discourses that are the products of modernity, believing that ‘[technology] emerges out of particular cultural conditions and in turn helps to create new ones’ (Escobar et al. 1994: 211). The predecessors to this critique were the critical theorists of modernity including Mumford and Marcuse who respectively warned of ‘authoritarian technics’ (Mumford 1964) and Western ‘scientifictechnical rationality’ as political systems of domination (Marcuse 1964). Marcuse, adopting a Marxist perspective, suggested that the Western regard for science and technology served a particular hierarchical structure of power and class and reinforced ‘unequal relations fostered by capital accumulation’ (Avgerou 2000: 5). Thus, the historical critique of technological modernity suggests that the fundamental principal that has come to distinguish ‘modern’ Western society from ‘traditional’ societies is the belief that man can be improved by reason alone (Touraine 1995). This position also helps to form the theoretical critique of ICT4Peace and its conviction that science and technology are beneficial to the creation of an ‘Information Society.’ Ribeiro (1997) has posited that ‘children of both globalism and the computer age see themselves as creating a new world mediated by hi-tech, where access to the network is both a sort of postmodern liberation and the experience of a new democratic means’ (Ribeiro 1997: 3). Therefore, in addition to its theoretical foundations, the genesis of ICT4Peace is very much a product of the historical climate within which it evolved. The end of the 20th Century witnessed unprecedented international interventions in conflict zones across the developing world, driven largely by the magnitude of human suffering in these areas and ‘hope for the “peace dividend” that was to accrue with the end of the cold war’ (Rohozinski 2003:2). Mark Duffield (2005) suggests that this period experienced a ‘securitisation’ of international development, as the Cold War Era’s geopolitics (the security of the state) were replaced with the Humanitarian Era’s biopolitics (the security of populations). Thus, this period shifted away from more traditional and limited interventions, intended to curb violence and provide humanitarian aid, towards a more comprehensive social transformation of these areas, applying the liberal signposts of development, and modernist notions of progress. The stated goals of these ventures were to ‘transform conflict zones from nests of Hobbesian atavism and poverty into modern, liberal, market-oriented democracies’ (Rohozinski 2003:3). Amid this historical backdrop the notion of an ‘Information Society’ emerged. The discourse surrounding the ‘Information Society’, reminiscent of the modernisation theses that Marcuse and Mumford criticised half a century before, hints that through the immutable progress of ICTs ‘all societies will move inexorably over the next twenty years to the condition of late twentiethcentury southern California’ (Golding 2000: 170). Based on the West’s own experiences with technological modernity, development and relief practitioners have come to consider ICTs as neutral devices of communication and information transmission, while simultaneously ‘harboring strong expectations for the positive development and peace-building potential that

they may enable’ (ibid: 4). The following literature review endeavours to contribute to this tradition of critical theory by identifying the themes and assumptions that are composite to the ICT4Peace discourse.

2.2 Current Research Until the WSIS set an explicit research agenda for ICT4Peace, few formal investigations addressed the subject. The most relevant research has been limited to the military’s reliance on ICTs and claims of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Much has been written about this RMA including extensive research on ‘Netwar’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001), and ‘Cyberterrorism,’ (Denning 2001), often performed under the auspices of military publications. What follows is a discussion of ‘the first serious and high-level report’ (Hattotuwa 2006) published on the subject of ICT4Peace. ICT for Peace: The Role of ICT in Preventing, Responding to and Recovering from Conflict (Stauffacher et al. 2005) was commissioned by the United Nations ICT Task Force (UNICTTF) in conjunction with the WSIS. The UNICTTF report is essentially descriptive research intended to broadly delineate ICT4Peace as a unique area of study and identify current activities which fall under its arrangement. The first obvious theme presented in the report is the emphasis on the neutral qualities of ICT. The report highlights the neutrality of ICT at several points by suggesting ‘that every technology can be used for good or evil’ (iv), and that ‘the internet itself is neutral’ (11). The report looks primarily at the operational applications of ICT—those applications devoted to the organization, and networking of peace practitioners—consequently it suggests that the technologies themselves have no social or political bias, that ‘in all cases, technology is a means to an end’ (55). From the theme of neutrality the report often assumes that equality exists among users. In highlighting the universal benefits of ICTs the report suggests that, ‘ICTs give us the potential to improve standards of living throughout the world,’ (iii; emphasis added) and ‘the web gives a potentially limitless number of individuals and organizations the ability to broadcast news (11; emphasis added). On a few occasions the report does indeed warn of the potential for inequitable distribution of ICTs ‘subject to social and economic constraints’ (10), since ‘political will is required to respond to information, to share it widely and equitably, and to ensure global dissemination’ (iii). However, these caveats are in reference to the notion of technology ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’; they are not largely critical of the possibility of existing social inequalities that ICTs might help perpetuate. The report acknowledges that, ‘for those who know how to use it, however, the internet offers ways of raising the profile of forgotten emergencies, [and] countering the misuse of the internet for promoting conflict’ (11; emphasis added). Yet the report never explicitly addresses the vast disparities that exist between segments of the global population in terms of technological experience and savvy. The report also emphasises the fundamentally liberal qualities of ICTs, particularly with regard to free speech and information flows. The Liberal discursive theme extends throughout the report suggesting that, ‘[ICTs] have given a new meaning to human rights, in particular the freedom of expression and information’ (iv), ‘communication is also essential for ending conflict and building lasting peace, and ICT has a key role to play in improving communication, facilitating negotiations, increasing transparency, and building trust’ (7). The report does not elaborate on the specific causal pathway between peace and the liberal values of transparency, communication and liberty, instead assuming that the most likely implication of greater communication flows is more peaceful relations. Limited evidence is given for this claim, although one example cited indicates that ‘in Chiapas, Mexico, the Zapatista’s use of the Internet called international attention to the plight of the indigenous; this attention may have afforded them some protection and prevented a full scale violent conflict from developing by enabling their participation in a political process’ (23). Thus, ICTs are expected ‘to some extent enable the

democratization of information’ (6) and democracy in turn acts as a harbinger of peace. Such a position echoes democratic peace theory and the liberal expectation that communication preserves the central freedoms of democratic society (Kedzie 2002: 107). In addition to the themes of Neutrality and Liberalism, the UNICTTF report demonstrates an expectation favouring the Positive implications of ICT, particularly at the grassroots level. Despite being focused on primarily Western web-based initiatives, the word ‘local’ is found 72 times throughout the report. Frequently claims are made that ICT ‘[fosters] people-to-people links’ (62), ‘[makes] people-to-people connections’ (ibid) and can supplement local exchanges ‘by linking people to people, both in country and in Diaspora populations’ (48). The report reflects often on the grassroots benefits derived from the large scale use of ICT in conflict zones given that, ‘rather than seeking to promote a solution from outside, the goal is simply to create space for collective problem solving between the protagonists’ (48). This Positive discursive theme is reflected in the assumption that localised social interactions subsequently encourage peace by addressing the local roots of violence. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan indicates in the preface, ‘ICTs can help address the root causes of violent conflict. By promoting access to knowledge, they can promote mutual understanding, an essential factor in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation’ (iii). Most of the ICT4Peace initiatives detailed in the report have originated in Europe and the United States, and the report does not detail how these initiatives overcome the possibility of socioeconomic bias. As the first serious academic attempt to identify ICT4Peace as a unique area of research and development, the UNICTTF report is indicative of the broader discourse on the subject. The report is legitimised by its high-ranking affiliations with the United Nations, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). More importantly, this report is intended to target an audience previously unfamiliar with the concept, specifically large international organisations and corporations in a position to allocate resources to ICT4Peace (Currion 2006). So while the report is largely intended to be descriptive, we might also expect the discourse to perpetuate these particular themes and assumptions, due to its stature and primacy. The remaining portion of this review examines a variety of articles, websites and initiatives that fall under the purveyance of ICT4Peace. Organised according to their application (Operational, Programatic and Peace-Building), the discourse analysis confirms the dominance of the Neutral, Liberal, and Positive discursive themes and assumptions identified in the UNICTTF report.

2.3 Operational Applications and Neutrality ICTs applied operationally are by far the most common example of ICT4Peace. In this capacity ICTs are a tool and support mechanism for diplomatic and civil peace practitioners. These tools ease the complex coordination of relief operations, helping to control the rapid flow of information, supplies and people in conflict zones. Operational applications of ICTs tend to include technology that disseminates information and allows for networking between stakeholders, as well as field-based support systems and early-warning systems. Networking and field-based support The operational applications of ICT4Peace include the use of cellular and satellite communications technology, VoIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol), and GIS (Geographic Information Systems) to form networks of contact between geographically disconnected stakeholders within and outside of conflicts. Lt. Col. Boltz’s research into the emerging relationship between ICT and Peace Support Operations (PSO) indicates that ‘[one] of the greatest Information Age boons to PSOs is an increased capability to share information quickly, universally, and objectively’ (2002). This claim to objectivity is common when discussing the operational aspects of ICT4Peace and stems from a prevailing treatment of ICTs as utilitarian tools. Much of ICT4Peace demonstrates a clear predisposition favouring this view of rational neutrality. This view is supported by the many and varied uses of technology; it is no longer the case that the military is the sole proprietor of advanced ICT in areas of conflict. Increasingly various international organisations devoted to peace-building, like the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employ vast amounts of advanced technology. These organisations have become so dependent on ICT that many ICT4Peace initiatives are devoted simply to providing these groups with rapid, field-based deployment of technology and support (See Humanlink 2007 and Ericsson Response Program 2007). Other ICT4Peace initiatives are devoted to using ICTs to collect, organise and distribute information relevant to the peacebuilding community. Frequently these initiatives make use of the Internet and are organised into ‘Portals’ of searchable information (See ReliefWeb 2007, IRIN 2007, and Reuters AlertNet 2007). Internaldisplacement.org is a large searchable database specifically designed to distribute information on internally displaced people (IDP) around the world. The goal of this site is to ‘directly contribute to raising awareness of the plight of internally displaced people’ (Internaldisplacement.org 2007). These portals are ideally ‘standing [bodies] that will fuse and disseminate information for the good of all,’ acting as a ‘neutral clearinghouse for accurate, current, and useful information’ (Roth 1997). Although many of these ICT4Peace initiatives are web-based several are actually software applications designed to connect large, distributed networks outside the limitations of internet access (See Voxiva 2007 and Groove 2007). Voxiva is a collaborative software package that has been used in states recovering from conflict, including Rwanda. The software is ‘designed to bring technology to the ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’. By leveraging phones, PDAs, as well as the Internet, these applications ‘allow organizations to collect information from and communicate with distributed networks of people in a timely and systematic way’ (Voxiva 2007). Similarly Microsoft Office Groove (formerly Groove Software) is a peer-to-peer collaborative desktop package that has been adopted by hundreds of government and non-governmental organizations as well as the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. In particular, the Force Protection Rapid Solution application is designed to be used by military, NGO, and civilian peace practitioners to share threat data, and alerts in hostile areas, while the Route Assessment application can

coordinate the movement of convoys through potentially hostile areas. Another operational software package is The Government out of a Box project (GooB), ‘which aims to develop a better civilian tool set for the international community to deal more professionally and effectively with failed states and post-conflict societies’ (CMI 2004). The main objective of the GooB project is to assist in the rapid reconstruction of the civil service, enhancing ‘local ownership in the new administration’ (CMI 2004). Described as a ‘Lego box with ready-made components’ (ibid), the project suggests that peace-building operations around the world are similar enough that readymade, neutral ICT tools could be developed to quickly restore a local sense of belonging and regularity to the lives of people affected by conflict. Early-warning Systems Those involved in peace-building efforts are acutely aware that it ‘is much better to prevent conflict than to have to resolve it’ (Stirrup 2007: 24). Thus, an ever more important operational application of ICT4Peace is the development of early-warning systems used to prevent and alleviate tensions before they escalate. Traditional early-warning systems consisted mostly of qualitative analysis, however this methodology has been criticised as being subjective and predisposed to bias (Lundin 2004). Additionally, Wolf (2005) has lamented that, ‘for warnings to work, it's not enough for them to be delivered. They must also overcome that human tendency to pause; they must trigger a series of effective actions, mobilizing the informal networks that we depend on in a crisis.’ In this sense, there is a demand that early-warning systems must employ models that make use of the alleged objectivity of technology (ibid). Hence, quantitative systems are considered more appropriate for early-warning (Lundin 2004). These computer prediction models are expected to be ‘less dependant on subjective judgement’ since ‘with a quantitative approach, it is also possible to validate and improve the model by “teaching” the system […] in other words a self-learning system’ (Lundin 2004). Ultimately most ICT4Peace early-warning systems combine both human coding (qualitative) and machine parsing (quantitative) methods. One such example is Swisspeace's Early-warning Program, FAST International (swisspeace.ch 2007). FAST International's quantitative methodology is based on event data analysis which Swisspeace claims offers ‘consistency, transparency, speed, and interactivity’ (ibid) and automated coding which enables a large amount of information to be digested reliably in a brief period of time. By using ICT to objectively synthesis vast sums of event data FAST International is expected to act as a neutral watchdog, balancing the de-sensitization and subjective hype of traditional media (ibid). As this review demonstrates, ICT4Peace operational initiatives exalt the impartial qualities of technology. This treatment emerges from a primarily Neutral discursive theme; ICTs in this capacity are value free. This sentiment is variously described as, ‘information technologies are neutral […] whether the consequences of information technologies are beneficial or deleterious depends on the uses to which they are put’ (Rosenau and Johnson 2002: 55-56; See also UNDP 2001 and Layton 1992). As a result of this faith in the neutrality of technology, ICT4Peace initiatives fail to consider the alternative implications of technology and assume that ICTs are ‘tools creating open channels rather than contested spaces’ (Rohozinski 2003: 218). The discursive theme of Neutrality limits the ways that ICTs can be conceived of and their social implications understood. As technology is increasingly portrayed as a neutral and unbiased tool in support of peace, the assertion that these tools have the potential to better the lives of all and banish global inequalities has increased. In a 2001 UN report, revealingly titled ‘Digital Opportunities for All’ the authors justified the goal of universal access to ICTs by concluding

that these tools are critical to ‘increased social inclusion and the creation of a better life for all’ (Gurumurthy & Singh 2005: 7). Similarly Alty (2006) has described the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as ‘built on the principles of equal opportunity and development.’ Practitioners who use ICTs operationally are likely to view technology as an objective tool, and are particularly susceptible to the assumption that technology benefits all people equally; a belief that resonates with Bill Gates’ claim that the ‘Information Society’ may ultimately reduce the global inequalities between rich and poor nations (Norris 2000a: 1). In a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) entitled Wikis, webs, and networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings, Linder’s (2006) recommendations are indicative of the assumption underlying much of ICT4Peace that ICTs allow for a hitherto unheard of degree of global equality and a forum for communication that strongly resembles the Habermasian ideal speech situation (Murphy 1994: 114-115). She suggests that ‘user-driven content, in which all individuals contribute information, share concepts, and evaluate resources, is the practical choice for fast-paced environments with conflicting and unreliable data’ (17). She further suggests users who best utilize the resource shall drive the market regardless of their position in a hierarchy (18). Linder uses the phrase ‘architecture of participation’ to underscore the inclusive properties of ICTs, particularly the internet, highlighting their potential as ‘systems with low barriers to entry that are designed for openness and user contribution [… elevating] valuable contributors […] on merit, rather than position and title’ (19). The assumption that ICTs encourage equality is also appealing to those initiatives designed to bridge the infamous ‘digital divide’ and to encourage social and economic development in areas impacted by conflict, otherwise known as the Programmatic applications of ICT4Peace.

2.4 Programmatic Applications and Liberalism The programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are linked to the Information Systems approach to international development, and are often indistinguishable from ICT for Development (ICT4D). In this capacity ICTs are conceived of as tools that can help failed, recovering, or vulnerable states to ‘leapfrog’ the traditional stages of development by ‘enhancing governance, empowering citizens, facilitating regional development […] and offering new opportunities to combat poverty’ (Rohozinski 2003: 4). These initiatives are in accordance with a recent United Nations report indicating that ‘the world is undergoing a revolution in [ICT] that has momentous implications for the current and future social and economic situation of all countries of the world’ (Rice 2003: 73). The programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are heavily dominated by a Liberal discursive motif clearly demonstrated in both theory and practice. While there may be no universally agreed upon definition of liberalism, insofar as ‘what we tend to call liberal, resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions’ (Doyle 1986:1152), it is possible to identify the influence of this theme in ICT4Peace as well the assumptions it perpetuates. Broadly speaking, the ‘recognizable characteristics’ of liberalism include an emphasis on individual rights such as equality, free speech, (Doyle 1986: 1151) the rule of law, the free exchange of ideas, a market economy and a transparent system of government, notably liberal democracy (Liberal International 1997). Reflective of liberalism, ICT4Peace expects ‘that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” in their foreign policy’ (Doyle 1986: 1151). Consequently, this Liberal discursive motif has propagated the assumption that ICTs used programmatically to increase information flows and transparency will also facilitate economic development, and social development, specifically promoting democracy. Economic Development The programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are only the most recent line of an ancient scholarly tradition linking development, democracy and peace. This liberal tendency to view development as a linear progression that eventually, and necessarily, concludes in Western liberal democracy is found throughout the ICT4Peace discourse. ICTs are often expressed in terms of their capacity to ‘leapfrog’ failed states into more advanced and progressive societies. The World Development Report (1998/99) has described the ability of developing countries to ‘leapfrog the industrial countries by going straight from underdeveloped networks to fully digitized networks’ (in Rosenau & Singh 2002: 279). It is by merit of increased transparency and the free flow of information that ICTs are expected to promote both economic and social development. In designing the National Strategy for an Information Society in Serbia, the UNDP reports that those countries who take the lead in implementing national ICT strategies have the most ‘outstanding economic performance’ (UNDP 2005: 12), further suggesting that these strategies ‘address the opportunities to use ICT to expand employment and earning opportunities […] for the poor, women, [and] marginalized communities’ (ibid: 38). Other countries in the process of rebuilding after violent conflict have also adopted the view that there is a causal link between ICTs and economic development. The Rwandan ICT strategy, described as ‘more “mobile in every pocket” than “chicken in every pot”’ (‘Once war-torn’ 2006) is aimed at the rapid transformation of a depressed agricultural economy into an information economy, decreasing the percentage of the workforce involved in farming from 90 to 50 percent in only 15 years (ibid). Working with Microsoft to develop a comprehensive ICT strategy, the government ‘believes that ICT is offering Rwanda a window of opportunity to leap frog the key stages of

industrialisation and transform [Rwanda] into a service-driven, knowledge-based economy’ (Microsoft 2006). In addition to broad national strategies, many initiatives are favouring individual technologies to promote economic development, citing singular examples of success drawn from the developing world. For example, in defence of their ‘HomeBox,’ a ‘web content creation tool for the Developing World,’ Piper and Hwang (2001) describe a farming village in Peru as ‘one example of a community that directly benefited from access to the Internet. Two years after Internet services were established, the average yearly income rose from US$300 to US$1500’ (145). Thus, ICT4Peace programmatic initiatives seek to recreate this success by increasing information flows and allowing local producers to participate in a global market. In addition to the internet, advanced ICT like GIS are being incorporated into peace operations in regions recovering from conflict like Kosovo, to increase transparency and convert field-based information into a more effective development program (Boltz 2002). In the hopes of reversing the destructive effects of war on state economies, The African Education Knowledge Warehouse (AEKW) is using ICT multimedia and skills training to rehabilitate child soldiers in Angola, Liberia and Rwanda ‘into main stream society’ (AEKW 2007). Further, Bankes and Burge (2004) have suggested that mobile phones have the potential to ‘[leapfrog] the technological gap between the developed and developing world’ (Banks & Burge 2004: 5). The theme of Liberalism present in the ICT4Peace discourse promotes a particular set of causal assumptions regarding the links between development, democracy and peace. These assumptions are exemplified by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs’ (NDI) assertion that ‘it is no coincidence that the world's most prosperous and peaceful nations are also the most democratic’ (NDI.org). ICTs are expected to incur the same results in the developing world, as the West attributes to them in the developed world (See Alty 2006). In addition to using ICTs to encourage economic development the programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are designed to encourage the social development of conflict-affected countries. Consequently the Liberal discursive theme encourages the assumption that transparency and increased communication flows from ICTs are a harbinger of democracy and ultimately peace (Stauffacher et al. 2005: 7). Social Development The Liberal discursive theme in ICT4Peace supports a view of ICT hinged on the premise that increased communication flows will inevitably support the further promotion of liberal freedoms and democracy around the world (Kedzie 2002: 106). This view emphasises the nature of advanced ICTs to permit the rapid, relatively unconstrained diffusion of single-to-many and many-to-many forms of communication, whereas the former had previously been a monopoly held by central authorities, and the later had been prohibitively expensive (Rosenau & Johnson 2002: 70). Programmatic initiatives highlight the ability of individuals to rally together, challenging traditional power structures and empowering their cause through collective action. Kedzie’s (2002) research into the link between ICTs, democracy and peace suggests that ‘through communication come different and higher levels of consciousness, at which point people can begin to set the agenda of world politics and the parameters of discourse themselves’ (108). Imbued with liberalism, this discourse rests on the cyclic cause and consequence logic that ‘democracy is embodied in communicative practices’ (ibid: 107), therefore increased communication leads to democratisation, which in turn leads to greater ‘freedom[s] to know, share, and find out’ (ibid), which are further democratising. Thus a central goal of ICT4Peace initiatives is to stress the ‘participatory structures’ of ICT that ‘mimic the participatory nature of

democracies’ (Linder 2006: 19). As an example, the Philippines in 2002 is suggested as providing the first real test of mobile telephony as a democratic tool, when hundreds of thousands of text messages were used to organise massive rallies which eventually helped to topple President Joseph Estrada (Hong 2005). Other programmatic initiatives aimed at social development focus on the informational capacities of ICTs and in particular the quality of transparency. In this capacity ICTs are seen to produce global transparency, where vast amounts of information, previously unavailable or hidden, are exposed. The ICT4Peace discourse is rife with references to the democratic and peaceful effects of transparency. The UNDP (2005) has posited that, when used with the proper intentions, ICTs may create ‘a new kind of transparency where our contribution to humanity becomes visible for the rest of the world to see’ (23-24). Similarly, Kedzie (2002) maintains that the ‘increase in transparency works to mitigate the harshness of world anarchy by opening new avenues for the evaluation of credibility and intent’ (108). By expanding access to information, ICTs are believed to also expand the global frontiers of democracy and limit the ability of governments to exercise their power, the result being ‘that governments cannot lie and act with their otherwise characteristic impunity (Steele & Stein 2002: 35). As President Mbeki of South Africa anticipates, increased transparency ‘cannot but enhance the legitimacy of the democratic state, tap the initiative and intellect of millions of citizens, limit any tendency towards arbitrary rule and reinforce social stability and peace’ (Mbeki 1995). There are numerous online examples, of websites devoted to increasing transparency and subsequently democratic accountability. Amnesty International’s Eyes on Darfur website (Eyesondarfur 2007) leverages the power of high-resolution satellite imagery to document evidence of atrocities committed in Darfur. The initiative is intended to increase the transparency of the conflict and protect human rights ‘by allowing people around the world to literally “watch over” and protect twelve intact, but highly vulnerable, villages’ (ibid). Referring to this initiative Cole and Crawford (2007) have commented that ‘one trend is clear - this type of technology will make it harder for regimes to take action in the dark.’ In what has come to be known as the ‘Zapatista Effect’ a small group of indigenous fighters in Chiapas, Mexico used technology to transform their violent insurgency into a ‘non-violent, less overtly destructive, but still highly disruptive movement that […] had both foreign and national repercussions for Mexico’ (Ronfeldt 1998: 4). The Liberal theme that dominates the ICT4Peace discourse reifies communication and transparency as democratizing forces. As the AEKW initiative, the Eyes on Darfur website and the Zapatista’s peaceful use of ICTs demonstrate, there is certainly great potential for these tools to contribute to global and regional peace-building. What this discursive theme also demonstrates is a failure to explore possibilities outside of this framework, to question the assumption that communication and transparency increase peace and democracy.

2.5 Peace-building Applications and Positivity Even more idealistic than the programmatic applications of ICT4Peace are the peace-building applications, designed to build the global foundations for cooperation and transform conflict zones by harnessing the virtues of communication. The large body of research that has emerged from the field of conflict resolution indicates that communication is able to transform tensions between antagonists through analysis, exploration, questioning and reframing individual interests and positions (Hattotuwa 2005: 5). Kadende-Kaiser (2003) has described the ability of ICTs to advance these forms of communication as their ‘mediation potential;’ applauding the Internet’s ability to serve as ‘a medium through which the parties can communicate with each other’ (Kadende-Kaiser 2003: 27). ICT initiatives designed to encourage dialogue between warring factions or affected populations are a product of the political environment of the post-Cold War era dominated by relatively small inter- and intra-state conflicts, often focused on ethnic rivalries. The impacted countries have frequently been left divided along complex ethnic lines with limited, if any, cross-border communication. Progressively, ICT4Peace initiatives are being designed to address these lingering hostilities and gaps in communication by encouraging ICT mediated contact between the parties through video, radio, and the tools of the internet – websites, emails, chat rooms and VoIP. Peace-building applications largely fall into two categories: communication within conflicts, designed to encourage direct contact between rival sides or among conflict-affected populations, and communication outside of conflicts - aimed at encouraging peaceful communication within diaspora populations, or the international community. ICTs are used to connect geographically or socially distant populations, in the hope that connecting people is also protecting them from the prejudice and the violence reinforced by isolation. These peace-building applications have been designed with an overwhelmingly positive view of communication; a consideration of the possible risks of communication is conspicuously absent from the discourse. Instead, the Positive discursive motif has contributed to the naïve assumption that there is a direct causal link between ICTs and peace-building through constructive grassroots involvement and communication. Communication within conflicts Within conflict environments the allure of ‘virtual communication’ is undeniable. Fear and paranoia are endemic to these societies and a desire to remain isolated from perceived or imagined enemies is expected (Kadende-Kaiser 2003: 271). Hattotuwa (2005) has noted that interactions in virtual spaces are particularly important because even in the absence of contact in person, ‘virtual interactions using ICTs can help sustain and nourish processes of conflict transformation’ (7). Hattotuwa is particularly eager to suggest the possibility of using ICTs as a means to encourage grassroots interventions that can ‘integrate and connect stakeholders in each village […] in the country, into multi-sector and holistic peace-building processes’ (Hattotuwa 2005: 13). An emphasis on grassroots communication is common when discussing peacebuilding initiatives, and Linder (2006) suggests that it is the ultimate goal of connectivity to empower the local community members to rebuild their country (iv). This assumption of positive grassroots interaction is embodied in phrases such as: ‘engage and empower grassroots communities’ (Hattotuwa 2005: 14); ‘relying on the community to generate, share, and interpret content’ (Linder 2006: iv); and ‘designed to establish a sense of community among the users’ (Laouris 2004: 76). Examples of these initiatives can be found addressing a host of current and past conflicts around the world, including in the Middle East (Stuart & Harel 1997), Cyprus

(Laouris 2004; Laouris & Anastasiou 2005), Sri Lanka (Hattotuwa 2002; Hattotuwa 2005), the Solomon Islands (People First Network), and Burundi (Burundinet). In Cyprus several different initiatives have been designed to address the protracted conflict and limited channels for communication between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Due to a relatively high level of economic development, a large English speaking population and high literacy and education levels it has been relatively easy for ICT4Peace initiatives to proceed in Cyprus (Laouris 2004: 69-70). The Technology For Peace (TFP) project was designed with a focus on individuals and to create a channel for members of both communities interested in promoting peace to meet online, and discuss ideas (ibid: 75). Laouris (2004) has noted that ‘the close relations and interactions of grass-root citizens with top-level diplomats [are instrumental in this process]’ (77). In addition to providing a forum for peaceful discussions, the website also provides a service for free SMS (Short Message Service) communications between the Northern and Southern portions of the ethnically divided island. A similar initiative, designed to address the ongoing tensions in the Middle East is SHALOM/SALAAM, a project focused on the ‘language of conflict,’ that relies primarily on email to distribute and keep an ‘archive of discourse’ (Stuart & Harel 1997). The project aims to be an interactive medium that ‘will collect the common metaphors, stories and top-of-the-mind analogies of participants […] It is an effort to foster that deeper understanding of cultures in conflict’ (Stuart & Harel 1997). In the Solomon Islands the peace-building applications of ICT4Peace have been combined with the programmatic applications to create the People First Network (PFN). PFN is a web-based initiative designed to promote development and peace by enabling rural ‘information exchange between stakeholders’ and is ‘deployed with full community ownership’ (People First Network 2007). Despite a lack of peer-reviewed research to support the success of these initiatives, new peace-building projects designed with the latest forms of ICT continue to be popular. Their credibility is premised in large part on emerging ICT trends in the developed world – far removed from the realities of conflict zones. Linder (2006) suggests that the popularity of various social networking sites in the West, like Facebook and Wikipedia, has changed the dominant view of the internet. Whereas the Internet had traditionally been viewed as only a means to access information – a virtual library – the increased participation involved in social networking has refocused attention on the Internet as a community-like network (11). Projects like Mandate the Future (MtF), a forum designed to give Sri Lankan youth the opportunity to communicate their views on peace and global issues, hope to enlist social networking to create ‘[global communities] based on the merger of the grassroots and web based communities’ (Hattotuwa 2002: 4). Also based in Sri Lanka is Info-Share, a collaboration software platform designed to support ongoing communication and information sharing on the peace process and to ‘enable public participation in the process from the grassroots upwards’ (Hattotuwa 2005: 1). As the trend of online shopping booms in the developed world, another application popularised in the West and hoped to have possible relevance to peace-building is Online Dispute Resolution (ODR). ODR refers to the various online means of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), or resolving mostly financial disputes outside of the courts and traditional litigation processes. Parlade (2003) has suggested that by adapting ADR techniques to the online environment, ODR might evolve to address more than just financial disputes, covering mechanisms for dispute prevention, including education, and outreach, ‘ombudsman programs, conflict management, assisted negotiation, early neutral evaluation and assessment.’ In the developed world ODR-for-profit sites such as SmartSettle, Square Trade and Cybersettle have

settled millions of financial disputes, Cybersettle alone has serviced more that a billion U.S. dollars in settlements (Cybersettle 2007). The success of these services in the more affluent regions of the world has led to conjecture regarding ODR’s relevance for peace-building in the developing world. Parlade (2003) has speculated that delays in the administration of justice in developing countries seriously impact the quality of justice in these regions, and may be a root cause for conflict. Balvin (2005) following this line of reason, concludes that the goal of ODR, ‘to solve a given dispute in a manner that has the least negative impact on the involved parties,’ could easily be applied to online services addressing the concerns of conflict protagonists. The ultimate benefit of such a service would be that once users become acquainted with the values of a culture of peace, ‘they can practice them in conflict situations and personal disputes’ (ibid). Communications outside of conflict Stauffacher et al. (2005) have indicated that another promising avenue for ICT4Peace, is supplementing local exchanges by linking people to people, both in country and in Diaspora populations (48). Here, it is constructive to envision Rohozinski’s (2004) concept of ‘Glocal’ where initiatives designed to address peace at local levels are ‘increasingly played out on a planetary scale’ (Rohozinski 2004b). Thus, notions of the individual and the global community are seamlessly combined and mediated through the perception of ‘connectivity’. The Harvard Law Schools’ peace-building initiative Global Voices Online uses ICTs to ‘shed new light on the nature of our interconnected world’ (Global Voices Online 2007). The project is designed to build connections across the gulfs that divide people from understanding each other more fully, emphasising the power of ICT engendered connectivity. Embracing the notion of ‘Glocal,’ the initiative insists that the ‘bond between individuals from different worlds is personal, political and powerful […believing that] conversation across boundaries is essential to a future that is free, fair, prosperous and sustainable - for all citizens of this planet’ (ibid). Similarly, Interlocals is a website devoted to paying service to local practice by providing a forum for international communications—hence its name, ‘Inter-locals’. Despite large portions of the site written in English, Interlocals is intended to target non-English speakers, ‘creating a space for people-topeople dialogue and understanding (Interlocals 2007). As many protracted conflicts also experience large movements of populations and the creation of diasporas, several peace-building initiatives are designed to connect members of the diaspora, ideally contributing to peace in their native communities. As an example, the Gurtong Peace Trust Project hopes to create a coalition for the promotion of peace among the South Sudanese diaspora as well as those in Sudan itself, thus linking ‘the members of the Diaspora and Home in a spirit of reconciliation and sincere love for the homeland’ (Gurtong Peace Trust Project 2007). By using the Internet to bridge the gap between different cultures and connecting Sudanese all over the world the site intends to ‘make a significant contribution to the search for unity and peace’ (ibid). During the conflict in Burundi, ‘the diaspora exchanged views and agendas on Burundinet,’ (Kadende-Kaiser 2003: 273) ‘[discussing] the situation, [debating] root causes, and [figuring] out ways to move forward’ (Burundinet 2007). By favouring the positive implications of communication, the peace-building applications of ICT4peace suppose that ICTs constructively address the root causes of conflict. The concept of ‘collective knowledge’ is frequently cited as the means by which broad technological applications will address the root causes of conflict. Stauffacher et al. (2005) suggests that welldesigned ICT initiatives ‘build societies’ capacities for collective problem-solving in tense postconflict situations’ (48), while the PFN describes the process as a ‘cross-fertilisation’ of ideas

that takes place at the national level (2007). Laouris & Anastasiou (2005) go as far as to describe how collective positivity adds to a ‘national culture of confidence and transmits a euphoria’ (9) which in turn contributes to global levels of euphoria.’ The Positive discursive theme, similar to the Neutral and Liberal themes, obscures more than it illuminates. It is too early in the development of ICT4Peace to indicate whether or not the assumptions bred by these themes are correct. However, it is the ideal time to examine the likelihood that alternative implications are possible. What the ICT4Peace discourse clearly demonstrates is a need for self-reflection, to challenge the assumptions that ICTs encourage equality, that transparency and information flows are democratizing and that ICTs encourage peace-building by addressing the root sources of conflict. The following chapter, while modest in scope, hopes to introduce a new discourse, one that challenges the assumptions thus far taken for granted within ICT4Peace.

CHAPTER THREE - Critique 3.1 Critique of the Neutral theme: ICTs may not engender equality Reduced to its most basic unit, modern ICTs are composed of binary digits—bits—taking a value of one or zero. Excluding science fiction tales of artificial intelligence, this technology is incapable of forming independent moral judgements, a fact that is frequently used to qualify the general motif in ICT4Peace literature that ICTs are neutral and value-free. As the previous literature review has indicated, the theme of Neutrality is often expressed by noting both the positive and negative potential uses of these technologies but, as they are designed to address peace, they tend to limit their focus to those uses deemed beneficial to the creation of an ‘Information Society.’ The relative silence addressing alternative implications of ICTs in conflict zones neglects the possible detrimental effects of technology, those which may aggravate existing inequalities or possibly escalate societal tensions. Certainly, there are numerous examples of these tools being applied to the benefit of communities immersed in conflict. During the war in Kosovo BaBe (Be active, Be emancipated), a Croatian women’s’ human rights group, used the Internet to document abuses and seek support from the international community (Kee 2005: 35). Similarly, during the Taliban regime the Revolutionary Women’s Association of Afghanistan (RAWA) used hidden cameras, email and the internet to document abuses of women while working with international counterparts to disseminate the images and seek both emotional and financial support (Kee 2005: 34). These are ideal examples of ICT4Peace and technology improving global equality for women (Povey 2003; Kandiyoti 2005). However, technology can also be used to further marginalise minority communities or to promote criminal endeavours. Rohozinski (2003) remarks that in the Balkans, for example, ‘organized criminal gangs have taken to cell phones and the internet with equal vigour, using them to sustain criminal enterprises and networks that penetrate the larger region and range across sectarian lines’ (Rohozinski 2003: 221). While these examples do support the claim that technology can be used for both beneficial and detrimental applications, they do not attest to the neutrality of ICTs. If neutral is understood in the political sense, meaning abstaining from taking sides in a conflict (Downing & Thigpen 1989: 505), then the ease with which ICTs are drafted to both favourable and detrimental—even criminal—uses, implies that this technology is not neutral but rather ambiguous. Thus, critiquing the assumption that ICTs encourage equality in conflict zones begins first by highlighting the ambiguity of this technology, and the possible inequalities that it may sustain or provoke. Research devoted to the philosophy of technology has overwhelmingly sided against the view of technology as neutral. More than simple binary characters, ICT can be reduced to the language that surrounds the technology, the political nature of the decision whether or not to employ technology and even the anatomy of technology, each of which ‘point to technology being value-laden, not neutral or value-free’ (Davies 1995: 133). The theme of neutrality within much of the ICT4Peace discourse may largely be a result of an organizational norm devoted to emphasizing this quality. Many of the groups devoted to ICT4Peace and embroiled in dangerous conflict zones, like the UN or the ICRC rely on humanitarian inviolability and safe passage based on the pillars of neutrality and impartiality (Anderson 2004). Thus incorporation of these themes into organisational discourse is necessary, ‘especially during war, when the cooperation of the belligerent parties is essential to the relief of suffering’ (ibid: 41). In this sense the theme of Neutrality can be characterized more as a hopeful expectation of the communities they wish to

create than a tangible reality. Ribeiro (1997) suggests that this inaccurate portrayal of neutrality may be a ‘common characteristic of all imagined communities [giving] the impression that everyone is equal once qualified’ (4). Contrary to these hopeful expectations, ICTs favour those best and most able to exploit them and these uses do not always favour peace. ICT4Peace highlights the theme of Neutrality to lament the great disparities that exist on earth, but often fails to recognize how the ambiguity of this technology may in fact exacerbate global inequalities. Violent conflict is in itself a global inequality which disproportionately affects developing countries. Between 1960 and 1999 ‘one half of the least developed countries […] suffered conflict’ (Stewart 2003: 326). Technology is not like potable water, food or shelter in the sense that its value is universally shared. Technology is valuable only to those who know how to use it, and even then the most advanced and experienced users will incur disproportionate success. As Gunkel (2003) suggests, ‘the value of this technology has been determined by unique circumstances that are only applicable to a small fraction of the world’s population’ (508). This is currently the case, as by any measure only a small subset of the world’s population enjoys an overwhelming proportion the world’s technological prowess. The U.S. has more computers than the rest of the world combined and contains 50 percent of the world’s internet users. Whereas South Asia, which has 23 percent of the world’s people, claims less than one per cent of the world’s Internet users (Dagron 2001: 28-29). ‘The typical Internet user worldwide is male, less than 35 years old, with a university education and high income, urban-based and English speaking— a member of a very elite minority’ (ibid). Similar inequalities persist with other advanced forms of ICT seeing as 92 percent of the market in production and consumption of computer hardware, software, and services are represented within the twenty-nine members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; Norris 2000b: 2-3). These figures are not supportive of the idealistic claims of advanced technology’s rational neutrality, rather they indicate that the skills required to benefit from ICTs promise to accrue to those best able to exploit them, those with the most experience with them, and those most able to shape their development. Rosenau and Singh (2002) suggest that if ‘this is the same group that has always exploited technological innovations […] then we should expect, by extension, little change in international political processes and outcomes’ (9). The future that Rosenau and Singh predict is one where global inequalities remain ultimately unaffected by the advancement and distribution of ICTs. Those who emphasis the neutrality of technology and promise a cyber domain that is capable of engendering equality have failed to note ‘how much the new world overlaps and rests on the traditional world in which power depends on geographically based institutions […] the information revolution exists in the context of an existing political structure’ (Keohane & Nye 1998: 82, 85). More ominous than the prospect of ICTs supporting the status quo of global disparities, is Norris’s (2000a) suggestion that ‘far from promoting greater equality between nations,’ ICTs like the internet ‘could allow more advanced economies to pull farther ahead’ (2). Davies has echoed this sentiment by recalling that ‘the benefits of [technologies are] often unequally distributed in favour of the resourcers’ (Davies 1995: 133), notably the Western developed world. While there are segments of the global population that stand poised to unequally reap the benefits of the ‘Information Society’ there are also possible disparities within states that must be addressed. Gurumurthy (2005) describes elites in developing countries as being outside the burden of the ‘digital divide,’ suggesting that a privileged few within developing countries tend to dominate the control and direction of ICTs in the early stages of diffusion. It is useful to recall

that the diffusion of agricultural technology to developing states known as the “Green Revolution” did not benefit all landowners equally. While the American inspired research did produce hybrid grain seeds which increased crop yields, the intensive capital inputs that were necessary favoured large and wealthy landowners disproportionately (Layton 1992: 10-11). Far from being neutral, the Green Revolution was ‘formed and governed by the social and economic conditions specific to the US of the time’ (ibid) and ultimately the effect in developing countries has been that ‘the knowledge gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” has widened’ (Dagron 2001: 29). In the context of ICT4Peace, it becomes clear that the ambiguity of technology has serious implications for conflict zones by favouring those best able to manipulate the technology, rather than those with the noblest of intentions. Examples from Rwanda suggest that the tools imported to support the operational applications of ICT4Peace were ‘neither neutral nor inconsequential in the eyes of conflict protagonists on the ground’ (Rohozinski 2003: 219). Rohozinski (2003) describes how at the most benign end of the spectrum UN radios were frequently stolen by locals to pirate UN frequencies for long personal conversations. More portentously, these same tools were allegedly used by the key perpetrators of the 1994 genocide to pass coded messages across the country (219) and further fuel the conflict. Thus, technology intended to promote peace instead favoured the innovative, albeit seditious use of inciting violence. As trends in violent conflict shift further away from interstate conflict towards growing intrastate violence (Hensel 2002: 1), power relations within countries will be of increasing relevance. The theme of treating ICTs as neutral, in conjunction with the assumption of equality, threatens to further accentuate schisms within states. Peters (2001) warns that the ‘underlying trend is that privileged groups acquire and use technology more effectively, and because the technology benefits them, they become more privileged’ (34). There is ample evidence to suggest that ICTs are simply not capable of engendering equality where it has not previously existed. Development theorists have offered the ‘digital divide’ as a much needed critique showing that this utopian rhetoric remains oblivious to the fact that access to technology is ‘limited by specific circumstances, and should not be assumed to be automatic or universally applicable’ (Gunkel 2003: 500). Although the notion of a ‘digital divide’ has been criticised as further perpetuating a prejudicial paradigm of development, limited in its engagement with societies only to the point of addressing what they lack (Potter 2006), it is nevertheless useful for identifying extant inequalities (Gunkel 2003: 507). By its very definition the ‘digital divide’ addresses different levels of technical and socioeconomic barriers to equality. For the purposes of this research the term is understood to refer to the gap between those who do effectively use new ICTs, and those who do not. Broadly speaking the digital divide can be separated into two categories of disparities: access inequalities —technical impediments to adopting the technology, for example financial, physical infrastructure, and literacy concerns; and structural inequalities —deep-seeded social and cultural inequalities that are reflected in the adoption of technology, for example gendered, ethnic, and racial divisions. The remainder of this critique examines the access and structural inequalities that cast doubt upon the assumption the ICTs are tools of peace, engendering equality. Access Inequalities Seemingly, global ICT distribution is rapidly increasing; all African countries now have access to the internet, compared to only 11 in 1996 (Miller 2001). Mobile phone use in particular has shown a penchant for reaching populations affected by conflict ahead of telephone landlines,

mains electricity and even drinkable water, like in Somalia, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (White 2003). Clearly this reflects substantial progress in the diffusion of ICTs outside the developed world; however it would be a mistake to assume that a levelling of the international technological landscape has begun. As Miller (2001) has noted, many of the internet connections in Africa consist of just one internet service provider (ISP) located in capitol cities, while many Africans who do have internet access may only have unreliable access to email. Technical impediments to accessing ICTs are numerous, but in areas of conflict the most obvious are a lack of necessary infrastructure and financial destitution. Rice (2003) has summarised this impediment as, ‘[for] an estimated 2 billion people, access to fresh water or electricity is a daily challenge of more fundamental concern than access to the information society’ (Rice 2003: 82). For countries affected by violent conflict, often the world’s poorest countries, up to 80 percent often live in rural areas that simply lack the infrastructure to support advanced ICTs (Peters 2001: 27). While this disparity deprives rural populations of access to this technology, it may also further emphasise urban-rural inequalities. The market remains the most widely used mechanism for the dispersion of ICTs; therefore it is quite probable that disparities in access to these technologies will follow global and domestic economic patterns (Rosenau & Johnson 2002: 61). Golding (2000) suggests that throughout history this pattern of market dispersal has led to what he describes as the ‘fallacy of universal abundance’. While in the past consumer goods have inevitably progressed from more affluent groups to the less affluent, recent ICTs do not follow this pattern. While earlier innovations were introduced during periods of rapid economic growth and rising popular affluence, none of these trends are currently present (174). Additionally, reminiscent of the Green Revolution, ICTs require recurrent investments for upgrades, replacements, peripherals, and a host of other incidental costs (ibid). ‘Even a $600 PC or $100 Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) phone is far beyond the reach of the vast majority of the world's population, when nearly 3 billion live on less than $2 a day’ (Peters 2001: 29). Other technical impediments that merit consideration include basic literacy, the ability to understand the basic mechanics of the technology to repair and maintain it, as well as the language skills necessary to operate technologies dominated by English. Research has demonstrated that even among the relatively few internet users in Africa, a higher education and English language skills remain a necessity (Peters 2001: 27; Mercer 2006: 252). Largely for practical reasons, these technical aspects of the ‘digital divide’ are the most frequently discussed. Of even greater relevance to ICT4Peace, yet more difficult to overcome, is the development of a social divide, or the structural inequalities that affect discriminated groups within society. Structural Inequalities By limiting discussion of the ‘digital divide’ to technical inequalities, the response also becomes limited to a technical solution, usually greater technology transfer and improved infrastructure. When considering the possible inequalities supported by ICTs it is also necessary to consider that ‘ICT disparities usually exacerbate existing disparities based on location (such as urban-rural), gender, ethnicity, physical disability, age, and, especially, income level’ (Peters 2001: 34). Providing, inexpensive or free access to ICTs, attends only to the access inequalities and not to the underlying social inequalities antithetical to peace. Only 46 percent of women living in poverty are literate, ‘53 percent of the world’s poor do not speak the official language in the country where they live and more than two-thirds of people living in poverty also live in rural areas’ (Rice 2003: 82). Thus, it is unlikely that minority groups stand to experience great advantages from the introduction of ICTs. Statistics on internet use indicate that gender

represents a profound structural inequality in ICT use. Internet access studies in Ethiopia, Senegal, and Zambia have shown respectively that 86 percent, 83 percent, and 64 percent of Internet users are male, while only 4 percent of users in the Arab world are female (Peters 2001: 27). These statistics are indicative of large structural inequalities that ICTs may help to further perpetuate. McKay & Mazurana (1999) have demonstrated that there are a host of social constraints to female access to ICTs in developing countries including high illiteracy rates, language, time constraints, and cultural and traditional inhibitions. As ‘gender roles are nowhere more prominent than in war’ (Goldstein 2001), the possibility that ICTs may promote existing inequalities should be an important consideration for ICT4Peace initiatives. Particularly since in countries ‘where women are not allowed to learn to read, let alone use a computer, the incorporation of the computer into that society will only benefit men, thus increasing inequality’ (Peters 2001: 36). A discourse based on the theme of neutrality, and one that perpetuates the assumption that ICTs engender peaceful equality disregards the realities of conflict zones and the international political arena where ‘information does not flow in a vacuum but in a political space that is already occupied’ (Keohane & Nye 1998: 84). ICT4Peace has thus far ignored the ambiguity of technology—the possibility that these tools will not be used for their intended purposes—and the reality that ICTs can and do favour those best able to manipulate the technology. A digital divide exists, both in terms of technical access and structural inequalities. What is most alarming is that these technologies may be capable of exacerbating existing societal tensions in areas sensitive to power differentials, discrimination, and violence. As Rohozinski (2003) has astutely noted, ICTs follow patterns of appropriation that support the unique social behaviours, cultural norms and political struggles in which they find themselves (233), regardless of what ICT4Peace initiatives intend or the international community deems legitimate.

3.2 Critique of the Liberal theme: ICTs may not be democratizing During the Cold War era international politics were heavily dominated by the inter-systematic feuding between liberalism and communism, a conflict of values so fundamental that ‘both “camps” claimed universal validity and exclusive legitimacy’ (Schimmelfennig 2000: 123). As communism in Europe collapsed, the Western international community found itself in a position to declare its own values as ‘the only internationally recognized principles of legitimate statehood’ (ibid). Liberals have come to optimistically presume that the norms and values of liberalism universally apply to all regions of earth and all spheres of life (Kedzie 2002: 107). Subsequently the ‘coincident revolutions’ at the end of the 20th Century—emerging democracies around the world and the proliferation of ICTs—inspire Western societies to conclude that the two trends are linked, despite only anecdotal evidence to this effect (Kedzie 1997). For the purposes of this critique democracy is defined quite broadly as a combination of representative government and individual freedoms (Kedzie 1995). As the literature review attests the Liberal discursive theme in ICT4Peace tends to err toward modernism and enlightenment, emphasising the positive rather than the negative aspects of increased transparency bred by ICTs. Liberals, in their conviction that ICTs are ‘particularly well suited to carry the message of democracy abroad,’ (Kedzie 2002: 108) are remiss to note that ICTs are also useful tools of deception, state propaganda and terror (Eriksson & Giacomello 2006: 231). In many cases ICTs are simply inadequate to serve the demands of democratic development, particularly in countries affected by conflict. The following critique demonstrates that the democratising potential of ICTs cannot be taken for granted. Increased transparency and ICT proliferation do not always threaten authoritarian regimes, and in fact sometimes they are beneficial to them. The critique also takes a more critical eye to transparency, concluding that there are both quantitative and qualitative barriers to democracy. ICTs and authoritarian regimes ICT4Peace, dominated by liberalism, sees ICT as having a special mediating role in democratic peace theory— the claim that democracies are unlikely to fight each other (Kedzie 2002: 108). By transporting democracy around the globe and threatening the rule of authoritarian regimes, ICTs are believed to be ‘promoting pacific modes of international cooperation’ (ibid). While a critique of democratic peace theory is beyond the span of this research (see for examples Layne 1994, Raknerud & Hegre 1997 and Rosato 2003), there is plenty of evidence to cast doubt on the assertion that ICTs threaten authoritarian regimes. To begin with, the barriers to access described in the previous section (3.1) and embodied in the ‘digital divide,’ simply preclude many individuals under authoritarian regimes from benefiting from any democratising potential that ICTs may engender. While ICTs may have the ability to foster certain liberties in these societies, adopting these technologies also necessitates the existence of certain liberties, including access to education and at least modest freedoms to speak one’s mind. The ultimate irony ‘is that those who might most benefit from the net’s democratic and informational potential are least likely either to have access to it, the tools to use it, or the educational background to take advantage’ (Barber 1997: 224). To suggest, as Bill Clinton has, that ICTs have the power to ‘make a closed political and economic society “impossible” and ultimately bring down [communist regimes]’ (Lord 2006: 15), ignores the great amount of domestic power these regimes wield and their ability to control the flow of information within their borders. It is an incorrect assumption that authoritarian regimes are averse to ICTs and transparency. In fact, these regimes tend to encourage those ICTs that they

are most able to control, therefore often encouraging television use, while strengthening the barriers to adopting the internet (Corrales & Westhoff 2006: 912). Despite ICT4Peace’s portrayal of the internet as a portent of liberal democracy, many authoritarian states have been able to embrace the internet without suffering great challenges to the power of their regimes. Increasingly, wealthy, market-oriented autocratic states have begun to allow internet access to citizens. For while they may fear the possible political consequences of greater information flows, these states also celebrate the economic payoffs of internet expansion (ibid: 911). Notably, Singapore has championed a massive state-led initiative to emerge as the ICT hub in the Asia Pacific region, giving its entire population high-speed access to the internet, while having ‘no intention of surrendering political control in the process’ (Lord 2006: 104). Singapore’s shrewd ability to reconcile the economic benefits of transparency, with the objective of maintaining political control has become a model for other authoritarian regimes including China (ibid: 113). China has taken advantage of the fact that 38 per cent of its internet users are exclusively interested in ‘entertainment’ (Corrales & Westhoff 2006: 929). By providing access—albeit heavily censored—the state has further consolidated its control by diminishing a great many citizens’ dissatisfaction with the status quo. Corrales and Westhoff (2006) predict that the cumulative effect might actually be ‘insufficient pressure for democratization, and consequently, postponed democratization’ (929). Authoritarian regimes are skilled at adapting technology to suit their own demands. While ICT4Peace research highlights how ICTs have promoted civic involvement in Western democratic countries, better communications and transparency can also help rulers keep tabs on and intimidate their citizens. Since ICTs frequently rely on communication networks comprised of computers located within the sovereign jurisdiction of the state, governments are free to restrict the content of these networks (Lord 2006: 97). This is particularly the case with the Internet which, as Lawrence Lessig notes, both democratic and authoritarian governments can regulate by manipulating the underlying code and the legal environment in which it operates (in Kalathil & Boas 2003). Therefore many authoritarian regimes are becoming adept at blocking unwanted content from the eyes of citizens and monitoring and punishing violators. In 2003, eight of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries had implemented censorship or surveillance regimes, and had designated specially formed government departments to police their population’s use of e-mail and the internet (Rohozinski 2004a: 2). The intensity of these efforts varies between states, as do the tactics used. Syria blocks the entire Israeli Internet domain (.il), Tunisia actively monitors internet usage detaining and arresting offenders, and in Egypt police pose as online homosexuals to entrap and prosecute those who respond to their advances (ibid). The emphasis within ICT4Peace on free flows of information and the democratising power of free speech in blogs and websites is not reflective of the reality in many countries where draconian regulations are used to persecute individuals for content posted to the web (See “Malaysia cracks down” 2007). In perhaps the most extreme case—although not atypical of the tension present in conflict zones—Rohozinski (2004) describes how Palestinian telecommunications are routed by way of ISPs to Israeli security services, where this information has been used to carry out targeted assassinations (2). As authoritarian regimes open up their telecommunications markets they will have no shortage of willing partners in carrying out their content restrictions. Foreign multinational corporations—eager to gain access to virgin markets—provide these regimes with intrusive user information and allow content restrictions in return for the chance to do business. States have the means and the motivation to control the use of ICT, consequently it is unrealistic

to expect these tools to democratise people if challenging the status quo presents a genuine and palpable threat. Thus, it is likely that rather than being a determinant of societal change, ICTs are more often a mirror of the larger society in which they operate (Barber 1997: 210). Quantitative barriers to promoting democracy Rational debate, political deliberation (Raiti 2006: 3), and prudence are the features that define the ideal democratic process (Barber 1997: 208-209). These paced and considered values pose an immediate challenge to applying ICTs—by nature high-speed—to promoting the democratic process. Also relevant is the overwhelming amount of information distributed by ICTs. In 2002, the Internet alone contained 532,897 terabytes of information (UCB 2003), a value that would be much larger in 2007, and nonetheless is equal to more 53,000 times the amount of information printed in the US Libraries of congress (ibid). The vast growth of information made possible by ICTs has led to what Zinnbauer (2001) refers to as ‘information glut’ and resulted in ‘attention poverty’. This information glut requires a near constant capacity to receive information and a distinct willingness to analyse and assess data on behalf of the user. Subsequently, ‘if the bottleneck was ever availability of information it has now shifted to attention’ (ibid). Keohane and Nye (1998) have also warned of the detrimental effects of attention poverty, indicating that as attention becomes a scarce resource it will be those individuals capable of distinguishing between the valuable signals and the white noise that gain the most power (89), and this group is likely to be those who have designed the technology. Contrary to claims of democratisation, information glut and attention poverty indicate that average citizens may be overwhelmed and marginalised by their experiences with ICT, particularly in countries with very little familiarity with advanced technology. The amount of information and the speed with which it is transmitted necessitate efficient knowledge management systems which are often lacking in conflict situations. Steele and Stein (2002) make reference to this dilemma, describing how in the period leading up to World War I the speed of newly developed ICTs ‘severely limited the opportunities for a diplomatic solution to the crisis’ (27). This problem exists to an even greater extent in the age of satellite and wireless ICT devices. Holohan (2003) suggests that during the conflict in Kosovo the ‘biggest danger was being drowned in a deluge of detail while suffering a dearth of useful and non-time consuming analysis’ (36). This raises another concern regarding the usefulness of the information transmitted by ICTs. The assumption that ICTs are democratising relies on the promise of easily accessible and useful information available to citizens. As Barber suggests: ‘strong democracy calls not only for votes but for good reasons; not only for an opinion but for a rational argument on its behalf’ (Barber 1997: 223). Qualitative barriers to promoting democracy On its own the quantity of information available through ICTs means little to the promotion of democracy. What is probably more important is the quality of the information, and what it stands to contribute to democratic discourse. Unfortunately ICTs—particularly the internet and SMS—suffer from a reputation problem. The supposed ‘democratization of online publishing’ (Zinnbauer 2001) has led to a vast plurality of sources. As Lord (2006) has so eloquently stated ‘transparency is not synonymous with truth’ (5). Western observers, with a longer history of using digital sources, feel relatively comfortable distinguishing between reality and rumour, fact and perception. However, conflict environments are vulnerable to fear and speculation and individuals may have insufficient exposure to these technology systems to discriminate between reliable sources and propaganda. Dyson (1998) maintains that even Western societies have yet to

learn ‘Net literacy,’ often taking a story’s appearance online as ‘proof that it has been subjected to rigorous journalistic standards’ (50-51). While ICT4Peace may position ICTs as tools of learning and democratic participation, research into the actual uses of these tools contests this. Gunkel (2004) reports that some of the most popular services on the internet are sex chat rooms, online game playing and retail shopping; young internet users are mostly interested in entertainment. In Yemen only 5 per cent of users employ the internet for academics and 95 per cent have tried to access pornography (Rohozinski 2004a: 19). In fact, accessing pornography on the internet is common around the world. In Nigeria up to 40 per cent of usage is related to browsing sex sites (Longe & Longe 2005: 60) and in Tanzania at least a quarter of Internet use is related to pornography (Mercer 2006: 34). Certainly, the possibility for the internet and other ICTs to offer citizens access to news, science and diverse opinions from around the globe is astonishing. Unfortunately, research confirms that ‘once digitally enabled, all groups – by income, ethnicity, gender and education – fall into almost identical patterns of usage’ (Gunkel 2004). The research presented in this portion of the critique indicates that there is strong evidence to suggest that ICTs do not inevitably and irreversibly create democracy. In reality, ICTs are often manipulated by authoritarian regimes to intimidate populations and consolidate their own political control. Ward & Gleditsch (1998) find that new ‘rocky’ democracies, particularly those that experienced rapid transitions, are at an increased risk of being involved in warfare. With this consideration, ICT4Peace initiatives must proceed with caution, aware of the social and political power differentials that are being created. By 1990, one out of every thirteen Rwandans owned a radio, an initiative which had been heavily promoted by UNESCO as a democratic development tool (Lord 2006: 59). Four years later these tools were used as weapons of war. When former US Vice-President Al Gore predicts the creation of a ‘new Athenian Age of democracy’ (Lord 2006), he speaks of ICTs as being a ‘metaphor for democracy itself’ (ibid). However, a critique of this assumption prompts the ominous reminder that ‘in Athens neither women nor slaves got much of a political look in’ (Golding 2000: 175).

3.3 Critique of the Positive theme: ICTs may not promote grassroots interactions As the discourse analysis presented in Chapter Two indicates, a Positive discursive theme runs through much of ICT4Peace, always favouring the beneficial possibilities of ICTs at the neglect of addressing the more malignant prospects of this technology. This theme is most obvious in ICT4Peace’s near-complete disregard of the limits to social and individual appropriation of ICTs. In reality, the near 50 percent failure rate of ICTs in developing countries (Câmara & Fonseca 2007: 121) should cast doubt on the assumption that these tools incur positive interactions at the grassroots level. By failing to consider how these tools might be detrimental to individuals and communities in conflict zones, the sustainability of these initiatives is questionable. Guerin (2005) has argued that in order for technological innovations to be sustainable, there must be major investment and participation on the behalf of the affected communities; ‘the quality of life must improve, and citizens must be empowered’ (5). To date the ICT4Peace discourse has largely assumed that access to ICTs is a ‘good thing’ (Mercer 2004: 51), and have thus been unreceptive to possible unintended and negative consequences. Nicholas Negroponte personifies this assumption by refusing to address criticism directed towards his One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project (designed to provide inexpensive laptops to children of the developing world), suggesting that ‘criticising [OLPC] is like criticising the church, or the Red Cross’ (Aihe 2006). Nevertheless, there is a relevant and persuasive critique of ICT4Peace that suggests that these tools may not be relevant or appropriate for developing communities affected by conflict, and that other stake-holders stand to gain much more than the local communities. Without a consideration of local conditions, even the most philanthropic intentions can be subverted and used to further local violence. An instructive example is the GooB project mentioned in section 2.3. Designed to build governance capacity and local ownership through the use of ‘ready-made ICT tools for civilian administrations’ (CMI 2004), the project has failed to consider how ethnic tension or corruption might undermine its positive intentions. While the GooB is premised on the assumption that ‘civil registration is an important first step to giving local people a sense of belonging and to regulating their daily lives’ (CMI 2004), it is not difficult to imagine how such a database of sensitive information could be misused in conflict environments. In Sri Lanka for example, the U.N. has accused the government’s security forces of helping to abduct child soldiers to fight the Tamil Tigers (‘Sri Lanka army’ 2006). Additionally, had the GooB program existed in Rwanda during the genocide, it seems unlikely that the ‘vulnerable group module’ designed as ‘a simple tool to register vulnerable groups’ (CMI 2004) would have been used for noble intentions. ICT4Peace must stand accountable to the intended recipients of these initiatives, addressing both the questionable local content and the intent of its designs. Questionable local content in ICT4Peace The Positive discursive motif in ICT4Peace, by assuming that ICTs have desirable impacts in a community, portray sustainability as a technical property of the technology—its durability, ease of use, or universality. What is of greater importance is the social and cultural properties of ICTs, that is to say whether or not the technology serves a particular need of the community or provides meaningful local content. In this case more than just basic computer literacy is needed, meaningful local content is understood to be an expression of each particular community’s experiences and indigenous knowledge. In studies designed to examine ‘local content,’ the principal findings demonstrate that international ICT initiatives fail to coherently define ‘local content’ (Noronha 2004: 8). Influenced by notions of ‘glocal’ interactions, ‘one person’s “local”

content is another’s “global” content’ (ibid). Regarding sustainability, what is most important is that local content is reflective of the community it is designed for, that rather than being viewed as content for local communities, it is seen as content from local communities (ibid). Thus the content of these initiatives—both hardware and software—must emanate from the needs of the community, a feature that is noticeably absent from many ICT4Peace initiatives. Recent UNESCO research conducted in the Pacific region shows that some island countries are still trying to reach even 10 percent of local content on television (Gonzalez 2004: 12). Many initiatives do not even achieve the most basic language requirements of ‘local content,’ since English-dominated digital spaces are ill-equipped for non-Latin based text. ICT4Peace initiatives also ignore the more nuanced cultural qualities of these communities where, as in much of Africa and South Asia, physical meetings and orality are integral components of communication (Noronha 2004: 7; Mercer 2004: 59). Mercer (2004) has demonstrated that email can be anathema to these cultures, generally eschewed in favour of more personal and direct forms of communication (59). In Tanzania for example, locals often are not used ‘to seeing objects as a source of information,’ preferring ‘to ask people’ rather than replacing personal contact (ibid: 59-60). The Positive discursive theme of ICT4Peace generally assumes that local engagement in ICTs is the only rational approach that individuals can take (Heeks 1999: 10), refusing to acknowledge that wilful non-participation is a legitimate choice as well. Notions of beneficial ‘local content’ are undermined by usage statistics that indicate a high prevalence of pornography on the internet and a ubiquity of information otherwise irrelevant to conflict communities: 10 out of every 12 emails are spam, and 1 in 12 is a virus (Postini.com 2007). Even in developed Western societies, studies indicate a large body of voluntary nonusers of ICTs. Nearly 40 percent of Hispanic nonusers in the US cite ‘don’t need’ as their reason for abstaining from the internet, with another 6 percent of responses being ‘too old’ or ‘not interested’ (Gunkel 2004). When a third of all nonusers in the US are ‘just not interested’ in computers (ibid), the relevance of these tools in conflict communities is speculative, even dangerous if negative externalities exist. Embodied in the Positive discursive theme of ICT4Peace is the Contact Hypothesis, postulating that greater and broader contact between individuals of antagonistic social groups will encourage the peaceful and deliberative settlement of disputes, thus reducing inter-group tension (Lord 2006: 46). This optimistic hypothesis predicts that conflict—simply ‘rooted in miscommunication and misunderstanding’—can be alleviated through increased communication at the grassroots level (Steele & Stein 2002: 26). Despite the heuristic appeal of this assertion there is a great deal of research to indicate that conflict resolution and the channels of communication have complex and at times antagonistic interactions. Putnam has identified an important distinction between ‘bridging’ contact groups ‘that function to bring together disparate members of the community,’ and ‘bonding’ contact groups ‘that reinforce close-knit networks among people sharing similar backgrounds and beliefs’ (Norris 2002: 1). This distinction is particularly relevant to conflict communities; while bridging groups tend to produce positive externalities, bonding groups are at a greater risk of producing negative externalities (ibid). The possibility that online communities may reinforce likeminded beliefs and prejudices, rather than communal understanding is particularly germane to zones of conflict, where as the case of Rwanda demonstrates, fear and ingrouping may corrupt the possibility of bridging contact. The contact hypothesis assumes that contact is experienced among equals with shared goals, however in environments corrupted by violence and asymmetrical power relations, contact may exacerbate and widen on-going conflict

and social cleavages (Norris 2002: 1). Kadende-Kaiser (2003), though a proponent of computer mediated communication (CMC), acknowledges that ‘if power and influence are not outside, but are at least partly encoded within us’ it becomes unlikely that the distancing, isolation and anonymity of CMC serve to displace or dilute tensions (276). In what is ‘arguably the most significant [work] in social psychology’ (Fine 2004: 663), Muzafer Sherif’s (1961) research established that merely increasing the opportunities for contact between rival groups was not enough to encourage cooperation, and in fact could possibly elevate the levels of conflict (Sherif 1961). Ultimately, if the contact is asymmetrical in nature, reflecting existing social inequalities, contact alone will not act as a venue of change, but rather as a catalyst for further aggression (Maoz 2001: 190-191). In communities embroiled in ‘fear, contests over power, or historical perceptions of wrongdoing’ (Lord 2006: 52), it becomes a distinct possibility that in-groups will use contact to increase their own self-worth by devaluing the out-group (ibid). Rather than benefiting local communities, Akpan’s (2003) research indicates that ‘[privatesector] interests and for-profit organizations appear to be the immediate beneficiaries’ (271) of a discourse that favours the use of ICTs to aid in the development of conflict communities. Noronha (2004) refers to ‘information colonialism’ as the process by which large portions of the world are converted into ‘“downloading” societies and consumers of information, instead of “uploading” ones and producers of information’ (6). As advanced ICTs diffuse across the world the trend favouring large proprietary companies threatens to increase the inequality in content distribution and favour the Western developed world (Peters 2001: 38). The fact that ICT4Peace is now on the global agenda, does not necessarily reflect the intrinsic merit of this issue. According to Luyt (2004), it is instead indicative of a ‘particular convergence of interests and their ability to collectively set the political agenda in a certain way.’ Questionable intent in ICT4Peace Similar to Mazrui’s (1978) critique of political development, ICT4Peace can easily be evaluated as ‘a process of acquiring Western skills of government, Western restraints in political behaviour, and Western institutions for resolving conflict.’ As developing countries, including those affected by conflict, increasingly act as lucrative markets for ICTs as well as peripheral ICT service providers, it is necessary for these markets to establish adequate levels of infrastructure to support this development. Thus the capitalistic motives of the West, fit remarkably well with a discourse premised on ‘automatic and unproblematic catch-up, leapfrogging, and progress to the ideal represented by the developed countries’ (Wilson 2001: 12). Keohane and Nye (1998) argue that, being the ‘first on the scene,’ the U.S. is well placed to create the standards and architecture of the global information system (88). This proposition is exemplified by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the private American corporation solely responsible for administering the identifier systems of the internet. ICANN is frequently accused of ‘not fostering accountability’ and ultimately favouring the interests of the industry sector (Ó Siochrú 2007: 28). By portraying ICT4Peace as a struggle to catch up with the Western developed world, there is great risk that the developing world will experience only imitation and dependency. That is, ‘imitation may engender vulnerability to continued manipulation by Western economic and political interests’ (Mazrui 1978). This trend is already present, symbolized by the 15 percent of the world’s population that provides nearly all of the world’s technological innovation, the approximately 50 percent only able to adapt this technology in production and consumption, and the small remainder who exist completely disconnected from both innovation and adoption (Rice 2003: 82). Regardless of the proposed

benefits of ICTs in conflict-affected countries, ‘the ancillary benefits for corporations and stakeholders to developing rural regions […] are to place conduit devices in the hands of as many potential consumers as possible’ (Raiti 2006). ICT4Peace initiatives will introduce technology that has large associated costs that primarily benefit Western corporations. In subSaharan Africa alone, around US$24 billion dollars is paid each year to mostly U.S.-based software companies to secure the use of proprietary products (May 2006: 123). However Africans need to work much longer than their Western counterparts to afford the software. Ghosh has calculated that considering the amount of work hours needed to purchase a US$560 license for Microsoft XP, in Africa the equivalent price is US$30,297 (cited in May 2006: 136). It is probable that corporate and private interests in ICT4Peace are only in their nascent stages, and are liable to become more widespread in the future. The UNICTTF report suggests that ‘more needs to be done to engage the private sector’ and ‘leverage the business community’s expertise’ (Stauffacher et al. 2005: 62). This is despite research that indicates that the benefits of these partnerships with private firms accrue asymmetrically to the corporate sponsors (Reed 2000: 12). Returning to the concept of sustainability, initiatives driven by capitalistic tendencies are unlikely to have the grassroots success that ICT4Peace predicts. As Thabo Mbeki has indicated, the developing world is ‘extremely interested to ensure that [they] are not mere importers and consumers of a predetermined content. Rather, [they] also want to be […] active and significant participants in the creation, production and formulation of content’ (Mbeki 1995). As countries recovering from conflict increasingly form alliances with large propriety companies, for example Rwanda and Microsoft, many are unaware of the political implications of proprietary software (Gurumurthy 2005). Without the freedom to copy, modify and distribute software, local communities will ultimately be constrained in their efforts to create context-specific and meaningful content. As May (2006) has noted, ‘when the source code of software is protected, reverse engineering of specific programmes for local modification is inhibited [… further restraining] local innovators to improve off-the-shelf technologies to reflect local conditions’ (May 2006: 134). A century ago, a British ambassador upon considering the social implications of the telegraph, declared that ‘[it] is impossible that old prejudices and hostilities should longer exist’ as this new devise would allow people the world over to share their thoughts and hopes with one another (Lord 2006: 46). In the past, just as now, the Western developed world’s understanding of technology has been intimately bound to its perceived assumptions regarding the revolutions these innovations are expected to engender (Rohozinski 2003:16). A critical eye finds a great deal of evidence to cast doubt upon overly positive assumptions, particularly at the grassroots level of conflict. There is certainly the possibility that ICTs have a worthy contribution to make to conflict communities, but without a rigorous consideration of these initiative’s faults, they are likely to be unsustainable and possibly dangerous.

CHAPTER FOUR - Conclusion – The very nature of designing technological systems to suit social and cultural purposes is what Fitzpatrick (2003) has described as a ‘wicked problem,’ where there is no answer to be found but rather a trial and error process that continually reveals more about the nature of the problem (x). Hence, a critique of ICT4Peace that is limited only to criticism fails to be enlightening. Rather, such a critique should take what is assumed and ‘show that these things have their history, […] that the starting point is not a given but a construct, usually blind to itself’ (Johnson 1981: xv). The Neutral, Liberal and Positive discursive themes of ICT4Peace have their origins in the West’s unique experiences with technological modernity. This critique does not necessarily suggest that these themes are wrong, rather that they are an incomplete picture of the social implications of technology in regions of conflict. Postman has noted that ‘anyone who practices the art of cultural criticism must endure being asked, what is the solution to the problems you describe?’ (1993: 181). Of course, there are no ‘solutions’ to wicked problems, only novel ways of approaching them. In computer science, programs are ideally designed to ‘gracefully degrade,’ meaning possible failures are considered during the design phase to ensure the program functions well even if some components fail. Given that it is impossible to predict with certainty the social effects that a technology will experience, ICT4Peace must struggle to design initiatives that are deeply considerate of possible design flaws and the characteristics of the adopting society. If the ‘Information Society’ is unable to function exactly as the West has come to expect, these failures must be considered during the design phase of the initiatives. Chapter 3 has indicated that ICTs are unlikely to succeed as tools of participation, development, or peace if they are not linked to existing cultural, political and technological experiences. Equality and shared community goals produce sustainable technologies, not the reverse. In Somalia, the epitome of a ‘failed state,’ where clan based militias maintain violent domination, three local cellular operators are cooperating to provide telephone and Internet to over 70 percent of the country (Rohozinski 2003: 1). This network is not a success due to heavy-handed Western intervention; rather, the ‘best and cheapest telephone system in all of east Africa’ (ibid) is an exemplar of shared interests and local demand surpassing violent clan rivalries (CMI 2004). Further, the dominance of proprietary software in most ICT4Peace initiatives is not suggestive of graceful degradation; adopting parties have no recourse to alter these tools as the needs of their environment demand. If, as Richard Stallman has argued, software is like language and should not be owned because it is foundational to society (May 2006: 134), ICT4Peace must develop improved mechanisms to encourage communities to modify the technology to reflect their specific needs. Such a goal might necessitate the use of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS; See May 2006 for a description of FOSS) for those societies in a position to benefit from it. There is a great deal obscured by a discourse premised on the assumption that ICTs encourage equality, democracy, and local communities of peace. Ultimately, what the ICT4Peace discourse most obscures is the ample evidence to indicate that its framework is flawed, and premised on the West’s experiences with technology and the ‘Information Society.’ Each of the themes and assumptions discussed, merit further study to better understand the ICT societal complex, particularly in areas impacted by conflict. By way of conclusion, I include Lawrence Lessig’s (2002) insightful proposition that ‘[a] time is marked not so much by the ideas that are argued

about, but by the ideas that are taken for granted.’ Without a reflection on how to design the ‘Information Society’ to gracefully degrade in locations distinct from the Western developed world, ICT4Peace stands to be marked not by its noble intentions, but regrettably by its flawed assumptions.

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