Thayer Consultancy ABN # 65 648 097 123
Background Briefing: Australia-Vietnam Defence Cooperation Carlyle A. Thayer September 6, 2009
[client name deleted]: Nong Duc Manh, Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist Party will visit Australia next week. I would like your assessment of defence cooperation between Canberra and Hanoi. Question 1. How do you assess Australia’s military role in the Asia-Pacific region? Answer: The Australian Defence Force is one of the most modern and capable military forces in Southeast Asia. It is modest in size, however. Australia’s past commanding military predominance has been eroded in recent decades, especially by Singapore and to a lesser extent Malaysia. Australia is bound by the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), along with New Zealand and the United Kingdom, to come to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore should they face external aggression. An Australian senior air force officer heads the operational component of the FPDA, namely the Integrated Areas Defence System. Australia regularly participates in multilateral military exercises with other FPDA members Australia has a defence treaty with Indonesia and cooperates closely with the Philippines. Australia has strong defence and security ties with Japan and South Korea. But Australian air and naval forces are unlikely on the own to decisively affect the power balance in Northeast Asia. Australian operations outside Southeast Asia are likely to be in coalition with other allies and like-minded countries. Australia’s most recent Defence White Paper outlines ambitious plans to increase defence spending with the acquisition of twelve conventional submarines and large numbers of advanced multi-role jet aircraft. At present, Australia is facing severe manpower shortages in operating its Collins class conventional submarines in addition to repeated technical problems with this new model. Australia’s military footprint in the larger Asia-Pacific is enlarged by its alliance relationship with the United States and the interoperability of their forces. Australian forces in Afghanistan are designed a NATO partner. The provision of US intelligence and technology is a force multiplier for Australia. Question 2. How do you assess defence cooperation between Australia and Vietnam up to now? Answer: Australia first established defence relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1999 when both sides agreed to extend defence attaches. Australia has initiated a Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) which has focused on small steps in areas that are not sensitive. Both sides collaborate in military medical research, especially on malaria. Australia provides assistance in English-language training with a particular focus on “train the trainer”, that is assisting Vietnam’s own military instructors who teach English as a foreign language. Australia makes its greatest impact in the provision of scholarships and funding for professional military education and training (PME). Australia regularly hosts Vietnamese officials at its staff college and senior officers course at the Australian Defence College. Recently Vietnam has sent a student to attend the Australian Defence Force Academy. Under
2 the DCP Australia also funds shorter term training courses for Vietnamese defence personnel, mainly in Australia but also overseas. Since 1999, over 150 Vietnamese officers have visited and studied in Australia under the DCP, including over forty officers who have received a Masters degree and nearly thirty senior officers have attended the Australian Defence College. Australia is probably the largest provider of this assistance to Vietnam. Both Australia and Vietnam cooperate in counter-terrorism. Vietnamese special forces have visited Australia and members of the Australian SAS will visit Vietnam later this year. Australia and Vietnam defence relations also include high-level visits and since 2001 bilateral defence cooperation talks. Defence and Foreign Affairs officials conduct an annual strategic dialogue. Australia would like to raise defence relations on a par with other ASEAN states but recognizes that this will only take place at a pace comfortable to Vietnam. Australia has offered assistance in peacekeeping but in all sensitive matters the Vietnamese have been slow to take up this offer. Question 3. Can Australia be of any assistance to Vietnam in dealing with the rising military threats from China especially in the South China Sea where Hanoi and Beijing have conflicting interests about the sovereignty on Spratlys and Paracels? Answer: Australia’s Defence White Paper and its projected defence build up has been widely read as a reaction to the rise of Chinese military power and lack of transparency with respect to China’s strategic intentions. Australia and Vietnam share a convergence of strategic interests, along with other countries such as the United States, in preventing China from becoming the hegemonic power in Southeast Asia and East Asia. Australia and Vietnam can coordinate their diplomatic and political efforts and at a defence level share strategic assessments of China’s military capabilities. If Vietnam requested, Australia might be able to provide niche training in technical areas to raise Vietnam’s overall capability. But Australia, however, is unlikely to be involved in providing direct military support to Vietnam vis-à-vis China. Any Australian military role with respect to China and the South China Sea is likely to be in concert with allies. Question 4. Can Vietnam benefit or profit from the recent tensions between Canberra and Beijing? Answer: The Australian Government has been at pains to quarantine friction in its relations with China arising from the arrest of Rio Tinto executive Stern Hu on charges of commercial espionage and issuing a visa to Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer. The Australian Foreign Minister has been at pains to stress the long-term nature of the relationship. Friction did not prevent PetroChina from signing a 20-year deal with ExxonMobil valued at $50 billion for liquefied natural gas from Gorgon project off the coast of Western Australia. This is reported to be the largest Australian trade deal. And Australia has joined the United States in issuing an invitation to the People’s Liberation Army to join in combined small scale land and naval exercises in the future. Given these developments Vietnam is best served by staying the course of maintaining good relations with both China and Australia and not trying to make some short-term gain by playing on fleeting differences. The larger strategic picture is how to adjust to China’s rise and how to contribute to making China’s rise peaceful.
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Background Briefing: Australia-Vietnam Defence Cooperation Carlyle A. Thayer August 4, 2009
[client name deleted] QUESTION: Can you provide an assessment of General Hurley’s [Australia Vice Chief of Defence] visit to Vietnam? What does he expect Vietnam to go further? What does Vietnam expect from Australian Army in direct way, as well as indirect way (a bridging role to be performed by Australia for Vietnam US military ties)? ANSWER: Australia and Vietnam first established defence relations in 1999. Australia and Vietnam have initiated a reciprocal Defence Cooperation Program (DCP). Under the DCP over 150 Vietnamese officers have visited and studied in Australia. Over forty Vietnamese officers have received a Masters degree in Australia and nearly thirty senior officers have attended the Australian Defence College. In April 2001 Vietnam and Australia conducted their first Defence Cooperation talks in Hanoi and these are now held annually. Lt. Gen David Hurley, vice chief of the defence force, visited Hanoi to attend the latest round of Defence Cooperation talks to plan for the future. Both sides agree to step up the exchange of visits and defence cooperation in such areas as training, military medicine, counter-terrorism, and border protection. The two sides also agreed to exchange views on UN peacekeeping operations. Australia seeks three objectives: first, to promote mutual understanding of each other’s defence establishments and how they operate; second, to raise defence cooperation with Vietnam on a level similar to that of other ASEAN members; and third, to promote Vietnam’s integration into the region in a way that will contribute to security in Southeast Asia. Australia seeks to achieve these objectives by conducting high-level dialogue, regular visits at all working levels and training exchange programs. The ultimate outcome would be to interact with the Vietnamese military at the operational level. Australia recognizes, however, that these objectives can only be met gradually “at a pace comfortable to all.” Vietnam seeks direct benefits from the Defence Cooperation Program in the form of English language training, the participation of its senior officers in advanced professional military and education training courses and funding to
2 attend a number of specialized seminars, workshops, conferences and shortcourses in Australia and overseas. Vietnam also seeks to gain knowledge about military technology, defence intelligence collection and analysis, air defence, the role of the special forces in counter-terrorism, and mine countermeasures. Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program provide Vietnam an opportunity to interact in Australia with military officials from across the Asia-Pacific including the United States. Through staff college and senior courses, Vietnam can gain a valuable insight into the perspectives and experiences of senior military officers in the Asia-Pacific. Such experience could be invaluable when Vietnam decides to make a contribution to UN peacekeeping. Australia is one of the top providers of military education and training for Vietnamese officers. The defence relationship with Australia primarily reflects the important role of the Ministry of National Defence and the Vietnam People’s Army in Vietnam and its promotion of Vietnam’s integration with the outside world. Vietnam can leverage this experience in its defence relations with the United States and other countries.