T5 B43 Jan 26-27 Hearing Notes 1 Of 2 Fdr- Team 5 Staff Statement Outline- Draft 101

BORDERS, TRANSPORTATION, AND MANAGING RISK January 26-27, 2004 TEAM 5 STAFF STATEMENT OUTLINE - DRAFT Commission Sensitive Staff Statement One: The Border Security System Prior to September 11 (JKR and TE) I.

Introduction

II.

The U.S. Border Security System pre-9-1 1 (Exhibit - simple chart) .r ou* • The State Department: visas, watchlists, rel. w/ FBI and CIA (TE) • The INS: role in CT and entry (primary and secondary) (JKR) • Interior Enforcement such as it was (JKR) • Immigration Benefits such as it was (JKR)

III.

How the hijackers got into the United States - debunking the myth of clean operatives, clean visas, clean entries, and clean stays. •

Clean operatives? No. Al Qaeda's tactics (including any document and passport fraud) learned from the detainee reports and CIA finished intelligence. (Exhibit - hijackers' passports, and possibly, notebook) (SG)

Discussion of how the hijackers gained "legal" access to the U.S. •

Clean visas? Not really. Opportunities at the consulates. Visas for the 1 9 hijackers (Exhibit - visa applications). Clean applicants? Not entirely. A brief bit on Saudi visa policy and its origins. 214(b)'s prominence. Visa express in Saudi Arabia. Issues with their visa applications and opportunities to catch the hijackers. Examples of Khalid Al Mihdhar, KSM show flaws. (TE)

•

Clean entries? At least not for the pilots. Opportunities at our border. Total numbers on entries for all hijackers (eg opportunities lost w/o intel); 3 referrals to secondary inspection (explain what that is) out of these and opportunities to exclude two of the pilots. Entry of the 19 hijackers (Exhibit - Secondary report(s)). Atta for his unapproved M-l application; S. Al Ghamdi b/Q_he listed no address on his 1-94, spoke little English, and had a one way ticket; and Al Shehhi to determine whether had legit extension/change of status from B2 to Ml. (JKR)

•

Clean stays? Not entirely. Opportunities for interior enforcement. Focus on Jarrah and Hanjour, and N. Al-Hazmi. Student visa and interior

enforcement issues with particular focus on the pilots (Exhibit - change of status applications of Atta and Al Shehhi). Absolutely not. 3 overstays (Atta, Hanjour, N. alHazmi). Student application violations (Atta abdicated his when left the U.S., Hanjour failed to show up). Local law enforcement could have detected them had they been looking. (JKR) IV. What went right? A description of hijackers and plotters who didn't make it in and why. (Exhibit - chart of runner-ups and what happened to them). [Note: Need to figure out what to do with Moussaoui.] (TE, JKR) • • •

Visas: Jihad Al Ghamdi, Binalshibh, Essabar, Ali Aziz, Entry: Qahtani Other: Al Hamlan, Saud Al Rasheed, Zuhair Al Thubaiti

V. A critical assessment of the reasons for success and opportunities lost including consideration of programs such as entry-exit and student tracking (Exhibit opportunities and how many indicators applied) (All) Panel One: Main Points we want to elicit from each witness Ryan (TE): The law did not present ay obstacles to denying visas to terrorists before 9-11. Although the standards for keeping out terrorist was high, if they lied, you could always use 214(b). Tipoff was a major innovation and success that kept out a lot of terrorists. State did not give great scrutiny to the visa applicants from Saudi Arabia , UAE, Egypt, and Lebanon. Visa Express was consistent with State's mandates and beliefs abut the intelligence. CO's were mostly concerned with 214(b). The computer system was not designed to check the truth of assertions on visa applications. The State Department compartmentalized security in the visa process, and believed reasonably that they were getting all the intelligence they needed. [Note: hard to finesse watchlist issue here to be discussed later in staff statement.] Interviewing for terrorists is difficult and not something CO's had been trained to do. An interview can provide useful information, but interviewing everyone creates a great drain on resources, and may not be the best way to manage risk and balance commerce and security. Interviewing everyone was not an option for CA prior to 9-1 1 . Visa waiver was helpful to State, and, although it posed risks, State believed they were addressed adequately.

Biometrics will help, but will not solve the intelligence problem. State was responsive and helpful in developing pilot student tracking program, but in the end the INS pulled the plug. Meissner (JKR): There was adequate law available to exclude or remove the hijacker pilots; however, some of the laws key to exclusion or removal failed to be implemented, eg entry-exit and student tracking. Visa issuance information was not available at primary. CT was not given a high priority in INS pre 9-11; the NSU Unit had solid personnel, but were self-tasked and under resourced. The INS was wholly reliant on State for its terrorist lookouts, and State in turn was wholly dependent on the intelligence community. The INS was an extremely complicated myriad of services and enforcement, and had difficulty creating or implementing holistic strategies or programs. • student tracking (fully piloted, with biometric id card, but denied development because of lack of support from senior management) • entry-exit (no pilot, Canada, trade groups and N Border governors not in favor of it) • fraud and backlogs in timely adjudication required a holistic approach, but never considered, despite the well publicized problems in both areas Access to intelligence was extremely limited, and there was no effort to collect and analyze CT information from inspectors, Border Patrol, or interior enforcement prior to 9-11. Full immigration information integration was never considered which would create "border bios" of aliens. The databases were difficult to use, informationally inadequate, not available to all users who needed them and the technology supporting them was inadequate. Inspectors were never given adequate or continuing training on document fraud or interview techniques. No entity with oversight over the INS ever took interior enforcement seriously, so the possibly of actually enforcing the law against those who managed to get within US borders was minimal. Visa Waiver was an additional burden on an already stressed border system. Panel Two; An Incident in Florida

Main Points we want to elicit from Melendez-Perez (JKR) Human beings, not just technology, are critical in countering terrorism. Interviews by CBP officers conducted by those well trained in behavior and interview techniques can yield significant results. • MP relied on a DOJ Arab language translator and his own military training in interviewing. The documents looked clean so no FDL support, and no Customs or JTTF involvement. • Q looked like a hit man, told inconsistent stories, and seemed evasive. • Q's demeanor and responses indicated he was lying, and confirmed MP's growing suspicion that he was a security risk to the US. The fingerprint and photo taken in secondary inspection helped confirm that the Q removed on August 4, 2001 at Orlando was the same Q at Gitmo. MP and other inspectors have broad discretion to turn people around at the border. However, the culture at the border has been to err on the side of admission, not exclusion, despite the letter of the law being the opposite. Give example. Initiative like MP's was not always rewarded. Saudis, who flew directly into Orlando during the summer months, were presumed admissible and "untouchable", as most were families on their way to Disney World. Q had a number of indicators that led to his being pulled into secondary - call it profiling on intending immigrants and drug couriers. MP received unusual support for his request to remove Q, and attempt to place Q under oath and creatively use existing law to remove him. The FBI never followed up with MP, even after Q ended up at Gitmo and his link to 9/11 was established, despite MP providing the local JTTF Q's secondary inspection report on 9/11 itself. In the new CBP, immigration officers need to be treated with dignity, or good ones like MP may resign. Statement Two: The Hijackers and Watchlists (SG) I.

The Watchlist Issue What is a watchlist and how does it work? The story of State and Tipoff, the Blind Sheikh and Viper The CIA and watchlisting The FBI and watchlisting

The Hazmi and Mihdhar story (as best we can tell it publicly) (SG, BG) II.

A critical assessment of the opportunities lost, to include the earlier material on border systems, State and INS.

Panel Three; Visas and Watchlistins Today Main Points we want to elicit from each witness Ziglar Pre 9/11: job assigned by Ashcroft was to restructure the INS; CT was not on the bill of lading. On 9/11: • the borders were not shut down, they were put on high threat level, meaning every person and vehicle was searched. This did slow things down significantly. • Ziglar had to give new authority at headquarters to get command and control in the field, via Border Patrol. • A tremendous strain was placed on human resources at the border, with Border Patrol and the National Guard soon called in for backup • In attempting to address the 9/11 investigation, INS was given certain chores • In attempting to address prevention of another 9/11, strong ideas were put forward in the SIOC that later bore fruition in four alien initatives, mostly imposed upon Ziglar without prior discussion. Post 9/11: • Ziglar quantifies what it would take for the INS to truly secure the borders, while continuing the attempt at restructure. Ultimately, the restructure is not permitted to move forward, as Ziglar receives a call from Andy Card that DHS is supported by the WH. • Interagency coordination on border security. Bonner Pre 9/11: job as seen by Bonner was to increase the private public partnership on trade while enforcing the law. On 9/11: • Not sworn in until 9/20, but Verrone agreed with Ziglar to declare threat level at POEs. • Any "emergency response" on 9/11 conducted by Customs. • Interagency coordination on border security. Versa

Pre 9/11 border support: • Posse Comitatus defined at the border • Border Patrol with equipment, personnel and technology. • Personnel pull back after fatal use of weapon, which was maintained even after 9/11 9/11: ?? Post 9/11: • Request from Ashcroft and response, ie use of National Guard and equipment/technology and February MOU • Intelligence integration within US to support borders Panel Four: The Response on the borders to September 11 Main Points we want to elicit from each witness Harty (SG. TE) Harty has made many changes since 9-11, Resnick (SG. TE) Bucella (SG, TE)