Thayer Multilateral Institutions: The Asean Regional Forum

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1

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Multilateral Institutions in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum Carlyle A. Thayer

Seminar Series October 2000

i

Table of Contents Executive Summary

i

Introduction

1

The Formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum

5

Strategic Uncertainty

6

Role of Track 2

7

Accommodation in the Asia-Pacific Region

8

Measuring the Effectiveness of the ARF

11

Interest-based Approach

13

Identity-based Approach

14

Measuring ARF Effectiveness

17

Strengthening the ARF

19

Procedural

19

Process

20

Security Challenges

21

The Goals of Regional Order

23

The Goals of Regional Security

24

Non-traditional Security Issues

25

ARF Structure

26

The United States and the ARF Enhancing Regional Cooperation

28 29

Abbreviations

32

Participants

34

Bibliography

35

i MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA: THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM Multilateral Institutions in Asia Seminar: Executive Summary Executive Summary: On July 17, 2000 the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) convened a one-day seminar entitled “Multilateral Institutions in Asia” which focused on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The purpose of the seminar was to discuss the future of Asia’s multilateral security institutions, with a focus on assessing the reasons behind the emergence of regional organizations, measuring their effectiveness, and examining what, if anything, should be done to strengthen their roles in the region. The seminar also considered the implications for U.S. policy. Emergence of the ARF. The idea of a multilateral forum to conduct a dialogue on regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific emerged in the early 1990s. Proposals were advanced by Australia, Canada and Russia among others. ASEAN took the lead in 1991 by agreeing that its annual post-ministerial conference could discuss security issues with its dialogue partners. This ASEAN initiative was made possible due to a confluence of events: the end of the Cold War, U.S. disengagement (the loss of bases in the Philippines), consensus among ASEAN think tanks, and the initiatives of individual ASEAN countries such as Singapore and the Philippines. The result was agreement among ASEAN members in 1993 to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Leadership of the ARF. The leadership of the new multilateral security dialogue forum was given to ASEAN. This was because ASEAN was the most acceptable and least threatening potential leader of the ARF. ASEAN leadership assuaged Chinese suspicions of multilateral institutions and made Chinese participation in the ARF possible. It was noted that ASEAN’s leadership role had suffered subsequently because of a noticeable weakening of ASEAN cohesion due to three factors: the Asian financial crisis, domestic instability in Indonesia and enlargement (the inclusion of new members – Cambodia, Laos and Burma). Nonetheless, participants concluded that ASEAN should remain in the “driver’s seat” and it was premature to consider “other forms of alternate leadership” of the ARF. The seminar felt that the sharing of the chairmanship of inter-sessional working groups between ASEAN and non-ASEAN states remained an effective mechanism for initiatives by non-ASEAN members. The ARF as a “security community”. This issue was discussed extensively. There was agreement that the notion of a security community, especially as propounded by Karl Deutsch, was inappropriate for the region’s security architecture at this stage. The evolution of a European security community was based on the perception of a common threat. This is not the case in Asia-Pacific at present. The very term “security community” was also considered linguistically

ii unacceptable by regional states because of its connotations of Western institutions and the identification of an adversary. The notion of a “security community” appears to have been “reversed engineered” to fit the peculiarities of Asia-Pacific; that is, applied retrospectively to the Asia-Pacific on the basis of existing European institutions. The bottom line conclusion was that the notion of a “security community” should not form the theoretical underpinning of U.S. engagement strategy planning. Strengthening the ARF. The following suggestions were felt to have merit: •

Increased interaction by defense officials.

•

Inclusion of law enforcement and immigration officials in the ARF process.

•

Establishment of a Regional Risk Reduction Center.

•

Creation of an ARF Secretariat with an independent research capacity.

•

Further dialogue based on case studies of successful intra-regional conflict resolution and case studies of unsuccessful extra-regional conflict resolution.

•

Greater involvement of the ARF in addressing transnational issues.

•

ARF action to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

•

Revival of efforts to create a Regional Arms Register.

•

Strengthening of Confidence Building Measures, especially maritime CBMs.

•

Stepping up the involvement of “track one-and-a-half” activities due to concern that existing track two activities had become too much of a “club,” lacked new thinking, and needed reinvigoration and new blood.

•

Eventual establishment of an ARF High Council to assist in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Suggestions for U.S. Policy. The continued engagement of the United States in regional affairs was held to be essential to regional peace and security. The seminar expressed strong concerns about the development of a destabilizing power vacuum should the U.S. disengage. Participants noted that regional concerns about U.S. disengagement were less pronounced now than in the early 1990s. A continued U.S. military presence was necessary to deal with

iii contingencies arising on the Korean peninsula, between China-Taiwan, and between India and Pakistan. The ARF is likely to remain an unmanageable forum for dealing with regional security issues for the foreseeable future. ASEAN is beset with severe limitations on its operational capability to lead cooperative actions to address regional security concerns. The ARF’s focus on confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy presents an opportunity cost in not dealing effectively with more pressing security concerns (in North East Asia, for example). The United States should more fully embrace multilateralism by adopting a “pull strategy” rather than a “push strategy”. The United States should continue to assist regional states develop a sense of ownership of multilateral efforts to address common security concerns. The United States has resources that it can bring to bear on these issues. The U.S. should consult with select regional states about the most sensible and efficient way these resources can be used cooperatively to attain common goals. In this way the onus is placed on the “customers” to define what they expect and want. The next step would be to encourage select regional states to reach a consensus about their priorities. The U.S. should then incorporate these inputs into its engagement strategy. This multilateral process provides the opportunity for U.S. allies and friends to have influence on and become proponents of U.S. policy in the region.

1

Multilateral Institutions in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum Introduction The Asia-Pacific region lacks any overarching effective security structures comparable to Europe. The region is beset with pockets of instability and potential hot spots. The Asia-Pacific also contains both developed and developing economies and a plurality of sub-regional associations formed to encourage trade and investment. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the best example of such a sub-regional grouping. It has been only relatively recently, however, that ASEAN has enlarged its agenda to deal explicitly with security issues. In the early 1990s ASEAN took the lead in establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster multilateral dialog on security matters. The ARF is still in its formative period of development. It is also one of several sub-regional associations in the Asia-Pacific that addresses security concerns (eg. Five Power Defense Arrangement, Four Party Talks on Korea, Trilateral Forum on the North Pacific, Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialog). In 1993 the Clinton Administration overcame a long-standing U.S. aversion to multilateral security institutions in Asia-Pacific by endorsing multilateralism and the ARF. This change in national policy impacted on the Department of Defense which has had to reconceptualize it strategy of engagement in Asia-Pacific. One of the key players in implementing U.S. defense policy in Asia-Pacific is the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC). The current incumbent, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, has applied himself conceptually to exploring new possibilities of multilateralism involving the military. Since taking office in February 1999 he has articulated his views in a series of public addresses that are reviewed briefly below. A close examination of these speeches reveals an evolutionary process in developing new concepts and practical activities for enhancing regional cooperation. Admiral Blair’s intellectual engagement with these issues provided a major stimulus to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies to explore the question of multilateral institutions in Asia at a specially convened international seminar held in July 2000. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a security strategy for the AsiaPacific that called for “developing security pluralism.”1 According to Admiral Blair, speaking in May 1999 shortly after assuming the position of Commanderin-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, security pluralism “refers to a network of bilateral and multilateral relationships adding up to a resilient security

1U.S.

Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998. Washington, D.C.: November 1998. pp. 42-44.

2 framework for the region.”2 He also argued that there were two contending concepts with respect to regional security, the traditional balance of power approach and security pluralism. In his view: [s]ecurity pluralism is an alternative to balancing power. It relies on diplomacy and negotiation to make steady progress on disputes. A network of security and military relationships — bilateral and multilateral — develops to maintain peace and allow economic and cooperative development by which all nations prosper and benefit… In the AsiaPacific Region we need more security pluralism thinking and less balance of power thinking.3 Admiral Blair also identified five multilateral institutions that contributed to developing security pluralism: the ASEAN Regional Forum, Four Party Talks on Korea, Trilateral Forum on the North Pacific, Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialog and the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum). In a subsequent address Admiral Blair developed three additional concepts, “enriched bilateralism,” “strategic communities” and “security communities.”4 In Admiral Blair’s view the old metaphor describing U.S. security ties as “a hub and spoke arrangement” needed to be modified in light of likely future security challenges. In his words: American security relations in Asia have been referred to as a hub and spoke arrangement — with America at the center of bilateral ties among nations who have weak or non-existent military relations with each other. We now need to enrich those bilateral ties. No longer is it sufficient to consult only with South Korea on American policy toward North Korea, we need also to work very closely with Japan, and consult with China and Russia. Consulting with security partners on bilateral relations regarding third countries before setting policy and taking action is becoming more important. From enriched bilateralism it is a relatively small step toward bringing all parties working on the issue together for consultation and coordination. 2Admiral

Dennis C. Blair, “Collective Responsibilities for Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Remarks at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, May 22, 1999. 3Ibid. 4Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, September 8, 1999. Security communities became the favored expression; see: Dennis C. Blair, “Security Communities Are the Way Ahead for Asia,” International Herald Tribune, April 21, 2000. In August 2000, in a further evolution of conceptualization, the expression “enhanced regional cooperation initiative” was adopted.

3 The approach that Japan, South Korea and the U.S. used for coordinating their policies regarding North Korea is a template for building upon enriched bilateralism. The four-party talks provide similar opportunities for coordination among China, South Korea and the U.S. Extending this process transforms the former hub and spokes system into a network of security relations that build the confidence needed for the formation of strategic communities (emphasis in original).5 In Admiral Blair’s view the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and instability in Indonesia has resulted in a weakening of ASEAN and the ARF. Both organizations were assessed as “making little headway “ in dealing with the region’s most pressing security problems. This made it imperative to draw China into a regional security community. In his words: [t]he fundamental security challenge in the Asia-Pacific region is to transform the balance of power approach proposed by those who advocate a multi-polar global power structure into one that instead aims to produce strategic communities where the thought of using armed force to resolve disputes never arises (emphasis in original).6 In a series of major speeches delivered in March and April 2000 Admiral Blair fleshed out his concept of a security community by specifically borrowing a term used by political scientist Karl Deutsch in the 1950s to describe Western Europe.7 In an address to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference he argued: The way ahead is the development of security communities. Karl Deutsch coined the term to describe a community of nations that have dependable expectations of peaceful change. The attributes that I ascribe to security communities are that they are nations who —genuinely do not plan or intend to fight each other, —are willing to put collective efforts into resolving regional points of friction,

5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7Karl

Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Amitav Acharya has also drawn on the work of Karl Deutsch to define a “security community,” see: “A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?” Journal of Strategic Studies, September 1995, 18(3), 180.

4 —are willing to contribute armed forces and other aid to UN mandated operations to support diplomatic solutions,8 —are willing to contribute to humanitarian operations, and —are willing to plan, train and exercise their armed forces together to build trust, confidence, and capabilities to conduct these kinds of operations. The concept of security communities is particularly apt for the Asia-Pacific region because the member nations need not be treaty alliance signatories. Communities may be based on a non-military organization9 such as the ASEAN Regional Forum; or their membership may be based upon geography or common concerns10 rather than any multilateral security forum. The key issue is that the members are committed to policy coordination, including combined military cooperation, on a particular regional security issue, or a series of related security issues, to advance peaceful development over time.11

8As

an example of Admiral Blair’s evolutionary approach in conceptualizing security issues points four and five were combined and reformulated in an address to the Pacific Basin Council. The text now read: “that are willing to contribute their armed forces and other assistance for humanitarian operations and peacekeeping operations to support diplomatic solutions.” In this speech reference to a UN mandate was dropped and contributions to peacekeeping operations was included. In a subsequent speech Admiral Blair reverted to his original five points. See, respectively, Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the Pacific Basin Economic Council, March 21, 2000 and Remarks as Prepared for Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, University of California San Diego, Graduate School of International Relations & Pacific Studies, Dean’s Roundtable Breakfast, April 13, 2000. 9In Admiral Blair’s address to the Pacific Basin Council he added ASEAN to his list of nonmilitary organizations. In a subsequent speech to the University of California San Diego Admiral Blair dropped ASEAN from this section. 10In a further example of Admiral Blair’s evolutionary approach in conceptualizing security issues, in his address to the Pacific Basin Council this phrase was changed to read ”[t]hey can simply be groupings of nations who share a common geographic concern or functional concerns as they work together.” In a subsequent speech to the University of California San Diego Admiral Blair reverted to his original five points. 11Remarks by Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, presented at the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., March 16, 2000.

5 Finally, to round out this discussion on the “security communities” concept, it should be noted that Admiral Blair included an explicit military component (including military dialog and rudimentary exercises).12 In 1997-98 a number of factors combined to weaken perceptions of ASEAN’s cohesion: the Indonesian “haze problem,” the Asian financial and economic crisis, ASEAN enlargement, 13 political instability in Indonesia and to a lesser extent Malaysia, and the rise of intramural differences between ASEAN members. In 1999 violence in East Timor resulted in a UN-mandated Australianled international intervention force (INTERFET) to secure order. These developments led to renewed doubts about the ARF’s ability to respond effectively to regional security challenges. It was in these circumstances, and in light of Admiral Blair’s call to replace balance of power politics as the mainstay of regional security, that the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies decided to convene a one-day international seminar focused on the future of multilateral institutions in Asia with specific attention to the ASEAN Regional Forum. The seminar examined four sets of issues: •

the factors which led to the emergence of the ARF as the region’s main multilateral security forum;

•

measures of ARF effectiveness;

•

measures which might strengthen the ARF; and

•

the implications for U.S. policy.

The following sections examine each of these issues in detail. The Formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum14 The ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF is primarily a product of shifting power alignments in Southeast Asia following the end of the Cold War. Three sets of

12Remarks

as Prepared for Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, University of California San Diego, Graduate School of International Relations & Pacific Studies, Dean’s Roundtable Breakfast, April 13, 2000. 13For difficulties associated with ASEAN’s enlargement see: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Reinventing ASEAN: From Constructive Engagement to Flexible Intervention,” Harvard Asia Pacific Review. Spring 1999, 3(2), 67-70. 14This

section draws on Maria Consuelo C. Ortuoste, “The Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” Paper delivered to Multilateral Institutions in Asia Seminar, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, July 14, 2000 and Ortuoste, “Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum Experiment,” FSI Quarterly [Manila], January-March 1999, 1(1), 4373.

6 factors converged in the early 1990s that led to the creation of the ARF: strategic uncertainty, the interaction of regional security think tanks, and accommodation among states in the Asia-Political region. Strategic Uncertainty The post-Cold War security environment was marked by increased strategic uncertainty as bipolarity gave way to incipient multipolarity. In 1991-92 the United States withdrew from its military bases in the Philippines. At the same time China was perceived as a rising military and economic power. In 1992 China became more assertive in the South China Sea after promulgating a law on its territorial sea and contiguous waters. It granted an oil concession to the Crestone Corporation in an area Vietnam claimed was on its continental shelf. China also occupied and began construction on a number of features in the area. Japan’s role was limited to economic aid through its Official Development Assistance program. Indeed, Japan was criticized by the United States for its “check book diplomacy” during the Gulf War. In light of these changes ASEAN sought to transform the old balance of power system based on unilateral action with a new balance based on the positive engagement of external powers in consultation with each other. Finally, there was a new attitude of optimism about the efficacy of dialog. This attitude has its origins in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) process.15 As a result there was increased discussion in the region about how to prevent economic growth from being undermined by security issues. In sum, bilateral military alliances and existing regional organizations were increasingly perceived as inadequate to deal with new security issues. For example, one participant noted the example of Somalia16 as a “new kind of conflict” that was a factor in thinking leading to the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Support for comprehensive security also gained ground and this led naturally to the search for alternate security mechanisms. In the early 1990s at least nine countries advanced specific proposals, most prominently Japan, Canada and Australia.

15PECC

was formed in September 1980 as a tripartite partnership of representatives from business and industry, government and the academic world acting in their private capacities from individual countries in the Asia-Pacific. Its purpose is to encourage cooperation and policy coordination in trade, investment, finance, human resource development and all major industrial sectors. Membership now stands at twenty-five. See: www.pecc.net 16In September 1992 500 lightly-armed Pakistani peacekeepers were deployed. In December the United Nations Security Council adopted a peace-enforcement mandate.

7 Role of Track 2 Southeast Asian states were caught flat-footed by the end of the Cold War. During this period of initial hesitancy regional think tanks — the ASEANInstitutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) network — took the initiative. The ASEAN-ISIS network consisted of five strategic studies institutes based in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (plus the Brunei Ministry of Foreign Affairs).17 Because these institutes were not formal government bodies they became known as track two organizations to distinguish them from track one which involved sovereign state actors. Since 1990 ASEAN-ISIS deliberations provided a multilateral framework for strategic thinking. ASEAN-ISIS engaged in extensive networking, for example, through the Asia-Pacific Round Table held annually in Kuala Lumpur since 1987, and the Indonesian workshops on Confidence Building in the South China Sea inaugurated in 1992. Through these endeavors ASEAN-ISIS developed the habit of dialog and support for confidence building measures (CBMs). They also discovered the efficacy of presenting their governments with collective proposals rather than individual submissions. In brief, in a variety of formal and informal settings ASEAN-ISIS incrementally added to their governments’ agenda. In November 1994 ASEAN-ISIS held a formal meeting with senior ASEAN officials and presented a document containing eight chapters including a discussion of peacekeeping. The ASEAN-ISIS proposals, along with those from Australia, Canada and other countries, were then consolidated by Brunei in its capacity as chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee. They were then reviewed by ASEAN officials. Next, Singapore diplomat Kishore Mahbubani was commissioned to draft a mission statement/concept paper based on the common elements of these proposals. The development of Mahbubani’s paper benefited from further exchanges among ASEAN officials who sought to define a role for ASEAN in the emerging multilateral process. The result was a Mission and Vision Statement that was presented to a meeting of ASEAN senior officials in Bangkok in May 1994. The final product that emerged was entitled the ARF Concept Paper.18 In the early 1990s a series of conferences on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (SCAP) were hosted by ASEAN-ISIS, the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Pacific Forum/CSIS and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs. Also, in parallel with the emergence of the ASEAN-ISIS network, non-Southeast Asian 17Center for Strategic & International Studies (Indonesia), ISIS Malaysia; Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines), Singapore Institute for International Affairs (since replaced by the Institute of Defence & Strategic Studies), Institute of Security & International Studies (Thailand). 18The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper. http://www.aseansec.org/amm/prog_arf.htm

8 track two institutes were active in the process of developing a track-two equivalent of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In 1993 ten institutes came together and founded the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP).19 This new body also included strategic studies think tanks from Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and the United States.20 It should be noted that the original ASEAN-ISIS was composed of think tanks from five “like minded” states. ASEAN enlargement to include Vietnam (1995), Laos, Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999) has resulted in the transformation of ASEAN-ISIS. Four of the new members are represented by government officials rather than private individuals.21 Brunei has always been represented by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accommodation in the Asia-Pacific Region Individual governments also played a role in the creation of the ARF. In the 1990s both Canada and Australia advanced proposals supporting a new multilateral security framework. For example, Canada’s Joe Clark proposed the creation of a multilateral body to deal with security issues mainly in Northeast Asia. Australia’s Foreign Minister Gareth Evans proposed a Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled on the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).22 ASEAN officials dismissed European institutions out of hand arguing that the security environment in Asia Pacific was entirely different from Europe. Japan and South Korea also rejected the notion that European institutions could be transposed to the Asia-Pacific. The United States also opposed Evans’ CSCA proposal out of fear it would dilute its bilateral alliances. The rejection of the European models was accompanied by efforts by ASEAN scholars and officials to define the uniqueness of the AsiaPacific region in terms of its geography, and economic and security linkages. In 1991 an ASEAN-ISIS meeting held in Jakarta to discuss the forthcoming ASEAN Summit, considered a proposal to convene an Asia-Pacific political dialogue. This meeting was attended by the head of Japan’s Policy Planning Office in the Gaimusho. According to Carolina Hernandez, “ASEAN-ISIS requested this official to seek the support of Japan for the initiative if it should be 19The

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (CSCAP). CSCAP Pro-Tem Committee, 1993. 5-8. See also the writings by Des Ball and Paul Evans listed in the bibliography. 20 In addition to the five ASEAN-ISIS members (see note 17 above), the other founding members included: Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University (Australia); Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, York University (Canada); Japan Institute of International Affairs; Seoul Forum for International Affairs (South Korea); and Pacific Forum/CSIS (U.S.). 21 Vietnam, for example, is represented by the Institute of International Relations (IIR) which comes under its Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 22Robyn Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 1998, 20(2),120.

9 brought up in the 1992 [sic] Kuala Lumpur AMM and subsequently in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) with ASEAN’s dialogue partners.”23 The Gaimusho official brought the ASEAN-ISIS initiative to the attention of his Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, and recommended that Japan support the idea of a regional discussion of security issues if the matter was raised by ASEAN first. In an episode that deserves further historical scrutiny, Foreign Minister Nakayama, on his own initiative, endorsed the idea of a regional security dialog in remarks to the 24th ASEAN PMC held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. Nakayama’s proposal for a process of political discussion envisioned that security dialogue would involve a comprehensive discussion of security. He suggested that senior ministers meet prior to the ASEAN PostMinisterial Conference to discuss security issues. ASEAN was extremely sensitive about formally discussing security issues at the PMC. The PMC usually considered economic matters but had recently allowed discussion of Cambodia on the agenda. Nakayama’s endorsement of regional security dialog unintentionally preempted the ASEAN-ISIS initiative and did not go down well with his audience. According to Hernandez, “[h]aving come from a ranking official of a major regional power about whom lingering suspicions on foreign policy motives remain in the minds of many of its neighbors, the idea was met with deafening silence.”24 Nonetheless, this episode demonstrates that there was growing external support for discussions on regional security by ASEAN’s dialog partners. The ASEAN-ISIS proposal (Memorandum No. 1) was formally presented to ASEAN in June 1991 and was endorsed in principle at the Fourth Summit held in Singapore in January 1992. By the early 1990s ASEAN’s role in brokering a peace settlement in Cambodia had been eclipsed by the role of the five permanent members of the UN’s Security Council (otherwise known as the Perm 5 or P5).25 ASEAN risked marginalization as a result. The idea of a region-wide security dialogue was supported by Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines but not Malaysia. Indonesia was initially reluctant because of its role as chair in the Workshop on the South China Sea. Indonesia led the workshop process on behalf of ASEAN and was reluctant to see any diminution of its role in a new body. ASEAN finally acted collectively as it did not wish to see its primacy in regional security matters challenged. The first regional security dialogue between ASEAN members and other regional states took place at the Singapore summit in January 1992. A 23Carolina

G. Hernandez, “Philippine Participation in Track Two Activities on Security-Related Issues: ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP Experiences, 1990-1997,” in FSI Foreign Affairs Quarterly, January-March 1999, 1(1), 81. 24Ibid., 80. 25Richard H. Solomon, Exiting Indochina: U.S. Leadership of the Cambodia Settlement & Normalization with Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.

10 declaration was issued that stated that the PMC would discuss security issues. Security issues were raised at the ASEAN annual ministerial meeting and PMC held in Manila in July. For example, the United States raised the issue of drugs as a security concern at the ASEAN Six Plus One meeting. China took a strong stand against hegemony (U.S. leadership). It was initially opposed to participating in multilateral security organizations because it felt these would constrain Chinese actions. Later China concluded multilateral institutions could be useful devices for constraining the United States. Chinese attitudes slowly changed as it was integrated into the regional security dialogue process. China attended its first ASEAN PMC as a guest of host country Malaysia. China’s status was then upgraded to consultative partner and eventually into full dialog partner status (along with Russia). The United States was a latecomer in supporting multilateralism in Asia-Pacific. Generally the U.S. viewed collective security, such as European collective defense, as being directed against a particular threat. In 1990 Secretary of State James A. Baker wrote to his Australian counterpart and told him that proposals for multilateral security forums were “a solution in search of a problem” and that existing bilateral arrangements were still suitable. According to one seminar participant, the U.S. administration had a “Asia blind spot” and was unwilling to give consideration to other than the forward deployment of U.S. forces. It was the Clinton Administration that first endorsed multilateralism.26 This was signaled by Winston Lord in his confirmation hearing27 and in a major speech given in 1993 supporting multilateral structures. In 1993 the above three strands converged and resulted in the formation of the ARF as a multilateral security dialog forum. An early draft of what became the ARF Concept Paper included the expression “co-drivers” in its discussion of ARF leadership. In other words ASEAN and its dialogue partners would share the leadership role. Australia was an advocate of this formula but did not aggressively push its case preferring to take its lead from ASEAN. In the event ASEAN took the “driver’s seat” and assumed the prime leadership role of the ARF. In the 1990s, ASEAN as an organization was widely perceived as a success story. It promoted high rates of economic growth and had taken the political lead in opposing Soviet-backed Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. In the view of one observer, ASEAN had become a “diplomatic community.” ASEAN 26Lim,

“The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,” op. cit., 121. Statement at Confirmation Hearings for Ambassador Winston Lord Assistant Secretary of State-Designate, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” March 31, 1993. http://www.gwjapan.com/ftb/pub/policy/congress/senate/newpacfc.txt 27“Opening

11 leadership of the ARF therefore did not present a high risk to any other ARF member. ASEAN was a non-military association. Also ASEAN was the only group that was acceptable to all other prospective members. If Australia or any other country had taken the lead other states would not have come on board. The ARF would have been a non-starter if either China or the United States had initiated the process of setting up a multilateral security forum. According to one seminar participant, there were three possible approaches to security: (1) collective self-defense; (2) collective security based on the United Nations (where no enemy was identified); and multilateral cooperation arrangements. In the end ASEAN Regional Forum was “the only game in town.” Finally, ASEAN emerged as the natural leader of the ARF because it had already developed an acceptable framework for discussions on security issues through its dialog partner process at its annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, argued that strategic circumstances in the Asia-Pacific were different from Europe where the CSCE had been created to deal with the East-West conflict. Alatas argued for a unique Asian approach to managing change and maintaining equilibrium among external powers. In 1992 the ASEAN PMC proposed that security issues by discussed at a meeting of composed of PMC senior officials. The following year an informal dinner meeting of foreign affairs officials set the stage for the first formal meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 25, 1994 in Bangkok. Measuring the Effectiveness of the ARF28 The ASEAN Regional Forum is now six years old. The ARF initially adopted a three-phase program of development: confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and elaboration of approaches to conflict. It was later agreed that phases one and two (confidence building and preventive diplomacy) could proceed in tandem. The ARF’s work plan is conducted by a number of intersessional groups and inter-sessional meetings held in the first half of each year.29 Proposals from the ISGs and ISMs are transmitted to ARF senior officials for consideration and recommendation to ARF ministers. The ARF is presently

28This

section draws on John Garofano, “Measuring ARF Effectiveness: A Proposal for Research,” Paper delivered to Multilateral Institutions in Asia Seminar, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, July 14, 2000 29Currently the two most active are the Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures and the Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief. The Inter-sessional Meeting on Peacekeeping is moribund. It was at Chinese insistence that a distinction was drawn in nomenclature between inter-sessional activities (support groups versus meetings). China wanted to reduce the impression that the ARF had set up institutionalized working groups on a permanent basis. See: Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302. London: Oxford University Press for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996, p. 42.

12 bogged down over disagreement about how to define preventive diplomacy. China, in particular, is concerned that preventive diplomacy may be used as the thin edge of the wedge to intervene in its internal affairs (Tibet and Muslim separatism in its western provinces). Critics have dismissed the ARF as a “talk shop” because of its slow pace. On the other hand, supporters of the ARF measure its effectiveness by other means. They note that not only has ASEAN been able to convince China to participate but that China has gradually moderated its hostility to multilateralism. For example, concerning territorial disputes in the South China Sea, China has modified its position from opposing multilateral discussion of this issue to engaging in a dialog with ASEAN as an organization. Within the ARF, China has agreed to settle the issue by peaceful means on the basis of international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in particular. Further, there has been a considerable change in the content of China’s first two White Papers. The first dealt with arms control issues almost exclusively while the second dealt with a broader range of security concerns. Supporters of the ARF also point to its extensive discussion and adoption of CBMs. At the fifth ASEAN Regional Forum the chairman issued a matrix that included the publication of defense policy statements and Defense White Papers, circulation of submissions to the UN Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR), and participation in the UNCAR, regional security dialogues, high-level defense contacts, exchange of representative of defense institutes and defense officials, and disarmament/non-proliferation regimes. An increasing number of ARF members are voluntarily subscribing to these and other ARF-endorsed CBMs. One participant noted that at the ISG on Search and Rescue held in Honolulu in late 1998 the plenary sessions were formal affairs with little observable progress, but in the technical meetings there was a convergence of views on practical things to do. It may be argued that the ARF’s long-term goal is the creation of a security community defined as a community of states that have shared expectations about a peaceful future and about pacific solutions to problems that threaten stability and peace.30 With this as the end state, there are two approaches to the process by which partially antipathetic states can form a security community: an interest-based approach and an identity-based approach.

30ASEAN

itself has set the goal of becoming a community of peaceful, socially cohesive, competitive and prosperous Southeast Asia by the year 2020; see ASEAN Vision 2020 issued by the second informal summit held in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997.

13 Interest-based Approach The interest-based approach represents the realist view of inter-state relations. Inter-state cooperation is based on perceived national interest and the existence of an external threat. States are forced to deal with each other to overcome conflicts of interest. States cannot isolate themselves from the system. The interest-based approach favors the creation of institutions. For example, states form a regime, such as the CSCE, and devise ways to share information and develop transparency. In sum, although self-interest permits states to engage in cooperative activity states’ identities do not change significantly as a result. The interest-based approach posits that states cooperate if it will bring them gains in the form of increased security or if non-participation will bring them relative loses. The “shadow of the future” serves as a powerful motivating force for states to engage in cooperation in order to avoid the penalties lost through non-cooperation. But the range of cooperative activities will tend to be narrow because of the overriding concern of states to limit the relative gains accruing to a rival. Institutions are supported to the extent that they lower the transaction costs of arriving at a mutually beneficial agreement. The interest-based approach suggests that ARF effectiveness can be determined by measuring the following issue-areas: Group 1: Perceptual •

Evidence of concern for the “shadow of the future.”

•

Evidence that serious conflicts are due to misperception and lack of information.

•

Evidence of new information altering prior perceptions or behavior in serious cases.

•

Evidence of regime-type arrangements effectively lowering the costs of acquiring new information.

Group 2: Interests •

Evidence of the persistence of traditional, national interests.

•

Evidence of regime-constraining effects on traditional behaviors and interests.

14 Identity-based Approach31 The identity-based approach represents the sociological approach to the study of inter-state relations. According to Karl Deutsch a dense network of transactions among states involved in the process of integration leads to a sense of “we feeling” or community. Sovereignty is slowly pooled over time. In other words, states give mutual consideration to each other’s needs. Others — outsiders — perceive individual members as part of a group. In sum, how each nation sees itself gradually changes over time as a result of political and economic interaction. Diplomatic meetings, for example, slowly change consciousness as each participant develops a comfort level in dealing with other members. Through this process there is a gradual adjustment of interests. The development of a European security community evolved from the mid-19th century to the 1950s. In other words, more than power politics (realism) is at work. The identity-based approach provides another means by which to evaluate the ARF’s effectiveness. According to one participant’s view ARF’s sense of community is being fashioned by the development of shared interests and norms (traditional security concerns plus other issues such as maritime issues, piracy and drug trafficking). The ARF has made modest progress in encouraging transparency. The use of force has not characterized relations between ARF members but it is not clear that the existence of ARF has contributed to this peaceful state of affairs. There has been some, however slight, movement towards preventive defense. These factors have developed a stronger sense of “us.” But the ARF has not yet resulted in the development of a Deutschian security community. The ARF needs to develop a High Council to resolve disputes among its members. And the ARF needs to more fully integrate defense officials in the process of identity formation.32 The identity-based approach suggests that ARF effectiveness can be determined by measuring the following groups of issue-areas: Group 1: Consciousness •

Density of transactions.

•

Extent of transactions.

•

Evidence of “we-feeling.”

31Amitav

Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000. 32In 1997 at the ARF senior officials meeting it was decided to include defense officials in discussions on CBMs as a step towards preventive diplomacy.

15 •

Evidence of trust.

•

Evidence of shared images.

Group 2: Impact on Significant Groups •

Evidence of these issues revealing themselves in key policy making groups or in public.

Group 3: Outcomes •

Evidence of convergent interests.

•

Evidence of spillover when agreement is not reached in one area.

•

Overall decrease in tensions.

The identity-based approach was criticized on a number of grounds by seminar participants. First, there is the problem of defining what geographic region is being included in the ARF security community. Does the ARF represent a nascent East Asian identity? If so, what about the states of Eurasia, where do they fit in? A second consideration is the question of ASEAN identity. How is ASEAN identity being changed by the recent formation of an East Asian community (ASEAN plus 3 — China, Japan and South Korea)? Is it possible that not one but multiple identifies may be formed? It could be argued, the real work of the ARF will take place at the sub-regional rather than regional level. Finally, the notion of an East Asian identity cuts across the notion of an Asia-Pacific community. Some state that initially joined the ARF supported conflict resolution as one of its goals, but with the passage of time and enlargement of the ARF’s membership, these states have begun backing away from their earlier commitment. Some participants saw a relationship between domestic political systems and a security community. It was argued that a successful security community was likely to emerge if all its members were democracies. Here it was noted that a trend towards democratization was taking place in East Asia as the examples of Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia illustrate. Others were skeptical that democratization would lead to increased cooperation. Domestic opinion might be mobilized and exacerbate security. Nationalism was on the rise in the face of globalization and the trend towards regionalism. Further, there was the problem of telescoping history in comparing six years of ARF development with a much longer period of development in the West. It was argued in this context that the density of contacts between states was not a particularly effective measure of effectiveness but interoperability was.

16 The U.S.-China dialog was cited as an example of divergences of viewpoints. China interpreted U.S. policy calling for shaping the security environment and leadership as “bending to one’s will” and “special responsibility for the region,” respectively. One participant argued that CINCPAC’s approach to regional security has always been strongly bilateral. ASEAN and the ARF are not treated equally. U.S. motivations for joining the ARF had more to do with wanting a seat at the table and not being left out. The U.S. is slowly coming around to appreciate that bilateral relations cannot solve the main security problems which confront the U.S. But if the U.S. tried to give the ARF responsibility in this area, the ARF would decline. This raises the question whether the ARF serves ASEAN identity. It was argued above that the ARF’s long-term goal is the creation of a security community (but not defined in the same way as used by Admiral Blair). The ARF contains half of the world’s population and five of the great powers. Karl Deutsch used the term security community loosely. In the view of one seminar participant Admiral Blair appears to have “reverse-engineered” his concept by attempting to fit the European experience (which was evolutionary and developed over a considerable period of time) onto Asia-Pacific. The ARF has never articulated a vision of its future as an identity-based security community. Other participants argued that the conflict in Cambodia provided a focus for ASEAN. But in the post-Cold War era ASEAN has lost its compass. In order to create a security community both identity and interest based approaches need to be adopted. China feared multilateral engagement because they lacked the experience and felt participation would constrain China’s actions. A security community must be based on an opportunity model not a conflict model. The enlargement of ASEAN to ten members seemed to be directed at this goal but the inclusion of four non-performing members mitigated against the early creation of a security community. The creation of a security community may involve the voluntary transfer of national sovereignty to a regional organization. ARF members jealously guard their national sovereignty and repeatedly stress their adherence to the cardinal principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Nonetheless, there has been some discussion in the ARF, in the ASEAN PMC, and bilaterally about the principle of non-interference and whether or not is should be modified in special cases. The most serious issues will be those which are essentially internal but with an external dimension. A prime example is Thailand’s advocacy of readapting the principle of non-interference is cases like Burma where domestic problems there spill over the border and affect Thai security.

17 Measures of Effectiveness The ARF’s effectiveness must be measured by both the interest-based and identity-based approaches. There is evidence that both power politics and “something else” has led to a change in regional identity. Process changes identity over time and it is also possible to have competing identities. The ARF has made limited if mixed progress in a number of areas: •

Transparency. Sixteen of the ARF’s twenty-two members (1999) provide data to the UN Conventional Arms Register and the publication of Defense White Papers has increased. But little progress has been recorded in establishing a Regional Register of Conventional Arms.

•

Adherence to procedural norms. A recent study by Nischalke33 has found that ASEAN has a mixed record in adhering to the “ASEAN way” on a number of security issues. ASEAN generally adhered to a common position on the conflict in Cambodia, but there were occasions when individual states adopted deviant positions. ASEAN dealt with the question of expanded membership on the basis of consensus and ASEAN states reached agreement on the formation of the ARF through debate and compromise. The ARF has been inconsistent in setting conditions for membership; both observers and dialog partners have been admitted.

•

Conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea. In response to Chinese assertiveness in 1992 ASEAN adopted a Declaration of Concern. ASEAN has been less than unified in dealing with subsequent Chinese encroachment in the Mischief Reef area off the west coast of the Philippines. Clear differences have emerged between Malaysia, on the one hand, and Vietnam and the Philippines, on the other, over defining the geographical area to be covered by a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. ARF members have raised the question of conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea at ARF meetings despite Chinese opposition to holding discussions in a multilateral setting.

•

Non-use of force. ASEAN member states have not resorted to armed force against each other since the association was founded in 1967. But the reasons for this are not altogether clear. On balance there is little evidence of a seachange in attitudes regarding the utility of force in inter-state relations by ARF members.

33Tobias

Ingo Nischalke, “The ‘ASEAN Way:’ A Real Spirit or a Phantom?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2000, 22(1), 89-112.

18 •

Arms control. ARF members by and large subscribe to non-proliferation agreements and the conventions on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Many are signatories to the Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. But ARF member states continue to brook no limitation on conventional arms procurements. Weapons purchases have resumed as individual states recover from the Asian financial crisis. Because the ARF has failed to fully engage defense officials in inter-sessional activities, progress on achieving informal or even tacit agreement on conventional arms control has not made any progress.

•

Confidence Building Measures. ARF members participate in a wide variety of CBMs such as security dialogues, exchanges between defense colleges, disaster relief, voluntary exchanges of information on military exercises, and circulation of papers to the ISG on CBMs. There are also a number of partially implemented CBMs: bilateral exchanges of security perceptions, increased high-level defense exchanges, military exchanges and training, annual defense policy statements, publication of White Papers, participation in the UNCAR, signing of global non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and other activities. Despite the wide ranging nature of CBM activity, the evidence is not clear that CBMs have had the desired effect. CBMs may give an illusion of progress.34

•

Transition to stage three (conflict resolution). The 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation makes provision for a High Council to resolve disputes among members. This has not been utilized. In similar vein, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) makes provision for a referral of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ARF has agreed that CBMs (phases one) and preventive diplomacy (phase two) may proceed in tandem. But progress has been halted due to disagreement over an acceptable definition of preventive diplomacy.

•

Institution-building. The ARF can hardly be described as an institution. The ARF consists of meetings of its inter-sessional groups, senior officials and ministers. It does not have the capability of peace management or enforcement. There is presently some reconsideration in ASEAN to strengthen its institutions in light of its failure to respond effectively to the haze problem in Indonesia, the Asian financial crisis, and political instability in East Timor.

•

Voluntary transfer of sovereignty. Both Thailand and the Philippines have advocated making ASEAN’s principle of non-interference more flexible. This

34For

a critique of CBMs see: Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, Adelphi Paper 307. London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1996.

19 would in effect entail a voluntary transfer of sovereignty from the state to ASEAN as a regional organization. Recently ASEAN approved the concept of an ASEAN Troika to deal with disputes among its members — but on a voluntary basis only. Recent discussions in ASEAN about finding a middle way between strict non-interference and intervention to deal with a major threat to regional stability may encourage the ARF to give these issues its consideration. It is unlikely at this stage, however, that the ARF would authorize the use of force against a member state. •

Settlement of bilateral disputes. There are a number of bilateral disputes among ASEAN35 and ARF members including border and territorial disputes. A number of incidents have been recorded where force has been used, such as artillery duels along the Thai-Burma border, to aggressive action by naval patrol vessels against private fishing vessels found encroaching in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). For the most part settlement of these disputes has been on a bilateral basis. Indonesia and Malaysia have taken their territorial disputes over Ligitan and Sipadan islands to the ICJ. Likewise Malaysia and Singapore have taken a similar dispute to the ICJ as well. But so far the ARF has not played a role in conflict resolution nor has there been any attempt to develop conflict resolution mechanisms to deal with specific cases involving ARF members. Strengthening the ARF

The ARF’s strengths and weaknesses must be put into context. The ARF is a relatively young security body. It is only one part of the regional security architecture. There are a number of bilateral defense-security links at regional and sub-regional level which shore up regional order. The ARF has never considered the U.S. security role and the possibility of a diminished presence even including the dismantling of military bases in South Korea and Japan. The ARF faces another major challenge: furthering the economic integration of its diverse membership. The ARF has three main limitations: procedural (setting the “rules” for decisionmaking), process (determining how decisions are carried out) and security challenges. These will be discussed each in turn. Procedural ASEAN primacy within the ARF must be recognized at the onset. The ARF would not have gotten off the ground without ASEAN. If ASEAN had not been placed in the driver’s seat, China would not have joined. ASEAN primacy has 35N.

Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN. Pacific Strategic Paper 9. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999.

20 meant, however, that regional security issues are viewed primarily for their impact on ASEAN. But there are major security issues in Northeast Asia that have not been addressed. The ARF with ASEAN in the chair gives ASEAN too much of a role on Northeast Asian security issues. This could prove unacceptable to other participants at the negotiation stage. The ASEAN Chair will also have difficulty in preventive diplomacy related to Northeast Asia. The Chair can offer its good offices and facilitate dialogue on emergent disputes, but the states of Northeast Asia are unlikely to accept a leading role for ASEAN. Process36 There is no danger, however, of ASEAN losing its pivotal role in the ARF. At present ASEAN represents ten of the ARF’s twenty-three members. ASEAN could take a less proprietal role and be less insistent on being the core of the ARF. Non-ASEAN members influence the ARF through their role as co-chair of inter-sessional groups and as chair of some ARF-sponsored meetings. The ARF operates by way of consensus decision-making and at the pace of its most cautious member. There is evidence that some states have already become frustrated at the time-consuming and slow pace of decision-making. Other countries may soon lose their patience as well. The ARF operates without a formal agenda. It conducts it annual meetings on the basis of unstructured discussions. These rarely go into depth on any particular issue. Foreign Ministers are free to raise any issue they like. The quality of the security dialogue is “once over lightly.” Some countries object if certain issues are raised (eg. China on the South China Sea). ASEAN fears institutionalization. The ARF lacks a Secretariat. There is no central depository for documentation although the ASEAN Secretariat plays a minimal role. This weakness may place some constraints on the role of the ARF in preventive diplomacy. For example, in order to carry out the tasks of information gathering and early warning of conflict, a Secretariat and central depository is essential.37 A proposal to create a Conflict Reduction Center remains on the table. Consideration could be given to creating a virtual ARF secretariat. The ARF attempts to build consensus on norms in a non-formal and nonlegalistic way. Is decision-making is not accompanied by the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance. One illustration of the ARF’s procedural weakness concerns membership criteria. The ARF operates on the basis of case by case decisions which leads to inconsistency. Some states have been admitted directly

36Maria

Consuelo C. Ortuoste, “Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum Experiment,” op. cit., 46-47 and 51. 37Ibid., 47 and 67.

21 into ARF membership from observer status while others have been admitted only after being elevated to the status of dialogue partner. Security Challenges There is uncertainty about the relations between the major powers and how they will develop in the future. Five countries are of direct concern: the United States, China, Japan, India and Russia. Will they develop cooperative or competitive relations? What can the ARF do? The ARF needs the support of both the United States and China. A key concern for the ARF is how to make relations between Washington and Beijing more collaborative. ARF members have a shared interest in developing a mechanism to encourage such cooperation. They could take the initiative within the ARF to develop a policy response to address this issue. However some states might be extremely sensitive to this. The nature of conflict is changing and the ARF needs to adjust accordingly. Intrastate conflict has increased while armed conflict between states has decreased; but it cannot be ruled out completely (boundary and territorial disputes, force modernization, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems). The ARF could play a contributing role to ameliorating intra-state conflict. The ARF could play a complementary role in advancing a peaceful resolution to conflict on the Korean peninsula. As a useful step, the ARF could play a role in encouraging North Korea to participate more in the regional community. ARF members could assist in exposing North Korea in a non-threatening manner to the views of other regional states. The ARF has played a minimal role in the resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Individual ASEAN states (and others) have raised their concerns at ARF meetings. The ARF could play a greater role in increasing defense transparency. It could increase the participation of defense personnel in ARF activities. But there are some constraints on the ARF. There are some countries where defense and foreign affairs officials do not sit and discuss security issues. There are other domestic constraints. The promotion of military CBMs presents a chicken and the egg problem. The ARF needs the participation of the military and it needs military CBMs. The ARF could be strengthened if a role was developed for it in this area. For example, it was hoped that the ISG on humanitarian issues (peace operations and search and rescue) would provide such an opportunity. It was felt by some participants that a meeting of defense department officials would

22 generate the core of military CBMs. But when the matter was considered at a Senior Officials Meeting, dominated by foreign ministry personnel, it was decided that military participation should go no further than an informal lunch attended by military officials only. The ARF has addressed the issue of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems from the very beginning. The ARF spoke out against the testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in May 1998. But in light of Indian attempts to constrain further progress on this question it appears likely that the ARF will find it hard to reach a concrete agreement on what further steps to take. The ARF has played a role in discussing the question of ballistic missile defense proliferation. Ballistic missile proliferation is on the ARF’s agenda because of North Korean actions years ago. The ARF has discussed this issue and expressed its concern but it has not pressed North Korea to limit its activities. The ARF accepted that it should play a role in preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy was included in the original ARF Concept Paper as a second phase activity. But six years has passed and nothing practical has emerged. Some countries fear that preventive diplomacy will be used to constrain an activity by a country when its core interests are at stake. There is the fear that a country might end up being involved in compulsory conflict resolution procedures. There is also the concern that preventive diplomacy is a mechanism for outside intervention in a country’s internal affairs. Nevertheless, despite the long-time it has taken to discuss the concepts and principles of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, preventive diplomacy remains an important part of the ARF’s agenda. The ARF, through a Secretariat and a Conflict Risk Reduction Center, could play a role to facilitate, mediate, and provide information in a dispute to prevent armed conflict. The ARF needs to redefine what is meant by non-intervention. For example, there is now increased agreement that the cross border movement of people can be discussed by the ARF (eg. the movement of Burmese into Thailand). In order to move forward, the ARF needs to address hard issues such as the sources of conflict — ethnic and religious tensions and separatist movements. One initiative the ARF could undertake is to encourage one and a half track or track two dialogue on the basis of case studies of where these hard issues were successfully or not so successfully dealt with. There have been changes in the nature of threats to security. The ARF needs to address such “soft” security issues as illegal migration, drug trafficking, and environmental issues. The ARF initially adopted a cautious attitude out of fear that the consideration of soft security issues would displace concern for the hard issues. When Indonesia first raised the question of drug smuggling, other ARF

23 members felt it was a topic best dealt with by the ASEAN PMC. The ARF has now come around and will consider illegal immigration, piracy, and small arms trafficking. According to diplomatic observers this new concern for soft security issues has added value by raising the awareness of ministers. It is expected that law enforcement and immigration ministers and officials will be drawn into discussions under the ARF framework. The ARF will be constrained in moving forward on the above proposals due to its caution and sensitivities about the comfort level of other ARF members. Because of this there is scope for track two involvement, especially by CSCAP. CSCAP can and must think ahead of the ARF. CSCAP could develop proposals on the principles to govern intervention in internal affairs by spelling out the under what conditions intervention can take place, who will be involved and how the intervention will occur. The Goals of Regional Order What are the goals of regional order? Three may be identified: survival, peace and prosperity. Some states are willing to surrender elements of sovereignty in order to create regional order. States seek to strengthen themselves and improve their standing in the region. They seek the goal of physical and ideational survival, as the examples of South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate. The goal of survival is problematic. With the exception of South Korea and Taiwan, few if any other states in the Asia-Pacific face imminent and credible threats to their very existence. It would be difficult to create an organization based on norms (such as the renunciation of the use of force) alone. It might be possible to achieve consensus at the level of declaratory policy, but at a deeper level norms would be contested. There are competing ideas of regional order in Asia. The ARF and alliances represent two approaches to international order. All suggestions to strengthen alliances and multilateral institutions are pathways to some end. So far the discussion on how to strengthen the ARF has focused on means not ends. One seminar participant suggested that territorial integrity be listed as separate goal of regional order because a maximalist view is held in the Asia-Pacific that survival includes control over the population, territory and by extension Exclusive Economic Zones. Another participant disagreed and said territorial integrity should be included under survival. Still another participant suggested that the number of goals should be expanded to include managing change, transition of power, sanctity of contracts and international agreements. Concerning the goal of peace: what is meant by peace — the absence of war or the renunciation of the use of force? States seek peace but it is unclear on whose

24 terms and conditions. States also seek the goal of prosperity, which equates to becoming richer and therefore stronger. But the goal of prosperity raises the relative versus absolute gains argument. Concerning the three goals, if they are expanded the question of relative gains arises and states will become concerned. The Asian financial crisis indicated that relative gains took precedence. There are tensions between the three goals. The ARF should address core issues through norm creation and CBMs. States may seek a higher order goals such as democratization or attaining other political and social values. So far there has been very little discussion of the goals of regional order at the level of head of state or government. The Goals of Regional Security What are the goals of regional security? Security is a contested concept. There are competing notions of what represents security. For example should states pursue a dominant or hegemonic approach to the region? Should states pursue a liberal agenda and seek the creation of a community of democratic free market states? Regional order may be based on these goals but the foundation rests on alliances. For example the United States has a global vision. China reacts to the United States in a defensive manner. China stresses the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the framework for inter-state relations. Japan and ASEAN pursue a rules based approach in which the weak are protected against the strong. This represents a non-acceptance of the status quo. There are different pathways to regional order: balance of power (national), multi-national (regional) and global based on ad hoc institutions. It cannot be assumed that the ARF will be the institution for the creation of regional order. The ARF should not have all burdens of regional security placed on it. The ARF represents a minimalist, more “touchy feely,” approach to order. It lacks teeth — the power of enforcement. The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could not deal effectively with the problems in Bosnia. So why should the ARF be expected to deal effectively with circumstances like East Timor or separatist movements in Indonesia and/or the Philippines? Despite the weakness of multilateral institutions, Asia has not had a major war. Did regional institutions create peace, or did peace emerge without institutions? There is a danger about being over ambitious in our expectation of what multilateral institutions can do. The ARF could not respond to the crisis in East Timor. APEC did not react to the Asian economic and financial crisis of 1997-98. Neither the ARF nor APEC were geared to handle these situations. Take the example of the Organization of African Unity; after it was formed it intervened, failed and remained moribund for a long time.

25 Value can be added to the ARF by enhancing its powers in response to a particular issue. For example, the United Nations is often unable to act in response to internal crisis in a nation state unless it invokes Chapter 7 and declares the situation a threat to peace. The ARF could be strengthened by making this norm more flexible. The ARF should not go down the Bosnia route. ARF members should not adhere rigidly to the principle of non-interference. It has yet to determine how far down the path of interference it is willing to go. In other words the ARF must engage in the creation of international norms and their implementation. It must consider whether or not it should intervene in such situations as the treatment of Muslims in western China or Kashmir. There are five key actors: the U.S., China, Japan, Russia and India. The U.S. is the leading player in most conflicts, not the ARF. The ARF needs to be involved in norm creation and the generation of CBMs. The ARF may well develop into an umbrella organization with a separate Northeast Asia Forum. The ARF will also have to widen the footprint of its membership beyond Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania. Non-traditional Security Issues The ARF must address how it will respond to non-traditional security issues. These may cause the ARF to shift its focus from core issues. Should security issues be lumped together? How far should the ARF go in addressing nontraditional security issues? There are practical considerations as well. There are concerns that if the ARF does reach out and consider transnational issue they will increase the number of meetings. There are also practical restraints arising from human rights concerns. The ARF may be better served by addressing core issues. If ARF expands and considers transnational issues the question of how to prioritize them arises. This may prove very difficult. There is the view that nontraditional security issues have been placed on the agenda because of lack of progress in other areas. Will a consideration of soft issues lay the ground work for the later consideration of hard security issues? Soft issues will develop habits of dialog and generate rules and mechanisms that may be transferred to hard issues. Non-traditional security issues have already been identified by regional states as legitimate security issues in their own right. The ARF could assist other states in realizing that non-traditional security issues are real security issues. For example, for the last year and a half Thailand has been concerned about the flow of amphetamine pills across its border from Burma. Thailand has reorganized its military from a focus on counter-insurgency to dealing with the cross border drug trade. Thailand is reportedly supporting the insurgents in Burma to restrict

26 and disrupt the drug trade. This undermines the “ASEAN way.” Australia views illegal immigration as a security issue. It has expanded its coast watching system to prevent illegal migration. Drugs and arms trafficking are all tied together and are international in scope. They cannot be dealt with by any one state. They need to be addressed by an international consortium. The majority of seminar participants agreed that non-traditional security issues should be placed on the ARF agenda but there was no consensus over which issues were to be given priority. ARF Structure Some attention needs to be paid to the ARF’s structure. ASEAN has to share the running with other players. Already there is concern, expressed by the permanent secretaries of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, that ASEAN may be taken over in a larger grouping such as APEC that is dominated by the U.S. and Japan. A formula must be found in which ASEAN retains influence but others — the U.S. and Japan — can set the agenda. Otherwise ASEAN faces the prospect of marginalization. The ARF performs a valuable service by bringing China and the United States together. This will reduce misperceptions on both sides in understanding the other’s intentions. The ARF must address the question of process and its reliance on unanimity before taking action. This is not just an ASEAN principle. China, for example, does not want to go beyond the principle of unanimity. Should the ARF create a Secretariat? ASEAN opposes the idea; but both ASEAN and APEC have Secretariats. A Secretariat could serve as the point of contact for the ARF. An ARF Secretariat should have a research capability but it should not just rely on CSCAP for inputs. CSCAP has evolved into a club of familiar people. One way of strengthening the ARF is to limit and reduce our expectations about what it can accomplish. The ARF’s institutional structures are weak because they are modeled on ASEAN. The “ASEAN way” does not apply well at all. ASEAN when it was founded was motivated by a common external threat. Due to the common weakness of its members they had a shared interest in cooperation. ASEAN cooperation has evolved slowly. In contrast the participants in the ARF do not share similar views on cooperation. They are not bound by weakness. They have widely divergent interests. The ARF does not have the same sense of regionalism that motivated ASEAN. It is asking too much of the ARF to evolve as ASEAN has. The ARF can facilitate contacts among its members but little else.

27 Despite the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN will continue to play a prominent role in the ARF. Its ability to do so, however, has been undermined. But the ARF is one organization that China accepts. ASEAN’s structures are weak and it is difficult to see how these can be transposed to the ARF that has a wider more divergent membership. One can over emphasize the ability of the ARF’s role in ameliorating SinoAmerican tensions. The ARF may play a role when the only obstacle is a neutral venue. It is more likely disputes between the United States and China will be solved bilaterally. In sum, the ARF’s inherent potential to solve disputes is limited. The ARF can develop norms of behavior and CBMs but it is not capable of conflict management. The ARF’s role in developing CBMs is an important part of its program. The ARF should begin by playing a small role and then gradually develop preventive diplomacy and conflict management mechanisms. As an initial step the ARF could develop a list of experts to assist in facilitation when disputes arise. It is important not to raise unrealistic expectations and then be disappointed when they are not realized. The ARF needs to address three questions: membership, nuclear testing, and China. Why shouldn’t Pakistan become a member? Pakistan has a limited impact beyond South Asia. Its main concerns are Kashmir and Karghil. After Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons, Japan proposed that Pakistan enter a dialogue with ASEAN and India. The Philippines was to host such a meeting alongside the ARF as a dialogue mechanism. The Japanese proposal did not include Pakistani membership in the ARF however. North Korea has always been seen as part of the ARF’s geographical footprint. North Korea has transferred missile technology to Pakistan. But the impact is on South Asia not Northeast Asia. This raises the global nature of proliferation that should be primarily a UN matter. The ARF can play a positive role on the nuclear testing issue. When the ARF takes a strong position on this issue, its member governments are emboldened to speak strongly on this issue. The ARF can encourage adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and put pressure on states for the creation of global non-proliferation regimes. But why should the ARF go out on a limb regarding nuclear testing when its members have not even signed the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty? India’s offer to sign the SEANWFZ protocol was done to gain recognition of its status as a nuclear weapons state. This was a bit

28 disingenuous. Formal recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state is not a real possibility in the short to medium term, as U.S. officials have indicated. There is a linkage between China, Central Asia, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania on the nuclear question. The dynamics of interaction indicate that you cannot compartmentalize the sub-regions. The U.S. and Japan both have interests in Central Asia, for example. The United States and the ARF The key security challenges facing the United States are: relations with China, the Taiwan issue, Korean peninsula, nuclear testing and proliferation in South Asia, and transnational threats. It is a fact of life that the U.S. is a central actor as far as all regional security issues are concerned, especially hard security issues. The feeling of insecurity about a continuing U.S. military commitment to Southeast Asia is of long standing. It initially arose from Japanese-U.S. economic tensions in the 1980s. It surfaced again during the Cambodian conflict when the U.S. declined to arm the anti-Vietnamese Khmer resistance. Feelings of insecurity about U.S. staying power in the region rose again with the withdrawal of the U.S. from bases in the Philippines and the ensuing draw down of military assistance programs (involving arms purchases). The concern over the staying power of the U.S. was an early 1990s phenomenon. It is less prevalent today. Now there is more acceptance of the U.S. role especially in relationship to China, Taiwan, Korea and Northeast Asia generally. The U.S. is moving from 100,000 forward deployed to “100,000 capability” and a security community. The U.S. expects others to pick up the slack. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, for example, in his address to China’s National Defense University stressed alliances, engagement and multi-national approaches to security. Secretary Cohen has also raised the question “who would rush to fill the vacuum if the U.S. left Asia.” In other words, the United States still continues to see its role as central. The ARF is not viewed in Washington as a viable alternate security mechanism. It may be premature to speculate what policies a Gore or Bush Administration would adopt for the Asia-Pacific. Vice President Al Gore has indicated that U.S. priorities will focus on Japan, Korea and China. Other than to offer support for the ARF, Gore has said very little about Southeast Asia. Governor George Bush has stressed the “fellowship of free nations” as his guiding principle. When he has addressed Asian security issues his focus has been on China — which will be “unthreatened but not unchecked” — and not Southeast Asia.

29 The role of the United Nations and its role has been similarly absent from public discussion. Governor Bush opposes placing U.S. forces under a UN Command. Both candidates for president realize that any mention of the role of the United Nations as central to U.S. security policy is only a losing proposition. Enhancing Regional Cooperation The U.S. is the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the maritime domain. It is in the U.S. interest that very little happens to upset the status quo. This accounts for why there has been comparatively little new thinking about how the United States should adjust its policy towards the new multilateral institutions in Asia, including the ASEAN Regional Forum. U.S. membership in the ARF is motivated by the desire not to be excluded from any regional body. In the view of one senior policy analyst, “the United States wants to be part of everything. The U.S. wants to come to the party.” There are currently two developments that potentially undercut the U.S. role. The first is the emergence of the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) and the other is the proposal to set up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir initially proposed the East Asian Economic Caucus in response to the Asia Pacific Economic forum (and NAFTA) because he feared U.S. and Japanese dominance when APEC was set up in 1989. Mahathir attempted to set up a “caucus” within APEC but was thwarted by the strong negative reactions of Indonesia, Australia, the United States and Japan. Mahathir then proposed an East Asian Economic Group. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and domestic instability in Indonesia provided the opportunity to resurface this initiative under a new name. ASEAN Plus Three is the East Asian Economic Group under a different name. The formation of ASEAN Plus Three raises the question where do the ASEAN states put their limited human and financial resources into the ARF or ASEAN Plus Three? Indonesia lacks the human resources to meet the demands of the ARF let alone ASEAN at the present time. Although the founding statement of ASEAN Plus Three touched on political and transnational issues, its focus so far has been more on economic issues. The bottom line remains that the ASEAN Plus Three cannot assume a regional security role without the United States. When the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund was first mooted by Japan it was opposed by the United States. Tokyo immediately stepped back, but recently Japan has revived this idea. Will an AMF develop within the context of ASEAN Plus Three? Japan has made clear, however, that the AMF proposal would supplement not supplant the IMF where the U.S. has a commanding voice. China too initially opposed the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund as a Trojan Horse for Japanese influence. China too is now more receptive and rational about Japanese

30 proposals that are in China’s interests. In sum, China’s position is to support initiatives if they serve to keep the U.S. out even if Japan gains. An AMF is unlikely to play an important role without the participation of the United States. ASEAN is still uncertain about the long-term role of the United States. Korean reunification and the rise of anti-base sentiment in Japan and South Korea could lead to a U.S. military pull out from bases in East Asia. There is a feeling held by some regional states that the U.S. will not come to the defense of ASEAN members in the event of a conflict with China. Seminar participants expressed strong concerns about the development of a destabilizing power vacuum should the U.S. disengage. The continued engagement of the United States in regional affairs is essential to peace and security, especially in dealing with contingencies arising on the Korean peninsula, between China-Taiwan, and between India and Pakistan. At a recent informal CSCAP meeting in Singapore held with representatives from the European Union, the relevancy of the OSCE to the ARF was reviewed. The CSCAP meeting considered case studies involving sovereignty, intervention and preventive diplomacy. The United States Institute of Peace presented a simulation involving the use of good offices by an ASEAN Troika. The OSCE has attempted to deal with local conflicts, whereas the ARF is not configured to handle conflicts of this nature. The ARF would do well to study the functions of the OSCE. The ARF is likely to remain an unmanageable forum for dealing with regional security issues for the foreseeable future. ASEAN is beset with severe limitations on its operational capability to lead cooperative actions to address regional security concerns. The ARF’s focus on confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy presents an opportunity cost in not dealing effectively with more pressing security concerns (in North East Asia, for example). AsiaPacific’s security structure will be over-lapping and duplicative. This raises the question with a multiplicity of regional institutions “who does what?” Seminar participants agreed that the United States should more sensitive to the regional security concerns. They also agreed that the U.S. could enhance regional cooperation by adopting a “pull strategy” rather than a “push strategy” where multilateral efforts were required. The United States should continue to assist regional states develop a sense of ownership of multilateral efforts to address common security concerns. The United States has resources that it can bring to bear on these issues. The U.S. should consult with select regional states about the most sensible and efficient way these resources can be used cooperatively to attain common goals. In this

31 way the onus is placed on the “customers” to define what they expect and want. The next step would be to encourage select regional states to reach a consensus about their priorities. This multilateral process would provide the opportunity for U.S. allies and friends to have influence on U.S. policy making. The U.S. should incorporate these inputs into its engagement strategy in order to enhance regional cooperation.

32

Abbreviations AMM

Annual Ministerial Meeting

AMF

Asian Monetary Fund

APCSS

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN

Association of South East Asian Nations

CBM

Confidence Building Measure

CINCPAC

Commander-in-Chief Pacific

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies

CSCA

Conference for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific

CSCAP

Council for Security Cooperation in Asia

CSCE

Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe

CTBT

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone

FSI

Foreign Service Institute

ICJ

International Court of Justice

IDSA

Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies

IIR

Institute of International Relations

IMF

International Monetary Fund

INTERFET

Intervention Force East Timor

ISG

Inter-Sessional Group

ISIS

Institute of Strategic and International Studies

ISM

Inter-Sessional Meeting

33 JIIA

Japan Institute of International Affairs

NAFTA

North America Free Trade Agreement

OSCE

Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe

P5/Perm 5

Permanent Five (members of United Nations Security Council)

PECC

Pacific Economic Cooperation Council

PMC

Post-Ministerial Conference

SEANWFZ

South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

SFIA

Seoul Forum for International Affairs

SIIA

Singapore Institute of International Affairs

UN

United Nations

UNCAR

United Nations Conventional Arms Register

USN

United States Navy

34

Participants Dr. Muthiah Alagappa Senior Fellow, Research Program East-West Center

Professor Shigekatsu Kondo Director, First Research Department National Institute for Defense Studies

Ms. Christine Bergado Membership Coordinator Pacific Telecommunications Council

Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese Professor Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Mr. Pete Bostwick Senior Regional Analyst Joint Research Center Pacific

Mr. Christopher Johnstone Research Fellow Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. Lee H. Endress Director, College of Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Mr. Mel C. Labrador Analyst, Asia Pacific Area Network Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

Mr. Butch F. Finley Associate Professor Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. Satu P. Limaye Director, Research Division Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. John Garofano Research Fellow JFK School of Government Harvard University

Dr. Shaun Narine Visiting Fellow East-West Center

Ms. Rosemary Greaves Head, Strategic Analysis Office of National Assessments

Ms. Maria Consuelo Ortuoste Chief, Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines

Mr. Jonathan Page Research Assistant Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. Denny Roy Research Fellow Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Ambassador Charles B. Salmon State Department Advisor Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Captain Robert G. Speer Director of Conference Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

LtGen (Ret) H.C. Stackpole President Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. Carlyle A. Thayer Professor Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

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