T8 B8 Miles Kara Docs (3) Timelines Fdr- On Top- 1-17-02 Transcript- Chief Michael Tamillow- Naval Historic Center

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SUBJ: REMAINING PRIORITY 9-11 ORAL HISTORIES All identified, DoD priority oral histories concerning the events on 9-11 and shortly thereafter have been delivered, with the following two exceptions: - BURROUGHS, Charles - National Airport Fire Department Only Abstract file is available and has been provided. Extensive search by the originator for the original audio file ended without locating it. - TAMILLOW, Chief Michael - Chief, Fairfax County Fire Department Only a partial transcript is available and has been provided. Extensive search by the originator only yielded the same partial audio and transcript files. Since this oral history was done over the phone, a technical problem could have occurred. Good faith efforts were made to locate the complete audio and/or transcript files of the above oral histories.

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U.S. Naval Historic Center 11 September Project Civilian Response Interview with Chief Michael Tamillow January 17th, 2002

[BACK-UP DISKETTE] REGINA: Okay. CHIEF, I want to thank you for taking the time to talk to me. I'm going to put a brief introduction on here for the sake of the transcriber. Okay? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Sure. REGINA: This is DR. REGINA T. EGARS [sp.] with the Naval Historical Center, one of this historians assigned to the Department of Defense documentation project from September 11th. I am on the phone with CHIEF TAMILLOW, with Arlington County Fire Department. CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: That's Fairfax County. REGINA: Oh, excuse me, Fairfax County, thank you, Fire Department. The time is approximately 3:15 on the 17th of January. CHIEF, I'd like to, us to start with you just telling me a little bit about how you came to work in this, in this field. CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Okay. Fairfax County has been involved in large scale disaster response since 1988. We respond internationally under the U.S. Agency for International Development and then domestically under FEMA with the Urban

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Search and Rescue Program. I was the original Program Manager for our Department's activities in this and so I've been involved in it ever since the very first day. REGINA: Oh, I see. I see. On that day, where were you when you first heard of what had happened or were informed that your unit needed to be called out? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Right. I was on-duty at my Fire Station in the Fair Oaks section of the County. And, I was in my office, one of the people on my shift came in and said, obviously, there was something on TV. I went in the day room and we were watching, you know, the incidents transpire in New York. We were, watched live the second plane come in. It was pretty clear then that it was, obviously, it was a terrorist incident. We thought we would probably be involved in the New York incident. And then, so I started making contacts at headquarters, notifying the Fire Chief and other senior staff. And then it was shortly thereafter that the Pentagon was struck. So, we knew, quite well, that we would be involved with that. REGINA: And, your unit, once you saw that, how long was it before you actually called out to the Pentagon? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Let me see, that happened about, what, 9

REGINA: About quarter to 9, about 9:15, between 9:15 and 9:30.

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CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Right. So, we started making contacts within about 10 minutes. I was told to report to headquarters to start planning activities. We started getting informal requests from Arlington County's dispatch center that they were probably going to want our Urban Search and Rescue Team. One of the things they weren't aware of is there is a triggering mechanism under the Stafford Act where a request has to go from the locality to the State of Virginia and then to the Federal Government. So, we helped them in the background with that. REGINA: I see. CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: At the same time, we were already activating our people. The general requirements for the FEMA process is to have your Team together within four to six hours, ready to go. We activated a number of times. We've been on five earthquakes. And, unfortunately, this is our third terrorist incident. So, we are pretty well practiced. And, we were able to pull all 70 people and 58,000 pounds of gear together in two hours. REGINA: That's incredible. Okay. So, you had an experienced Team going in? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yes, Ma'am. REGINA: Now, what was your exact title at that time? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: I was one of the two Taskforce Leaders who were in charge of the whole Team.

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REGINA: Okay. And, does your Team have a specification designation? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yes, it's called Virginia Taskforce 1. There's two Urban Search and Rescue Teams in Virginia and we are Taskforce 1 and then Virginia Beach is 2. So, that's why the different designations. REGINA: I see. CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: And we are called an Urban Search and Rescue Team. REGINA: And, so, in about two hours you were ready to go to the Pentagon? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yes. And then we had pulled all of our people together at a mobilization area at Fire Station 18, which is down in the Jefferson Village area, just off of Route 50. So, within about, literally, 15, 18 minutes from the time we left the County, we were on-scene at the Pentagon. REGINA: I see. Do you recall, CHIEF, what was your first reaction to what you saw there? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Well, like I said, we've had a fair amount of experience. It's pretty amazing, you know, we were seeing things on TV prior to this, just like Oklahoma City or Nairobi bombing. Whenever you actually walk up to, you know, the immediate front of one of these incidents, there's a significant aspect of feeling overwhelmed just by the enormity of it. But,

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pretty much, we don't have time to deal with the emotional aspect. We are dealing very systematically, very technically, in terms of checklists of actions that we need to take. So, we kind of have a systematic approach. Well, not kind of, we have a very systematic approach that we use, so, I was dealing more on, you know, that element. Who did I need to coordinate with in Arlington County, the FBI and the like? REGINA: Okay. Can you walk me through your response there? And, you mention that there's procedures already in place. Once you were on the site and just exactly what happened in terms of what your objectives were, your goals and that sort of thing, and walk me through that day. CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Okay. As soon as we got there, it's one of the general procedures we have, you certainly have to report in to local authority. Arlington County was clearly in command of this. We are there as a support element. So, I went to their forward command post, which was out on the lawn adjacent to the heliport and told them that Fairfax County was here. Like any incident, they are trying to subdivide it to assign people. So, we were assigned to handle what's called the rescue branch, meaning all the urban search and rescue type of activities. Arlington County and everybody there was, totally had their hands full with all this suppression and emergency medical activities. And that's clearly what our, you know, focus is,

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anyway. After that, before you can really get an Urban Search and Rescue Team operating, you have to find a location. Because, like I said, we are carrying about 58,000 pounds of gear. You have to start getting this equipment cache offloaded and opened up and equipment handed out so that people can go into operation. And, we've had experience on this on every mission. It's clearly, just, the first thing you have to do. The whole grass area on the west side of the Pentagon was a debris field, which is consequently an evidence field. We've learned that from working closely with the FBI on other terrorist incidents. I met with one FBI agent who was on the scene. We already understood they wouldn't want us to set up there, but, so we picked an adjacent area on the outermost grass part of the west lawn there where there wasn't any debris and started setting our equipment up. The first thing we want to do is get a size-up of the situation. What is it we are dealing with in terms of possible casualties, people trapped, the structural stability of the building? We have predetermined procedures. If we don't have immediate rescue spacing us within each Urban Search and Rescue Taskforce Team, we can put together two, what we term, Search and Recon Teams. They are a multidimensional team made up of command personnel, search personnel with dogs or electronic devices, rescue personnel, medical personnel, structural engineer, HAZMAT engineer and a safety officer. So, you have ten

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people from all those disciplines. We immediately deploy two of those once they had their tools and equipment that they needed to take with them. This was, literally, about 15 minutes after we hit the ground. So, while the rest of the Taskforce is setting up our full, what we call our base of operations, which is our equipment cache area, our tents for command and sleeping and eating and everything, the two Search and Recon Teams were deployed into the building itself. Everybody's where the direct impact was. We put one Team in on the left-hand side, what we call Division B, and the other Team on the right-hand side, which is called Division D. And, so, they started into their search and recon activities trying to assess, you know, any possible victims, structural conditions and the like. REGINA: As you are doing this, I should say, when you arrived there, you mentioned that you went to the forward command post, but, after you left there, who would have been the person that you would have reported to or would have overseen what you were doing there? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: It was still that forward operations officer at the command, at that forward command post. So, we just maintained touch with him, and, you know, kept him apprised of what we were doing. At the same time, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was sending three other Urban Search and Rescue Teams in and an Overhead Coordination Team for FEMA

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called an Incident Support Team. But we knew that'd be a number of hours away, in fact, it was late that night and the next day before they got in the 1ST because of, you know, flights being grounded. So, we pretty much handled, you know, the command and control for the Urban Search and Rescue Teams from our Taskforce until the other elements got in. REGINA: I see. And, can you explain for us exactly what the Incident Team reports their responsibility would be there, at that site? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yeah, for the Incident Support Team, they are there as a support function to the local jurisdiction, to Arlington County, to alleviate them of a lot of the details of the management of multiple Urban Search and Rescue Teams in terms of command and control and especially logistics support as there is extra blades, tools, food. We try to be zero impact on the locality. Instead of us coming in and then all of a sudden telling Arlington, well, we need all this stuff and they are already overwhelmed, instead, the Federal Government provides that overhead support and coordination for them. REGINA: Thank you. Can you describe for me, you mention about the two Teams on either sides of the actual . . . CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Impact area. REGINA: Where the plane hit, can you describe for me what you all were doing?

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CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yeah, they did a pretty detailed search and recognizance of the five stories on each side, five stories high to the left and the right of the impact. What was interesting for us, this was our first time that we had ever arrived at a significant disaster of this magnitude so quickly.' So, there was still a tremendous suppression or firefighting activity going on. Usually, by the time we get to an earthquake or, you know, another terrorist incident, things like that are clearly out. This was the case in Oklahoma City. So, not only were they having to do a very detailed analysis of, you know, structural stability, impacts, HAZMATs that might still be there, looking for possible victims and the like. They had to dovetail all their operations around ongoing, you know, firefighting activities, even including, you know, requiring, you know, supply their breathing, you know, SCBA breathing apparatus. Usually we don't have to do those type of things. So, that was a new dimension to it. The hardest thing is just getting an assessment of the structural stability, that's where our structural engineers come in. And it is certainly their thinking very technically, very systematically, but it's, there is no real black and white issues on this. There's no way they can say this area is absolutely safe and this area is not. Once they do an assessment of what they think the structural stability or instability is, then we have to start assessing,

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okay, what areas can we safely work in if we think, okay, there's a possibility of maybe victims in this area. That's a real limiting factor, areas you'd like to get into you can't until you can start getting in and structurally shoring the building. It turned out this incident was probably the largest shoring operating in the United States for an Urban Search and Rescue operation. REGINA: Is that right? .CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yeah, we went through, over the course of three and a half days of non-stop shoring with four Urban Search and Rescue Teams working around the clock in a consistent manner, we went through over five miles of dimensional lumber, 6 x 6 dimensional lumber. Reimposing shoring for 34 major structural columns that were taken out of the building. REGINA: Wow! Does that mean that you guys were, your Team of 60 some persons was then split up to work those continuous shifts? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Exactly. Yes. REGINA: Can you talk to me a little bit about how you all were organized? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yeah, the, it was about three or, we got on the scene about, right at 2:00. Montgomery County, Maryland's Taskforce, got in, I think, around 5:00, 5:00 to 6:00. They were the second Team in. Virginia Beach came in later that night, I think at 10:00 or 11:00. And, sometime in the middle of the

II night or the next morning, Tennessee's Taskforce was the fourth one in. Once we had everybody there, we go into round the, we were already in round the clock operations, but, once we had four Taskforces, Fairfax and Virginia Beach both worked the night time operational period from 7:00 at night until 7:00 the next morning. And during the day time operation it was Montgomery County and Tennessee. And, so, within each Team, the largest segment of the Team is the rescue component. And they're, that is the component that actually does the shoring and then would do any surgical rescues of any victims that are in there. So, each Team has four rescue squads that comprise the rescue component with two overhead rescue team managers. Each squad is composed of five rescue specialists and one rescue squad officer. So, you have a total of 24 for the four, and then two overhead, so, 26 of the people are in the Rescue Team. And, so, it's those rescue squads that work together, just around the clock, relieving each other, you know, as seamlessly as possible, to keep continued operations like that. REGINA: Now, were you working on 8-hour shifts or 12-hour shifts? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: 12. That's the actual work shifts, but then you have to get there an hour beforehand, before you come on, for coordination and everything, and then you have to stay

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an hour afterwards to coordinate with the other shift when they come on. So, you are actually working . . . REGINA: So there's a transitional period there. CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Yes, Ma'am, for that overlap. So, usually, most people are working 14, 16, 18 hours a day because once you are relieved off there's gear to clean-up and equipment to clean-up and the like. REGINA: Now, as a, as the person overseeing both components of this Team, what did you find most challenging? CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: Well, there's such a diversity of issues for somebody at my level. Trying to keep close coordination with Arlington County, make sure, making sure we were meeting their needs, dovetailing our operations in and around theirs, coordinating with the personnel from the Pentagon. I think, as you are obviously aware, there was a massive renovation going on prior to the attack. REGINA: That's right. CHIEF MICHAEL TAMILLOW: And, so, that was a real benefit because we had large company contractors on site that could, you know, get us trucks or cranes or whatever we need. So, there's a lot of coordination there. Trying to coordinate the feedback coming up from our HAZMAT personnel and our structure specialist and identifying, okay, the specific strategy and tactics we were going to use to either bring parts of the building down that were unsafe or the shore areas that were unsafe that could still

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remain standing, coordinating our efforts with the FBI for their evidence recovery and the documentation and removal of victims that were found. Coordinating our actions with what's called an NMRT, National Medical Response Team from the public health service that was brought in specifically to help us with decontamination aspects. Just insuring, keeping, you know, the Fire Chief and the senior staff back in the department apprised of what's going on and shoring that

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