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Background Briefing: Obama and Burma Carlyle A. Thayer November 14, 2009
[client name deleted] What should President Obama say to Asean, and to Thein Sein, at the US‐ASEAN summit? How important is it that he and Hu Jintao follow up on the Asean meeting RE Burma next week? Are you hopeful that any further progress can be made? ANSWER: President Obama should inform ASEAN about the new U.S. policy of sustained engagement with the military regime in Burma in order to promote democracy and human rights in the long‐term. The President should stress that no one country alone can bring about positive change in Burma without the cooperation of other regional states such as ASEAN, China, Japan and India alongside members of the international community such as Australia and the EU. It is important, the President should remind his audience, that there be some coordination so that policies of individual states do not undermine these objectives. The President should identify the Friends of Burma as the lead group and seek consensus to support it. If President Obama has the opportunity to meet face to face with Prime Minister Thein Sein, he should tell him that every positive move Burma makes will be reciprocated. In particular, the President should press for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house detention and the initiation of a sustained dialogue aimed at national reconciliation between the military regime, the opposition National League for Democracy and the ethnic minorities. Further, President Obama should stress that the credibility of the forthcoming national elections in Burma. How these elections are conducted will be a crucial indicator of the direction Burma’s leaders want to take the country. On the one hand, they offer a way out of international isolation and the end of punitive sanction; on the other hand, if mishandled, the elections could trigger a prolonged sanctions regime. President Obama should raise the Burma issue in his meeting with President Hu Jintao. He should note that China has a stake in Burma’s future and should use its influence, as it has in the past, to promote peaceful change. President Obama should also stress the convergence of U.S. and Chinese strategic interests and the need to
2 cooperate together and with regional states in order to bring about positive political change in Burma. I am not hopeful that there will be an immediate change in Burma’s domestic policy towards Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Time appears to be running out. The elections are to be held next year at a date yet to be announced. No electoral law has been promulgated. That leaves at most thirteen months. It would be a mistake to view the ethnic minority groups and the pro‐democracy opposition as representing cohesive and united social forces. The military junta is extremely cautious and will not readily agree to policy changes that could trigger political instability. The military regime is likely to play on the disunity of the opposition and among ethnic minority groups to steer a solution favourable to its interests. This could provoke a walkout by members of the NLD and some of the ethnic minority groups. Having said this, there are straws in the wind coming from Burma. Burma has signaled that it wants a dialogue with the United States so much so that it has agreed to comply with United Nations resolutions on trade with North Korea. The leadership is aging and the possibility of major changes in Burma’s international situation could stimulate pressures by a younger generation of leaders for change. This could include opening to the United States to avoid economic dependency on China.
3 Vietnam Defence Budget as percent of GDP, 2001‐07 (in billion U.S. dollars) Defence Budget GDP (DB)
Year
VPA Size
DB as % of GDP
2001
484,000
2.6
33
7.9
2002
484,000
2.9
34
8.5
2003
484,000
3.2
39
8.2
2004
484,000
3.17
45.4
7.0
2005
455,000
3.15
52.2
6.0
2006
455,000
3.43
61.1
5.6
2007
455,000
3.73
71.2
5.2
Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (2000‐01 to 2007‐08).
4
The chart below compares estimates by Australia's Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the International Institute of Strategic Studies of recent defence funding.
Chart 1 Vietnam’s Defence Funding, 2001‐2007 (in billion U.S. dollars)
Source: Defence Intelligence Organisation, Defence Economic Trends in the Asia‐Pacific, (2008), and International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance (2001‐02 to 2007‐08). Increasing the defence budget by 100 million dong would not add appreciably to defence’s coffers. In 2007, Vietnam’s defence budget was around 60 trillion dong.