T5 B2 Furey- Tom Fdr- Entire Contents- Interview Request- Mfr- Notes- Cable 104

Thomas H. Kean CHAIR

DOS INTERVIEW REQUEST NO. 6

Lee II. Hamilton V I C E CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste Max Cleland Fred F. Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests interviews with the following Department of State officials during the weeks of September 29, October 6, or October 13, 2003. Please provide a proposed date, time, and location for these interviews no later than September 29, 2003, if possible. The anticipated length of each interview is two hours.

Slade Gorton

1. TomFurey John Lehman Timothy J. Roemer

2. Brian Flora

James R. Thompson

The Commission anticipates that classified information may be discussed at these interviews. The Commission reserves the right to re-interview these individuals based on the results of the requested interviews and the needs of the Commission.

Philip D. Zelikow i;XECL'TIVF. DIRECTOR

September 24, 2003

Daniel Marcus General Counsel

TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-1 lcommission.gov

Joanne Accolla From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

[email protected] Wednesday, September 24, 2003 12:42 PM [email protected] [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] DOS interview request no. 6

DOS interview request no 6.doc...

Karl: Attached as a Word document is DOS interview request no. 6. call Tom Eldridge at 202-401-1686 with any questions about the topics to be covered and to arrange for these interviews. Feel free to call Dan or me as well if any issues arise. Thanks. Steve

Please

Thomas H. Kean CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton VICE CHAIR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERVIEW REQUEST NO. [ ]

Richard Ben-Veniste Max Cleland Fred F. Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick Slade Gorton John Lehman Timothy J. Roemcr James R. Thompson Philip D. Zelikow KXECL'TIVK DIRECTOR

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests interviews with the following DOS personnel during the weeks of September 29, October 6 or October 13. Please provide a proposed date, time and location for each interview no later than September 25, 2003. Unless otherwise stated, the anticipated length of each interview is 2 hours.

1 . Tom Furey 2. Brian Flora These interviews may involve the discussion of classified information. The Commission reserves the right to re-interview these individuals based on the results of the requested interviews and the needs of the Commission. September 16, 2003

Daniel Marcus General Counsel

TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 http://www.9-l lcommission.gov

Page 1 of 1 /anne Accolla From:

Joanne Accolla [[email protected]]

Sent:

Tuesday, September 16, 2003 1:22 PM

To:

'[email protected]

Subject: Team 5 - Interview Requests Contact for Erenbaum and Cutler: Janice; contact for Fowler and DOS: Tom. Steve - how will you notify us when these letters are signed and sent?? Need to know for follow up purposes - thanks. Joanne M. Accolla Staff Assistant National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 202.401.1774 [email protected]

9/16/2003

COMMISSION SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Tom Furey, Former Consul General and Acting DCM , Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Type of event: Interview of Thomas Patrick Furey Date: December 5, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Tom Eldridge Team Number: 5 Location: Room 7516, State Department - Video Teleconference with London Participants - Non-Commission: Name

Agency/Title

Tom Furey

Current Consul General in London

Phone

Jamie Borek

Asst. Legal Counsel

202-647-2193

Participants - Commission: Tom Eldridge

Counsel Team 5

202-401-1686

Susan Ginsburg

Counsel Team 5

202-401 -1747

Documents/handouts received by the Commission: None Other contacts referred to: None TEXT: We interviewed Mr. Furey by videoteleconference from his office in London, U.K. It was 10:30 a.m. our time, and 3:30 p.m. London time. Mr. Furey was at a table in the Embassy auditorium with 250 empty seats in front of him. Mr. Furey served in Mexico City as Ministerial Counselor for Consular Affairs from 1997 - 2000. There he supervised the largest consular operation in the world, handling 2 million NI visa applications per year in 2000. He supervised 120 consular officers and 350 FSNs doing visa work. While in that job, he referred to the Best Practices Handbook "often" in order to make the operation as efficient as possible. Furey arrived in London August 23, 2001 where he assumed his current duties as the Consul General. Prior to that, from September 10, 2000 to July 17, 2001, he was the Consul General in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In addition, from April 19 - July 17, 2001, he was the Acting DCM in Riyadh. Charles Brayshaw preceded Furey in the DCM job and moved up to be the Charge D'Affaires when the ambassador (Fowler) left in April.

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9/11 Working-level Employee \"::; .

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\s Consul General in Riyadh, he both supervised directly the c

Riyadh, and he was a secondary supervisor over the consuls general and their operations in Jeddah and Dhahran. He reviewed the evaluations of those individuals. Serving under him in Riyadh wer^ jwho was his deputy. Als&,| | 1 whowas was the the Junior Junior Officer in charge charee of of NlVsJ NIVsJ""^ I who I |who | whowas wasinincharge chargeof of IVs, and| | a Consular Associate who assisted with NIV interviews. We asked Furey about his initial impressions of Riyadh and the visa operation. He said: 1. Consular officers were overworked, often processing applications until 8 p.m. in the evening. Morale was very low. 2. The set up was dysfunctional 3. The waiting room was inadequate for the hordes of people who showed up. Saudis would shove TCNs out of the way to get to the windows because they believed it was beneath them to stand in line with TCNs. He said people were getting into fist fights in the waiting room. 4. There were large crowds outside the embassy causing problems for the Saudi police outside and U.S. employee guards inside. Furey believed the crowds could cause guards to cut corners on screening entrants to the compound. The RSO Bill Lamb was "very much in favor of ideas to minimize people coming into the embassy unnecessarily." 5.1 J 6. Visa applications were increasing at a rate of about 5 % per year.

It cannot be emphasized enough that Furey heard NOTHING from the intelligence agencies at post during his tenure there - including his time as DCM -- indicating that Saudis were a security risk. Furey talked with his predecessor Alan Kepchar about how to solve these problems. At that time, there was no model for setting up an appointment system without using a 900 number. The 900 number would allow the caller to pay a fee for the service of setting up an interview. The Saudis had not legalized 900 numbers. Also, the consensus was that the Saudi mail system was not reliable for sending passports. Accordingly, Furey gravitated toward a drop-box system through which an applicant would drop off their application without coming into the embassy. In other words, instead of controlling how applicants came into the embassy, they decided to screen the applications. We asked Furey whether he ever talked with CA HQ about the problems he was having in SA. We specifically asked whether he ever asked for more resources to help with his problems. He said he never did so explicitly. Rather, he said that in talking about the problem as a whole, it was clear to him the perception back in Washington was that his problems did not justify having more consular officers. Rather, the problem was a lack of efficiency. Furey said the view - expressed in the Best Practices Handbook - was that if the post had a pool of applicants with a historically low refusal rate, then the post should not be interviewing all those applicants.

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Furey emphasized that the interview policy for Saudis when he arrived was that they were not interviewed, and no policy change occurred on this subject from any policy he subsequently adopted, i.e., Visa Express. "They were already not being interviewed." Note: Furey said he believed that a "majority" of Saudis did not bring in their applications themselves. Rather, they had an expediter, driver, or business employee do it for them. Saudi Visa Policy Furey agree with our statement that Saudis as a group were considered to have overcome the presumption of inadmissibility in 214(b). This was true for citizens of all nations in the GCC. The reasons for this presumption were (1) they did not overstay their visas, (2) they did not work in the U.S., (3) they were not deported by the INS, (4) they did not commit crimes and get criminal convictions in the U.S, and (5) they were not considered security risks. The consensus was that they qualified for a visa. Visa policy for TCNs was different because TCNs had more variety in their situation. Some were good risks, and some were more likely to be intending immigrants. These policies were not written down. "No one articulated a policy, per se," but the refusal rate for Saudis had been low (he thought below 1 %) for longer than anyone could remember. Furey disagreed with the assertion that Saudis received preferential treatment. He said Saudis were treated like cits of countries in the Visa Waiver program and for the same reasons. Furey felt that the law always allowed a CO to deny a visa to an individual based on the CD's belief that the person was lying to them. Visa Express Much ink has been spilled on Visa Express. In the creation of Visa Express, Furey drew upon all of the above. The conclusion he drew was that the most feasible way to increase efficiency and security was to use travel agencies as drop-boxes. The prospective agencies were vetted by "all elements of the embassy." There were many more that applied to participate and were not accepted. They selected those who had the best reputations and complied with their security concerns such as having safes to hold the passports. They also wanted agencies spread throughout the country. CQ| ]had the lead on this project.! [oversaw selection and training of the travel agencies participating in the program. . We asked Furey how there was oversight of the travel agencies. He said the FSNs would report on a daily basis about agency compliance,with the program's requirements. For example, agencies would input the name put down by Saudis on their application, but Saudis would frequently transliterate their name. Agencies would need to be told to use the name on the 9/11 Working-level Employee COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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passport. Another issue was incomplete applications. FSNs would send back some incomplete applications and tell them to have the applicant fill it in completely. Furey said incomplete applications had been a problem before VE, but that they did not always have time to catch the incompleteness in a way that allowed for meaningful correction. We pressed Furey on this point. Why, we asked, couldn't the incompleteness be caught when the application was submitted? After all, the form was not very long before 9-11. Furey said it was a question of resources and could be viewed in the context of the broad CA budget problems of the 1990s. Even though someone was at a window accepting visa applications, that person, Furey said, did not always have time to screen the applications for completeness. Instead, the FSNs would be taking cash from applicants for the visa fees, or doing data entry, or assisting COs interviewing people. Meanwhile, the applicants and their expediters would be fighting over who got to drop off their application. Applications with large blanks could be caught, but completeness was not achieved uniformly at the time of submission before VE. We asked Furey about the timing of the introduction of VE in SA. He said it was mandatory as of June 1, 2001. He said this was for Saudis and for TCN renewals. Then, there continued to be "chatter" reported in the intelligence about an impending AQ attack against the embassy and mission in Saudi Arabia. There continued to be large numbers of TCNs at the embassy gates posing a threat and an attractive target for terrorists. The RSO continued to believe that the crowds were a target and caused stress on the guards. Furey said there were many emergency action committee meetings. As a result, Furey ordered VE to become mandatory for the whole country in late June 2001. Furey said the travel agencies were "just a messenger service." We pressed him on this point, asking whether they were performing any screening. He maintained they were not. We asked whether they were not told to cull from the applications those that were incomplete or did not contain the required paperwork. He said they were told to do these things. We asked, for example, whether they were told to make sure the student visa applicant had an 1-20 attached, and not to submit the application until they did. He said that was true. Nevertheless, he maintained that the travel agencies had "no authority to screen out" applications by, for example, advising the applicants that they were unlikely to be approved. He said they were not making a preliminary adjudication, but rather were making sure the applicant was meeting the basic requirements for an application. We asked whether what the agents did was not similar to a consular officer making a determination under Section 221(g) of the INA. He said it was not because the CO was saying that the applicant "had gotten to first base" in the visa process by issuing a 221(g) denial, whereas the travel agency - by not turning it in to the embassy — was saying the applicant had not even gotten to first base. This explanation lacked logical force. With regard to the issue of incomplete applications, Furey said there was no State Department instruction that said that putting down the word "hotel" for one's destination was unacceptable. He said VE did lead to more complete applications, something borne out by our review of the hijackers who got their visas in June 2001. With regard to the fact that several of the hijackers lied on their visa applications, Furey said that it was the first he had heard this - a SIGNIFICANT POINT. When told one had lied

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about whether they had been to the U.S., he said that was unusual because most applicants would have trumpeted this fact as proof they were good visa risks. Likewise, the fact that they had applied for an been approved for a U.S. visa previously would have been in their favor, so to lie about that, as several of the hijackers did, would have been unusual. Furey said the State computer system would not bring up a prior approved visa for an applicant - and thus flag this anomaly - before 9-11, only a refusal. Even today, while the system allows a CO to pull up this information, it is not a part of the routine application processing or the name check process. [Note: In SA, DHS employees probably do check for the truth of whether an applicant has traveled to the U.S. before in the DHS databases.] We asked Furey whether he had ever heard discussed the fact that someone might lie on their application in order to hide the fact that they had a new passport. He said this had never been brought to his attention. Jeddah and Visa Express Furey said he knew that people in Jeddah were not particularly enthusiastic about the idea of visa express, but that he was not sure he ever understood their concerns. He said they told him they were overwhelmed by people in their waiting room. He asked them if they had other ideas for solving their problems, and they had none. [Note: Furey was familiar with the unusual interview policy in Jeddah. See MFR of Robert Waller.] The dismantling of Visa Express We asked Furey what he thought about the dismantling of VE in July 2002. To the writer's surprise, he said this was "absolutely" a good idea. Furey said he now feels that interviewing all applicants is the correct way to go. Furey said that the visa interview is both a tool for the CO to help in making a good decision, and a "weak link" that can be exploited by the terrorist. He acknowledged that the CO is rarely going to catch a terrorist in an admission that they are a terrorist. However, the interview is still a tool, and one that should not be given up. Waiving it creates a weak link and terrorists will be looking for the weak link. "It should have been done in the past, but resource constraints appear to have been the dominating factor in the visa adjudication process." With regard to SA, Furey said, "I knew something about Saudi Arabia on September 12 that I didn't know on September 10 - Saudi visa applicants can be security risks." Furey said that the prior attacks in SA he heard had been perpetrated by the Iranians: Khobar and the 1995 OPM-SANG bombings. Document Fraud We asked Furey what capability he had in Riyadh to identify document fraud among visa applicants. He said that in London, he has British employees who are so skilled as to be forensic document scientists at detecting fraud. By contrast, in Riyadh he had no such expert. CA/FPP

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was covering the whole world and not particularly focused on Riyadh. He described the Saudi passport as easy to falsify and not machine readable. Best Practices Were all about managing process in the most efficient way in an era of a shortfall of resources. MRV's enabled State to get automated and produce the CLASS system. Nevertheless, there were perpetual funding and personnel shortfalls. In Furey's view, CA did "extraordinary things to take an incredibly dysfunctional process and make it right." Furey said SecState Powell has made a lot of progress in making up these shortfalls with his Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. For the future Furey said that he felt the "most important tool we can use" is biometrics. They are a "huge step forward in increasing the integrity of the whole process." Soon, everyone can be checked against the 14 million record INS database (IDENT) containing fingerprints of overstays, criminal aliens, and EWIs. Furey also felt that COs do need and have been getting more "systematic" training in how to interview to detect deception. He said that the expectations for the visa interview are unrealistic because you are asking the CO to "predict the future." Furey sees visa waiver as a "weak link." See Richard Reid. Other weakness he sees is the U.S. passport. If he were AQ, he would recruit either a visa waiver country citizen or a U.S. citizen. U.S. cits don't need a passport to enter from the Western hemisphere, and this is a weakness. Furey says his understanding is that DHS personnel abroad are just checking people against DHS databases, and he asks himself why they simply can't just make those databases available to the State people. The fact that Furey thinks in these terms - looking for "weak links" in the visa and border security process - itself reflects a shift in thinking. Before 9-11, people involved in consular work knew their work affected border security, but considered their job to involve security concerns only as far as their checking the name check function in CLASS prior to adjudicating a visa (with whatever attendant security advisory opinion followed) and their role in the Visas Viper program. "Security" was not a Best Practice. Yet it would be terribly unfair to suggest that State's inattention to security led to 9-11. It was State who created the only true terrorist watchlist, and it was State who created the only worldwide automated border security system (CLASS and the CCD). It is not that consular staff at State did not concern themselves with security. Rather, consular personnel saw security as compartmentalized and injected into their work at the two discreet points - name check and viper - and were comfortable having security delegated to the National Security agencies providing information to those programs. Today, consular administrators view themselves as involved at all times in security and the search for "weak links."

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9/11 Working-level Employee

Questions for Tom Furey f xV" ^ 1- When were you in SA?

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2. Who worked under you in visa work in SA? 3. What familiarity did you have with Best Practices in other posts? was

the v*sa workload for SA actual and projected when you arrived in SA.

5. Did you ever seek additional resources for SA to deal with increased demand for visas while in S A? If not, why not? 6. What were your reasons for creating visa express?

,

Best Practices: Interview by exception, Remote data entry, TARP Security - long lines outside the embassy were a security problem. The RSO was not happy. 7. Did Saudis routinely have their applications submitted by expediters? If so, about what percentage would you say did this? 8. Did visa Express solve the problem of Saudis filling out applications incompletely? 9. What security concerns were communicated to you by the RSO during the Spring and Summer of 2001, and what decisions did you make in response to those concerns/threats? 10. When precisely was Visa express implemented in SA and what were the reasons for the dates? Same for Riyadh and for Jeddah? In Riyadh May 27, 2001 In Jeddah-June?, 2001 1. Our understanding is that the original implementation program and dates were hanged. Why and for whom? What was your schedule for Saudis? What was the schedule for TCNs? Added end of June? How did each change? 12. What were the interview rates for applicants in SA and how were they captured? No record of an interview in the computer. Only notes on the form. 13. Was there any change in the interview rates for Saudis as a result of Visa Express?

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14. What about TCNs? Didn't it go down since they were now subject to the interview by exception? End of Visa Express July 20, 2002. No Interview by Exception. No personal appearance waivers. No TARPs. Family questions Was Saudi Arabia the only country with known terrorist risks which had this accelerated approval? Who initiated this process and what was the reason given for instituting the program? Why were incomplete and erroneously filled out visa applications of the hijackers approved? Why was Saudi Arabia given preferential treatment above all other nations in immigration? Prior to Sept. 11, did Visa Express permit approximately 97 percent of Saudi applicants to obtain visas without face-to-face interviews? Whose job was it to check on the validity of student visas? Specifically, Hani Hanjour entered this country on a student visa and never attended class, who was responsible for this?

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UNCLASSIFIED

Cable Text:

UTE4681"

UNCLASSIFIED

UTE4681

ACTION CFPP-01 INFO LOG-00 DS-00 L-00 TEST-00 /009W

MFA-00 EUR-00 NEA-00 USIE-00

NP-00 OIGO-00 DCP-01 VO-03

-

AMAD-00 FBIE-00 NSAE-00 ASDS-01

13E285

CA-01 UTED-00 CAEX-01 DSCC-00

CIAE-00 FBO-00 PPT-01 NFAT-00

INL-00 TEDE-00 IRM-00 SAS-00

191355Z 738

R 1913452 AUG-MFM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5676 AMCONSUL JEDDAH DIR FSINFATC WASHDC INFO GCC COLLECTIVE UNCLAS RIYADH 002326 DEPT FOR CA/EX. CA/VO. CA/FPP. NEA/EX. NEA/ARP NFATC FOR M/FSI/SPS/CONS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CMGT. CVIS. KFRD. AFSI. ASEC. SA SUBJECT: U.S. VISA EXPRESS PROGRAM TRANSFORMS NIV SCENE IN SAUDI ARABIA

1. (U) Summary. Embassy Riyadh, in coordination with Consulates General in Jeddah and Dhahran, has launched a new, mandatory service for processing nonimmigrant visas. Naming the new program "U.S. Visa Express". Embassy Riyadh established the service to eliminate the long lines of NIV applicants at the Embassy and Consulate General in Jeddah and to reduce the number of public visitors entering the posts. The program draws on CA best practices - travel agencies as NIV reception agents, remote data entry, and interview by exception. As a result, the workload on the Consular Sections' staff has been reduced and made manageable, customer service to NIV applicants has improved, and general post security has improved. The program has transformed the U.S. consular scene throughout Saudi Arabia. End Summary. An Outline of the Program

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2. (U) Using CA "best practices" as its basis, the U.S. Visa Express program employs selected travel agencies and their nationwide networks as NIV application reception points. These firms review the applications for completeness, enter the data on diskettes using CA's Remote Data Service (RDS) software installed -at each client company, receive the MRV and issuance fees, and deliver the applications, diskettes, and fees daily to Embassy Riyadh and Consulate General Jeddah for processing. The following working day. the agencies collect the passports of those applicants whose visas were issued without interview, drop off new applications, and return the visa-ed passports to their offices for applicants to collect at their convenience. 3. (U) Initially, the program, which was started in early May and was officially launched with countrywide media coverage the fcUst of June, was mandatory only for Saudi applicants and for qualified non-Saudi resident TCNs. (Qualified resident TCNs were defined as persons who had traveled to the U.S. on a multiple entry NIV within the previous two years). In late June, however, given the program's success and the heightened terrorist threat in the region, the Embassy expanded it overnight to make it mandatory for all applicants in Saudi Arabia. A consular officer reviews all applications. The passports of those applicants whose submissions do not demonstrate clear visa eligibility are returned to the agencies with a form letter indicating that the applicant must come to the Embassy or Consulate General for interview any work day from 8:00 to 10:00 AM and/or what additional documentation should be submitted. These applications are adjudicated in the NIV application as pending (INA Section 221g). Applicants who come for interview have already paid the MRV application fee and have proven to be manageable in numbers. After an initial trial of having the TCNs pay the extra issuance fees to the travel companies, Embassy Riyadh discontinued the collection of issuance fees from the agencies for resident TCN applicants on submission of their applications to the post. Instead, the agencies pay the issuance fees at the time of passport collection for resident TCN applicants issued without interview. Resident TCN applicants issued after interview pay on their own. Steps in Setting Up the Program 4. (U) Setting up the new NIV service in a country the size of Saudi Arabia, where 90.966 NIV applications were processed in FY-2000. and using ten travel agencies companies, was a large-scale operation. It required that one conoff act as project's director and coordinate the establishment of the program in constant communication with all the other conoffs in-country. In addition, the project manager had to keep the Embassy Front Office, the Consuls General, other agencies, and Section Chiefs informed of our UNCLASSIFIED 2

UNCLASSIFIED

plan and Its implementation schedule. From the initial stage, when conoff began meeting with various companies to explore the possibilities and conferring with the Department to learn what legal options were available until launch date, establishing the program took place over a period of seven months. Having gone through the entire process and knowing the pitfalls, the project director conoff believes it is possible to establish a Visa Express program in a much shorter period of time and certainly in much less time in a smaller country. 5. (U) The project director conoff began by conducting a top-to-bottom review of how consular personnel process NIV applications at post. At the same time, conoffs met with leading travel agents to discuss the idea of such a visa service and to learn their suggestions. Some of them were already taki-n§*-in visa applications and submitting them to Embassy Riyadh, but they were not doing data entry, which meant they would need to transform and expand their U.S. NIV operation. Embassy Riyadh Consul General and conoff met with the Embassy Country Team, post GSO. post Department of Commerce PCS. and post PAD staff to introduce the concept and to get feedback from a broad range of in-house sources months before the program was publicly launched. The Embassy Riyadh Consul General and the project director conoff traveled to the Consulate General in both Jeddah and Dhahran to introduce the concept to the consular staffs there. 6. (U) The Embassy Riyadh Consul General and the project director conoff made presentations to the representatives of the travel agencies at meetings conducted at all three posts. They gave the agencies a three-week deadline for submitting proposals as to how they would handle the service. Conoff analyzed submissions from some twenty companies (later another twenty attempted to join on the bandwagon with even more proposals). She assessed the proposals according to a set of ten major criteria, including experience, computer capability, commitment to advertising, office security, geographic breadth of branch networks, and general reputation nationally or regionally. Based on conoff's evaluation of the various proposals and the companies' strengths, she and the Consul General selected ten companies to launch the program over a test period, with the idea that the number might eventually be cut. 7. (U) The Mission then signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the travel agencies that CA and L had provided to Embassy Riyadh. The MOU includes all the requirements the Embassy had stipulated in the initial presentations and had used to evaluate and select the companies. In addition, it sets a maximum fee which travel agencies can charge to be the agent for U.S. NIV UNCLASSIFIED 3

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applications. This fee is a ceiling but not a floor. Some participating travel agencies have opted not to charge customers for U.S. Visa Express service if they purchase their air tickets and vacation package/hotels through the travel agency. Following the selection and the signing, the project director conoff kept in constant communication by telephone and e-mail with all the companies to remind them of their commitments. 8. (U) During the subsequent three weeks, between the MOU signing and the official press conference/media launching, the Embassy and the Consulate General in Jeddah actually began to operate the new service informally as a way to test all the "systems" before "final launch". During this intense period, conoff organized installation and training programs all over the country for the travel agencies to learn the RDS software. Fortunately, a CA Orkand refresher team was in Dhahran and post was able to obtain Department approval for £*rteam member to come to Riyadh to hold introductory training. Then conoffs and Consular NIV FSNs went on the road to the travel agencies' offices in Riyadh. Jeddah. and the Eastern Province cities of Al Khobar and Dammam to survey their Visa Express operations and to train their staffs. At the same time, companies were encouraged to begin their advertising and to begin bringing in visa applications in order to get the public used to the new service before the formal June 1 launching. 9. (U) Throughout this period, the project director conoff also worked with the Embassy Riyadh PAD staff to prepare a media event to launch the program on June 1. Together, they managed to get some stories placed in the local press in advance. The Embassy Riyadh Consul General formally launched the Visa Express program with a full-scale media event with representatives of all the travel companies also in attendance. He emphasized that the new service would be advantageous to the traveling public as well as the Mission. For days after the Consul General's press conference, the Saudi media ran a variety of stories in both the Arabic and English press. Comments. Implications, and The Future 10. (U) The Visa Express program directly advances several MPP goals. The achievement of Mission objectives under Travel and Migration is enhanced in that we can more effectively support the travel of those Saudis and resident TCNs who come to the U.S. for tourist, educational, and medical services. Effective nonimmigrant visa services also supports the exports of U.S. goods and services by facilitating business travel. By completely reorganizing how the Mission provides NIV services to the public, the key MPP goal of American Citizens is facilitated by freeing UNCLASSIFIED 4

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.consular officers' time from NIV services and allowing it to be reallocated to providing services to Amcits. Finally, the MPP goal of Diplomatic Readiness is advance by reducing the number of visitors to the Mission's posts, thus enhancing security and reducing the local guard force resources needed to screen and inspect visitors. 11. (U) In the Mission's experience, the Visa Express program has proven to be a winner all around. The Saudi public loves the convenience. The Saudi Government, which was initially hesitant, is now asking the British and French Embassies in Riyadh to implement the exact same system. The travel agencies have gained publicity and name recognition for their travel service. The consular NIV staff says the new system has vastly reduced stress on them. 12. (U) The U.S Visa Express program is the way of the future and Embassy Riyadh, whose Consul General serves as RCO for the- Arabian Peninsula, has already begun encouraging other Missions in the region to launch similar programs. Critical to its success, however, is that the program must be made mandatory: otherwise. NIV applicants will refuse to use it at first. Once in place and accepted by the traveling public, the Visa Express program will improve consular efficiency and enhance Mission security throughout the region. BRAYSHAW NNNN End Cable Text

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