Terrorism Studies and South East Asia: Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis? Professor Carl Thayer School of Humanities and Social Sciences Seminar Presentation to Defence and Security Applications Research Centre July 13, 2007
Terrorism Studies z Not
a recognised discipline z Weak research methods z Nearly
half of terrorism literature written by political scientists z 80% of all research based on Englishlanguage secondary sources (mainly media reports) z 13% of articles rely on interviews (but only 1% are systematic or structured) z 6% of articles give no sources
Terrorism Studies z Weak
research methods
z Patterns
and relationships not being studied by use of inferential statistics
z Research
influenced by Government agenda and ‘terrorism industry’ z Media simplification z Phenomenon of ‘celebrity analysts’
Greg Sheridan’s 1st Proposition There has been an institutional failure by Australian universities and strategic community to seriously address the threat of terrorism, especially in Southeast Asia. 1. “there is not a single Australian researcher on Southeast Asian terrorism of international repute” “much of what they [universities] have come up with in terrorism research is rubbish. Much of it is postmodern theoretical nonsense…”
Greg Sheridan’s 2nd Proposition 2. “The strategic community has failed because of its continued paradigm paralysis, its chronic inability to regard terrorism as a serious strategic issue”. “Universities and think tanks can take comfort in the chummy common room embrace of dead paradigms. But, in doing so, they offer suboptimal service to their nation”.
Universities z
ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security z
z
Griffith University + ANU and University of Queensland
Macquarie University Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT) z Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (Postgraduate Study Pattern) z
z
Monash University z
z
Research Network for a Secure Australia z
z
Global Terrorism Research Centre Administered by the University of Melbourne
University of Wollongong z
Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention
Think Tanks z
Australian Strategic Policy Institute z
z
Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia (2005)
Lowy Institute
Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia (2005) z Mindanao A Gamble Worth Taking? (2006) z
z
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) z
The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 149 (2003)
Sheridan’s 3 Specialists z
Rohan Gunaratna z
z
Zachary Abuza z
z
Singapore-government funding, head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research Funding from U.S. think tanks – Smith Richardson Foundation, United States Institute for Peace
Sidney Jones z
Southeast Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group (ICG)
Rohan Gunaratna
Review of Inside Al Qaeda The most disappointing book [of 5 under review] is Rohan Gunaratna’s Inside Al Qaeda. Gunaratna… offers many interesting but poorly substantiated details. The book itself is more a data dump than a comprehensive analysis. Daniel L. Byman, World Politics (Oct 2003), 141.
Review of Inside Al Qaeda Of the five [books under review], Gunaratna’s book is the most problematic. Although it often overwhelms the reader in detail, many of its key claims…are unsupported. In addition, it often relies on intelligence reporting without so much as a hint of whether the material is from an interview, a document, or a media leak. Other claims advanced by Gunaratna deserve additional substantiation… Daniel L. Byman, World Politics (Oct 2003), 141.
Review of Conflict and Terrorism in
Southern Thailand
“Some are likely to see this book especially as just another output in Gunaratna's terrormongering academic exercises… Too many terror mongers are better than too few”. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Chulalongkorn University,
Contemporary Southeast Asia,
Arabinda Acharya, Sabrina Chua and Rohan Gunaratna, eds.
April 2006
Review of Conflict and Terrorism in
Southern Thailand
z z
Significant factual and interpretive errors undermine the credibility of the book “Overall, the critique demonstrates that various interpretations of what is happening in the South of Thailand remain plausible, and the article concludes that the authors of Conflict and Terrorism were too poorly equipped to deal with these competing interpretations to offer any insights into the conflict.” z
Michael Connors, ‘War on Error and the Southern Fire’, Critical Asian Studies, 38(1), 2006, 151-175.
Zachary Abuza
Review of Militant Islam It takes knowledge of language, history and, of course, Islam to conduct academic research on militant Islam. Sadly, Abuza has a minimum mastery of the relevant areas, and he is a fish out of water in this academic area… His minimal knowledge of Islam, and ignorance of Arabic, Indonesian or Malay and of Islam in Southeast Asia, led him to cull information for the book from secondary sources... This analysis has too many mistakes to serve as a reference book. Solahudin, Jakarta Post, December 7, 2003
Review of Militant Islam “According to some observers such as the Indonesian journalist Solahudin, Militant Islam is weakened considerably by Abuza's lack of familiarity with Islam, Arabic, Indonesian and Malay. It may be too harsh, however, as Solahudin does, to call the entire thesis of Militant Islam into question because of these shortcomings. Abuza's study, as long as read not in isolation but in tandem with other works, will still prove useful to counter-terrorism analysts and practitioners”. -Kumar Ramakrishna, Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2004
Review of Militant Islam “However, while such arguments contribute to the debate on terrorism and counter-terrorism in southeast Asia, overall, this book is a disappointment. It reads largely like a rough, unedited first draft, replete with inappropriate and factual inaccuracies. Regrettably, these serious, multiple shortcomings – many of which could have been mitigated by greater editorial diligence – imply that Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, as it stands, does not qualify as the authoritative reference on the subject that had been widely anticipated”. Tim Huxley, IISS, Survival, 46(3), 184.
Review of Militant Islam “It is tedious to recount the numerous errors of fact, spelling, and interpretation that plague Abuza’s work. This may explain why there has been so little published criticism of it. For country specialists, these errors expose a weak grounding in the history, geography, and culture of the peoples described. Unfortunately, the errors are reproduced by other regionalists drawing on Abuza”. -Kit Collier, Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, 35.
Sidney Jones z z z
z
Studied at university in Iran M.A. International Politics Asia Director, Human Rights Watch/Asia for 14 years Southeast Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group (ICG) since 2002
Greg Fealy & Kit Collier
ANU, ex-ONA
ANU, ICG
Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy
Malcolm Cook and Kit Collier
Greg Barton & David Wright-Neville
Monash, ex-APCSS
Monash, ex-ONA
Greg Barton
Marika Vicziany, David Wright-Neville, and Pete Lentini
Methodology z Google
search using “name” + terrorism z Scholar search using “name” + terrorism z Impact = Number of Google Hits divided by the number of Scholar hits (I = GH/SH) z Popular impression only z Dose not assess academic quality
Classification z z z z z z
A = Australian academics who write on terrorism generally (N= 40) ASEAS = Australian Southeast Asian specialists who write on regional terrorism (N= 12) MPA – Most Prolific Authors (N = 30) O = Overseas academics who write on terrorism generally (N = 14) SEA = academics in Southeast Asia who write on regional terrorism (N = 8) Total N = 104
Comparison of Sheridan’s 3 Specialists with Thayer’s 4 (sorted by impact) Academic
Classification
Google
Scholar
Impact
O
30,500
120
254
Jones, Sidney
SEA
24,700
118
209
Gunaratna, Rohan
SEA
76,200
535
142
Barton, Greg
ASEA
1,320
51
26
Collier, Kit
ASEA
257
10
26
Wright-Neville, David
ASEA
695
49
14
Fealy, Greg
ASEA
535
82
7
Abuza, Zachary
Comparison of Sheridan’s 3 with Australian Southeast Asian Specialists Academic Thayer, Carl/Carlyle Abuza, Zachary Jones, Sidney Gunaratna, Rohan Connors, Michael K. Kingsbury, Damien Barton, Greg Collier, Kit Wright-Neville, David Martin Jones, David
Google 14,328 30,500 24,700 76,200 646 33 1,320 257 695 916
Scholar 47 120 118 535 14 1 51 10 49 90
Impact 305 254 209 142 46 33 26 26 14 10
Average Academic Output on Terrorism Measured by Impact (July 5, 2007) Category
Most Prolific Authors Australian Southeast Asian specialists Southeast Asian terrorism specialists
Google
Scholar
Impact
11565
202
41
1729
49
42
13174
149
50
Australian terrorism specialists
1050
34
55
All categories
8334
119
58
25112
228
119
Overseas terrorism specialists
Top Ten Global Rankings by Google Hits Academic
Classification
Google
MPA
101,000
O
93,700
SEA
76,200
O
61,900
MPA
57,100
Pape, Robert
O
57,000
Burke, Jason
O
51,300
Abuza, Zachary
O
30,500
MPA
30,500
O
29,700
Hoffman, Bruce Bergen, Peter Gunaratna, Rohan Lacqueur, Walter Wilkinson, Paul
Ranstorp, Magnus Sageman, Marc
Top 11th-20th Global Rankings by Google Hits Academic
Clalssification
Google
Chalk, Peter
MPA
26,900
Jones, Sidney
SEA
24,700
Sandler, Todd
MPA
21,800
O
20,300
Horgan, John
MPA
19,000
Crenshaw, Martha
MPA
18,100
Thayer, Carl/Carlyle
ASEA
14,328
Williams, Clive
A
13,900
White, Robert
MPA
13,800
Israeli, Raphael
MPA
12,800
Richardson, Louise
Top 15 Global Rankings by Impact Academic
Classification
Scholar
Impact
Kara-Ali, Mustapha
A
1
514
Bergen, Peter
O
226
415
Williams, Clive
A
41
339
ASEA
47
305
Burke, Jason
O
183
280
Richardson, Louise
O
75
271
Abuza, Zachary
O
120
254
Townsend, Jacob
A
4
222
Williams, Don
A
3
218
Jones, Sidney
SEA
118
209
Ranstorp, Magnus
MPA
146
209
O
328
174
Gunaratna, Rohan
SEA
535
142
Horgan, John
MPA
139
137
A
82
127
Thayer, Carl/Carlyle
Pape, Robert
Moore, Andrew
Falsifying Sheridan’s Proposition 1 z
Australia does have researchers on Southeast Asian terrorism of international repute z z
z
Michael Connors, Greg Fealy, Greg Barton, Kit Collier, David Wright-Neville, David Martin Jones Harold Crouch, Virginia Hooker, Anthony Milner, John Funston, Damien Kingsbury
Australian academic terrorism specialists and Australian regional specialists regularly punch above their weight in terms of impact on the world wide web z
Andrew Moore, Carl Thayer, Jacob Townsend, Clive Williams, Don Williams
Greg Sheridan’s 2nd Proposition 2. “The strategic community has failed because of its continued paradigm paralysis, its chronic inability to regard terrorism as a serious strategic issue”. “Universities and think tanks can take comfort in the chummy common room embrace of dead paradigms. But, in doing so, they offer suboptimal service to their nation”.
What Hugh White Wrote z
z
“I think terrorism poses a serious threat of death and injury to individuals in our society and governments have an important responsibility to respond effectively to it. But the nature and scale of the threat have been seriously exaggerated since 9/11. “Terrorism, even nuclear terrorism, appalling though that would be, does not endanger the international system. It does not constitute a global Islamist insurgency and it cannot be effectively addressed by a Long War, as our failure in Iraq has made clear. Reshaping the Australian Defence Force to fight terrorism would therefore lead us up a blind alley whose dead end is already in plain view.” z
Hugh White, ‘Neighbourhood Watch’, Australian Literary Review, The Australian, June 6, 2007.
Al-Qaeda-Centric Paradigm
Three Key Questions How to characterize al Qaeda 2. How to account for change over time 3. How to assess the question of agency in al Qaeda’s relationship with militant and extremist groups in Southeast Asia 1.
Three Approaches z International Terrorism Experts z Rohan Gunaratna, Peter Bergen, Jason
Burke
z Regional security specialists z Zachary Abuza z ‘Singapore School’ z RAND affiliates z Country Studies Specialists z Sidney Jones, Greg Fealy, Greg Barton,
Kit Collier, Michael Connors
Al Qaeda-Centric Paradigm AQ paradigm has and continues to dominate the analysis of regional and international terrorist linkages • Pyramidal structure + global terrorist network + Afghan base + loose coalition of terrorist groups (Gunaratna 2002) • Central leadership + international network + front companies + membership cells in sixty countries (Abuza 2003) •
The Al Qaeda Paradigm •
Three common elements: • Al Qaeda hardcore • Scores of other militant Islamic groups • Others who subscribe to “the idea,
worldview, ideology of ‘al-Qaeda’” -Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (2003)
Change Over Time •
International and regional experts employ an approach characterized as ‘back to the future’ • 1988-91 Al Qaeda penetrated Southeast
Asia • 1993 World Trade Center bombing • 1995 Operation Bojinka
• organised by Ramsi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad
• Start point: Darul Islam (1948-mid-1960s)
The Question of Agency • •
• •
Southeast Asia as al Qaeda’s ‘second front’? Who or what represented ‘al Qaeda’ in its dealings with Southeast Asia in the formative period? Who represented Southeast Asia? Post-2001 initiative for terrorism in indigenous hands with al Qaeda remnants
Is Jemaah Islamiyah a threat to the Indonesian government? zI
don’t think it has any capacity to overthrow the government. Nor do I think it has any mass base support of any significance in Indonesia, although it certainly has some. For most Indonesians, it really is a radical fringe and one that most people would steer clear of. But it does have the capacity to engage in further terror (Sidney Jones, 2003).
JI and Global Jihad z “In
sum, JI has been able to survive because it has been able to link its jihad with that of other militant organizations in the region. JI has been able to forge a common cause, in the name of a global jihad, and this has led to exchanges of techniques, training, money and support.” Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (2007), p. 60.
z Z.
JI - Net Assessment z z z z
z
"In 2002, JI was probably at its height.” The Australian JI cell was "effectively dismantled" after the 2002 Bali bombings. JI lives on but it is "far weaker" confined to Indonesia with international contacts severed. "I don't think the threat to Australia comes from JI as an organisation but it is the most important recruiting group for young people.” "But we can't rule out another attack and that is likely to come from a splinter group." z
-Sidney Jones, Adelaide Advertiser, July 7, 2007.
Conclusion z
z z
Sheridan errs when he asserts that Australia’s strategic community does not take the threat of terrorism seriously Terrorism is not a strategic threat to the international system in Southeast Asia The threat of terrorism in our region is highly localised z
z
JI splinter groups and other extremists
Australia is better placed to rely on its own regional specialists rather than ‘celebrity analysts’
Terrorism Studies and South East Asia: Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis?
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