Thayer Vietnam: Ninth Plenum Cadre Policy

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Background Briefing: The Ninth Plenum and Cadre Policy Carlyle A. Thayer January 13, 2009

[client name deleted] QUESTION: With the plenum on now, I want to prepare profiles on two apparent rising stars, which might come in useful now or at some stae in the future. -Truong Tan Sang, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee, permanent member of the Secretariat of the CPV Central Committee, and -Education Minister Nguyen Thien Nhan. I was wondering whether you had much biographical material on them which you would be willing to share, as well as comment on each for quotation? ANSWER: The ninth plenum (tenth congress) will conclude tomorrow. It is significant that this meeting will review ten years of implementation of the resolution on cadre strategy of the third plenum (eighth congress) that met from 24-27 July 1997. The third plenum convened as peasant discontent in Thai Binh province began to pick up momentum. The plenum adopted two resolutions, one that led to the implementation of grassroots democracy in 1998 and subsequently, and the other on guidelines for developing a personnel strategy for cadres employed by the state. The third plenum’s discussion of personnel strategy was the first time that the party Central Committee had discussed this issue in “a profound and complete manner and… issued a specialized resolution on cadres.” This resolution mainly related to whole of career training for cadres and public supervision to identify cadres who were corrupt and degenerate. It is notable that the third plenum expressed concern that “hostile forces” would attempt to interfere with the new personnel policy with the aim of making cadres “deviate from socialism.” What is not part of the public record is that the third plenum discussed and reached agreement that party secretary general Do Muoi, president Le Duc Anh, and prime minister Vo Van Kiet would all retire as deputies from the National Assembly and hence not contest the elections scheduled for July. They retained their seats on the Politburo until the next party congress. Vietnam is presently at the half way mark between national party congresses. In addition to focusing on how to improve the efficiency of lower level cadres, the Central Committee will be concerned to arrange an orderly leadership transition for the eleventh congress. This means that prospective members of the Central Committee must be identified and given increased responsibility in new areas in order to test their mettle. The Central Committee will also be considering how to bring about generational change at the next congress among its most senior members, that is, those on the Politburo. It is early days yet. Vietnam’s current economic difficulties coupled with the global economic crisis may have the same impact as the peasant disturbances in Thai Binh province over a decade ago. At a party plenum held in December 2007 Do Muoi was replaced as party secretary general by Le Kha Phieu.

2 If the Central Committee is considering replacing Nong Duc Manh, who would they pick? The most likely choice is the person that the educated Vietnames elite refers to as “number two” in the party, Truong Tan Sang. Sang is permanent secretary of the party Secretariat and has oversight of the day to day running of the party. He has been deeply involved in promoting a conservative ideological line that stifles intellectual expression and muffles freedom of the press. Sang was stung by the Nam Cam corruption scandal and was reprimanded by the Central Committee for failure to take effective action against the Nam Cam criminal syndicate while he (Sang) was party boss in Ho Chi Minh City. No doubt these newspapers had high-level backers in the party that enable them to pursue what by Vietnamese standards must be viewed as aggressive press reporting. Although Sang was never mentioned in the press, it was Tuoi Tre and Thanh Nien that pushed the envelope in reporting on the Nam Cam scandal and eventually triggered disciplinary action. In Sang’s view the journalists’ association, intellectual groups and the media are weapons in the party’s armoury designed to keep it in power. Sang has argued that these weapons should be used to forge the great national unity bloc of “farmers, workers and intellectuals.” Although Sang hails from the southern province of Long An and has had long experience in the party and state apparatus in Ho Chi Minh City, he is no reformer in the mould of Vo Van Kiet or Nguyen Tan Dung. Sang distanced himself from Vo Van Kiet.. When Kiet passed away last year, Sang was instrumental in censoring an edited volume that commemorated Kiet’s life. Sang rose to his present position in spite of his official reprimand. He commands wide support within the party apparatus. The vast majority of root and branch party members reside in the northern provinces, especially the northern central provinces. Sang received a commanding vote of confidence in internal party pre-selection voting prior to the tenth party congress. At present he must be considered a leading contender for the post of party secretary general. He will be 62 years of age at the next party congress. Politburo member and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stands at the opposite end of the political spectrum from Truong Tan Sang and his crowd. After his selection as Prime Minister, Dung attempted to reorganize the Cabinet by replacing at least two incumbent deputy prime ministers with two new stars, including Nguyen Thien Nhan. A compromise was reached. The number of deputies was expanded from three to five and Nhan was appointed to one of the new slots. Nhan holds a degree from Harvard and is presently Minister of Education and Training. Nhan has the support of younger reform minded members of the party. But he lacks experience. According to one former Hanoi-based journalist, Nhan is viewed as having been woefully ineffective in the education portfolio. If he is being groomed for higher office, he will have to be assigned more substantive ministerial duties in the coming year. If the third plenum of 1997 is any guide to go by, leadership changes could be engineered by the National Assembly at one of its two sessions this year. Irrespective, the Central Committee has the power to execute leadership changes in the party any time it meets in plenary or executive session.