T7 B18 United Misc Fdr- 7-31-00 Report Re Dulles Security Audit 564

July 31,2000

Ms. Karen Burke General Manager United Airlines Dulles International Airport Dear Ms. Burke:

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The LAX Security Team, representing the Hub to Hub audit program, visited the IAD operation from June 19-23,2000. During that period, we >vere able to complete a comprehensive audit that focused on the security operatiori Additionally, under the newly revised Performance Measurement Program, we were able
Observations of the checkpoints began in the PM on Monday, June 19 and .continued throughout the audit period. The checkpoint was properly staffed in order to accommodate the peak passenger volumes throughout all shifts, and complied with the Federal Aviation Administration established staffing guidelines. «* . \e majority of our checkpoint observatio behavioral trends, and appearance. Our recommendations are as follows: 1. Review hand wand procedures. While some general techniques were followed, areas for improvement include/"

_/process must be completed again for total resolution. 2. Review behavior. Two screeners in two different lanes were observed talking over passengers while bags were processing through the x-rays^ not always observing screen. 3. Review appearance including the need to avoid chewing gum, keeping shoes on, and removing nose studs, buttoning down uniform collars. \r tests were conducted at the s secondary screening process. Results of the tests were) | WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION UASSI1 -00032941

Ms. Karen Burke July 31,2000 Page Two

The screeners were generally very pleasant, and respectful to all the customers passing through the screening process. CTX Operations: The CTX operation was outstanding. The screeners were confident, protective of their work area and the integrity of the overall screening process. They were confident, proud and knowledgeable, and at the same time genuinely aware of customer concerns or anxiety about the process. Training/Trainer Observations: The morning of June 21, we observed a new hire training class. The trainer covered the material thoroughly, and specifically reviewed critical procedures, which may occur in the event of an extraordinary security incident. He seemed to be very aware of class comprehension of the subject matters, particularly in light of the language diversity of the attendees.

Interviews: <•' Interviews were conducted with representatives from both the CSS and PDS screener groups. The CSS staff members interviewed were very competent, and extremely aware of the skills of individual PDS screeners on duty. They were quick to respond to calls for assist, and their demeanor with passengers and screeners both was above reproach. They were on the dime! As a whole, the PDS staff interviewed well, however there were obvious language concerns with several screeners, and one in particular. This individual was identified to the Duty Manager and the Account Manager, with a recommendation for immediate removal from position for retraining or accommodation in another work area. Some of the screeners interviewed had difficulty with terms such as breach, haz mat, disabled. Interviews were also conducted with members of the Special Service group. They were a very caring group. Again, however, there was some language problems that deter from assisting passengers with special needs. WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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Ms. Karen Burke July 31, 2000 Page Three

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Training Files: We reviewed the files of those employees randomly selected for interviews. The files were categorized in an orderly manner. The areas of concern requiring some corrective action included the following: 1. Cross outs on cover, pages 2. Blanks - no signatures 3. Recurrent training dates 2 months to 1-1/2 year late._ \. Object Testing I '

There were a few other minor issues, however Dan and Jack were able to resolve to our satisfaction prior to the day's end. Personnel Files: Personnel files were reviewed matching the interviews and training files from the previous day. We could not verify: 1 . High school diplomas or GED for one screener. 2. Sign off on ten year background checks for seven screeners. 3. Drug tests on one sc^eener. 4. 1-9 for one screener. 5. Hire date discrepancies between training files and personnel files. ACSSP: The ACSSP and Security Directives were current and appropriately available for review. GSC training records were also current and available for review. FACILITIES: The FAA required signage was posted at the checkpoints, however UA has made available standard signage for system use, which may ordered through a DIS page. Jack had obtained the DIS information prior to our departure, and advised it presented no issues with the Consortium. WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION UASSH-00032943

Ms. Karen Burke July 31,2000 Page Four

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In conclusion, we would like to thank you for the opportunity to review the security process at Dulles International Airport. We are certainly cognizant that facility issues, as well diversity of the work group may contribute to some differences by location. We were very impressed with the space and equipment set up at the IAD checkpoints and CTX area. We also would like to note our observations of the good working relationship between Argenbright and United management staff. The Argenbright employees also displayed a good attitude toward their jobs, and the United customers. We believe the audit process was rewarding to all, and very informative for us. We wish to thank Jack and Dan for their assistance, and hospitality. Thank you for your time and feedback during the exit debriefing. Sincerely,

Sincerely,

Joe Carricato Argenbright Security Account Manager Los Angeles

Barbara Harrison United Airlines Security Manager Los Angeles

Cc: Dan DiGiusto DanBoelsche Beth Zurenko Jack Bentley

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WARNING THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION