T8 B3 Boston Center Terry Biggio Fdr- 9-22-03 2 Mfr And 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 749

Committee Sensitive MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) interview with Terry Biggio, Facility Deputy Manager, Boston Center. Type of event: Recorded Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: Chris

, FAA General Consul

Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. Background On 9-11 Biggio was assigned as Operations Manager Areas A and D with duty as OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) in conjunction with the Traffic Management Unit (TMU). Biggio reported to Glen Michaels, assistant deputy for Boston Center who was away on 9-11, and has since retired, and Heather Ackerman, an administrative manager who was away at a joint managers meeting on 9-11. Therefore, Biggio was the manager responsible for the performance of Boston Center on 9-11. Prior to becoming theOMIC, Biggio worked at Boston Center as a Quality Assurance officer, an instructor, an ATC supervisor, an Operations manager, a support manager, and as acting deputy. Biggio's statement signed on Sep 15, 2001 indicates that he worked the OMIC position from 0630-0958 EOT on the morning of 9-11. Morning of 9-11 On 9-11, after the morning rush was over, Daniel Bueno, the Traffic Management Supervisor, paged Biggio, who came to the TMU and was briefed by John Schippani and Bueno about a possible hijacking, based on three factors—no communications, transponder turned off, and possible unusual communications from the cockpit. They displayed AA11 as a primary target [no transponder] on the 46R (Boston Sector) radar display, which was being worked by ATC Peter Zalewski at the time. Zalewski had heard something unusual but was not sure what, so requested that the tape be pulled and replayed Bob Jones, Quality Assurance was asked to pull the tape and review for possible unusual communications. Jones told Biggio within minutes of the

threatening communication, and that the speaker clearly had a Middle Eastern accent, and had said something like "we have some planes" and "don't do anything stupid". Biggio had the Regional Operations Center and, he said, the Washington Operations Center on a speaker phone and immediately relayed that information. He perceived his subsequent role as a "conveyor of information to the ROC." According to Biggio, prior to 9-11, an airplane that had gone NORDO (no radio communication) was a frequent occurrence. An airplane that lost transponder was relatively infrequent, but not unheard of. An airplane that had seriously deviated from its course was indicative of a serious mechanical problem, and Biggio had never experienced those three factors in combination before. Those factors, when applied to AA11, were enough for Biggio to deem it necessary to contact ROC, but without the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts AA11 would have been recognized or labeled a hijack. Biggio noted that though he did not call the Washington Operations Center (WOC) directly to inform of the hijacking, he was placed in a conference call through the ROC that was being actively monitored, as far as he knows, by the WOC. The attack was not anticipated. He thought they would have gotten something from the aircraft, a special code Specifically, ATCs are taught that a hijack would include a covert sign from the cockpit, either use of the transponder code 7500, which flashes "HIJACK" on the data block for the flight on the ATCs TMU (traffic monitoring unit), or the pilot would have used covert language (the word "trip" to describe the airplane's course) to signal the ATC. In simulated hijack exercises the pilot would be in contact with the ATC, and they would be able to verbally confirm "7500" for a hijack, "7600" for a malfunctioning transponder, and "7700" for an emergency. Biggio stated that though there was no drill, simulated scenario, or previous reallife scenario that mirrored the events of 9-11, Boston Center was able to respond effectively through the benefit of numerous air traffic situations during the summer storm season and the combined extensive experience of the ATC staff. Biggio noted that part of Boston Center's subsequent ground stop success can be attributed to their authority over air traffic. Biggio was able to stop air traffic through the Sparta/Carmel air corridor and was able to ground stop Logan Airport directly. Biggion characterized the Traffic Management Unit function as the management of information by facilitation and as one of the better functioning parts of government. Information is free-flowing because of the need to deal with severe weather and with other constantly changing conditions. He noted three main points of the collective knowledge brought to bear on 9-11 by Boston Center: 1) Coordination and communication were key since the situation had not been planned for, but the instinct and capability to deal with crisis scenarios had been firmly developed; 2) quality personnel enabled solid communication in Boston Center, but Biggio had serious concerns after the impact at the Pentagon that his Center's urgency and information was not being translated to FAA operations nationally; and

3) the responsiveness of Boston Center allowed for the Sparta/Carmel corridor and all west bound traffic to be shut down, which saved valuable airspace for the coordination of the complete clearing of the skies to commercial air traffic. "Airplanes on the ground can't hurt you." Regarding Boston Center, FAA and the Military Pre-9/11 protocol for communicating a hijack threat to the military had been practiced by as far as Biggio knew they had never practiced intercept procedures. In such exercises all communication was handled through the ROC. Once the first WTC collision was reported, Biggio clearly believed it to be AA11, and communicated this to the open line with ROC. It is for this reason that Biggio was surprised to hear that military and civiliancontrollers in the New York region were still looking for AA11 after impact. Biggio noted that there is tension with the military at times over the use of airspace, specifically regarding use of the Whiskey 105 and 106 warning areas off the coast, but that the tension is normally negligible. Regarding crisis management preparation and response post-9/11 Biggio noted that ATC procedure has shifted from a service focus to a homeland security focus, and that some of this change in concentration was due to the critical incident stress debriefing for the ATCs post-9/11. Biggio believes both sides, FAA and military, need education on each-others procedures and capabilities. The Dynamic Simulation exercises required for ATCs pre-9-11 did not stress combined FAA/military scenarios, and Biggio is concerned his ATCs would not have been successful in coordinating a military intercept with United Airlines 175. He is extremely concerned with the air vulnerability of the nation's nuclear power plants. Since 9/11 he has experienced a scenario in which a fighter scramble had not reached a nuclear plant cap in time to escort an aircraft out. The incident had no adverse result, but served as an example of the need for quicker communication and response time, despite steps like the 24 hour DEN (Defense Event Network), increased attention to NORAC communication, and 360 degree "confidence turns" (an ATC supervisor can request a pilot perform a complete 360 degree circle if there is cause for suspicion of the aircraft). Biggio believes that permanent airspace caps over these high risk sites may be necessary. The ROC is central, he wouldn't say "clearing house," but they have the communication bridges. Training-wise they knew information had to go through the ROC because of experience with accidents in the past. Biggio was not aware of a "five-minute" standard concerning lost communications, per se. His perception was that a controller [and others] just keep going and quickly run though a mental checklist—check his own comms, try other company (in this case AA) planes, try AFRINC (ground-based communications system with the cockpit), and try Guard (UHF and VHF frequencies devoted specifically to emergency communications.)

Other Information He had communicated with his counterpart at New York Center, Bruce Barrett, and passed along what he saw—an aircraft that might be descending to Kennedy, following a "tear drop" course, and in coast track with perhaps an ELT On the tracking of primary-only targets he said that is accomplished based on the route of flight and that is why they were able to pick up AA11 when it ceased transponding. If it drops below coverage [of the en-route center] one assumption is that it broke up in flight. Danny [Bueno] had a hard time getting his point-out of AA11 across to New York Traffic Control—couldn't see it. Concerning ELTs (Emergency Locator Transmissions) Biggio said that a hard landing could cause such a transmission. An ELT is not a signal sent by pilot operators. It is clearly indicative of a crash. It was his "gut feeling" that it was AA11 that hit the first tower—the coast track, the ELT, and the fact it was descending. He told that to his TMU, to the ROC and to the ATM at Herndon. Final Comment Biggio believes that communication and information is key. He also believes that given a urgent situation, it is vitally necessary to be confidant that Boston Center know it is speaking with the right person to have the correct information, or request for information, immediately addressed. He believes that ATC supervisors now will recognize the unusual signs in their airspace that will indicate a possible terrorist event using aircraft, and that those supervisors will communicate immediately with TMU and Boston Center management officers of the suspicious activity. Biggio is extremely concerned though that this process, as well as it may work within Boston Center, will not translate into the rapid and effective national response needed to deal with a crisis akin to the 9-11 attacks. He would not, with confidence, have declared AA11 a hijack if it hadn't been for the cockpit communications.

[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 with Terry Biggio, Deputy of Facility, Boston Center. Type of event: Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: Chris

, FAA General Consul

Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. Background: Currently Terry Biggio is Deputy of Facility for Boston Center. On 9/11 Biggio was Operations Manager Areas A and D for one and half years with duties as OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) in conjunction with the Traffic Management Unit (TMU). Biggio reported to Glen Michaels, assistant deputy for Boston Center who was away on 9/11, and has since retired, and Heather Ackerman, an administrative manager who was away at a joint managers meeting on 9/11. Biggio was the manager overall responsible for Boston Center on 9/11. Prior to being OMIC, Biggio worked with Boston Center as a Quality Assurance officer, an ATC teacher, an ATC supervisor, an Operations manager, a support manager, and as acting deputy. On 9/11, Daniel Bueno paged Biggio, who came to the TMU and was briefed by John Schippani and Bueno. They showed Terry AA11 on the 46R radar display, which was

being worked by Peter Zilowski at the time. Bob Jones was asked to pull the tape recording for AA11 to review for possible unusual communications. Jones told Biggio immediately of the threatening communication, and that it the speaker clearly had a middle eastern accent, and had said something like "we have some planes" and "don't do anything stupid". Biggio immediately relayed this information to the Regional Operations Command (ROC). According to Biggio, prior to 9/11, an airplane that had gone NORAC (no radio communication) was frequent. An airplane that lost transponder was relatively infrequent, but not unheard of. An airplane that had seriously deviated from its course was indicative of a serious mechanical problem, and Biggio and never experienced such a serious deviation before. These three factors, when applied to AA11, were enough for Biggio to deem it necessary to contact ROC, but without the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts AA11 would have been recognized or labeled a hijack. Specifically, ATCs are taught that a hijack would include a covert sign from the cockpit, either use of the transponder code 7500, which flashes "HIJACK" on the data block for the flight on the ATCs TMU (traffic monitoring unit), or the pilot would have used covert language (the word "trip" to describe the airplane's course) to signal the ATC. In simulated hijack exercises the pilot would be in contact with the ATC, and they would be able to verbally confirm "7500" for a hijack, "7600" for a malfunctioning transponder, and "7700" for an emergency. Biggio noted that though he did not call the WOC directly to inform of the hijacking, he was placed in a conference call through the ROC that was being actively monitored, as far as he knows, by the WOC. Biggio noted that though there was no drilled simulated scenario, or previous real-life scenario that mirrored the events of 9/11, Boston Center was able to respond effectively through the benefit of numerous air traffic threats during the summer storm season and the combined extensive experience of the ATC staff. Biggio noted that part of Boston Center's success can be attributed to their authority over

air traffic. Biggio was able to stop air traffic through the Sparta/Carmel passage and was able to ground stop Logan Airport directly. Biggio noted three main points of the collective knowledge brought to bear on 9/11 by Boston Center 1) Coordination and communication were key since 9/11 's situation itself had not been planned for, but the instinct and capability to deal with crisis scenarios had been firmly developed; 2) quality personnel enabled solid communication in Boston Center, but Biggio had serious concerns after the impact at the Pentagon that his Center's urgency and information was not being translated to FAA operations nationally; and 3) the responsiveness of Boston Center allowed for the Sparta/Carmel corridor and all west bound traffic to be shut down, which saved valuable airspace for the coordination of the complete clearing of the skies to commercial air traffic. Regarding Boston Center, FAA and the Military: Pre-9/11 protocol for communicating a hijack threat to the military had been practiced by as far as Biggio knew they had never practiced intercept procedures. In such exercises all communication was handled through the ROC. Once the first WTC collision was reported, Biggio clearly believed it to be AA11, and communicated this to the open line with ROC. It is for this reason that Biggio was surprised to hear controller for the New York region were still looking for AA11 after impact. Biggio noted that there is tension with the military at times over the use of airspace, specifically regarding use of the Whiskey 105 and 106 space off the coast, but that this tension is normally negligible. Regarding crisis management preparation and response post-9/11: Biggio noted that ATC procedure has shifted from a service focus to a homeland security focus, and that some of this change in concentration is due to the critical incident stress debriefing for the ATCs post-9/11. Biggio believes both sides, FAA and military, need education on each-others procedures and capabilities. The Dynamic Simulation exercises required for ATCs pre-9/11 did not stress combined FAA/military scenarios, and Biggio is concerned his ATCs would not have been successful in coordinating an intercept with

United Airlines 175. He is extremely concerned with the air vulnerability of the nation's nuclear power plants. Since 9/11 he has experienced a scenario in which a fighter scramble had not reached a nuclear plant cap in time to escort an aircraft out. This incident had no adverse result, but served as an example to Biggio of the need for quicker communication and response time despite steps like the 24 hour DEN (Defense Event Network), increased attention to NORAC communication, and 360 degree "confidence turns" (an ATC supervisor can request a pilot perform a complete 360 degree circle if there is cause for suspicion of the aircraft). Biggio believes that permanent airspace caps over these high risk sites may be necessary. Recommendations: Biggio believes that communication and information is key. He also believes that given a urgent situation, it is vitally necessary to be confidant that Boston Center know it is speaking with the right person to have the correct information, or request for information, immediately addressed. He believes that ATC supervisors now will recognize the unusual signs in their airspace that will indicate a possible terrorist event using aircraft, and that those supervisors will communicate immediately with TMU and Boston Center management officers of the suspicious activity. Biggio is extremely concerned though that this process, as well as it may work within Boston Center, will not translate into the rapid and effective national response needed to deal with a crisis akin to the 9/11 attacks.

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