T8 B3 Boston Center Peter Zalewski Fdr- 2 Mfr And 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 753

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C. Type of event: Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238 7045] Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Please refer to the recorded interview for a complete account.

Zilowski has been with the FAA since 1982. He has been with ZBW for his entire career, but spent a short period of time with Area E. On 9/11 Zilowski took a position at Hampton 31 at about seven o'clock, he then went over to R46 Boston High Sector (24k ft. and above). AA11 was handed off to him, and he climbed the flight first to FL 280, then to FL 290 for normal spacing procedures. He turned AA11 twenty degrees right to expedite the climb, and AA11 responded. Fairly soon thereafter he climbed them to FL 350, but AA11 did not respond. He tried calling AA11 again, since he wanted to turn AA11 back on course. AA11 started to move into the arrival route for Logan, and Zilowski became concerned. Zilowski changed his transmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everything checked out he attempted to reach AA11 on the 121.5 guard code. He checked previous sector frequency, and tried to contact the flight's company to establish communication. Zilowski became even more concerned as AA11 started to approach another sector's airspace. As these factors persisted and Zilowski still did not hear from the pilot of AA11, he noted that the situation was highly unusual. When the transponder had first shut off, Zilowski had told his supervisor, John Shippani, quietly. He then explained to Shippani what he had done to attempt to communicate with AA11. At this point hijacking had not occurred to Zilowski. He kept track of AA11 's primary, and still had no reading on its altitude. As AA11 starts to turn Zilowski heard a strange voice over the frequency. He noted that since he had experience at air route with heavy international traffic, an Arabic pilot's COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE

voice wasn't unusual to him. But in this sector, Zilowski noted that most pilots are American, so he thought the Arabic voice was out of place. Zilowski could not distinguish the message in the first transmission. It was the second transmission that he heard clearly. He "screamed" to his supervisor, and told him of the hijack. He put AA11 on the loudspeaker for the section. He had no RA to assist, and asked for an immediate "D" side. He concentrated on listening for communication from AA11 and, once Greg Tichini became his RA, gave Tichini all the planes in his sector. Zilowski firmly believes that the communication from the hijacker was meant for the passengers to hear, and is adamant that it did not come from the American Airlines pilot keying the microphone, Zilowski also stated that UAL175 heard the transmission from AA11 since they were on the same frequency. After the second communication Zilowski thought AA11 was headed back to Logan Airport, and was worried that it would turn back into the departures. He wanted to get another supervisor since he did not think Shippani was taking the situation seriously, and stated that he requested Bob Jones pull tapes to check the transmission. When AA11 continued on a southbound heading Zilowski thought it was headed to Kennedy. He gave the handoff to Athens Area B put Athens hadn't cleared the airspace yet, Athens picked up Zilowski's point out, but Zilowski kept monitoring the frequency in case of a further transmission. Zilowski handed control of his airspace over to Tichini once Athens took over tracking the flight. Zilowski then left the building for a break. Zilowski was informed of the first WTC hit from his parents, and stated he immediately knew it was AA11. Tichini told Zilowski of the second WTC hit of UAL175. 9/11 Personal Privacy

Zilowski explained to Commission staff that "Nordo" indicates no radio, whereas "Norac" indicates no radio communication. So AA11 was officially Norac. Zilowski also explained that when a transponder goes off the computer will automatically attribute a data tag with a call sign to the primary. Post 9/11 Zilowski believes the air travel is safer, and believes supervisors and the FAA take security much more seriously. He noted that pilots should be more involved in staying aware of the need for continued vigilance, and is worried the "system" may become complacent as time distances memory from the attacks. He noted that the rapport between pilots and ATCs is going away, and believes there should be more interaction between the two groups to better secure air traffic.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

Commission Sensitive MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with Peter Zalewski, Air Traffic Control Specialist Area C. Type of event: Recorded Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238 7045] Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. Background Zalewski has been with the FAA since 1982. He has been with Boston Center Area C (Boston Sector) for his entire career, but spent a short period of time with Area E. Because of shift swaps he had worked until 11pm the night before and then came back on duty on 9-11 as the Radar Controller, Boston High Sector (24,000 feet and above), R46. Morning of 9-11 Zalewski started at the Hampton, R31, sector at about seven o'clock and then went over to R46. AAl 1 was handed off to him routinely from Bosox Sector (lower altitude), and he climbed the flight first to FL 280, then to FL 290 for normal spacing procedures. He turned AAl 1 twenty degrees right to expedite the climb, and AAl 1 responded. Fairly soon thereafter he directed them to FL 350, but AAl 1 did not respond. He tried calling AAl 1 again, since he wanted to turn AAl 1 back on course. AAl 1 started to move into the arrival route for Logan, and Zalewski became concerned. Zalewski changed his transmitters and receivers to check his own equipment, and when everything checked out he attempted to reach AAl 1 on the 121.5 guard code. He checked previous sector frequency, and tried to contact the flight's company to establish communication. Zalewski became even more concerned as AAl 1 started to approach another sector's airspace. These factors persisted and Zalewski still did not hear from the pilot of AAl 1. He told Staff that the situation was highly unusual. When the transponder shut off

Zalewski quietly told his supervisor, Jon Schippani, about that additional development and explained to him what he had done to attempt to communicate with AA11. At that point the possibility of a hijacking had not occurred to Zalewski. He kept track of AA11 's primary, but had no reading on its altitude. As AA11 started to turn Zalewski heard a strange voice over the frequency. Since he had experience on an air route with heavy international traffic (Area E), an Arabic voice wasn't unusual to him. But in Boston sector, he told Staff that most pilots are American, so he thought the Arabic voice was out of place. Zalewski could not distinguish the message in the first strange transmission. It was the second transmission that he heard clearly. He "screamed" to his supervisor, and told him of the hijack. He put the AA11 frequency on the loudspeaker for the section. He had no RA to assist, and asked for an immediate "D" side. [A "D" side at Boston Center is a Radar Associate who assists the Controller] He concentrated on listening for communication from AA11 and, once Greg Taccini became his RA, gave Taccini all the planes in his sector to handle. Zalewski firmly believes that the communication from the hijacker was meant for the passengers to hear, and is adamant that it did not come from the American Airlines pilot keying the microphone. Zalewski also stated that UAL175 must have heard the transmission from AA11 since they were on the same frequency. After the second communication Zalewski thought AA11 was headed back to Logan Airport, and was worried that it would turn back into the departures. He wanted to get another supervisor since he did not think Schippani was taking the situation seriously, and stated that he requested that Bob Jones [Quality Assurance] pull tapes to check the transmission. When AA11 continued on a southbound heading Zalewski thought it was headed to Kennedy. He gave a handoff on AA11 to Athens Sector, Area B, but Athens hadn't cleared the airspace yet. Athens picked up Zalewski's point out, but Zalewski kept monitoring the frequency in case of a further transmission. [Note: even though Zalewski handed off AA11 the airplane remained on the R46 frequency and had to be monitored from that positon.] Zalewski handed control of his airspace over to Taccini once Athens took over tracking the flight. Zalewski then left the building for a break. Zalewski was informed of the first WTC hit from his parents, and stated he immediately knew it was AA11. Taccini told Zalewski of the second WTC hit of UAL175. 9/11

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Additional Points Zalewski explained that "Nordo" indicates no radio, whereas "Norac" indicates no radio communication. So AA11 was officially Norac. Zalewski also explained that when a transponder goes off the computer will automatically attribute a data tag with a call sign to the primary. Post 9/11 Zalewski believes air travel is safer, and believes supervisors and the

FAA take security much more seriously. He noted that pilots should be more involved in staying aware of the need for continued vigilance, and is worried the "system" may become complacent as time distances memory from the attacks. He noted that the rapport between pilots and ATCs is going away, and believes there should be more interaction between the two groups to better secure air traffic. [Staff Note: Zalewski broke down at this point and he was given the opportunity to collect his thoughts. When the interview reconvened Staff made the offer to continue with the recorder off. Zalewski gratefully accepted the offer and the following information is based on notes only.] His Personal Experience Zalewski reiterated that the second unusual communication was "not good," it "scared the hell out of me." He screamed for the supervisor, "Jon, get over here right now." He had no Radar Associate and tried to get the AA11 frequency on speaker and "tried to do 95 things at once." He did not "hear" the phrase "we have some planes" at the time it was spoken. Subsequently, the "FBI didn't talk to him." Zalewski feels wronged and that undue heroic credit has gone to the pilot of AA11, John Olangowski. "The keying part is a myth," Zalewski said. People do not know what happened. Someone in the building had talked to the media about events and Zalewski went to the front office and said, "I want to know who did this, find him and fire his ass." Zalewski is proud of his career. In 22 years he "never had an operational error, unusual in this building." "People" claimed that controllers talked to the media and a transcript was out in the public domain. He recalled that a controller offsite was held on Thursday (Sep 13) and he recalls saying in that forum, "that's not right," "that's not what I remember." His point was (and is) that his story has never been told and that the story in the public domain is not accurate. He only talked to Tom Brokaw—he was asked to do so and he said he would. At that point Zalewski returned to the main story. He said to Schiappani, "What are they saying?" "What are they saying?" (the cockpit communications) He recalled that "Jon goes away." [Note: Schiappani saw his role as the go between to the watch desk and he focused his efforts on keeping his supervisors informed.] UA175 was on his frequency and AA11 had not gone off the frequency. He asked for a "D" side immediately. Jon "had sauntered off.. .no sense of emergency." "I wanted a supervisor immediately." He recalled that other controllers looked at him as if he was crazy. [Staff Note: At this juncture Zalewski voluntarily made the statement "Here's a gay air traffic controller" shouting and screaming. Staff made no comment and did not pursue the issue.] He wanted the speaker on "loud" so that everyone could hear what he was experiencing. He went to Greg (Taccini) his RA and he was helpful but was "freaking out himself." At that point management combined sectors and took all the planes and gave them to Greg so that AA11 was singly on that one frequency. As above, his first thought was that AA11 was "returning to the airport," and thought "Boston." But then he asked himself the question, why aren't they shutting

traffic off. He then got a supervisor [other than Schiappani], I "finally got one." He wanted "someone with me, someone behind me... .1 could make the decisions." Quality Assurance had been notified and Bob Jones came to the Sector. Zalewski said, "I freaked out on him" and said, "some one has to pull these fucking tapes," "right now." He did not understand the first transmission, "they [hijackers] weren't even talking to us." He volunteered that, minus the cockpit communications, he would not have considered it to be a hijacking until much later. Returning to the arrival of Jones, Zalewski said, "he got it." "He felt what I felt." After Jones called back with the results of the re-listen [we have some planes] we began shutting off traffic. He said, "You see Mineta on TV saying we shut off traffic. That's not what happened." Zalewski thought "he [AA11] was going to JFK, that's exactly what I thought." Another supervisor came over [other than Jones], he "didn't get it." Then came the third transmission [approximately 0933] and Mark O'Neil said, "that's really scary." After that the "place got quiet." Even though he had handed off AA11 to Sector R38 he kept watching. After the first impact Zalewski was taken off position and he went to his car and called his parents. He was alone in the parking lot and "he knew it was AA11," but did not equate AA11 to terrorism. He had to hang up on his parents. At that point Greg Taccini came out to the parking lot and said he had seen a second aircraft impact and knew it was UA175. Zalewski's response was "who is 175," "you worked him." I never climbed him," he was stuck at FL 230. Zalewski said the union realized they had to do something. I though I "was going to have a nervous breakdown." They brought us into the union office and I "could hardly write a statement." He asked, "get these people away from me." [Note: Zalewski's statement is dated November 2, 2001 Zalewski's Observations (In response to a question about recommendations he might have) Zalewski stated that "security has gone overboard." He asked rhetorically why pilots aren't given letters. We [controllers] are always monitored. Where is the check and balance with the pilots? Earlier, Zalewski had characterized "NORDO" as a common occurrence because of pilot inattention—drinking their coffee and doing other things.

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