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•^Select for FOCUS™ or Delivery D Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Texa^-j&iHtaFy 10, 2001, Wednesday Copyright 2001 Star-Telegram Newspaper, Inc. Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Texas) January 10, 2001, Wednesday FINAL EDITION SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 1 LENGTH: 926 words HEADLINE: Air rage prompts call for safety measures; The FAA is expected to release a report today BYLINE: Bryon Okada; Star-Telegram Staff Writer BODY: In August, a man attacked the cockpit door of a Southwest Airlines flight bound for Salt Lake City until he was killed by other passengers who were restraining him. Last month, a man attacked crew members near the cockpit of a British Airways flight to Nairobi, Kenya, grabbing the controls and causing the plane to dive. "It was real quick chaos. There was no doubt in my mind we were going to die," said Clarke Bynum of Sumter, S.C., who helped subdue the attacker, enabling pilots to regain control. The Federal Aviation Administration is expected today to release statistics on incidents of so-called air rage. But aviation workers say they are most worried about the frequency of in-air attacks on pilots and crew members. Two such incidents recently resulted in deaths. To defuse such situations and protect people on airplanes, aviation experts have begun to explore several strategies, including bulletproof cockpit doors and passenger profiling. Some strategies are controversial and will require agencies to overcome jurisdictional conflicts to implement changes, officials said. "It's a complex issue, and it's going to take cooperation from a lot of different agencies, although that level of communication is hard to come by in the aviation industry," said Mike Sheffer, air safety activist and director of the Skyrage Foundation in Charlotte, N.C. Some proposed changes include armoring the cockpit, identifying passengers who have crisis management skills to aid flight crews, creating a database of problem passengers and training crews to defuse hostile situations.

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7/28/2003

Results - cockpit AND intrusion

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AA regulations call for a frangible cockpit door, meaning it must be able to break from its frame and prevent pilots from becoming trapped inside. But many times, a door is not enough to protect pilots or airplane controls from an enraged passenger, aviation officials said. One proposal calls for a nonmetalic door, made of composite materials similar to a water ski, that is bulletproof, slashproof, ramproof and, to some extent, blastproof. The door is being designed by TTF Aerospace of Tukwila, Wash., a maker of aircraft interior components. "It's a passive solution, and from the appearance there is no way you could know it was an armored door," company President Tim Morgan said. A concern with an armored cockpit is whether the door would be an obstacle in an emergency, pilots said. The TTF Aerospace model meets airline and FAA regulations and incorporates European standards, according to Stephen Luckey, chairman of the national security committee for the Air Line Pilots Association. "But even if you make a vault out of the door, if they have a rope around my flight attendant's neck, I'm going to open the door," said Luckey, a Northwest Airlines captain. He recently recommended that airlines begin compiling a database of passengers with crisis management skills - police officers, psychologists, doctors, military personnel - so that a pilot could call a passenger for help during an air rage incident. Passengers on international flights are shielded from being sued if they help during an air rage emergency. Legal immunity is not extended to domestic flights. "Based on last year's cockpit intrusions, two of which resulted in fatalities, the only commonality is that passengers saved the day and they did this on their own," Luckey said. Computer-assisted passenger screening is used on some international flights, but it relies on passengers to volunteer information and focuses on passengers with crisis management skills. It has met with some negative feedback, particularly from flight attendants. "It's ridiculous," said Kathy Lord-Jones, national safety coordinator for the Association of Professional Flight Attendants. "I know ALPA has good intentions, but to put our passengers through some screening on employment is not realistic." Safe Software Ltd. of Birmingham, England, has developed a software package that creates a database of potentially disruptive passengers. General data, such as the number of air rage incidents at a particular airline, would not be shared among airlines because

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Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc. (f/k/a Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.) FDCH Political Transcripts September 20, 2001, Thursday TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING LENGTH: 31938 words COMMITTEE: SENATE COMMERCE HEADLINE: U.S. SENATOR ERNEST HOLLINGS (D-SC) HOLDS HEARING ON FEDERAL AVIATION SECURITY STANDARDS SPEAKER: U.S. SENATOR ERNEST HOLLINGS (D-SC), CHAIRMAN LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C. WITNESSES: NORMAN MINETA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION JANE GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR AT THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES AT THE, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE JOHN MEENAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION CAPTAIN DUANE WOERTH, PRESIDENT OF THE AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION CHARLES BARCLAY, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT, EXECUTIVES PAUL HUDSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AVIATION CONSUMER ACTION, PROJECT BODY: U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION HOLDS HEARING ON FEDERAL AVIATION SECURITY STANDARDS SEPTEMBER 20, 2001 SPEAKERS: U.S. SENATOR ERNEST F. HOLLINGS (D-SC) COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN U.S. SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE (D-HI) U.S. SENATOR JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV (D-WV) U.S. SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY (D-MA) U.S. SENATOR JOHN B. BREAUX (D-LA) U.S. SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN (D-ND) U.S. SENATOR RON WYDEN (D-OR) U.S. SENATOR MAX CLELAND (D-GA) U.S. SENATOR BARBARA BOXER (D-CA) U.S. SENATOR JOHN EDWARDS (D-NC) U.S. SENATOR JEAN CARPENTER CARNAHAN (D-MO) U.S. SENATOR BILL NELSON (D-FL)

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11/24/2003

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fundamentally changed. And whether it's federalized or a not-for-profit corporation, those are two alternatives. MCCAIN: Mr. Secretary, the rapid response task force is going to report to you on October 1. How quick are you going to have a legislative package up for us after that? MINETA: Even though, Senator McCain, the report or the task force report will come to me, every day we are staying in touch with those task forces, in terms of their recommendations. So it's not that I'm waiting until the 1st of October. But as soon as that report comes in, we will have specific legislative recommendations where they are necessary. MCCAIN: Ms. Garvey, do you . . . MINETA: Some of it may be possible, given present law and given the appropriations that was passed last week. MCCAIN: Ms. Garvey, do you believe that there is anything within reason that the FAA could have done differently to prevent the tragedy that happened last Tuesday? GARVEY: I've asked myself that every single day, senator. I think we always, whenever there is a tragedy like this, you have to ask yourself that question. Are there things that you could have done differently? I do think, in the face of an individual who was willing to commit suicide, in the face of an individual who was willing to use a plane as a weapon, it was a very difficult situation. It has changed the way we think of our own security. All of our security directives — and I spoke with Ken Mead about this at length yesterday — all of our security recommendations in the past have been geared toward explosives. If you look at many of the recommendations that the IG has put forward and the GAO and our own, it has had to do with combating explosives. This was a whole new world for us. MCCAIN: Let me point out, in September '96, the Gore Commission asked that security screening companies develop uniform training procedures for all security screening personnel. In its 2000 report, the inspector general for the Department of Transportation discussed a test that it conducted, which the IG sent an armed individual through secure areas in airports, in some cases illegally boarded an aircraft. We've had study after study, commission after commission come before this committee and issue reports and recommendations that called for significant changes. GARVEY: To the screeners in particular, senator. MCCAIN: On a broad variety of areas. And in all candor, many of those recommendations were either not taken seriously enough or not implemented. GARVEY: Senator, just one note on the screeners. As the secretary mentioned, the training requirements are ready to go. Quite honestly, we have pulled all those back and saying, given what we see now, are those really the right requirements that we want to put in place? MCCAIN: Do you have aviation security equipment now sitting in warehouses because we don't have the lack of funds for installation? GARVEY: We have had some difficulties with the equipment, yes. MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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STAFF WORKING PAPER

I.

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY; OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

The most important objectives to achieve in order of priority for both the domestic and international systems are listed below. Everyone agreed that improving domestic checked baggage screening for explosives (for both international and domestic flights) is our numfeer one priority, requiring the construction of a consensus of support within FAA, the Department, the Administration, the industry and Congress for the measures listed below under Priority 1. A similar effort will be required for checkpoint screening improvements, covered by items listed under Priority 2. Airport assaults, off airport attacks and the surface-to-air missile threat were all discussed, but no specific countermeasures to those threats are offered below, while recognizing that some of the following measures will have some ancillary effect on these threats. Responses to related White House Commission recommendations will address some of these concerns. We fully realize that implementation of the proposed priorities for domestic aviation security listed below will be expensive, and will have a tremendous impact upon operations, causing delays and confusion if they were to be applied unwisely and without proper planning and preparation. On the other hand, the FAA by itself is unable to conduct a sufficient number of simultaneous demonstrations and operational tests of combinations of equipment and procedures to both gather data and provide a visible, realistic deterrent systemwide. Therefore, air carriers and airports, in the spirit of partnership encouraged by the White House Commission and its consortia, should be encouraged to mix and match the countermeasures offered below or perhaps suggest others, with some degree of freedom after consultation with the FAA, to see what works well and what does not in an airport environment. In such a cooperative effort, much could be learned while providing a level of deterrence and unpredictability heretofore unknown. The public would notice. In this context, it is useful to remember that ACS communicates directly with its customers on a regular basis through the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, seeking their advice and information on a multitude of issues. The priorities for ACS and civil aviation security all relate to the work of commissions, committees and laws that provide us with direction and requirements we must follow. The following list was created to allow reference to specific sections of laws or recommendations: White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Aviation Security Advisory Committee Baseline Working Group Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

WHC BWG FARA96 OCAA97 PCCIP

As an example, "WHC 3.15" would refer to Commission recommendation 3.15 on deployment of technology; "FARA96--305" would indicate that the same topic was discussed under Section 305 of the Act; "OCAA97" would mean that funding had been provided by that Act; "BWG" or "PCCIP" would indicate that those groups made recommendations on technology deployment. The order of the list of priorities reflects our corporate view of the relative ranking of the objectives listed. There is always concern about such rankings; any list regardless of content that does not follow

DISCUSSION PAPER

BOMB THREAT RESPONSE

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DECEMBER 1984

Prepared By The Bomb Threat Response Task Force Lloyd Anderson-EA/ALPA John Besrdslee-RC/ATA Security Committee Dick Childs-FL/ATA Security Committee Jack Hunter-FAA Dan Korseniowski-PHL/AQCt Security Committee

Walt Korsgaard-FAA Dick Lally-ATA Doyle Reed-MEM/AOCI Security Committee John Steele-TWA/ATA Security Committee

AA KEAN COMM 008436

I.

INTRODUCTION

This papct proposes the development of a conmon strategy to guide all concerned parties in responding to bomb threats against U.S. Civil Aviation interests. Such a strategy is already available to those involved lit the management of airline hijacking incidents, but, there is an absence of a similar, commonly accepted approach vith respect to bomb threats against airline aircraft or airports.

The number of bomb threats aga-inst aircraft and the number against airports exceed by & hundred fold the number of hijacking incidents.

The lack of a

common strategy to deal with bomb threats seems all the more remarkable when it is considered that a potential bomb explosion, on its face, presents a greater danger to life and property than does the typical U.S. airline hijacking. Moreover, in terns of in-flight emergencies, not only have there been more aircraft bomb threats than hijackings, but there have been more airline flight diversions, more emergency passenger evacuations and more related injuries attributable to bomb threats than to any other type of in-flight emergency.

Currently aircraft searches are conducted whenever a threat is "considered to be directed towards a particular aircraft or flight" (Air Carrier Standard Security Program - X.A.I).

In essence, the airlines search whenever the threat

is specific enough for a search to be feasible.

During the decade 1973 through

1982, 6,686 bomb threat related aircraft searches were conducted resulting in the discovery of 2 simulated explosive devices. One consequence of our inability to pinpoint a genuine threat with greater accuracy has been that, over the years responses to bomb threats have been inconsistent and to a great extent have evolved into "by-rote" reactions without intelligent analysis of the threat at hand or application of the extensive experience that is available.

The likelihood of

-1AA KEAN CO MM 008438

THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION Outlook for Terrorism in the United States The consensus among terrorism analysts at the U.S. government agencies participating in the BWG is that the terrorist threat level in the United States over the next decade will remain at least as high as it is at present and, indeed, will probably rise. This judgment is based on consideration of a number of factors. First, there are numerous unresolved conflicts across the globe, many of which show no sign of early resolution. While many of these do not involve the United States directly, the status of the United States as sole superpower means that parties to the conflict are prone to decry either U.S. involvement or lack of involvement. Second, since the United States is variously perceived as a supporter of unpopular regimes, an enemy of Islam, and an exponent of imperialism (whether political, economic, or cultural), any number of terrorist groups view U.S. interests as fundamentally inimical to their own, and thus see attacks against U.S. interests as justifiable, even meritorious. Third, the expanding geographical range of terrorist activity is increasingly evident. Members of foreign terrorist groups, representatives from state sponsors of terrorism, and radical fundamentalist elements from many nations are present in the United States. The activities of some of these individuals and groups go beyond fund-raising to recruiting other persons (both foreign and U.S. citizens) for activities that may include terrorism, training with weapons, and making bombs. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established capabilities and infrastructures to support terrorism. Fourth, the manifest vulnerabilities of the U.S. infrastructure are likely to prove irresistible to foreign and domestic terrorists wishing to inflict damage on the U.S. economy. Fifth, although it remains to be seen what lessons terrorists will draw from the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, a particularly worrisome development is the increasing willingness on the part of various terrorist groups to carry out attacks intended to bring about indiscriminate casualties.

15 WARNING NOTICE: This document contains sensitive information and is subject to the provisions of 14 CFR 191.1 et. seq. No part of this document may be released without the express written permission of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. 20591.

Finally, the phenomenon of ad hoc or non-traditional terrorist groups (such as the group responsible for the World Trade Center bombing) has introduced a factor that has greatly complicated the task of preventing foreign terrorist attacks on U.S. soil: denying entry of such individuals (who are not members of any known terrorist group) into the United States, recognizing or identifying them as terrorists once here, or anticipating the timing or targets of their attacks-all are extraordinarily difficult challenges to law enforcement. With respect specifically to the threat to civil aviation in the United States, it must be seen in the context of the broader threat. The events in Asia early in 1995 showed that the terrorists persisted in planning to attack aviation even when there were other targets identifiable with the United States in the area and even when they knew that the security measures protecting aviation had been strengthened. Publicity about the absence or ineffectiveness of U.S. domestic civil aviation security measures increases the potential for attacks here. The publicity may invite attacks from persons who might otherwise have been deterred by a perception of aviation as a relatively hard target. It is our judgment that civil aviation targets may be chosen by terrorists even if alternative, and (in their view) softer, targets are available, especially since an attack on aviation seizes the public imagination to a degree equaled by few other types of attack. These considerations lead us to the following determinations regarding civil aviation: •

If foreign terrorists conduct future attacks in the United States-and they likely will-they may choose civil aviation as a target despite the many, more easily accessible targets that are equally (or even more) symbolic of the aspects of the United States to which they are hostile.

•

Some foreign terrorists who have been in the United States have shown an ability to build (from readily available materials) small, improvised explosive devices that are capable of destroying commercial airliners. These terrorists are sophisticated enough to defeat existing baseline aviation security measures.

•

These terrorists are able to devise new methods of attacking lightly defended or undefended components of the civil aviation system.

Although there is no evidence to suggest that the threat to domestic civil aviation in the next ten years will increase disproportionately to the general threat, civil aviation's traditional appeal to terrorists as a target and continuing media attention to its vulnerabilities lead unavoidably to

16 WARNING NOTICE: This document contains sensitive information and is subject to the provisions of 14 CFR 191.1 et. seq. No part of this document may be released without the express written permission of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. 20591.

the conclusion that the threat to civil aviation in 2006 (like the general threat in the United States) will be at least as high as (and probably higher than) the threat in 1996. Role of Intelligence and Law Enforcement An increased threat to aviation cannot be addressed apart from the likely, simultaneous increase in threat to other potential targets within the United States. The use of additional investigative and intelligence resources to counter this threat is needed. In addition, as current aviation security programs compete with the requirement of protecting other targets, strong advocacy is needed within the Federal Government and in the aviation industry for effective law enforcement and intelligence programs at the federal and international levels. While some of the greatest domestic vulnerabilities relate to airline operations, most security countermeasures are ground-based and occur primarily within airports. The successful implementation of security measures depends upon shared responsibilities between airlines and airport operators, and cooperation between state and local law enforcement organizations, FAA, and other Federal law enforcement agencies at airports. Law enforcement officers are an important deterrent against a variety of potential attacks against airliners and passengers as well as airport facilities. They are needed both near aviation facilities and at airports to respond to incidents. Implications for Civil Aviation Security Although an increase in the anti- and counter-terrorism capabilities of other agencies is needed, these agencies cannot, by themselves, ensure the security of the nation's aviation system. The current domestic aviation security system was designed to primarily defeat criminal hijackers and has effectively done so for over 20 years. Nonetheless, the system has other vulnerabilities that could be exploited to allow a successful terrorist attack. Countermeasures necessary to tighten security will require significant initial investment and continuing operating costs. The time required to deploy some of the measures is such that they cannot be implemented and subsequently removed as contingency measures in response to specific threat information. In addition, these measures are also less cost effective if the high capital investment is only partially recouped through occasional implementation. Most importantly, it cannot be assumed that

17 WARNING NOTICE: This document contains sensitive information and is subject to the provisions of 14 CFR 191.1 et. seq. No part of this document may be released without the express written permission of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. 20591.

1998 FAA STRATEGIC P:AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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