T5 B8 Tow Truck Pentagon- Blind Sheikh Info- 9-11 Commission 692

(U) "Now he looked like a sweet old man. I can tell you that he did not look like a terrorist. He was a charming, little old man. "! (U) THE CASE OF THE BLIND SHEIKH (U) Sheik Omar Ali Ahmed Rahman regularly preached jihad at mosques in New York and New Jersey to individuals who participated in the February 26, 1993, bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) building.2 The Sheik himself was convicted on charges that he was "a leader" of their criminal organization and was sentenced on January 17, 1996 to life in prison for his crimes.3 Subsequent investigation revealed that/SHelk obtained entry to the U.S. and remained in the country due to a series of exceptional failures in our border security system, some with eerie parallels to the 9-1 1 hijackers.4 For example: •

The Sheik used multiple passports to structure his visa applications and travel over a four year period from 1986 to 1990. 1986, the Sheik was issued to the Sheik in Khartoum, Sudan even though there arguably was sufficient information about him in the U.S. Embassy in Egypt as early as 1981 to justify denying that visa.5 Before he ever applied for a visa, the Sheik was well known to U.S. officials in Egypt as a "high profile" opponent of secular Egyptian regimes accused of issuing a fatwa that resulted in the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The officer who approved it later stated that he may have done a poor job of scrutinizing the Sheik's application.6 J#) In April 1987, the Sheik received a visa in Cairo, Egypt after providing formal documentation that the Islamic Brotherhood, Inc., in Brooklyn, New York, was sponsoring him as their spiritual leader during the upcoming holy month of Ramadan, and would be financially responsible for him. The officer "knew who

1 Testimony of Consular Officer 2 before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, August 1, 2002 (regarding an interview the officer conducted of the Sheik before they began service as a State Department employee). Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 1. 3 RDHS03012623B. 4 J#f Although it has long been suggested that the Sheikh was issued visas because of his assistance with Afghan Mujahadeen fighters who were then allies of the U.S., the Inspectors General of both the CIA and State Departments found "no evidence . . . that any of these visas were granted to the Sheikh to serve CIA operational purposes." Talking Points prepared for the DCI by CIA OIG Frederick Hitz.l 1 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuancejof Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman,r [March 1994, p. 19 ("What we did find, ratjier, was evidence of: sloppiness; poor performance by some American officers and FSNs involved; inadequjate systems of control; and inadequate implementation of immigration laws, regulations, and guidelines."), i Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuapce of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 20. . I Revised Chronology of Events Regarding Issuance of Visas to the "Blind Sheikn.'^ j

'9/11 Classified Information

the Sheik was, but after receiving the needed documents decided to issue the visa because of his understanding that the Sheik had not been convicted of any crime."7 In fact, the Sheik's applications "were incomplete and misleading" and possibly "answered falsely" since the Sheik had convictions at that time for passing bad checks.8 Further, by 1987, the Cairo embassy's political section had a biographical file on the Sheik and his subversive activities "that would make him ineligible for a visa."9 However, this derogatory information on the Sheik was held in the Political Section and was not shared with the Consular Section in Cairo. •

Even though the Sheik was placed on a State Department watch list on August 7, 1987, as a "quasi-refusal,"1 the fact that he was on the watch list was not discovered by consular officials who denied the Sheik's visa application in Cairo in 1988, and thus an opportunity to make the refusal a formal one—that would have led to watchlisting by the INS—was lost.11

•

On May 10, 1990, the Sheik received his third visa in Khartoum, Sudan, after a State Department FSN who processed the application indicated that he had checked the watch list on microfiche when, in fact, he had not done so. He later stated that he made the decision not to check because of the Sheik's age, his physical appearance, and the fact that he had received previous U.S. nonimmigrant visas.12 Unknown to the consular officer who issued this visa, on May 2 and May 3, 1990, Embassy Cairo alerted Embassy Khartoum by cable that Egypt's "leading radical" had left Egypt for Sudan possibly to seek exile in the U.S. and asked Khartoum to provide information on his activities.13 By this point, U.S. officials knew the Sheik had arrested repeatedly in Egypt between 1985 and 1989 for attempting to take over mosques, inciting violence, attacking police officers, and demonstrating illegally, and was known to have been imprisoned and placed under house arrest until he left Egypt for Sudan in early 1990.14

Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 22. 8 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 25. 9 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 22. 10 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 25. 11 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 27. 12 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 31. 13 Cable 90 CAIRO 08871; Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 29. 14 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 2, 17. According to documents produced by the Sheik himself in connection with his asylum claim, he was arrested by Egyptian authorities for charges related to his preaching five times from October 1970 to April 1989. In April 1990, after his last incarceration and an extended period of house arrest, he was escorted to the airport

7

•

(U) On November 26, 1990, approximately six months after it first learned it had issued the visa, the State Department revoked the Sheik's visa,15 and sent notice to INS for entry in their National Automated Immigrant Lookout System (NAILS).16 However, the Sheik had already used the visa to enter the U.S. on July 18, and November 15, 1990. INS entered the Sheik into NAILS on December 10, 1990.17

•

Despite the fact that the Sheik was finally in the NAILS watch list, on December 16, 1990, the Sheik used the visa to enter the United States. The Sheik defeated the INS watch list and avoided detection at the port of entry by using a variation on the name on his passport on his entry form (1-94). The INS watch list needed virtually an exact name match to identify potential terrorists.

•

Despite the fact that by January 1991, the INS office in New York had begun an investigation of the Sheik to determine if he had made material misstatements on his visa application subjecting him to prosecution and/or deportation, on January 31, 1991, the Sheik filed an application for Permanent Residence with the Newark INS office as a Special Immigrant, Religious Teacher. The INS did not know that it had two files on the Sheik, one in New York and one in Newark, and on April 8,1991, the INS granted the Sheik permanent resident status. The Sheik successfully used his valid 1-551 "green card" to enter the U.S. after he was detained at JFK airport on July 31, 1991.

•

On March 6, 1992, the INS rescinded the Sheikh's permanent resident status on grounds he was a polygamist, had been convicted of bad check charges in Egypt, and had failed to disclose these facts in his application.18 However, the Sheik avoided being removed from the U.S. by, on August 27, 1992, filing an application for asylum and withholding of deportation to Egypt. An immigration judge held a hearing on the Sheik's claim on January 20, 1993, shortly before his followers bombed the World Trade Center, killing six people, and injuring 1,042. On March 16, 1993, an Immigration Judge denied the Sheikh's asylum and withholding of deportation claims.19

Conclusion

where he made his way to the Sudan. Affidavit of Omar Ahmed Ali, A29-753-750, dated August 11, 1992; DHS; RDHS03012623. 15 RDHS03012623. 16 Id. 17 Report of Audit, Review of the Visa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, 4-CI-007, March 1994, p. 35. 18 In the Matter of Omar Ahmed Ali, File No. A29-753-750 (In Exclusion Proceedings), March 16, 1993 (Meisner, J.), p. 3; RDHS03012623B. 19 In the Matter of Omar Ahmed Ali, File No. A29-753-750 (In Exclusion Proceedings), March 16, 1993 (Meisner, J.), p. 20; RDHS03012623B.

As with many other terrorists who have targeted the United States, including some of the 9-11 hijackers: • • • •

The Sheik's visa applications were incomplete; The Sheik's visa applications contained lies; The Sheik used multiple passports to structure visa applications and travel; Prior visa approvals helped the Sheik get approved again to come to the U.S. with little scrutiny; • Uncertainty in visa law played a role in the Sheik getting his visas; • Failure by a human to do their job—by checking microfiche—allowed the Sheik to defeat the watch list; • Information on the Sheik's subversive activities that should have been shared within the USG was not, and this repeatedly played a role in the Sheik's acquiring visas; • Even when the Sheik was placed on two terrorist watch lists, they failed to detect and stop him because of poor search engine and technological capabilities; • Failure by the State Department to promptly watch list the Sheik played a role in his gaining entry to the United States; • Poor coordination between INS computer systems allowed the Sheik to gain Lawful Permanent Residency and thereby remain in the U.S.; • The Sheik committed fraud on his benefits applications; • The Sheik abused the asylum system to remain in the U.S.