T7 B7 John Raidt Work Files- Narrative And Final Report Fdr- Entire Contents- 2 Draft Sections And Notes 727

I. C. DESTRUCTION OF PAN AM 103 (1988) AND RESPONSE

On December 21, 1988 a terrorist bomb, concealed in a checked bag unaccompanied by the Libyan agent who planted it, exploded in the cargo hold of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland killing 270 people.' Shortly after the incident, the administration's top anti-terrorism official testified that the Pan Am 103 disaster reflected a new trend in aviation terrorism toward sabotage and away from the customary hijacking threat. " In response, the administration announced a battery of initiatives to strengthen anti-explosives procedures at facilities considered high-risk, located mostly overseas. The procedures included mandatory x-ray screening of all baggage and a 100 percent passenger/bag match requirement '" Four months after the downing of Pan Am 103, Secretary of Transportation Sam Skinner announced the department's plan to spend over $100 million to purchase equipment specifically designed to detect explosives, unlike the x-ray machines in use at the time. (STILL WORKING ON: List number of Security directives, and rules implemented in 1989-199; and the general flavor of changes in the ACSSP's to prove explosives detection was the new emphasis). On August 4, 1989 President George Bush signed Executive Order 12686 creating the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. The panel examined the Pan Am 103 disaster and on May 15, 1990 issued a comprehensive report, including 64 recommendations to improve aviation security.1V In November of 1990, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act (PL 104604) to implement a number of the Commission's key recommendations. These included the creation of several new aviation security and intelligence billets; mandatory agency reports on aviation threats and system vulnerability; and, new FAA authorities to impose security measures at airports, including flight cancellation. (Of the 64, x number were implemented) v Notably the legislation also implemented a key commission recommendation with regard to performance problems with the TNA units sought by the Department of Transportation, requiring that Explosive Detection Systems not be deployed until the Secretary could certify their reliability or otherwise assure they contributed to security. V1 II a. CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY ON 9/11: CONGRESS

Prior to September 11, 2001, the 107th Congress held 25 hearings on aviation issues. None of the hearings focused on the status of aviation security. The primary Congressional spotlight on aviation was cast on the status of efforts to improve air carriers' customer service and the economic health and commercial health of civil aviation/"

The Commission could find only three occasions on which Senators or Members of Congress cited the topic of aviation security in floor statements during the 107th Congress prior to September 11, 2001. Only one bill was introduced on the topic in the same time period. Two of the three floor references to aviation security and the sole bill introduced pertained to renaming an FAA facility after a former member of the Senate. VH1 The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, issued a single aviation report in 2001 prior to 9/11. A major GAO report on Terrorism (NAME OF REPORT) issued on (INSERT), included a small section on transportation security. The GAO received (Number) of requests for investigations by Member of Congress on the topic.ix (GAO IS COLLECTING THE INFORMATION) The commission notes that while the aviation funding bill for FY 2002 had not been passed by Congress prior to September 11, 2001, Congressional funding for civil aviation security had substantially increased over the preceding five years from $72 million in FY 1997 to $139 million in FY 2001, (though the amounts appropriated in 2000 and 2001 were each approximately $1 million below the president's request). x The report accompanying the Transportation Appropriations bill for FY 2001, approved in the fall of 2000, did express Congress' ongoing frustration with the FAA on security matters. "The Committee is extremely disappointed over management issues which continue to plague the civil aviation security program. Many of these issues have been unresolved for some time.. .the Committee has provided substantial budgetary increases for civil aviation security programs over the past few years, and is unsure whether these additional resources are paying off in significantly improved security." X1 III. ELEMENTS OF THE AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM ON 9-11 Seven main elements comprised the nation's aviation security system in effect on September 11, 200l. xii 1. Intelligence Collection, Threat assessment and Response: The U.S. intelligence community was responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence data and routing pertinent information to FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence which was tasked with assessing the data, analyzing threats and determining follow-up action by FAA. 2. Passenger Pre-Screening: Air Carriers' were required to analyze passengers via a computer program that alerted the airline to those prohibited by the government from flying as well as "selectees"-- those who may pose a security threat— and a random sampling of other passengers. The air carrier was responsible for

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screening the checked baggage of "selectees" for explosives in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Plan. Secure Area Designation and Enforcement: Airports and Air carriers, with FAA guidance and approval, were responsible for designating secure areas and restricting access to authorized personnel only, in accordance with FAA approved Airport and Air Carrier Standard Security Plans. Checkpoint Screening for Weapons: Air Carriers (and their contractors) were responsible for screening passengers and carry-on luggage for weapons using metal detectors and x-ray machinery calibrated, operated and maintained under FAA minimum guidelines and in accordance with the Air Carrier Standard Security Plan. Checked Baggage Screening for Explosives: Air Carriers were responsible for screening the checked baggage of "selectees" using Explosives Detection System (EDS) equipment or a "suitable" alternative, in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Plan. Cargo and Mail Screening: Air Carriers were responsible for categorizing cargo between known and unknown shippers, and subjected the cargo to various tiers of inspection in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Program. Aircraft Security: Air Carriers were responsible for guarding and inspecting their aircraft; and for training aircrew on security procedures, in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Program. The FAA was responsible for operating a Federal Air Marshal program placing armed and trained security officers on certain high-risk flights.

V.b. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND RESPONSE (INFORMATION ABOUT THE EXISTING ALERT LEVEL AND WHAT THAT MEANS) As of September 11, 2001 eight FAA security directives, requiring air carriers and airports to take specific safety precautions, were in effect (seven were issued during the course of 2001 and one dated back to 2000). None specifically referenced the Al Qaeda organization, the 9-11 hijackers, or a threat to hijack a plane and use it as a guided missile. A Security Directive issued April 24th 2000 did issue an alert regarding Al Qaeda operatives including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, (who the FBI identifies as the main planner of the 9/11 attack) and five other individuals associated with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and the 1995 Bojinka plot. (CHECK TO SEE IF LIST INCLUDED Al QAEDA MEMBERS)( SEE WHAT WAS BEHIND THE MARCH 22 SD). FAA issued another SD on August 28, 2001 Security Directive warning airports and air carriers about nine individuals who should receive extra security screening, including physical search. At least six of the nine carried Pakistani passports. (SEE WHAT WAS BEHIND THIS SD AND IF THE PEOPLE ARE KNOWN AL QAEDA). xiil

Thirty-three FAA information circulars alerting air carriers and airports to aviation security concerns had been issued dating back to 1993 and remained in effect as of September 11, 2001.xiv Among the eight IC's issued in 2001 was a July 31 circular alerting the aviation community to "reports of possible near-term terrorist operations... particularly on the Arabian Peninsula and/or Israel." The circular stated that the FAA had no credible evidence of specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation interests, "Nevertheless, some of the currently active groups are known to plan and train for hijackings and have the capability to construct sophisticated lED's concealed inside luggage and consumer products. The FAA encourages all U.S. Carriers to exercise prudence and demonstrate a high degree of alertness." Interviews with air carrier officials indicated that THIS CALL TO BE PRUDENT AND ALERT)

(HOW DID THEY RESPOND TO

While the 1C seemed to focus attention on an overseas attack, the FAA issued a Security Directive on July 27, 2001 cautioning the aviation community about the use of fake credentials to penetrate secure areas at facilities overseas. The Directive stated, "...one can be certain that terrorists who might be contemplating an attack against civil aviation in the United States have taken note of the attractiveness of this modus operandi." Of the IC's issued in 2000 that were still in effect on September 11, 2001, six raised warnings associated with the activities and threats of Usama Bin Laden. (PENDING: LOOK AT THE DAILY INTELL SUMMARY AND SOME OF THE RAW DATA RECEIVED BY ACI; SEE WHAT PROMPTED THE JULY 31 1C AND WHAT CREDIBLE MEANS AND WHY THE FOCUS ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA; SEE WHAT ATA; AAL; UAL DID TO EXERCISE PRUDENCE AND DEMONSTRATE A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERTNESS)

See attached indictment of Libyan terrorist convicted in the bombing, and the attached press story about the incident. II See Criminal Acts Against Aviation report, and testimony by Paul Bremer before House Foreign Relations Committee on February 9, 1989. III See floor statement by Sen. Robert Dole IV See attached copy of the executive order, press accounts, and statements by Sen. Robert Dole. v See attached list of Commission recommendations; copy of PL 204-604; v' See copy of 104-604, and cross reference to commission recommendations. ™ Derived from a search of the Congressional Daily Digest and a word search of the Congressional Record using the search words "aviation security." vul Search of the Congressional record using the search words "aviation security." lx GAOinfo....TBD x CRS memo on funding. xi See House Rpt. 106-622. xii See FAA ACSSP and ASSP I

III IV

See Security Directives as submitted by the FAA in Commission document request See the Information Circulars as submitted by the FAA in Commission document request

PAN AM SECTION On December 21, 1988 a terrorist bomb, concealed in a checked bag unaccompanied by the Libyan agent who planted it, exploded in the cargo hold of Pan Am FXght 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland killing 270 people.' Shortly after the incident, the administration's top anti-terrorism official testified that the Pan Am 103 disaster reflected a new trend in aviation terrorism toward sabotage and away from the customary hijacking threat. " In response, the administration announced a battery of initiatives to strengthen anti-explosives procedures at facilities considered high-risk, located mostly overseas. The procedures included mandatory x-ray screening of all baggage and a 100 percent passenger/bag match requirement '" Four months after the downing of Pan Am 103, Secretary of Transportation Sam Skinner announced the department's plan to spend over $100 million to purchase equipment was specifically designed to detect explosives, unlike the x-ray machines in use at the time. (List number of Security directives, and rules implemented in 1989 and the general thrust and change in the ACSSP's to prove explosives detection was the new emphasis). On August 4, 1989 President George Bush signed Executive Order 12686 creating the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. The panel examined the Pan Am 103 disaster and on May 15, 1990 issued a comprehensive report, including 64 recommendations to improve aviation security.IV In November of 1990, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act (PL 104604) to implement a number of the Commission's key recommendations. These included the creation of several new aviation security and intelligence billets; mandatory agency reports on aviation threats and system vulnerability; and, new FAA authorities to impose security measures at airports, including flight cancellation. (Of the 64, x number were implemented) v Notably the legislation also implemented a key commission recommendation with regard to performance problems with the TNA units sought by the Department of Transportation, requiring that Explosive Detection Systems not be deployed until the Secretary could certify their reliability or otherwise assure they contributed to security. vl CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY ON 9/11: CONGRESS Prior to September 11, 2001, the 107th Congress held 25 hearings on aviation issues. None of the hearings focused on the status of aviation security. The primary Congressional spotlight on aviation was cast on the status of efforts to improve air carriers' customer service and the economic health and commercial health of civil aviation/" The Commission could find only three occasions on which Senators or Members of Congress cited the topic of aviation security in floor statements during the 107th Congress

prior to September 11, 2001. Only one bill was introduced on the topic in the same time period. Two of the three floor references to aviation security and the sole bill introduced pertained to renaming an FAA facility after a former member of the Senate. vm The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, issued a single aviation-»flgle in 2001 prior to 9/11. A major report on Terrorism (NAME OF REPORT) issued by GAO on (INSERT), included a small section on transportation security. The GAO received (Number) of requests for investigations by Member of Congress on the topic.ix (GAO IS COLLECTING THE INFORMATION) The commission notes that while the aviation funding bill for FY 2002 had not been passed by Congress prior to September 11, 2001, Congressional funding for civil aviation security had substantially increased over the preceding five years from $72 million in FY 1997 to $139 million in FY 2001, (though the amounts appropriated in 2000 and 2001 were each approximately $1 million below the president's request). x The report accompanying the Transportation Appropriations bill for FY 2001, approved in the fall of 2000, did express Congress' ongoing frustration with the FAA on security matters. "The Committee is extremely disappointed over management issues which continue to plague the civil aviation security program. Many of these issues have been unresolved for some time.. .the Committee has provided substantial budgetary increases for civil aviation security programs over the past few years, and is unsure whether these additional resources are paying off in significantly improved security." xl ELEMENTS OF THE AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM ON 9-11 The commission finds thatSeven main elements comprised the nation's aviation security system in effect on September 11, 2001.

v

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1. Intelligence Collection, Threat assessment and Response: The U.S. intelligence community was responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence data and routing pertinent information to FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence'tasked with assessing the data, analyzing threats and determining follow-up action by FAA. 2. Passenger Pre-Screening: Air Carriers' were required to analyze passengers via a computer program that alerted the airline to those prohibited by the government from flying as well as "selectees"-- those who may pose a security threat and a random sampling of other passengers. The air carrier was responsible for screening theDaggage of "selectees" for explosives in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Plan.

Secure Area Designation and Enforcement: Airports and Air carriers with FAA guidance and approval, were responsible for designating secure areas and restricting access to .authorized personnel only, in accordance with-aa FAA approved Airpor^StandardSecurity Plan# . Checkpoint Screening for Weapons: Air Carriers (and their contractors) were responsible for screening passengers and carry-on luggage for weapons using metal detectors and x-ray machinery calibrated, operated and maintained under FAA minimum guidelines and in accordance with the Air Carrier Standard Security Plan. Checked Baggage Screening for Explosives: Air Carriers were responsible for screening the checked baggage of "selectees" using Explosives Detection System (EDS) equipment or a "suitable" alternative, in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Plan. Cargo and Mail Screening: Air Carriers were responsible for categorizing cargo between known and unknown shippers, and subjected the cargo to various tiers of inspection in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Program. Aircraft Security: Air Carriers were responsible for guarding and inspecting their aircraft; and for training aircrew on security procedures, in accordance with an FAA approved Air Carrier Standard Security Program. The FAA was responsible for operating a Federal Air Marshal program placing armed and trained security officers on certain high-risk flights. V. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND RESPONSE As of September 11, 2001, eight FAA security directives requiring air carriers and airports to take specific safety precautions, were in effect (seven were issued during the course of 2001 and one dated back to 2000). None specifically mentioned Al Qaeda, the 9-1 1 perpetrators, or a threat to hijack a plane and use it as a guided missile. ( SEE WHAT WAS BEHIND THE MARCH 22 SD) Thirty-three FAA information circulars alerting air carriers and airports to aviation security concerns had been issued dating back to 1 993 and remained in effect as of September 11,2001. Among the eight IC's issued in 2001 was a July 31 circular alerting the aviation community to "reports of possible near-term terrorist operations... particularly on the Arabian Peninsula and/or Israel." The circular stated that the FAA had no credible evidence of specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation interests, "Nevertheless, some of the currently active groups are known to plan and train for hijackings and have the capability to construct sophisticated lED's concealed inside luggage and consumer products. The FAA encourages all U.S. Carriers to exercise prudence and demonstrate a high degree of alertness."

Interviews with air carrier officials indicated that ..... (HOW DID THEY RESPOND TO THIS CALL TO BE PRUDENT AND ALERT) . While the 1C seemed to focus attention an overseas attack, a Security Directive issued the same day, July 31, 2001, regarding security area penetrations overseas^stated, "One can be certain that terrorists who might be contemplating an attack againsf civil aviation in the United States have taken note of the attractiveness of this modus operandi." Of the IC's issued in 2000 that were still in effect on September 11, 2001, six raised warning associated with the activities and threats of Usama Bin Laden. (PENDING: LOOK AT THE DAILY INTELL SUMMARY AND SOME OF THE RAW DATA RECEIVED BY ACI; SEE WHAT PROMPTED THE JULY 31 1C AND WHAT CREDIBLE MEANS AND WHY THE FOCUS ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA; SEE WHAT ATA; AAL; UAL ID TO EXERCISE PRUDENCE AND DEMONSTRATE A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERTNESS)

' See attached indictment of Libyan terrorist convicted in the bombing, and the attached press story about the incident. " See Criminal Acts Against Aviation report, and testimony by Paul Bremer before House Foreign Relations Committee on February 9, 1989. '" See floor statement by Sen. Robert Dole 1V See attached copy of the executive order, press accounts, and statements by Sen. Robert Dole. v See attached list of Commission recommendations; copy of PL 204-604; V1 See copy of 104-604, and cross reference to commission recommendations. ™ Derived from a search of the Congressional Daily Digest and a word search of the Congressional Record using the search words "aviation security." vl" Search of the Congressional record using the search words "aviation security." ix GAOinfo....TBD " CRS memo on funding. xi

See House Rpt. 106-622.

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