Thayer Us Counter-terrorism And Southeast Asia

Internal Conflict and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Regional Responses and U.S. Leadership Carlyle A. Thayer * [Paper to panel on Internal Conflict and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Assessing the Effectiveness of Regional Responses and U.S. Leadership, 46th International Studies Association Annual Convention, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., March 1-5, 2005]

Abstract In the aftermath of terrorist bombings on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, U.S. President George Bush called for a global war on terrorism. The United Nations Security Council quickly rallied behind the U.S. and passed a resolution binding the UN’s members to prevent such acts from occurring again. In Southeast Asia, political leaders uniformly condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States and offered varying measures of support. This paper provides an overview of regional responses to the emergence of internationally networked terrorism and U.S. efforts to provide leadership in the war on terrorism. It concludes by offering an assessment of successes and shortcomings of the various approaches adopted along three dimensions: preferences, capacity and leadership.

Introduction In the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the United States on 11th September 2001 (hereafter (9-11), the United Nations Security Council, acting under the provisions of Chapter VII of its Charter, adopted Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. This resolution reaffirmed the Security Council’s unequivocal condemnation of the 9-11 terrorist attacks and “1. Decides that all States shall: (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; (b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts; (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities; (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons; 2. Decides also that all States shall: (a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;

*

C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor, Southeast Asia Program, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. on leave as Director, UNSW Defence Studies Forum, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University College, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra.

2 (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information; (c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens; (d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens; (e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts; (f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings; (g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.”

Resolution 1373 also called upon all members of the United Nations to: “(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups; (b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; (c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts; (d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999; (e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001); (f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts; (g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.”

In addition to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), the “relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism” include (see Appendix A): •

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention, 1963)

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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention, 1970)

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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil

3 Aviation (Montreal Convention, 1971) •

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973)

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International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention, 1979)

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Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention, 1980)

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Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988)

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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (1988)

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Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)

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Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991) and the

•

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997)

Finally, Resolution 1373 also established a Counter-Terrorism Committee, made up of all fifteen members of the Security Council, to monitor the implementation of this resolution by all members of the United Nations including ten Southeast Asian states grouped in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The following sections will review Southeast Asian responses to the events of 9-11 and evaluate U.S. leadership in the global war on terrorism in a regional context. Regional Responses The events of 9-11. In response to the events of 9-11, the states of Southeast Asia almost uniformly condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States, offered their sympathy to the victims, and pledged varying degrees of support to the U.S. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, for example, prided itself on being one of the first to send President Bush a message of sympathy. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir took the unusual step of personally signing the condolence book at the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. President Megawati Sukarnoputri visited Washington, D.C. shortly after 9-11. In a joint statement issued with President Bush on September 19th, she condemned the terrorist attacks and pledged to strengthen Indonesia’s cooperation in combating international terrorism. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Tok Chong stated that Singapore “stands with the United States” in the fight against terrorism, while his Thai counterpart, Taksin Shinawatra, made a more equivocal statement of support. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo offered specific concrete assistance. She stated that the Philippines would not only permit the use of its air space and military facilities for U.S. forces transiting the area but would be prepared to deploy support and medical personnel and combat forces – if requested by the United Nations.

4 The heads of government of the five core founding members of ASEAN all visited Washington, D.C. and reiterated their commitment to the war on terrorism: Indonesia (September 2001), Philippines (November 2001 and May 2003), Thailand (December 2001 and June 2003), Malaysia (May and June 2002), and Singapore (May 2003 and May 2004). Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited the U.S. in May 2002 and terrorism featured in his discussions with President Bush. Multilateral responses. One of the first multilateral anti-terror initiatives in Southeast Asia was undertaken by the Philippines. Significantly this was outside the ASEAN framework (see below). On September 26, 2001, President Arroyo initiated talks with Indonesia and Malaysia on cooperation to combat terrorism. Among the ideas discussed was intelligence sharing on Islamic extremism and ways to reduce the number of young men going overseas for extremist religious education. On May 7, 2002, the three states also signed an Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures” and agreed to cooperate in some twenty projects including procedures for dealing with border and security incidents. Thailand and Cambodia joined subsequently. In July 2004, in response to a U.S. Regional Maritime Security Initiative (discussed below), Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore signed a trilateral agreement to enable them to conduct coordinated naval patrols in the Malacca Strait to combat piracy. Multilateral responses – ASEAN According to ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong, “ASEAN may not have been very visible in this [counter- terrorism] campaign. We have many sensitivities to contend with particularly not to aggravate the perception that Islam and Muslims are engaged in a monumental struggle with modernization and the West.” Following the terrorist attacks of 9-11, and immediately prior to the ASEAN summit in Brunei, the third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime met in Singapore in October 2001. This meeting included terrorism in its discussion of transnational issues and agreed to convene special sessions of the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) to discuss issues related to combating terrorism. In addition the AMMCT decided to set up an Ad Hoc Experts Group to discuss terrorism. ASEAN leaders addressed their support for the war on terrorism at their seventh summit meeting held in Brunei in November 2001. There they adopted a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (November 5, 2001) that condemned terrorism as “a profound threat to international peace and security which require concerted action” and “a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020.” The ASEAN states agreed to suppress terrorism in accordance with the UN Charter, UN resolutions and international law. Finally, the ASEAN heads of government adopted nine measures: 1.

Review and strengthen our national mechanisms to combat terrorism;

2.

Call for the early signing/ratification of or accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;

3.

Deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing ‘best practices’;

5 4.

Study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism;

5.

Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of al modes of travel;

6.

Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the AMMTC [ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime] and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to combat terrorist organizations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice;

7.

Develop regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts.

8.

Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN’s role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners within the existing frameworks such as the ASEAN + 3, the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavor.

9.

Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional, and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.

This Declaration became the basic template of ASEAN initiatives to counter terrorism in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s stance was reiterated at its 8th summit meeting in Phnom Penh where members adopted another Declaration on Terrorism (November 3, 2002). This meeting endorsed the following activities: •

the International Conference on Anti-Terrorism and Tourism Recovery in Manila (November 2002);

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the establishment of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Center in Kuala Lumpur (November 2002);

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the Regional Conference on Combating Money-Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Bali (December 2002);

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the Intersessional Meeting on Terrorism of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia (March 2003);

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the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime with ministerial counterparts from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea in Bangkok (October 2003 or January 2004);

It should be noted that ASEAN’s modus operandi is to include terrorism as a security issue along with transnational crime. This is in deference to members states with a large Muslim population who are sensitive to any linkage between Islam and terrorism. For example, a Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism met in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002 and adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime. A separate “Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime” was adopted to monitor the implementation of the Plan of Action by its members. The Work Programme included six major areas: (1) information exchange, (2) cooperation in legal matters, (3) cooperation in law enforcement matters,

6 (4) institutional capacity building, (5) training, and (6) extra-regional cooperation. The counter-terrorism component focused on trafficking in small arms, illegal drugs, money laundering, and creating a regional data base on laws, regulations and treaties. ASEANAPOL officials met in January 2003 and agreed that each member would set up an anti-terrorism task force. ASEAN officials are currently studying a regional convention to combat terrorism. ASEAN has also issued joint statements with a number of countries on counter-terrorism, or, in the case of China “non-traditional security issues”: •

ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, (August 1, 2002) 1

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Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of NonTraditional Security Issues, Phnom Penh, (November 4, 2002).

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Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, (January 27, 2003).

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ASEAN-India Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, Bali, October 2003.

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Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (January 10, 2004).

At the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta in July 2004, ASEAN reached similar counter-terrorism agreements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Russian Federation. 2 Finally, ASEAN has extended its multilateral activities to include the “Plus Three” countries – China, Japan and South Korea as well as other regional states. In January 2004 the first ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime was held in Bangkok. ASEAN members also attended the Bali Regional Meeting on CounterTerrorism co-hosted by Indonesia and Australia in February 2004. This meeting was attended both foreign affairs and law enforcement ministers, or their representatives, from Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, United Kingdom, United States, and representatives of the European Union, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, APEC Secretariat, ASEAN Secretariat and senior representatives from the United Nations.

1

The United States adopted an ASEAN Cooperation Plan (ACP) to support ASEAN’s efforts at regional integration, addressing transnational issues including counter-terrorism, and support for the ASEAN Secretariat. The first ASEAN-U.S. consultation on the ACP was held in Hanoi in June 2003. A three-point Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism was adopted, it included information sharing, capacity building and border control. 2 The Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and Russian Federation on the Partnership for Peace and Security, and Prosperity and Development in the Asia Pacific Region (Phnom Penh, June 2003) identified terrorism as one of the principal threats to regional security.

7

Multilateral responses – the ASEA N Regional Forum The ASEAN Regional Forum is an unwieldy group of twenty-three members. It is primarily a “security dialogue forum”. The business of the ARF is conducted through a number of inter-sessional groups and meetings. A Statement of Measures Against Terrorist Financing was adopted at an ARF-sponsored meeting held in Honolulu in March 2002. Workshops on the Prevention of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Measures were held in April and October 2002, respectively. The reports of these workshops were filtered upwards through senior officials and then to the responsible ministers for their consideration. At the ninth ARF meeting in Brunei in July 2002, it was agreed that members would strengthen their commitment to bilateral, regional and international cooperation to combat terrorism. This meeting adopted the ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing (July 30, 2002). Five measures were highlighted: •

freezing terrorist assets in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373;

•

implementation of international standards through the adoption of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime; and cooperation with the a number of international financial institutions, such as the Financial Action Task Force, to tackle the issue of terrorist financing;

•

international cooperation in the exchange of information and outreach activities as directed by UN resolutions including the establishment of Financial Intelligence Units;

•

technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Asian Development to assist in capacity building; and

•

compliance and reporting in accord with international obligations to support the activities of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Financial Action Task Force (self-assessment and eight measures to combat money-laundering).

In July 2002, it was also decided to establish an Inter-Sessional Meeting on CounterTerrorism and Transnational Crime (ISMCTTC) to be co-chaired by Malaysia and the United States. It was within the framework of the ISMCTTC that the ARF has addressed the issue of terrorism. The first meeting of the ISMCTTC was held in Sabah in March 2003. The ARF has also included terrorism in its work program related to piracy and “other threats to maritime security.” Once again, the conflation of several transnational security threats serves to mute any imputation that there is a linkage between terrorism and Islam. In 2002, the ARF adopted a Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security that committed members to working with the International Maritime Organization and the International Maritime Bureau. At the Tenth ARF Ministerial Meeting held in Phnom Penh in June 2003, the participants adopted an ARF Statement of Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security.

8 U.S. Leadership In the aftermath of 9-11 President George Bush called for the creation of a global coalition to prosecute the war on terrorism. Senior officials including the president himself have visited the Southeast Asia in an effort to fashion an effective regional counter-terrorism coalition. In March 2002, for example, Robert Mueller, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) toured Southeast Asia and offered U.S. assistance in locating, apprehending and extraditing al Qaeda members. In July/August 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell attended the annual ASEAN dialogue partner consultations and annual meeting of the ARF in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. As a result of his diplomatic intervention ASEAN and the United States adopted the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (August 1, 2002). This was the first time an entire region had committed itself to counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States. During the course of Secretary Powell’s trip he also visited Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. President Bush attended the APEC Summit in Bangkok in October 2003 and visited Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore. Since 9-11, the United States has pursued a multidimensional approach towards Southeast Asia including hefty military aid to the Philippines, financial support to Indonesia and other forms of financial and technical assistance to enhance regional and individual state law enforcement capabilities including the police, customs, and financial officials. U.S. assistance is provided directly through the State and Defense Departments (Pacific Command) as well as to international organizations such as the Asian Development Bank. In 2004, the United States began emphasizing the importance of maritime security in the Asia Pacific Region and in the Straits of Malacca in particular. In March, Admiral Thomas Fargo, U.S. Pacific Commander, unveiled a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in testimony before Congress (discussed below). In May, the U.S. tabled a plan to increase maritime security in the Asia Pacific at the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting in Yogyakarta. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld underscored the importance of maintaining security in the Malacca Straits in remarks to the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in June. Secretary Powell followed through in July when he attended the annual ASEAN-U.S. dialogue partner consultations in Jakarta and urged Southeast Asian states to work with the U.S. to strengthen maritime security in the region. The United States has sought to enlist the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in counter-terrorism. The U.S. initiated a fund to set up financial intelligence units and to upgrade customs security at the October 2003 APEC Summit in Bangkok. In mid-November 2004 at the APEC summit in Chile, President Bush successfully included anti-terrorism measures as part of its program. The Santiago Declaration included provisions to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In particular, APEC members pledged to take further measures to deny terrorists access to the international financial system. APEC also approved an embargo on the sale of “man portable” shoulder fired missiles.

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Bilateral responses – The Philippines. Prior to 9-11, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo indicated her government’s desire to expand security cooperation with the United States. In a speech given on July 12, 2001, for example, she stated that her country’s military alliance with the U.S. was a “strategic asset.” After 9-11, President Arroyo promised “all out support” to the U.S. and sought assistance in eliminating the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines. As a result of the Philippines’ commitment to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, it became the largest recipient of economic and military assistance in Southeast Asia. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, “Philippine President Macapagal-Arroyo has been Southeast Asia’s staunchest supporter of the international counterterrorism effort, offering medical assistance for Coalition forces, blanket over flight clearance, and landing rights for US aircraft involved in Operation Enduring Freedom.” In August 2003, the Philippines sent a ninety-six member Philippine Humanitarian Contingent to Iraq to assist in reconstruction efforts. President Arroyo has twice visited the United States. On her first visit in November 2001, President Bush promised $100 million in security assistance over a five-year period and one billion dollars in trade benefits. During her second visit in May 2003, President Bush offered a substantial new military and economic aid program valued at $100 million. In addition, President Bush designated the Philippines as a “major non-NATO ally.” President Bush stopped in Manila briefly on October 18, 2003 and addressed a joint session of the Congress. President Bush announced an additional aid package of $340 million. In 2002 the annual combined military exercise, Balikatan, was modified to include U.S. training in counter-terrorism with a specific focus on the Abu Sayyaf Group on Basilan island. 3 At the conclusion of Balikatan 02, 660 U.S. forces remained in-country to advise and train members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in modern counterterrorist technology and techniques. In November 2002 the U.S. and the Philippines signed a ten-year Mutual Logistics Support Agreement. An attempt to expand the scope of military cooperation in 2003 foundered on domestic opposition to any hint that U.S. forces would be engaged in a combat role. Such a role is expressly forbidden by the Philippines’ constitution. Major combined exercises, Balikatan 03 were held on Luzon in April-May and September 2003. Combined exercises planned for Jolo, in Mindanao, were postponed because of difficulties in drafting the Terms of Reference. Meanwhile U.S. military advisers continued to train a 500-man elite AFP counter-terrorist commando unit. The U.S. and the Philippines conducted Balikatan 04 in February-March 2004 in Palawan and Bantanes provinces. A counter-terrorism combined exercise was carried out in July in North Cotabato province, a stamping ground for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

3

The United States first designated the ASG as a terrorist group in 1997. The ASG was involved in the kidnapping of U.S. citizens, two of whom where held captive in 2002.

10 Overall, as a result of stepped up cooperation in the war on terrorism, effective bilateral military cooperation between the United States and the Philippines has reached its highest point in over a decade. U.S. military assistance to the Philippines in the post-9-11 period was estimated at $400 million in March 2004. Substantial military equipment, including helicopters, has been turned over to the AFP. In November 2004, in a vote of confidence in the Arroyo government, President Bush successfully nominated the Philippines to head APEC’s Counter-Terrorism Task Force. There have been several irritants in the bilateral relationship. It was noted above that there is continuing domestic sensitivity over matters of national sovereignty that has served to constrain proposals for an expanded U.S. military role in the Philippines. A potentially serious development occurred in 2004 when the Philippines, responding to the demands of Iraqi terrorists holding Filipino hostages, prematurely withdrew 51 police and military personnel. This episode was quickly passed over. On August 7, 2004 the U.S. and the Philippines reaffirmed their joint commitment to “the campaign against international terrorism”; while the Philippines reiterated the importance of its “strategic partnership” with the United States. The Philippines has also resisted U.S. pressures to designate the MILF as a terrorist organization. The Arroyo Administration is engaged in delicate negotiations with the MILF; the United States has attempted to encourage a peaceful resolution of this conflict by offering (and then withdrawing) $30 million in financial assistance to develop Mindanao. One area of major weakness in counter-terrorism in the Philippines relates to its poor regulatory environment and inability to enact money-laundering legislation that is acceptable to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Philippines continues to remain on the list of noncooperating countries and territories. The Philippine Congress passed the Anti-Money-laundering Act of 2001 on September 29th (and related regulations in March 2002). The Act criminalized money laundering and created the Anti-Money-Laundering Council (AMLC). The FATF has identified three major areas of weakness: the reporting threshold, the requirement for a court order to freeze accounts, and bank secrecy provisions. In March 2003, the Anti-Money-laundering Act was amended to grant the Central Bank direct access to deposit accounts. In practice there are several logistical and technical impediments that hinder effective cooperation between the AMLC and law enforcement agencies. This in turn impedes successful prosecution of money-laundering cases. In summary, the Philippines will not be removed from the list of non-cooperating countries until it adopts and implements an effective anti-money laundering implementation plan. More generally, the Philippines lacks an effective overall regulatory environment. According to the Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003: “Major evidentiary and procedural obstacles in the Philippines hinder the building of effective terrorism cases, such as the absence of a law defining and codifying terrorist acts and restrictions on gathering of evidence. Generic problems in the law enforcement and criminal justice systems also hamper bringing terrorists to justice in the Philippines. Among them: low morale, inadequate salaries, recruitment and retention difficulties, and lack of cooperation between police and prosecutors.”

11 Bilateral relations – Singapore. Singapore stands with the Philippines as one of the two staunchest supporters of United States leadership in the global war on terrorism. On September 23, 2001, Prime Minister Goh Tok Chong declared that Singapore “stands with America” in the fight against international terrorism. Singapore provided its own KC-135 tankers to refuel U.S. aircraft flying from continental United States to Diego Garcia. In May 2002, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew was received in the White House where he personally pledged Singapore’s support. Prime Minister Goh visited Washington and met with President Bush; they initialed a new Free Trade Agreement. The U.S. also agreed to sell AMRAAM missiles for its F-16s. In October 2003, President Bush paid a return visit to Singapore; both sides agreed to negotiate an expanded defense and security cooperation framework agreement. 4 Prime Minister Goh also visited Washington in May 2004. Of all the states in Southeast Asia Singapore has the best internal security and defense capabilities. The Monetary Authority of Singapore has been proactive in directing banks and financial institutions to identify suspected terrorist financial transactions and moneylaundering. In September 2001 the government established a National Security Secretariat, an inter-ministerial task force, to take the lead in counter-terrorism. Singapore’s internal security apparatus has been effective in uncovering and disrupting local terrorist networks. Fifteen terrorist suspects were arrested in December 2001, and another 21 suspects were apprehended in September 2002. In January 2003, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a White Paper that provided details of the Al Qaeda-Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network operating in Southeast Asia. Singapore has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure security of maritime transportation. Singapore naval ships provide escort for selected oil tankers transiting the Malacca Straits. In June 2002, Singapore reached agreement with U.S. Customs to permit American inspectors based in Singapore to screen cargo containers bound for U.S. ports. Singapore became the first country to join the U.S. Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program. Singapore is also a participant in the U.S. Proliferation Security Initiative. In June 2004, the U.S. and Singapore held a ten-day combined exercise in Singapore’s territorial waters focused on conventional threats. Singapore was only country on the Malacca Strait littoral to publicly endorse the U.S. Regional Maritime Security Initiative. In short, Singapore-U.S. security cooperation is very close and “virtually seamless.” Singapore and the United States have established a Regional Emerging Disease Intervention Center in the island republic. The center is to develop the capacity to monitor and respond to health threats such as SARS, Avian flu and biological terrorism. Singapore has also contributed to regional counter-terrorism activities by hosting a major conference on terrorism and transnational issues. Singapore also hosts the Shangri-la Dialogue, an annual meeting of senior defense officials. Singapore has provided intelligence information to neighboring states that has been instrumental in the arrest of 4

This agreement will include bilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, combined military exercises and training, policy dialogues and defense technology.

12 leading terrorist operatives. Singapore and Australia are also cooperating closely to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and developing the capacity to respond to WMD attacks. Bilateral relations – Malaysia. The events of 9-11 provided the catalyst for a dramatic improvement in Malaysia’s relations with the United States. As noted above, Prime Minister Mahathir visited the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to sign the condolence book. Malaysia granted the U.S. over flights and had provided intelligence information on terrorist networks. President Bush met Mahathir at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai in October 2001. In May the following year, Mahathir visited Washington and signed an anti-terrorism agreement that included provisions for cooperation in intelligence, border security and moneylaundering. In mid-2003 U.S. customs inspectors were permitted to enter Malaysian ports to inspect container cargo bound for the U.S. for chemical and radiological emissions. Mahathir’s successor, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi reaffirmed Malaysia’s collaboration with the U.S. during a visit to Washington in July 2004 when he met President Bush. In August 2004, the U.S. and Malaysian navies conducted combined exercises in the South China Sea. Most significantly, Malaysia agreed to the establishment of a U.S.-funded Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism. At Malaysian insistence, the center will be administered by a Malaysian. Malaysia has served as a base for international terrorists. In January 2000, for example, terrorists met in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the bombing of the USS Cole and the attacks on the World Trade Center. In October 2003, the Scomi Oil and Gas company, based in Malaysia was implicated in the manufacture of parts for a centrifuge that was sent to Libya as part of the A. Q. Khan black market network in nuclear materials. In May the following year Malaysia arrested B.S.A Tahir a Malaysian-based member of the underground network. Malaysian internal security organs, like their Singapore counterparts, have been effective in uncovering and arresting regionally focused terrorists. By July 2002, Malaysia had arrested a total of sixty-two terrorist suspects. Not all has been smooth sailing in U.S.-Malaysia relations with respect to the U.S.-led war on terrorism, particularly while Prime Minister Mahathir was in office. Senior Malaysian officials have dissented from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. Mahathir has been particularly critical of the Bush doctrine of preemption. Senior Malaysian officials have argued that American “boots on the ground” in Southeast Asia are likely to fuel sympathy for the terrorist cause. Also, Malaysia has been prickly in defense of its national sovereignty. While cooperating in intelligence sharing on terrorist networks, Malaysia has refused to extradite terrorist suspects held under its Internal Security Act. Malaysia has objected to its citizens being included in new stringent application procedures in order to visit the United States. Finally, Malaysia was quite vocal in rejecting the U.S. proposal for a Regional Maritime Security Initiative. When the U.S. modified its position, Malaysian leaders stated their willingness to consider the proposal. Meanwhile Malaysia has reached agreements with its neighbors to conduct joint patrols in the Malacca Straits – without the United States. But the bottom line

13 remains that despite at times strident criticism in public Malaysia has continued to pursue effective cooperation on the operational level. Bilateral relations – Thailand. Although Thailand is a long-standing ally of the United States, its Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, initially adopted an equivocal line in his support for the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. Thaksin promised general support for the United States but was evasive about whether he supported U.S. air strikes on Afghanistan or whether Thailand would make its military facilities available to the United States. He argued that ASEAN approval was needed. On October 8, 2001, however, Thaksin endorsed U.S. air strikes against the Taliban but only because they had been approved by the United Nations. U.S. military aircraft were permitted to refuel at U-Tapo airbase. That same month Thailand declined to approve a U.S. request to station supply ships in the Gulf of Thailand. In 2004, Thailand joined Indonesia and Malaysia in rejecting an active U.S. military presence in the Straits of Malacca as part of the U.S.’ Regional Maritime Security Initiative. Prime Minister Thaksin visited Washington in December 2001 and achieved little in the way of economic or political assistance. This stood in contrast to the reception given his counterparts from the Philippines and Singapore. In 2003 Thailand declined to cosponsor the U.S.-U.K.-Spanish Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. Prime Minister Thaksin refused to publicly support U.S. intervention in Iraq as well. Nonetheless, Thailand engaged in other cooperative but low-profile security activities with the United States particularly in the field of law enforcement, money-laundering and intelligence exchanges. Thailand hosts annually a major combined military exercise known as Cobra Gold; in 2002 and 2003 it included a counter-terrorism component. Prime Minister Thaksin, like his counterpart in Indonesia, initially denied the existence of internationally and regionally networked terrorists on Thai soil. There was growing evidence to the contrary. Early in 2002, leading terrorist Hambali 5 was reported to have held a planning meeting in southern Thailand where the decision to attack “soft targets” such as nightclubs, hotels and schools was made. In 2002 southern Thailand began to experience a resurgence of attacks on police and soldiers in the southern provinces. In June 2003 Thai authorities arrested several terrorist suspects who were planning to bomb the U.S. and other western embassies in Bangkok. It was not until June 9-13, 2003, during the course of an unofficial visit to Washington, that Prime Minister Thaksin publicly declared for the first time that Thailand was an ally in the global war on terrorism. He now acknowledged the presence of JI in Thailand. His defense minister, Thanarak Isarangura, stated Thailand’s readiness to cooperate with the U.S.-led war on terrorism. In August 1993, in a major development, Thai police arrested Hambali and turned him over to the United States for interrogation. In the wake of this development, Prime Minister Thaksin issued two executive decrees amending the 5

Riduan Isamuddin; Hambali is an alias.

14 Criminal Procedure Code and Anti-Money Laundering Act to permit detention without trial. Thailand’s volt face did not go unnoticed in Washington. In October 2003, President Bush attended the APEC summit in Bangkok. In a separate meeting with his Thai counterpart, President Bush now designated Thailand’s as Southeast Asian’s second “non-NATO ally.” Thailand is now eligible for significant military assistance including arms sales. The United States and Thailand have been cooperating closely through a joint CounterTerrorism Intelligence Center that was established prior to 9-11. In 2004 three southern provinces witnessed the revival of violent separatist attacks directed against police, the military and local schools. In January, for example, a series of coordinated attacks resulted in the burning of twenty government school and the looting of a military armory. In April, there was another upsurge in violence in which over one hundred insurgents were killed in simultaneous attacks on police posts. Prime Minister Thaksin placed the affected three provinces (Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) under martial law and adopted a hard-line policy or suppression. In October, Thai security forces fired into a crown of protesters, killing nine. Another eighty died of suffocation while being transported in police vans. Prime Minister Thaksin uncompromising approach to this issue has provoked expressions of concerns by senior U.S. officials including Secretary of State Colin Powell. Bilateral relations – Indonesia. President Megawati Sukarnoputri visited Washington a week after the events of 9-11. She offered her government’s support in the war on terrorism in a joint statement issued with President Bush. The United States pledged extensive economic support amounting to between $530-$650 million including $130 million in FY 2002. These funds are to be used for development assistance in conflict areas (Aceh and Moluccas), police training, and a new security dialogue. The U.S. also removed restrictions on the sale of non-lethal military items and promised to seek Congressional funding for educating Indonesian civilians in defense matters. Otherwise the Bush Administration was constrained by U.S. legislation prohibiting military to military assistance until certain conditions were met (punishment of those involved in human rights violations in East Timor, and a good faith investigation into the murder of American civilians in Papua). U.S. attempts to enlist Indonesia’s cooperation in the war on terrorism have been problematic. Indonesian government officials condemned the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. These leaders reflect widespread public opinion that the United States is waging a war on Islam. President Megawati warned that the U.S. war on terrorism did not give one country the right to attack another. In November 2001, Megawati urged the U.S. to stop bombing during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. During her term in office President Megawati has not been particularly cooperative with the United States in counter-terrorism. Up until the Bali bombings in October 2002,

15 senior government officials either denied outright that terrorist networks existed in the country or openly sided with groups and individuals that outside observers considered extremist. The United States and Indonesia, for example, openly disagreed about whether or not Jemaah Islamiyah was a regional terrorist group and the role played by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, its “spiritual leader.” Vice President Hamzah Haz publicly dined with Ba’asyir and declared there were no terrorists in Indonesia. In October 2003 President Bush stopped briefly in Bali enroute to the APEC summit in Bangkok. The President’s attempt to promote U.S. educational assistance for religious curriculum reform was promptly condemned by the Secretary General of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas as interference in Indonesia’s internal affairs. Probably no episode has rankled U.S. officials than Indonesia’s refusal to proscribe Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization (JI is listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations) and the perceived “special treatment” give to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ba’asyir was indicted in April 2003 on charges of treason, immigration fraud and involvement in terrorist activities. On September 2, the Central Jakarta District Court found him guilty on treason and immigration charges but stated there was insufficient evidence to convince them of JI’s existence, its goal of overthrowing the Indonesian government and Bashir’s involvement with the group. Ba’asyir was given only a four year sentence which he (and the prosecution) promptly appealed. In November, the Supreme Court reversed the treason charge but upheld his conviction for document fraud and immigration violations. His sentence was reduced to three years including time served. In July 2004, Indonesian prosecutors dropped charges against Ba’asyir after the Constitutional Course ruled that the counter-terrorism law passed after the Bali bombings could not be applied retrospectively. Ba’asyir nevertheless remained detained on charges of leading a terrorist organization. Subsequently, Ba’asyir was charged with possession of explosives used in the bombing of the Marriott hotel. A verdict is expected sometime in early March 2005. The Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, in which 202 persons were killed, marked a major turning point. The Megawati government, previously paralyzed by denial and political in-fighting now openly acknowledged the existence of internationally linked terrorists for the first time. Megawati issued a decree instituting measures contained in a draft anti-terrorism law that had become stalled in parliament; she also welcomed foreign assistance. Indonesian police entered into a close and continuing cooperative relationship with the Australian Federal Police. As a result of their joint efforts many of those responsible for the Bali bombings were identified, arrested and brought to trial. Similar cooperation ensued after the bombing of the Marriott hotel on August 5, 2003 and the car bombing outside the Australian Embassy on September 9, 2004. Australia provided funds for a Counter-Terrorism Center. Indonesia has apprehended and imprisoned more terrorists than any other country in Southeast Asia. Because of Congressional legislation, U.S. assistance to Indonesia’s military has been relatively modest. In 2002, for example, the U.S. provided $12 million to establish a national police counter-terrorism unit, $4.9 million for police training, and additional

16 funds for training finance intelligence units, border security, banking regulators and immigration officials. In July 2002, Secretary of State Colin Power announced a terrorism package valued at $47 million; of this amount only $4 million was allocated to the military and it was to be used for training purposes only. In 2003 Congress approved a small training program under IMET; but this was suspended until the FBI reported on whether or not the Indonesian military was involved in the murder of American citizens in Papua. Under this program Indonesian military officers are to be offered counterterrorism fellowships. In August 2004, the United States announced it would be providing $468 million over five year in assistance to Indonesia. Of this amount, $236 was earmarked mainly for school curriculum reform. In September 2004, the FBI cleared the Indonesian armed forces of any involvement of the murder of American citizens in Papua. This cleared the way for the announcement by the State Department in late February 2005 that the International Military Education and Training program for Indonesia would be resumed; the program has been suspended since 1992. 6 Indonesia’s national police have taken active and effective steps against domestic terrorist networks. Over one hundred 100 key JI operatives have been arrested including national leaders, regional and sub-regional commanders, instructors, financiers, and the key operatives who planned and executed the Bali and Marriott bombings. On the legal front, in March 2003, Indonesia adopted a comprehensive antiterrorism law that defined acts that constituted terrorism and that provided the police and prosecutors with enlarged powers such as extended pretrial detention and the use of electronic evidence in court. Indonesia has strengthened its capacity to interdict terrorist finances by amending its antimoney-laundering law in September 2003 and by establishing a Financial Intelligence Unit (with U.S. assistance). However, Indonesia suffers from deficiencies in national leadership and a plethora of institutional weaknesses. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 concludes “[the Indonesian government] has been unwilling to ban JI, saying the organization never formally applied for recognition and thus cannot be prohibited. The absence of such a prohibition has impeded police and prosecutors in arresting and trying suspected terrorists and will most likely further hamper prosecutors’ efforts to put JI leaders behind bars.” In 2004, Indonesia’s new president, Sisilo Bambang Yudhoyono, indicated his willingness to submit legislation to Parliament banning JI but only if proof is provided that the organization exists. Indonesia’s institutional weaknesses include a weak rule of law, a poorly regulated financial system and serious problems on internal coordination. They have combined to prevent Indonesia from freezing any terrorist assets, for example.

6

Agence France-Presse, “U.S. to Resume Training of Some in Indonesia Military,” The New York Times, February 27, 2005. According to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has determined that Indonesia has satisfied legislative conditions for restarting its full International Military Education and Training program.” Boucher said Secretary Rice had concluded that the Indonesians were determined to continue their cooperation with the F.B.I. in a murder case involving American citizens “and thus have fulfilled the requirements articulated in the legislation to allow for resumption” of the training program.

17 Conclusion Preferences. This review of Southeast Asian responses to terrorism post-9-11 and U.S. leadership in the global war on terrorism clearly reveals that there are different preferences among the major actors. The United States seeks to disrupt and destroy the global terrorist network that is a threat to its national interests. The U.S. thus focuses on al Qaeda and its network of affiliates. Singapore, while capable of dealing with its domestic terrorist network, supports the United States because of its economic interdependence with the U.S. and its dependency on secure maritime sea-lanes. Indonesia clearly views countering separatism, in the form of the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM), as its main priority. Due to domestic political and religious sensitivities it is extremely reluctant to proscribe and take repressive measures against Jemaah Islamiyah. The Philippines has targeted the Abu Sayyaf Group, a terrorist group that has occasionally conducted operations in Indonesia but which clearly does not have a global reach. Thailand has attempted to insulate itself from external pressures while dealing with the threat of revived armed separatism in its southern provinces. Malaysia prefers to downplay the threat posed by JI in favor of targeting “Muslim militants” including those associated with the opposition Islamic party, PAS. There are also differences in the preferred institutions to deal with the threat of international terrorism. All states prefer to have the sanction of the United Nations to underpin their counter-terrorism policies. Yet not all states are willing to carry out the resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council (as Table A makes clear). Indonesia and Malaysia prefer multilateral approaches through ASEAN and the ARF. Yet the United States and Singapore pointedly omitted the ARF from their list of preferred multilateral institutions in their joint statement of October 21, 2003. Malaysia has been adamantly opposed to U.S. efforts to broaden APEC’s agenda beyond trade liberalization to include security matters. The Philippines willingly accepted the chair of the APEC Task Force on Terrorism after nomination by the U.S. Indonesia and Malaysia, while supporting the war on terrorism, have reservations about what they perceive as a U.S. “blind spot” – its failure to address the root causes of terrorism and America’s pro-Israel stance. In matters of domestic terrorism and regional piracy both countries prefer to take the matter in their own hands; they view a U.S. military presence as problematic if not counter productive. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have objected to U.S. travel advisory statements and immigration procedures that appear aimed at a Muslims wishing to enter the United States. Indonesia and Malaysia prefer to address terrorism (whether on land or at sea) within the broader context of combating transnational threat to their security. This has a double motivation. First, as noted above, these states do not share the same priorities as the United States. Old-fashioned piracy is viewed as a greater threat than maritime terrorism. Singapore differs with its regional neighbors and views maritime terrorism as a major threat. Secondly, Indonesia and Malaysia are very keen not to adopt counter-terrorism policies that can be perceived by domestic constituencies as anti-Islamic. Capability. The capability of the United States to conduct a global war on terrorism is unequalled. U.S. funds and technology have helped improve the capability of regional

18 states to monitor financial transactions that might be related to terrorism or money laundering. Computers and other devices have also assisted regional states in customs and border control and the discovery of document fraud. Crucially, the United States can provide assistance in logistics, management and strategic planning. The United States provides assistance to several ARF members in the form of technical support for counterterrorism measures, post-blast and forensic investigations, swift response teams, border security software, detection of fraudulent documents and terrorist interdiction programs. But U.S. counter terrorism capability is not unlimited. While countering international terrorism is America’s highest priority, Congressional legislation serves to constrain the Bush Administration in providing military aid to Indonesia, for example. Section 660 of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended 1973) prohibits foreign assistance funds for training police without a specific congressional waiver. The U.S. has a legacy of a complex web of waivers on its books that govern the operations of five federal departments providing security assistance to foreign law enforcement bodies. This is a major impediment to a coherent “whole of government” approach. The United States intelligence community, embracing some fifteen institutions, is not all knowing. The United States needs inputs and assistance from the intelligence agencies of all regional states, particularly human intelligence. Singapore and Malaysia have proved their worth in providing accurate information to Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia about terrorist networks and operatives on their soil. On the other side of the coin, the U.S. has unparalleled technical assets that can be deployed to counter-terrorism. These assets include overhead satellites used by Thailand over its southern provinces, equipment to enable Filipino helicopter pilots to fly at night and technical means to monitor mobile (cell) phones. The United States has inaugurated a Container Security Initiative (CSI) to prevent smuggling of terrorist weapons to the United States. Under the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-T-PAT) all U.S. bound cargo must be effectively scrutinized and documented. The CSI also includes a twenty-four hour Automated Manifest System in which a ship’s manifest must be lodged before loading or departing. Several Southeast Asian states lack the financial capability to fund port security measures that the United States has imposed under these requirements. Indonesia and the Philippines both suffer from weak institutions and legal systems. While their security forces may be effective in rounding up terrorist subjects, other crucial aspects of counter-terrorism, such as an effective court and penal system, erode the overall effort. Leadership. It is common in the literature reviewing the security architecture in Southeast Asia to note its weak institutionalism. Although ASEAN has adopted a wide variety of declaratory policies to address the threat of international terrorism, ASEAN can only monitor and not enforce compliance. States are free to choose and pick which policies to implement. The same holds true for the ASEAN Regional Forum. Leadership in ASEAN passes alphabetically from one country to another on an annual basis. ASEAN decisionmaking is on a consensus basis. This means that the ASEAN-United States agreement on countering-terrorism can only be implemented on a national basis.

19 ASEAN consensus decision-making blunted a detailed Indonesian proposal to form an ASEAN Security Community by 2020. Indonesia’s proposal for various forms of security cooperation was watered down by fellow members despite Indonesia’s position as chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee at the time. U.S. regional initiatives outside the ASEAN framework are not always successful, as a review of the fate of Regional Maritime Security Initiative illustrates. In the face of opposition from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the U.S. was forced to set back from direct involvement in the Malacca Straits to a support role. The U.S. attempt to take the leadership role on this issue was supported only by Singapore and resulted in a counterinitiative by Malaysia and Indonesia (and including Singapore) to conduct their own joint patrols. A similar fate befell a U.S. initiative to set up a regional center for counterterrorism. Malaysia agreed to host the center but only on condition that administration be left in local hands. But the U.S. was far more successful in APEC in expanding its agenda to cover security issues despite Malaysia’s objections. Finally, one must observe that ethic politics plays a role. Singapore is the most capable state in the region to undertake and lead counter-terrorism activities. But because Singapore is overwhelmingly an ethnic Chinese city-state, and is perceived as such by its neighbors, Singapore has to play a behind-the-scenes role with in ASEAN. Net assessment. The al Qaeda regional network in Southeast Asia has been broken up and disrupted as a consequence of the global war on terrorism. JI cells have been eliminated in Singapore and Malaysia. Several long planned operations have been disrupted as a result of police action in these two countries. Counter terrorism action by Malaysia and Singapore has knocked the wind out of the sails of the regional JI network dedicated to establishing an archipelagic Islamic state. The round up of terrorist suspects in Indonesia after the Bali and Marriott bombings has also degraded JI’s operational capabilities in that country. Nearly 200 suspected JI members in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia have been arrested or detained. Despite this generally upbeat assessment, the threat of political terrorism remains. There are several hundred JI members at large in the region who retain the motivation and capacity to conduct terrorist outrages such as JI bomb makers Azahari Hussein and Noordin Mat Top. As noted, there has been an upsurge in violence in the predominately Muslim provinces in the south of Thailand. Training linkages still remain between JI and the MILF. The most recent International Crisis Group report on terrorism in Indonesia notes “Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI's [Darul Islam’s] history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life. If the pattern outlined in this report holds, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate JI or its jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the central command but, with more attention to a few key measures, it ought to be able to contain them.” 7

7International

Crisis Group, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report No. 92. Brussels, February 22, 2005.

20 Appendix A ASEAN Signatories to United Nations Conventions Relating to Terrorism

Country

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

Number of Conventions as Signatory (N =12)

Brunei

na

na

Burma

yes

7

Cambodia

yes

4

Indonesia

yes

4

Laos

no

7

Malaysia

no

6

Philippines

yes

12

Singapore

no

6

Thailand

yes

4

Vietnam

na

na

Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003.

21 Appendix A ASEAN Statements on Countering Terrorism in Southeast Asia ASEAN Standing Committees Chairman's Letter to US Secretary of State Colin Powell on Terrorists Attack, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, (September 13, 2001) Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the Terrorist Acts of the 11th September 2001, Bandar Seri Begawan (October 4, 2001) Joint Communiqué of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (October 11, 2001) ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (November 5, 2001) Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, (May 20-21, 2002). ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (2002) Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, Kuala Lumpur, (May 17, 2002). ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, (August 1, 2002) ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing (July 30, 2002). Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the Tragic Terrorist Bombing Attacks in Bali (October 16, 2002). Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, (November 3, 2002). Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, Phnom Penh, (November 4, 2002). Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, (January 27, 2003). ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terrorism (2003) Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (January 10, 2004).

22 Joint Communiqué of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), Bangkok (January 8, 2004). Joint Communiqué of the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC+3), Bangkok (January 10, 2004). Co-Chairs' Statement of the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism (February 5, 2004). Joint Communiqué of the 24th ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference, Chiang Mai, Thailand (August 16-20, 2004). Statement by H.E. Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao’s People Democratic Republic, Chairman of the 38th ASEAN Standing Committee in connection to the terrorist bombing in Jakarta on 9th September 2004.

23 Bibliography “ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terrorism,” prepared for the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee, 2004. Carl Baker, “Philippines and the United States 2004-2005: Defining Maturity,” in Satu P. Limauye ed., The Asia-Pacific and the United States 2004-2005. Special Assessment Series. Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005. Richard W. Baker, “After Bali, Before Iraq,” Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 4th Quarter 2002. _____. “In the Shadow of Iraq,” Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 1st Quarter 2003. _____. “Pausing for Politics,” Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 2nd Quarter 2004. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 2002, 24(2), 294-312. Lyall Breckon, “Solid Support for the U.S. …So Far,” Comparative Connections: An EJournal of East Asian Bilateral Relations, 3rd Quarter 2001. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to the Philippine Congress,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 19, 2003. Dana R. Dillon, “Military Engagement with Indonesia in the War on Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, No. 818, June 12, 2002. _____. “The Shape of Anti-Terrorist Coalitions in Southeast Asia,” Heritage Lectures, No. 773, December 12, 2002. _____. “The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Developing Law Enforcement,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1720, January 22, 2004. _____. “Democratic Indonesia as a Security Partner,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1800, September 24, 2004. _____. “Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism,” Heritage Lectures, No. 860, December 20, 2004. Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan, “Promoting a Collective Response to Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, No. 825, July 22, 2002. _____. “Southeast Asia and the War Against Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1496,October 23, 2001. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and General Narciso Abaya, Philippine’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Mutual Defense Board Press Conference, Manila, June 6, 2003.

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