Thayer Asymmetric Threat & Southeast Asia

Introduction to Asymmetric Threat Carlyle A. Thayer * [Paper to The Incorporation of Asymmetric Threats in Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) Training Activities, Fourth FPDA Professional Forum, co-hosted by Australia and Malaysia, Crown Princess Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 20-22, 2003]

I would like to start by thanking the co-hosts for the invitation to address you today. It is indeed an honour for me to be here. I would also like to enter the standard caveat that I am speaking in my personal capacity and that my views do not represent the official policy or position of my employer. My aim today is to provide a general introduction to asymmetric threat as a foundation for you to meet the Professional Forum’s objective of exploring how the Five Power Defence Arrangements might adapt to address asymmetric threat in training activities. My presentation is divided into four parts: asymmetric threat, asymmetric threat and Southeast Asia, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and asymmetric threat, and a conclusion.

I. Asymmetric Threat When I was first approached about this topic I conducted a search of the Internet. The key words ‘asymmetric threats’ generated 8,310 hits, while the related key words ‘asymmetric warfare’ generated 11,600 hits. I will, of course, summarise this enormous literature in the next 40 minutes.

*

Carlyle A. Thayer is Deakin University’s On Site Academic Coordinator at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College. He is currently on secondment from the Australian Defence Force Academy where he holds a personal chair as Professor of Politics.

2 A review of the literature provides the following conclusions: there is no agreed definition of the term asymmetric threat, and asymmetric warfare is as old as warfare itself. Weaker opponents have always sought to neutralize their enemy’s technological or numerical superiority by fighting in ways or on battlefields that nullify it. 1 One writer argues that the term is nonsense because it implies a dichotomy - symmetry on the one side and asymmetry on the other. 2 I do not find it surprising that there is no agreed definition. Asymmetric threat is a contested term. That is what we academics do best. We invent terms and then argue endlessly over (or contest) the meaning of these new terms. Definition Let me table for your consideration the following definition coined by Colin Gray of the University of Reading, ‘asymmetric threats are those that our political, strategic and military cultures regard as unusual’. 3 Let me repeat: ‘asymmetric threats are those that our political, strategic and military cultures regard as unusual’. I think this definition is pertinent because of the multinational nature of the Five Power Defence Arrangements which brings together different ‘political, strategic and military cultures.’ Asymmetric threats are unusual in at least nine ways. 4 They are: •

Unconventional

•

Irregular in that they are posed by instruments (non-state actors) unrecognized by laws of war

1

Vincent J. Goulding, ‘Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare’, Parameters, Winter 2000-01, 21. Colin S. Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, Parameters, Spring 2002, 5 and 14. 3 Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, 5. 4 Adapted from Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, 5-6. 2

3 •

Unmatched by current military capabilities and plans

•

Highly leveraged against particular assets, civil more than military

•

Designed to work around, offset and negate current strengths

•

Difficult to respond to in kind

•

Difficult to respond to in a discriminate and proportionate manner

•

Raise the prospect of the ‘unknown unknown’. We do not look for what we do not know to look for.

•

Difficult to deter

The asymmetric threats of concern are those that do regional FPDA members, Malaysia and Singapore, hard to their interests. Asymmetric Warfare Now let me turn to the allied term asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare is a broad and inclusive term coined to recognize that two sides in a conflict may have such drastically different strengths and weaknesses that they resort to drastically different (asymmetric) tactics (or strategies or methods of warfare and conflict) to achieve relative advantage including attacks on civilians. In other words, asymmetric warfare may be defined as any conflict deviating from the norm, or an indirect approach to affect a counter-balancing of force. 5

5

David L. Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’, National Strategy Forum Review, Winter 2000, 1.

4 Traditionally, since the emergence of the Westphalian system of states, warfare was conducted on a state versus state basis. Asymmetry is not just the province of the weak; asymmetry may also be exploited by the strong. 6 It is not my intention here to go into a detailed narrative of the history of modern warfare. But I would like to introduce the idea that as warfare has evolved we may identify at least four generations of warfare: 7 First-generation warfare was characterized by close-order formations armed with guns to repel sword and bayonet cavalry and infantry. Second generation warfare was characterized by the use of mass firepower and its effective management through a conflict of attrition. Third generation warfare is characterized by the use of decentralized attacks against second generation armies with the defender often the winner by virtue of being able to wear the attacker down. Fourth generation warfare is highly irregular and consists of asymmetric operations in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatant. Emphasis is placed on bypassing an opposing military force and striking directly at cultural, political or population targets In the contemporary world state on state conflict has receded in scope and intensity. Conflict today is more likely to be between a state and a non-state actor. Non-state actors or fourth generation warriors (4GW) comprise non-national and trans-national groups that form on the basis of ideology, religion, tribe, culture, zealotry, and illegal economic 6

Gary Eason, ‘Analysis: Asymmetric Warfare’, BBC News Online, April 1, 2003 citing U.S. Brig. General Vincent Brooks. 7 Jason Vest, ‘Fourth-generation warfare’, The Atlantic Monthly Online, December 2001, 2 and Center for Defense Information, ‘Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare’, CDI Terrorism Project, October 5, 2001, 2.

5 activities. Through decentralized attacks on markets, communications and cultural icons and the use of information warfare they have pushed many regions of the world into anarchy. 8 Non-state actors are difficult to target and engage by conventional means. 9 Non-state actors may not wear distinctive uniforms so as to be hard to tell apart from the local community. They have shown themselves willing to fight and die for their causes, most notably by employing the tactic of suicide bombers. Non-state actors are not constrained by conventional norms and international law. They employ new and innovative means to achieve their objectives. In responding to the challenge of fourth generation warriors the military element of national power, however crucial, is not the decisive factor. Non-state actors cannot be easily decimated by conventional means. High-tech standoff warfare is largely ineffective as well. 10 Indeed, the overwhelming use of force (being seen as too successful), or a disproportionate use of force against non-state actors may produce a backlash. Conflict provoked by non-state actors has no quick fix solutions. Instead non-state actors must be confronted by a combination of military, economic, diplomatic, political and cultural elements of national power designed to erode their support base. In addition, states must often cooperate with neighbours and friends more distant to degrade the logistic, recruitment and communications bases of non-state actors. I would now like to turn to a discussion of asymmetric threats and Southeast Asia.

8

Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 2. Vest, ‘Fourth-generation warfare’, 2 citing Franklin C. Spinney, Donald Vandergriff and John Sayen, Spirit, Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century. 10 Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 3. 9

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II. Asymmetric Threats and Southeast Asia In many respects asymmetric threats are not a new phenomenon in post-independent Southeast Asia. Almost every state in the region has experienced some form of violent domestic challenge to the legitimacy of the state. These challenges have arisen from pro and anti communist insurgencies as well as ethnic, religious and regional separatist groups or movements seeking to establish an Islamic state. Communist insurgencies succeeded in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) but failed in the Philippines, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia and Thailand. All of these states were characterized by low levels of economic development. This has meant that the most important security challenges to the state have been internal. This has had an important impact on national security and defence doctrine as we shall see below. But there have been several state on state conflicts, notably between North and South Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia (Konfrontasi), and Vietnam and Cambodia. Changing Concepts of Security As we move through history from the end of the Second World War through the Cold War to the present post-Cold War era it is notable that our conception of what constitutes security has expanded. Traditionally national security was defined in terms of state or regime security from threats by other state actors. This meant the military element of national power played a dominant role in national security policy. Alliances were formed to provide collective security. The notion of national security in Southeast Asia, as I have noted, has always been predominantly internal in orientation. In our region the traditional paradigm of national security was altered by the adoption of a new paradigm called comprehensive security.

7 During the 1970s and mid-1980s, Indonesia and Malaysia both enunciated doctrines of comprehensive security. Let me provide a brief overview of each country: In 1973 Indonesia’s National Defence Board drew up a Guideline for State Policy which borrowed from the doctrine of Total People’s Defense and Security. The 1973 Guideline identified economic development as Indonesia’s top priority and introduced the concept of national resilience. The Guideline also spelled out a comprehensive multidimensional approach to security that included ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and security-defense. Later Indonesia enunciated the concept of regional resilience embracing membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and endorsing the concepts of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear weapons free zone in Southeast Asia. During the 1980s the term comprehensive security crept into Malaysia’s political vocabulary. In March 1984, for example, Datuk Musa Hitam spoke of ‘Malaysia’s doctrine of comprehensive security’. Two years later, Prime Minister Mahathir stated that ‘security is not just a matter of military capability’ and ‘national security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony’. In July 1986, former prime minister Tun Hussein Onn noted in a speech: ‘national security is dependent on the satisfaction of two very basic conditions. First, there must be a tolerable level of harmony between individual security, group security and national security… Second, our external environment must be made conducive and supportive of internal political and socioeconomic development… ‘[problems facing Malaysia] traverse political, sociocultural, psychological and economic dimensions – thus emphasizing the total or comprehensive nature of Malaysia’s national security’.

8 Let me note briefly that Japan adopted a doctrine of comprehensive security in the late 1970s. The doctrine of common security made its appearance in Europe in the early 1980s, while Canada advanced the notion of cooperative security nearly a decade later. The final security paradigm that I would like to mention is that of human security. The end of the Cold War, rapid economic growth in a number of countries, and the spread of global communications, has resulted in what Samuel Huntington has called a ‘Third Wave’ of democratization in the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia. Many of these transitions to democracy have not yet been consolidated. The point I am trying to make is that economic growth has resulted in the emergence of a middle class and what is termed ‘civil society’. Civil society refers to the emergence of a wide variety of local groups that are autonomous from the state, including non-government organizations (NGOs). These associations embrace a wide variety of issues but are most prominent for their advocacy of civil and human rights. This development has led to the emergence of the latest security paradigm that of human security. Up until this point my entire presentation has implied that the state is a legitimate political form and that violent challenges to its authority are illegitimate. But what about the case of totalitarian states like that of the Khmer Rouge, or authoritarian states such as Suharto’s New Order that decimated the Communist Party of Indonesia and its supporters and sympathizers? What about repressive military regimes in Burma and Thailand? Is it legitimate to take up arms against these states? Advocates of human security argue that the duty of the state is to provide for the security of all its citizens from threats of all kinds, such as state violence, not just external military

9 threats. Human security is concerned the totality of factors that can affect the well being of all individuals – women and men, the aged and the young, ethnic minorities, poor and rich. Human security is generally focused on multiple risks arising from economic insecurity, environmental threats, social disintegration, and human processes such as large-scale refugee movements and pandemics. The advocates of human security argue that international organizations such as the United Nations as well as local community groups should be involved in providing human security in complex humanitarian emergencies. Rizal Sukuma, an influential advisor in Indonesia, has written, ‘an ASEAN Security Community should balance its concern over state security with a greater emphasis on “human security”’. 11 To sum up, the theme I have been trying to develop is: our conceptualization of national security has enlarged over the past five decades from security against external aggression to common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security and human security. While the role of the military still remains central for the provision of national defence, the expanded definition of security has resulted in the involvement of many more government departments and agencies than before. In some cases, the armed forces have been assigned to carry out non-traditional tasks as part of a country’s approach to providing comprehensive security. This may have implications for regional members of the FPDA. Transnational Threats Our conceptualization of what constitutes a challenge or a threat to security has also undergone a similar redefinition. These new security threats are mainly transnational in 11

Rizal Sukma, ‘The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community’, Paper presented to the seminar on ASEAN Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects in the Current International Situation, New York, June 3, 2003, 4.

10 nature and are generated primarily by non-state actors. The list of what constitutes a transnational threat to security is ever enlarging. But for our purposes let me identify the most prominent: illegal drug smuggling, trafficking in small arms, people smuggling (for slavery, sexual slavery), illegal migration, environmental pollution and terrorism. It is notable that several transnational threats are found together in conflict zones. The non-state actors involved include warlords, criminal gangs, criminal syndicates, and terrorist groups. In some instances non-state actors may receive the support of a rogue state or support from one state organization, such as the military or intelligence service. The activities of non-state actors often overlap and there is a close connection between criminals, black marketers, drug lords, arms dealers, zealots and terrorists. 12 Transnational threats by definition affect more than one state and are generally beyond the capacity of any one state to address. For example, no one country can effectively halt the illegal drug trade originating in Afghanistan or the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia. Transnational security challenges increasingly require an interagency approach at national level and cooperative efforts internationally. Non-state actors attempt to exploit the seams where different agencies come together. Some critics have argued that the inclusion of transnational threats in our definition of security has so stretched the concept of security that it has become meaningless from a defence point of view. Or to express this objection more colourfully, ‘you can’t stop HIV/AIDS from spreading by putting a condom on your bayonet’. I would argue that the broadening definition of what constitutes security has implications for the armed forces of each country, both domestically and externally. Transnational

12

Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 4.

11 threats, to use an expression coined by Lt. Gen. Hank Stackpole, the president of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, is like ‘rust eating away at the fabric of society’. Transnational threats threaten the legitimacy of a state by undermining the rule of law and good governance. Warlords and criminals corrupt state officials (politicians, police and the judiciary) through bribery. Not so long ago the nexus between drug traffickers and Cambodian officials led to that country being called a ‘narco-state’. The professionalism of the military may be undermined by its involvement in moneymaking activities such as providing protection, marijuana production, illegal timber exports, smuggling and the sale of weapons and equipment to non-state actors. Transnational threats divert and consume resources that could be put to better purposes. This undermines the capacity of the state to efficiently meet the needs of its citizens. The combined effects of these forces may serve to weaken a state to the point where it becomes a failing or failed state. Non-state actors take advantage of weak or failing states for refuge and they exploit the discontent of the local population for support. Weak, failing and failed states negatively impact on their neighbours and the neighbourhood. Finally, to round off this discussion of transnational threats and security, nothing I have said is meant in any way to suggest that armed forces or the military have no utility in the new security environment. While the post-Cold War security situation in Latin America led one country to disband its military entirely, the security environment in Southeast Asia is not so conducive. There are a number of unresolved territorial and maritime boundary disputes. I would not go so far as to argue that there is an arms race in the region; but I would submit that the arms procurement policies of some states have led to the introduction of what could be considered offensive platforms. At the very least there

12 is no effective arms control regime in Southeast Asia. There is still disagreement in the region about the long-term implications of China’s rising military power. And finally, some non-state actors are continually at war with ‘the state’ and violence is a way of life. 13 Several states, such as Burma and the Philippines, face low intensity conflicts by relatively large armed groups. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines may have 10,000 persons under arms, for example. Conventional military forces still have a role to play. Sources of Asymmetric Threat The most important source of asymmetric threat to the state in Southeast Asia today comes not from the aggressive actions of another country but from regionally and internationally networked terrorist groups. 14 Before discussing this subject I would like to diverge slightly to discuss some new research on the root causes of terrorism. It is often argued by regional leaders that the root causes of terrorism are to be found in underdevelopment and poverty and/or U.S. policies in the Middle East (support for Israel, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). I would say that while these factors may contribute to the mobilization of terrorists, they are not its root causes. For the sake of discussion I would like to draw your attention to the research findings published by Michael Mousseau and Audrey Kurth Cronin. 15 Mousseau argues that ‘the

13

Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 4. James Wise, Australian High Commissioner to Malaysia, quoted by Leslie Lau, ‘FPDA to focus on antiterror tactics’, The Straits Times, May 28, 2003 and Robert Hill, Minister of Defence, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, RUSI Triennial International Seminar, National Convention Centre, Canberra, October 9, 2003, 1. 15 Michael Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ International Security, 27(3), Winter 2002/03, 5-29 and Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, International Security, 27(3), Winter 2002/03, 30-58. 14

13 social origins of terror are rooted… in the values and beliefs associated with the mixed economies of developing countries in a globalizing world’. 16 Mousseau draws attention to the prevalence of patron-client relations in developing mixed economies and the values and expectations these relations generate. Patrons provide goods, services and protection while clients provide labour and other forms of support. Globalization breaks this relationship. But it is not the clients – those on the bottom rung of the economic ladder – who lose the most. It is the ‘patrons and their lieutenants who hold privileged positions in the old clientalist hierarchies. This is why leaders of terrorist organizations frequently come from privileged backgrounds’.17 Mousseau goes on to argue that Muslim rage over U.S. policies in the Middle East has deeper roots than just identification with Islam. He states: ‘the underlying cause is not Islam but rather a deeply embedded antimarket and thus anti-American passion – a fury that extends beyond the Islamic world and whose origins are not understood even by those espousing hatred for the West’. 18 Globalization is the cause because it not only erodes the patron-client relationship but introduces new values that are at odds with the values of clientalism – ‘a lack of empathy for out-groups, an emphasis on community over the individual, and an incomprehension for objective truth and individual innocence’. 19 In a separate study Cronin takes a broad historical view of terrorism and argues that its main drivers were decolonization and globalization. The breakup of empires, decolonization and leftist anti-Westernism produced three waves of terrorism. ‘The 16

Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 6. Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 19. 18 Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 22. 19 Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 27. 17

14 current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization, but is facilitated by it’, she argues. 20 Globalization has produced a fourth wave of religiously inspired terrorism. But, she concludes, ‘even though the newest international terrorist threat , emanating largely from Muslim countries, has more than a modicum of religious inspiration, it is more accurate to see it as part of a larger phenomenon of antiglobalization and tension between the have and nave-not nations’. 21 I have made this slight diversion to illustrate that the root causes of terrorism cannot be eliminated quickly and the impact of globalization will continually be felt in Southeast Asia. We live in a region where Indonesia and the Philippines, not to mention Myanmar and Cambodia, could easily weaken and become failing states. Terrorism While there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism, the United Nations lists three organizations as terrorist groups: al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). This forms the legal and normative basis for counter-terrorism by the international community. Al Qaeda During the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979-February 1989) hundreds of Muslims from Southeast Asia were drawn to Pakistan where they received religious indoctrination and military training. Some even crossed over into Afghanistan and fought with the mujihadeen. A few high level al Qaeda operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Hambali, made their way to Southeast Asia to forge links with local 20 21

Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, 30. Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, 35.

15 militant groups and to offer training in terrorist techniques including explosives. Other al Qaeda operatives used Southeast Asia as a venue for planning terrorist attacks against the United States. During the Soviet occupation period, personal ties were forged between the leaders of al Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Jemaah Islamiyah. When Southeast Asia jihadist veterans returned home some became active in local militant groups. More Southeast Asian recruits continued to be sent to Afghanistan after 1989. The linkages between al Qaeda and local militant groups represented a new stage in the development of ‘new terrorism’ in the region. New terrorism is a term used to denote the emergence of internationally networked mass casualty terrorist groups. The U.S. attack on the Taliban regime, the occupation of Afghanistan and the prosecution of the global war on terrorism has greatly degraded al Qaeda’s effectiveness and severed many of its effective links in the region. It is difficult to know whether al Qaeda maintains its own separate cell structure in the region. 22 It seems likely that al Qaeda operatives have turned to professional terrorism as a career and have thrown in their lot with local militant organizations. Jemaah Islamiyah The most potent terrorist group in the region is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI); it pursues both a global Islamist and local political goals. JI is headed by an amir. He heads four councils with responsibility for governing; religion, discipline and fatwa. 23 Beneath this structure lies four mantiqis covering territorial administration. Mantiqi 1 covered Malaysia and

22

Hill, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, 3, argues ‘the links between JI and Al Qaeda are less clear’. 23 International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, ICG Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta and Brussels: August 26, 2003, 11.

16 Singapore; mantiqi 2 covered most of Indonesia; mantiqi 3 included Mindanao, Sabah and Sulawesi; and mantiqi four covered Papua and Australia. Each mantiqi was divided into districts (wakalah) and cells (fiah). The Malaysian cell established linkages with Kumpulan Militan/Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). 24 The JI attempted to forge a regional coalition of like-mined groups under the name of Rabitatul Mujahidin. 25 Representatives from JI, MILF and militant groups from Aceh, Sulawesi, southern Thailand, and Myanmar reportedly attended the first meeting. Rabitatul Mujahidin met three times in Malaysia between 1999 and late 2000. The recent arrest of Hambali indicates that JI had cells in Cambodia and Thailand. A recent study of the JI by the International Crisis Group dated August 26th 2003 states: New information suggests that JI was deliberately set up as a military organization and that the division into units known as mantiqis and wakalahs – originally defined as districts and subdistricts – was actually a territorial command structure of brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and squads. 26 The ISG report notes that all senior members of JI trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was from among these Afghan alumni that instructors were picked to set up a terrorist training camp in Mindanao from 1996-2000 in cooperation with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The ISG put the JI’s strength at 2,000; the hard core may number between 300-500. 27 The ISG Report also identified a JI special operations unit, Laskar Khos. Another disturbing feature of the ISG report is the

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Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24(3), December 2002, 453-454. 25 Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’, 459. 26 International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, i. 27 International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, and Hill, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, 2.

17 identification of new terrorist groups in Indonesia as well as the linkages between JI and criminal thugs (preman). This abbreviated account points to a regional terrorist network that is able to recruit, train, raise funds and provide logistics support for operations throughout Southeast Asia. MILF cadres have been implicated in terrorist bombings in Indonesia. JI members recruited in Malaysia reportedly fought in Sulawesi when conflict broke out between Christians and Muslims. The JI network planned terrorist attacks on foreign targets in Malaysia and Singapore including diplomatic missions, U.S. service personnel, and a U.S. warship. Their target lists also included MINDEF HQ in Singapore, a radar near Changi Airport and the Caltex Oil Company offices. There were also reports that terrorists considered attacking the water supply system between Malaysia and Singapore in order to sow discord between them. Action by Malaysian and Singaporean security authorities in late 2001 and subsequently shut down the JI. But key fugitives remain loose. 28 This means that terrorist groups located outside Malaysia and Singapore could plan and execute terrorist attacks inside Singapore and Malaysia. Such terrorist attacks could be mounted by a combined force of JI and extremists from the MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group and other terrorist groups. Southeast Asia faces other transnational threats in the form of criminal syndicates and gangs who engage in smuggling small arms and traffic in people and illegal drugs. Southern Thailand and Cambodia have been identified as the source for much of the

28

Hill, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, 3.

18 small arms smuggling in the region including to rebels in Aceh. Small arms pass through Indonesia to the southern Philippines. Finally, I would mention the prevalence of piracy in Southeast Asia. 29 This term is used loosely in the literature and includes criminal acts on the high sea as well as robbery and hijackings in ports and territorial waters. While most piracy appears local, there are notable instances when international groups hijack a ship, repaint and renumber it and sell its cargo in a distant port. There is at least one reported instance of GAM rebels in Indonesia hijacking a supply ship in the straits. As Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister noted recently, the maritime transport system has become particularly vulnerable to being targeted or exploited by terrorists. 30

III. FPDA and Asymmetric Threats All of this discussion now brings me to the matter at hand: the FPDA and asymmetric threats. The FPDA was formed in 1971 as a result of the exchange of bilateral notes between its five members. The FPDA was formed in a specific context: the withdrawal of British forces east of Suez, the end of confrontation with Indonesia, and withdrawal of U.S. military forces from mainland Southeast Asia. The core of the FPDA was IADS – the Integrated Air Defence System, headquartered at Butterworth. The FPDA remains today the only functioning multilateral military arrangement in the region that is operational. What is remarkable is that the FPDA has survived for so long and slowly evolved in the process. There was a period when British naval forces were absent from air defence and 29

Matthew W. Flint, The Timor Sea Joint Petroleum Development Area and Gas Resources: The Defence Implications, Working Paper No. 13, Canberra: Sea Power Centre Australia, 2003, 28-30. 30 Quoted in Nik Amran Abdullah, ‘Measures to protect shipping lanes from terrorism’, New Straits Times, October 7, 2003.

19 maritime exercises (Lima Bersatu) in the decade prior to 1988. 31 Australia moved from stationing aircraft at Butterworth and shifted to a policy of rotation. New Zealand ground forces were withdrawn from Singapore. In the late 1980s the FPDA was revived. The most recent development is the expansion from air defence to area defence. 32 Today we have been asked to explore how the how the Five Power Defence Arrangements might adapt to address asymmetric threats or consider options to build upon the existing cooperation between FPDA members to enhance their individual and collective ability to deal with emerging asymmetric threats. 33 My instructions today were not to answer this question but to provide the background – or scene setting – for your syndicate discussions. In order to assist these discussions let me briefly address multilateral institutions that have security roles and how these roles have changed over time. This might provide some useful background for our consideration of the FPDA. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only Asia-Pacific wide security body. It has set itself the goals of building confidence, preventive diplomacy and elaborating approaches to conflict resolution. Although much progress has been made in confidence building measures, several key areas remain: a regional arms register and steps at arms control. A mechanism has been set up for the ARF to exercise preventive diplomacy but

31

Khoo How San, ‘The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain’t Broke…’, paper presented to ASEAN Regional Forum Professional Development Programme, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, April 2328, 2000. 32 The FPDA ministers redesignated the HQ Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) to Integrated Area Defence System at a meeting held in Singapore, July 3, 2000. 33 According to Malaysia’s Defence Minister, Najib Razak, ‘the [FPDA] ministers agreed we should look at non-conventional forms of threats, in particular global terrorism, piracy and illegal immigrants… The ministers agreed that external threats in the conventional form have diminished’. Najib also noted that the shift in emphasis to terrorism did not mean the FPDA ‘will be involved in operational terms but we are looking at joint training, intelligence sharing and capacity building’; quoted in Agence France Presse, ‘Five-power defence group shifts focus to terrorism’, June 2, 2003, found in SpaceWar.com.

20 this has not been utilized. A regional center that could give early warning of likely conflict has yet to be established. The ARF has not moved to meet its third goal of conflict resolution because of the extreme sensitivity to sovereignty by China and other members. The ARF works closely with a track 2 body known as CSCAP – Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific. CSCAP is a non-governmental body consisting of the region’s leading think tanks. It makes recommendations to senior ARF officials. A study of CSCAP’s agenda over recent years indicates that it has become increasingly preoccupied with new security issues – transnational threat. So too has the Asia-Pacific Round Table organized annually by ISIS-Malaysia. There is very little evidence, however, that this preoccupation has altered the ARF agenda which focuses on traditional threats. APEC – the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum was originally set up to encourage trade liberalization. It is not a security body per se but there is initiatives to have national leaders discuss security issues at APEC summits. Such discussions took place at the APEC summit in New Zealand in 1999 and were crucial for laying the groundwork for UN-sanctioned intervention in East Timor. ASEAN is not a security body either but it has slowly moved to put security issues on its agenda. At the recent 9th Summit in Bali, ASEAN adopted a Declaration of ASEAN Concord II that endorsed the concept of an ASEAN Security Community. Let me quote from this document: The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defence arrangements and

21 taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than a defence pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy… Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in holistic , integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community… The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibility of being the primary driving force of the ARF. 34 The Shangri-la Dialogue is an annual informal meeting of like-minded defence ministers from around the region brought together by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) based in London. The Shangri-la Dialogue has discussed terrorism and consequence management of mass casualty attacks. It is my assessment that the Shangrila Dialogue took off because there was no comparable regional venue for defence

34

Extracts from paragraphs 2, 5 and 10, ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)’, October 7, 2003.

22 ministers or their representatives. ASEAN Defence Ministers, for example, do not met for substantial discussions on an annual basis as do many of their cabinet colleagues. The FPDA is one of a number of regional multilateral institutions contributing to regional peace and stability. It is set within an international and regional context where the definition of what constitutes security is being enlarged to include many non-traditional threats. These threats are overwhelmingly transnational, in that they affect more than one country, and find their origins in the actions of non-state actors. Modern day criminal syndicates and groups that sponsor new terrorism can shift their geographical base. They are hard to detect and deter. This raises the question how the FPDA might adopt to these changing circumstances as have other multilateral regional bodies. Transnational threats are dealt with by national government usually through a whole of government approach involving interagency committees or task forces. Many more organs of government are involved now engaged in this task (police, intelligence, foreign affairs, defence, immigration, customs, quarantine services etc.). National governments are very protective of their sovereignty. Yet they must cooperate with other states to address new transnational threats. In Southeast Asia the threat of new terrorism has generated many forms of cooperative responses. At the initiative of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and several other regional states have agreed to cooperate against terrorism. APEC, ARF and ASEAN have all adopted declarations of policy to counter terrorism. ASEAN and the United States have signed a Memorandum of Understanding. Australia and several countries have likewise signed an MOU on cooperation against terrorism.

23 Let me suggest that new terrorism is the main threat to regional security. Consider the following scenarios: •

The targeting of FPDA assets including IADS HQ, naval ships and aircraft on FPDA exercises or in ports. Terrorists could employ car bombs, shoulder held surface-to-air missiles 35 or explosive laden zodiac-type craft.

•

The targeting of western businesses or interests in Malaysia or Singapore by terrorist groups using biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. 36 How would the consequences of such a catastrophe be managed?

•

The use of a tanker by a terrorist group as a mass casualty weapon or a weapon designed to bring about economic dislocation as part of a broader campaign of destabilization.

•

Terrorist groups targeting Singapore (or Kuala Lumpur) as an economic hub using cyber war in order to achieve global effects.

•

The attempt by Islamist terrorists to sow discord by focusing attacks and propaganda on U.S. allies in the FPDA.

Malaysia and Singapore bear the responsibility for reacting to these incidents and seeking cooperation from countries of their choice. All I would like to raise is the question of how

35

The Electronic Warfare & Informational Operations Association estimates that there are 500,000 shoulder launched SAMs in circulation globally. U.S. intelligence estimates that 7,000 SAMs are on the black market and that 27 terrorist groups have acquired SAMs. Over the last two decades it has been estimated that between 29-40 civilian aircraft have been subject to SAM attack. See: Patrick Goodenough, ‘Australia Mulls Terrorist Missile Threat to Airlines’, CNSNews.com, September 5, 2003 and Associated Press, ‘Missile fears for Bangkok airport’, The Straits Times Interactive, September 8, 2003. 36 Australia’s Incident Response Regiment has conducted joint training in chemical, biological and radiological response with Singapore; Hill, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, 5. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the number of nuclear material smuggling cases rose dramatically in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia in 2001. During the period 1993-01, more than a hundred attempts to smuggle nuclear material into Turkey were discovered. See: Representative Ellen Tauscher, ‘Countering the New Asymmetric Threats’, Blueprint Magazine, November 15, 2001, found at New Democrats Online, NDOL.org.

24 if at all should the FPDA adjust its activities to meet these and other transnational threats. Should there be changes in how information and intelligence is handled and communicated? Should joint training activities and exercises be designed to incorporate a multilateral response in specified circumstances, such as counter-terrorism? What activities can be undertaken to improve capacity building – counter-hijack, hostage recovery, consequent management, military law?

IV. Conclusion Asymmetric threats are here to stay. They will be employed by internationally and regionally-based non-state actors, mainly criminal syndicates and terrorist groups. A military response alone is not the most effective way of dealing with such threats. A multidimensional integrated response is necessary and it should include a defence element. The rise of asymmetric threats and asymmetric warfare is taking place within the context of a broadening of the definition of what constitutes security by nation-states and regional organizations. In Southeast Asia the new security paradigm is one of comprehensive security. New threats to security are transnational in nature and involve the actions by non-state actors and sometimes the support of rogue states. The issue of transnational threats naturally has led some states to consider the role of the armed forces in meeting them. Southeast Asians are proud to note that since the foundation of ASEAN in 1967 no member of the organization has gone to war with another member. At the same time, the likelihood of state-on-state conflict is receding globally if not regionally.

25 In these circumstances can the long experience of multilateral cooperation fostered by the FPDA be adjusted or refocused to meet these new challenges? Can the FPDA serve as a model for other regional security endeavours? Should the geographic scope of FPDA exercises be expanded to include the states of eastern Malaysia? Should the FPDA contemplate expanding its membership by including Brunei at some time in the future? I would now like to conclude by offering some thoughts on two issues to assist you in your syndicate discussions. These are drawn from the article written by Colin Gray cited earlier. 37 1. How do asymmetric threats work? Asymmetric threats work by: •

defeating our strategic imagination

•

posing possible menaces so awful and awesome that countries dare not respond, at least not until actual experience provides incontrovertible evidence of the threat

•

challenging successfully our ability to respond effectively

•

acting against what appear to be our strengths.

2. What factors should shape our response? Factors shaping our response include: •

Asymmetric threats cannot be predicted in the sense that we cannot protect everything that is at risk.

•

We tend to focus on the most recent event and project it forward. But the uncertainties are too great.

•

Nevertheless we should be able to identify and therefore plan how to protect against the kind of threats that would do us most harm.

37

Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, 8-13.

26 •

We need to be alert to the possibility that asymmetric threats can wreak their greatest damage through ill-judged measures of response that we choose to undertake.

•

We need to identify and think hard about threats to which we lack obvious responses.

•

What do our adversaries value highly, and how can we threaten or hurt those values?

Thank you.