The United States And The Barbary Wars

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The United States and The Barbary Wars A Result of Preconceptions or Foreign Policies?

An engagement between a corsair and United States frigate during the First Barbary War (1801-1805). Picture taken from: Protection Agency, "Why We Do What We Do." http://www.diplomaticexecutiveprotection.us/ (accessed April 12, 2009).

By: Grant J. Brill For: Dr. Joseph Walwik INS 5326 - U.S./Maghreb Relations

6 May 2009

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Introduction Since the time of the Crusades there has always been some form of renegade force patrolling the Mediterranean. In the eleventh century this was characterized by Christian ships enslaving Muslims, however, as the Ottoman Empire expanded through mercenaries such as Khizr-ed Din the tables were turned. As Islamic corsairing began to take hold particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European merchants were subjected to a perceivably foreign Islamic maritime law. While many countries avoided armed conflict through annual payments, countries such as Britain and France were able to avoid direct naval engagements despite their comparatively robust naval forces, that is until 1816. The argued reason for this is that because of their extensive history in the region there was a level of mutual understanding and respect held between Europe and the Ottoman Empire that allowed for diplomacy instead of conflict, despite that Europeans commonly considered themselves as superior. With the United States’ independence in 1776, a unique situation was created as the new nation could not afford to pay tribute or to build a military. The country as a whole was forced to become a nation that could contend for power at a global level. In an effort to secure commerce in the Mediterranean from corsairs, Congress approved the commissioning of a navy that would serve with the intent of being a “fleet of observation.”1 However, this fleet would quickly launch the United States into the first of two Barbary Wars. At the same time, corsairs in Islamic North Africa were operating freely under the pretenses of religion and economic gain from seizing not only merchant vessels and their goods, but also their crew to be ransomed or sold into slavery.

1

(Garrity 2007)

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The nature of this conflict was subsequently characterized by two opposing mind sets. On one side, the corsairs made heavy use of religious fervor and advocated that it was a Muslim’s duty to capture and fight the non-believers, and on the other side, there was an attitude of European Enlightenment and the belief in ethnic superiority. With the United States coming into being during such contrasting belief systems, several questions emerge. For instance, did the United States adopt European Enlightenment into its foreign policy or did it diverge from Europe in its attitudes? To answer this question a more fundamental question must be raised, and that is whether the conflict between the United States and the Ottoman regencies was because of prejudices as a result of preconceptions or because of differences in foreign policies? Thus, this paper aims to answer this question and presents the events of the time in a chronological order. First, will be an introduction of the environment of piracy in the Mediterranean and the concepts of Islamic maritime law that held true throughout the United States’ engagement with Barbary. The second part will introduce the newly independent United States’ approach towards dealing with the corsairs. The third section argues that the United States’ foreign policy can be seen in comparing the naval expeditions of Dale and Preble not only to each other but also to the British Bombardment of Algiers. Lastly, the paper concludes with the argument that while corsairs had operated in a standardized manor it was the United States’ that escalated conflict as a result of preconceptions.

Early Piracy and Islamic Law Prior to the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire was under immense pressure internally and externally by the growing European economy. The empire that had once shown itself to be a Islamic dynasty capable of competing with European expansion was now entering a

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period of decay that would eventually carry over into its final demise in the twentieth century. The central government’s isolationist approach when dealing non-Islamic regions, dar al-harb (house of war) was partially the cause, but it was mainly due to an expansion of the empire beyond its central control in Constantinople. Religiously, North African populations generally adhered to the Maliki school of Islam while the Ottoman Empire officially adhered to the Hanafi school, the latter being a more moderate form of Sunni Islam. In the early sixteenth century, the Ottomans considered it vital that they possess control over the high seas. They specifically sought control over the areas of the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea as both were assessed to be critical in terms of maritime trade, either with China or with Europe. Early Ottoman sailors included Khizr-ed Din (1465—1546), more widely known as “Barbarossa”, who was at one time the most feared pirate in all of the Mediterranean and who’s legacy lived on another 300 years after his death with the Barbary corsairs2 and Mir Ali who, in 1589, attempted to retain control of the island of Mombasa3 on the South East shores of Africa. Both of these sailors were charged with carrying out naval expeditions along the coast of Africa to Portugal, and along the shores of Arabia in the name of the Ottoman Empire. Having seized control of Alexandria, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers the appointed Deys (regional governors) maintained a sphere of control that could easily reach the northern European waters. While the Ottomans never managed to control Tangier or Morocco as a whole, the Dey of Algiers found the Strait of Gibraltar an easy crossing into the Atlantic to primarily prey on Portuguese ships through piracy.

2 3

(Hangerman 2003) (Casale 2007, 269)

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It is important to note here that the Ottoman navy was originally militarily-oriented with the purpose of combat and occupation of land in the name of the Empire, but as it encountered and suffered from European (Christian) piracy, the Ottoman navy soon took a backseat to pirates/corsairs operating out of the ports of North Africa. By the seventeenth century, European encounters with Ottomans were mostly limited to encounters with corsairs patrolling the Mediterranean or with European merchants who would occasionally stop at the ports of Tripoli and Tunis after delivering other goods to Alexandria and Tangier. Algiers was generally avoided by the European in terms of trade because of its robust fleet of corsairs that operated virtually unhindered, consequently Algiers came to be synonymous with the term Barbary. Algiers being regarded as the bully of the three regencies was a position assumed in the late sixteenth century when the regency was subject to a revolution that left the Admiral of the corsairs, supported by the Janissaries, in charge to appoint the Dey. Whereas in Tunis the Janissaries retained power and established militant regency, and Tripoli had been left politically fragmented between attempts made by corsairs to manipulate the Dey and renegades who sought to overthrow the Dey completely. Therefore seeing Tunis and Tripoli as the weaker and less problematic regencies efforts were made to bypass Algiers completely. This, however, did not prevent conflict with Algiers. There were some merchants who considered it to be beneficial trade with Algiers despite the risk of being roughed up by the corsairs. Likewise, Algerian vessels were not safe to roam the sea as was described in the Journal of Thomas Baker (1677-1685). In his journal, Mr. Baker recalls that there were several instances where his fleet indiscriminately chased and opened fire on vessels appearing to be Algerian. At the core of all the problems Europe and the Deys were faced withwere the corsairs. Unaccustomed to the Islamic maritime laws being enforced,

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European ships were often seized, with the crew and cargo being sold off, due to miniscule discrepancies. Mr. Baker writes: After coming in contact with the Fortune Mary who had been dragged into Algiers by men of war. It is discovered that the Algiers ‘pretence for the affront being that her passport had been some few days out of date. The ship consequently was forced to forfeit all her goods.’4 While the Deys who may have initially sought to avoid conflict with foreign regions became economically powerless as: Piracy became a major source of income. But more profitable than sea robbery was their slavery. Gradually, slave trade became their primary occupation. The people enslaved by the Barbary corsairs were not Black Africans, but rather white Europeans. These persons were taken from ships captured by the pirates and from coastal settlements around the Mediterranean. The captives might have spent the rest of their lives as agricultural slaves, quarrymen, or rowers in a galley. In fact, the slave trade was so lucrative that the corsairs often went to sea solely for kidnapping raids.5 While corsairs were generally free to roam without specific direction by the government, there were several Islamic maritime laws that the Ottoman Empire adopted as a whole and to which the corsairs generally adhered to. This of course is not to say that there were not biases against certain foreigners, but rather that their role was both defensive and offensive. In terms of rules of engagement: Muslim vessels could engage enemy vessels if they were sighted approaching Islamic coastal frontiers with the clear intention of attacking and plundering maritime installations and settlements… In a state of war, Muslims on battleships were permitted to engage enemy war vessels even on high seas far from Islamic territorial waters. These rules were even applicable to enemy commercial ships that carried supplies, rather than troops.6

4

(Pennell 1989) (Lowenheim 2003, 30) 6 (Khalilieh 1998, 120) 5

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In defense the corsairs acted as a kind of coast guard to the Islamic world (dar al-Islam) as they stopped and checked foreign vessels once they entered territorial waters. Classical Islamic law defined territorial waters as being: The distance at which the top of a vessels mast could be discerned from land…. Maghreb in 549/1154, reported that ‘in the village of Bajanis [Andalusia]… there is a stone tower in which a fire is kindled when the enemy is seen approaching by sea from a distance of six miles.’7 Once stopped, the corsairs would check the vessel for a passport into Islamic ports signed by an Imam or an admiral of a corsair fleet, and a full manifest of the ship’s cargo and crewmembers and prisoners to include their nationalities.8 If the seized ship failed to produce any of these documents, the corsair admiral or captain was authorized to act as a caliph at sea and issue a legitimate verdict on the ship and crew’s fate. However, if the corsairs did not plunder the foreign vessels at sea, the ship and its crew were usually transferred to the authority of an Imam at a home port or render one fifth of the spoils to the Imam. From here the crew was either ransomed or sold into slavery. The admiral or captain, in place of the Imam was also authorized to issue an aman, safe passage document that allowed its possessor to freely enter into any Islamic port. This was not always the case though, as corsairs failed to adhere to such laws and indiscriminately attacked all merchants. In terms of offense, the role of the corsairs was slightly different and a bit more prejudice. Particularly in Algiers, long distance corsairing was made possible by Christian renegades leaving Spain during the Inquisition who not only brought a thirst for revenge against Spain, but more importantly, the ‘round ship’ or sailing vessels was introduced as opposed to strictly oared ones. These vessels had a distinct advantage in being able to sail long distances, well past the 7 8

(Khalilieh 1998, 138) (Khalilieh 1998, 139)

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Straight of Gibraltar.9 As two-fifths of Algerian corsairs were comprised of Christian renegades, most having converted to Islam, a significant number of corsairs operated specifically against Christian vessels.10 Offensively, corsairs also had the religious duty of jihad, literally a struggle in the way of God. Since Europe was considered a part of the dar al-Harb, it was technically the Muslim duty to try and convert its inhabitants or wage war on them if they refuse to submit to Islam. Corsairs sailing under the cause of jihad were usually using it as a guise since Muslim jurists generally frowned upon openly engaging in religious warfare as it could inadvertently draw the dar al-Islam into a frivolous war that would waste lives, resources, and compromise its overall security. In reality, corsairs using the cause of jihad were religiously legitimizing their plundering for wealth and booty. Furthermore, it was also considered religiously acceptable to take captives as based on Islamic law, non-believers were dealt with in four different ways: 1) Ransoming as mentioned before; 2) Sold as slaves into laborious occupations; 3) The captive could elect to pay the jizya (poll tax) and become a dhimmi, or a non-believer protected by the government as a kind of second class citizen so long as the jizya is paid; 4) The captive could convert to Islam allowing him to become an equal among his captors. In any event the outcome would either bring wealth to the regency or glory to Islam. In looking back on it, conversion may have seemed the most obvious and painless choice, however, during this time period, apostatizing was looked upon as losing one’s immortal soul. On the high seas, corsairs and foreign vessels alike would often shoot first and ask questions later as opposed to trying to engage in diplomatic talks first.

9

(Clissold 1976) (Clissold 1976, 509)

10

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In an effort to secure commercial trade with the Ottoman Empire, European governments established a number of treaties that would supposedly grant safe passage to Islamic territory. However, the problem for Europeans was two-fold. The first problem was that a separate treaty had to be established with independent Morocco, and the other problem was that the Ottoman regencies of North Africa no longer adhered to the policies of the central government. When Europe began to pay Morocco for safe passage, regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli followed in suit, usually demanding payments in excess of those made to neighboring regencies. Merchants now subjected to harassment by corsairs if they failed to produce legal documents and capture by the Dey if payments were not received, began to view North Africa as archaic and lawless.

As this was the age of Enlightenment, a time when it was widely held that Europeans were ethnically superior and destined to prevail through Darwin’s survival of the fittest theory, Europeans were soon reminded of the rhetoric of the crusades and began labeling North Africa as Barbary and assumed that it was the “white man’s burden” to civilize the uncivilized populace of the Barbary states. These sentiments were amplified by the frequent letters of desperation from captives and captivity narratives by those few who had escaped or been ransomed,11 most notably, equating their liberation to a divine salvation from God.12 European leaders, pressured by the growing increase in citizens being captured, adopted the policy of allying with the weaker regencies of Tunis and Tripoli while declaring war on what was considered to be the more tyrannical Algiers. Though some Europeans would contest the title of Barbary placed on the people, as articulated by a Russian Naval officer in a journal entry from 1776 stating:

11 12

(Weiss 2005) (Kidd 2003)

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The Romans called this people ‘Barbarians’ as they did all those whom they had conquered, and the Europeans have conserved the habit until today, although these peoples do not at all deserve such a contemptuous name. It is true that they are not cultivated but, like all other peoples, they have their own origin, which cannot be criticized, and their customs. The name of Barbarian only suits a ferocious, lawless and cruel people, but the Barbaresque seem to me in general to have mild manners and to be more welcoming to strangers than many Europeans, in particular the Sicilians, the Calabrians and some parts of the Spanish people.13

Captivity narratives also had a profound effect on the African slave trade, where the true rhetoric of the Enlightenment came to be heard. Those reading of the atrocities faced by their white brethren held in captivity would often belittle abolitionist movements and accuse them of not looking out for their own people first. In Britain Lord Horatio Nelson, an admiral in the Royal Navy, exclaimed that, “my blood boils that I cannot chastise these pirates. They could not show themselves in the Mediterranean did not our country permit. Never let us talk of the cruelty of the African slave trade while we permit such a horrid war.”14 Nelson was referring to the British government’s stance of allowing Algiers to retain its corsairs which harass adversary’s merchant vessels. These sentiments would also be echoed in the United States by Benjamin Franklin under the alias of the African Sidi Mehemet Ibrahim, and he wrote: Let us then hear no more of this detestable proposition, the manumission of Christian slaves, the adoption of which would, by depreciating our lands and houses, and thereby depriving so many good citizens of their properties, create universal discontent, and provoke insurrections, to the endangering of government, and producing general confusion.15

Benjamin Franklin sought to rationalize the need for African slavery from the perspective of an African Muslim.

13

(Thomson 1987, 15) (Lowenheim 2003, 41) 15 (Franklin 1790) 14

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To approach the regencies the French and British adopted “gunboat diplomacy,” characterized by frequently sailing a sizable armada into port stopping within firing distance of the city and fortifications. From there they would conduct diplomacy which tended to be extremely professional and if the Dey refused to the terms the ships would still wait to be fired upon first.16 This was the case in the British bombardment of Algiers in 1816, and is a hallmark of the prestige European naval forces held themselves accountable to when conducting diplomacy, as they afforded respect to the Algerians. In a letter thanking Lord Exmouth for conducting the bombardment of Algiers, British foreign minister Lord Castlereagh expresses how Algiers was perceived by Europe prior to the engagement by saying: The enemy might be inferior in scientific excellence and in knowledge of modern warfare, yet sufficient proof was given during the battle that the arm of this country was never turned against a foe more capable of opposing an obstinate and fierce resistance.17 This mentality of being able to respect the enemy despite the common belief of inferiority is perhaps what set Europe apart when dealing with Barbary.

Attitude of the ew United States With United State’s Declaration of Independence in 1776, the new nation found itself with an inheritance of preconceptions and problems from Europe in the interactions with the corsairs. Further, the lessons of French and British encounters with corsairs did not go unnoticed, which left policy makers in a paradox. As one-fifth of its trade came from the Mediterranean it was economically impossible to cutoff trade with the region, and having just won a bloody war for independence, few doubted the availability of resources and manpower to raise a navy and feared that a navy would symbolize an offensive threat and would bring conflict back to the 16 17

(Severn 1978, 33) (Lowenheim 2003, 34)

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shores of America. However, the United States could not ignore the fact that the country as a whole was an underdog, especially when it came to its naval power; meanwhile, securing protection for its merchants was paramount. To compound the problem, not only were the British now considered to be adversaries, but since the British had the most powerful navy in the Mediterranean the British government purposely let Algiers retain its corsairs so that they would prey on American merchants. The United States could not afford to continue to pay the regencies for temporary safe passage while corsairs from other regencies would continue to harass and capture their merchants.

In contrast to Europe the United States’ plan was far more strategic in the Mediterranean. The idea was that by establishing a treaty with Morocco it ensured a safe passage through the Straight of Gibraltar, and by allying with Algiers the United States planned on using the status of Algiers, being the muscle of the Ottoman regencies, to pressure Tunis and Tripoli into more favorable trade and safe passage agreements. For awhile this worked, allowing the United States to pay only a fraction of what other European nations had, until both Tunis and Tripoli realized how much more Algiers was receiving.18 In losing its treaties with Tunis and Tripoli, the United States also faced instability with Algiers as a result of absent and overdue payments. Congress therefore had the decision of whether to reproach the regencies and offer another treaty, break off ties, or send a navy to ensure diplomacy.

John Quincy Adams thought that any further negotiations would result in the demand of a $1.2 million dollars in return for a treaty. Furthermore, while the public was familiar with Islam, captivity narratives directly shaped public opinion by fostering preconceptions that the Islamic religion would always: 18

(Garrity 2007, 42)

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(1) Serve some “carnal Interest,” (2) be led by wicked men, (3) make carnality and wickedness central to its aims, (4) have “Falsities” at the very heart of the religion, (5) us “craft and fraud” to accomplish its ends, (6) be backed by conspirators who will eventually be revealed, and (7) be spread by force.19 Coupled with the sentiments of Enlightenment, the regencies of North Africa were viewed as religiously illegitimate and inferior as a civilization. With the sentiment of both religious and ethnic superiority alongside the success the British were having in the Mediterranean, Congress allowed for the establishment of a small squadron that would be dispatched as a “fleet of observation” under the leadership of Richard Dale in 1801. Comprised of four vessels totaling 128 guns, the fleet could easily defend against corsairs carrying the typical armament of 4 guns, but were outnumbered 3 to 1 militarily. The squadron was sent on a mission to Tripoli, the weakest of the regencies, to secure the dissolving peace agreement. However, upon reaching the Straight of Gibraltar , the squadron discovered that Tripoli had already declared war on the United States and was attacking merchants. In response, the fleet attacked and defeated the Tripolian vessels and was later sent to establish a blockade of Tripoli along with the Swedish. This proved to be a disaster though as two corsairs managed to not only slip through the blockade but also captured a merchant ship, the Franklin, and with it in tow slipped back through the blockade. To make the situation worse, while imposing the blockade the frigate Philadelphia ran aground and 307 members of its crew were taken captive.20 Despite the specific warning by James Madison that “to buy peace with Tripoli, is to bid for war with Tunis,”21 the United States ultimately ransomed the crew for $6,500 signaling that the presence of its naval force had been an epic failure and that the United States was still willing to pay ransoms.

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(Kidd 2003) (Mintz 2006, 43) 21 (Garrity 2007, 412) 20

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In 1803, the United States Navy regrouped from its failure to blockade Tripoli. It set off once again, this time under the command of Edward Preble to put an end to disputes with Tripoli. As before the mission of the fleet was to coerce the Dey into agreeing to a much more affordable peace treaty, but, unlike before, Preble was prepared to send an unwavering message to the Barbary States that the United States was in fact a force to be reckoned with. Ironically as before in 1801 the squadron was again delayed, this time as a result of an unexpected encounter with Moroccan corsairs. As it turns out, the United States was overdue in their annual payment to the governor of Tangiers and consequently Moroccan corsairs had been ordered to attack ships from the United States. Caught off guard by Preble’s sizable force of 168 guns, Morocco submitted to Preble’s terms of renewing the Treaty of 1786 while he lectured Moroccan officials about the value of American trade. Moving on, Preble’s fleet arrived in Tripoli in July 1804, while continuing periodic passes by the port of Tunis as a reminder of their presence. American observer Tobias Lear wrote a letter to William Bainbridge, a captive in Tripoli, stating: It must be dreadful to Barbary… We are a Nation different from all others, we are now powerful, if we choose to exert our strength; and we are rising rapidly to a great pitch of importance, while most other nations, which are now here, are at their full growth, or on the decline.22 Obviously this letter had been intended for Tripoli’s eyes as well, but what is important to take away from this correspondence is the idea of superiority and inevitable victory. Once diplomatic talks stalled, Preble enlisted the help of an additional eight Sicilian warships and on August 3, 1804, they commenced the bombardment of the city. This was followed over the next three weeks by three more attacks, and a much larger follow up attack in 1805.

22

(Garrity 2007, 419)

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Comparing Dale and Preble’s Expeditions to the British Bombardment of Algiers in 1806 When comparing the use of naval force, the United States not only held a far more aggressive stance than European nations, but the naval commanders carried with them the resounding rhetoric of the Enlightenment. How much of an impact the frustrations of lost goods to corsairs or captivity narratives had in foreign policy making is anyone’s guess. The fact is that when the United States sends a squadron of warships, the squadron commander is not only a military officer but also a diplomat with the purpose of negotiating agreements in the best interest of the country. This was not only the case in the eighteenth century but holds true today as well. Therefore, the appointment of Dale as admiral compared to Preble was a clear indication of United States foreign policy and its attitude towards the region. The quality of Dale as a commander was his levelheadedness in recognizing the limited capabilities of his force and that a direct attack on the primary ports of the regencies would ultimately be a disaster as it would consume resources and leave the squadron vulnerable to counter attack. With this in mind, Dale then set out to create a passive blockade where his ships served as a force of presence as opposed to coercion. Preble, on the other hand, was sent with the explicit intent of flexing American naval muscle. Accounts of Preble’s campaign are riddled with instances of either himself or his crew referring to the inferiority of Africa’s inhabitations. This was first apparent in his encounter with Morocco where not only did he pressure the government to renew its peace treaties, but also commenced in lecturing Moroccan officials. During the bombardment of Tripoli in 1804once diplomatic talks stalled, Preble seemed to waste no time in commencing the attack in order to send a message to the other regencies. Furthermore, even before the attack American observer Tobias Lear on board one of the ships wrote about the perceived superiority over a society (Tripoli) that was experiencing a downfall. Even after the battle, an officer reported that, “some

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Turks died like men, but most behaved like women.”23 This attitude is in stark contrast to British attitude both before and after the bombardment of Algiers in 1806, where the Muslims were thought of, and respected as a formidable opponent. The difference in Dale and Preble’s personalities indicates the continuity in American perception towards the Barbary region and a transition in its foreign policy. What is meant by this is that in both cases the Barbary States were considered to be inferior, although evidence is lacking from Dale’s expedition, the simple fact that Congress believed it sufficient to commission such a small squadron to combat Barbary is proof enough. In warfare, a defensive force always has the upper hand in terms of force ratio, which means that the attacker should send a force greater than the enemy’s defensive force. By sending Dale’s squadron outnumbered by the typical Barbary State regency of a force ration of 3 to 1, it leads one to believe that either the commissioning of the squadron was a farce or that Congress full-heartedly believed that one American could take on three subjects of the Barbary States. Perhaps the most drastic change had to do with foreign policy, as the deployment of Preble’s squadron no longer allowed the United States to stand by idly as the Barbary States decided what was owed. The aggressive and intolerant attitude of Preble’s expedition made the United States’ policy in the Mediterranean unique as it capitalized on the inferiority of the Barbary people and considered it to be insolent and within the rules of engagement if diplomatic talks were suspended. Therefore, the confrontational foreign policy held by the United States was not just professional but also based around certain prejudices towards the region.

23

(Garrity 2007, 420)

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Conclusion When judging the actions of the United States, it is important to ask the question of whether piracy in the Mediterranean singled out American merchants or if corsairs continued indiscriminant raiding of all ships in the region. It has already been shown that the United States was not free from the influences of Enlightenment and had adopted a clear attitude of superiority when dealing with Tripoli, more so in fact than the British. Therefore it is clear that despite the fact that United States was treated roughly the same as other European nations when it came to ransoms and price of treaties, Barbary was interpreted as lawlessness. The argument could be made that the simple nature of piracy makes conflict unavoidable, but since corsairs raided indiscriminately against all merchants operating in the area there does seem to be a standardized practice that has no particular aim in provoking conflict. The United States, on the other hand, quickly changed its foreign policy posturing from what could have originally been considered a “low intensity conflict” to an all out war. When put into a final comparison this leaves the corsairs operating as the economic backbone of North African Regencies and the United States, through adopting attitudes of Enlightenment, exploits the opportunity to aggressively flex what naval muscle it had.

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