T5 B1 Cadman- Dan Fdr- Entire Contents- Withdrawal Notice- Emails- Memos 079

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Series: Team 5 Files Folder: Cadman, Dan Date: 10/7/2003 Pages: 46 Description: Notes and summary of Dan Cadman interview

Reason for withdrawal: Classification review pending

Box 1 Withdrawn by: kw, 12/23/2008

Janice Kephart-Roberts From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Susan Ginsburg Monday, March 15, 2004 8:06 AM 'Cadman, Dan' Janice Kephart-Roberts; Walter Hempel RE: staffing agencies

Thanks so much Dan. That gives us a picture of the world of illegal documents as well. Had you ever seen similar organizations to the one in the article I sent in your work in the US? Extending back to countries other than in Eastern Europe? I gather the Walmart case was also eastern Europe. Susan Original Message From: Cadman, Dan [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, March 15, 2004 11:54 AM To: Susan Ginsburg Cc: Janice Kephart-Roberts; Walter Hempel Subject: Re:staffing agencies Yes, thanks, I'm safe and sound as are the others in our small office. Interesting article you sent. The anecdotal information on which I base my answer, for Spain only, is no. Labor contractors don't appear to be a prevalent form of hiring / providing labor here - - a t least in the non-agricultural arena. There is some evidence of brokers providing migrant labor for the fields, often Maghrebis (Arabic North Africans usually from the poorer parts of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, etc.), and also sub-Saharan Africans. But, to my knowledge, there is no direct nexus with terrorist cells. On the other hand, take a look at the attached article about the recent arrest of two Al Qaeda cell members by the Guardia Civil in Murcia. (It's in Spanish; sorry.) The last paragraph of that article says, roughly, "In the zone [where the arrests took place] live hundreds of Maghrebis that at the first hour of morning get up to work in the field as agricultural workers, and that went to this "locutorio" to speak with their families, and send them money, so this detention caused them surprise, as related by one of them, who asserted that they were 'good persons.1 [Note that a 'locutorio' is a small shop serving the needs of migrants through providing long-distance phone services; check cashing; selling phone cards; and money-changing/wiring, etc. The locutorio was in fact owned and run by one of the detained Qaeda members, as indicated earlier in the article. An excellent place to launder money and gain/provide access to phone services, no? Some of the more modern locutorios also have internet services, though I don't know about this one. ] To extrapolate from this particular circumstance, it would appear that the barrio in which these hundreds of Algerians and others were living/working within the city of Murcia created both an ambient subculture in which to operate without arousing suspicion, and also a very direct way in which this guy could make and clean money to be funneled into nefarious purposes. I can speculate as to a few reasons why sleazy labor contracting isn't prevalent in other sectors: (1) Spain's labor unions are very strong, and would not allow themselves to be undercut. (2) Workers' rights here are also strong, based on the many years the Socialists were in power immediately after the dissolution of the Franquist state; translated into practice, businesses wouldn't get away with subcontracting out labor as a way of trying to sidestep paying workers' benefits. (3) Until fairly recently, Spain's economy was at the bottom of Western Europe's, and thus there was no lucrative market to try and undercut natives' wages. Having said all that, it isn't that there is no illegal labor other than in agriculture -there clearly is. Usually things like waiters or deliverymen; there also seem to be undocumented aliens in segments of the construction industry, usually doing the physically hardest, and generally unskilled, things that need done. And, it's important to note that things are in rapid flux here. Immigration to Spain, both legal and illegal, is at record levels, and Spain's economy has rocketed during the past few years under the Popular 1

rty. I'm also curious to see what will play out vis-a-vis the newest members of the EU. suspect many will float to Spain, with its relatively liberal immigration laws, low birthrates, and nascent Eastern European communities (Romanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, etc.) It may be that such contract labor will be the thing of the future. With specific regard to areas of business or labor with a nexus to terrorist cells -well, you've read one in the paragraph above. And, it makes sense, doesn't it? I'm personally fascinated by this locutorio, because of the detention and questioning of the suspects in the recent bombings. You'll recall that what led to them was the detection of the unexploded bomb in a backpack, which also included a pay-as-you-go cellphone and a prepaid phone card. I'll be interested to see what comes to light in that regard. In other areas where terrorist suspects were engaged in business in Spain, see the second article I've attached (this one in English). I find the print shop particularly interesting. Spain has a huge -- I mean, huge -- and thriving underground business in counterfeit and altered documents, money, and transportation tickets. I can't say with any certainty at all that this fellow engaged in such activities; I honestly don't know. But I wouldn't be surprised, and when you ponder the things these fellows were proprietors of, most every one smacks of infrastructure support, doesn't it? Realty--safe houses. Used and rental cars--transportation. Locutorio--as discussed earlier. Printshop--documents. I admit, I don't see how audio, pottery or carpentry fit this notion, but the others have at least a reasonable possibility of having been targeted to achieve specific aims. Well, this was considerably longer than I intended.

Sorry.

Reply Separator Subject: staffing agencies Author: "Susan Ginsburg" <SMTP:[email protected]> Date: 3/14/2004 1:02 PM

Hi Dan, I'm sure you are incredibly busy over there right now - and I trust, safe. Re: the article below. Do you know of any terrorist ties to illegal labor networks? I understand from open sources that there was a front for muj. in Germany that operated this way. What is your view of the prevalence of such organizations? Do you foresee more? Thanks. Susan

BM Toc66874900USA TODAY: Overseas workers often in U.S. illegally By Paige St. John, FLORIDA TODAY March 10, 2004 Teresa Brown adores the Eastern Europeans who wash her dishes and wait on the tourists at her upscale restaurants on Florida's Atlantic Coast. She declares the foreign workers more honest and industrious than Americans. But these workers are not her employees. They are leased from a staffing agency, like many others who now supply workers to hotels, grocery stores and cruise ships. And not all of them should be here. In Biloxi, Miss., Orlando, and Atlanta, it is the same, operators of illegal labor 2

3£ Q&00

•3

JOINT INQUIRY - Committee Sensitto Prepared By: Rahul Gupta Reviewed By: (U) INTERVIEWEE: Immigration & Naturalization Service (U) Interview Method: Group Interview, briefing (U) Place: INS offices (U) Date: 6.27.2002 (FOUO) Participants: JIS: Jordan, Gupta, Barton INS: Dan Cadmon INS - Chief Counter-Terrorism Office National Security Unit (NSU) Tim Haugh INS/Office of Congressional Relations (U) RECORD OF INTERVIEW Dan Cadman provided the following information: In 1997, INS decided to create a CT coordination position a He was not given any control over the "unit" and only given a handful of people. He was not given control of the LOOKOUT unit which he thought he should have. INS had a number of units already involved in CT but they were in different parts of INS—the new CT coordination position was not linked to the existing INS units. There were INS reps in DCI/CTC and FBI/ITOS. He was able to get indirect control of the INS folks in FBI/ITOS (4 staff). He did not get control over the INS/NAILS and INS/TIPOFF reps. He got indirect control of the INS detailees to the JTTFs. 110 agents/2 supervisors/46 of 47 JTTFs Before 9/11 INS/NSU had 14 intel analysts and 42 people total. The key issue for him and the INS working with the FBI was the Alien Terrorism Removal Court Provision of the AEDPA. The INS was asked to tie up loose ends on hearings to deport individuals suspected of terrorist linkages but the actual information used was from the FBI. The INS sometimes was not aware of the information because of FISAs and the involvement of the OIPR from Justice. 9/27/2002 2:15PM AG Reno did not like to use the ATRC or the AEDPA. The judges knew that and would frown on this process. AG Reno was not persuaded of efficacy and propriety of the law. The INS tried to get some relief on the access to data by signing a letterhead memo with CIA and FBI. The INS did not have any problems with credibility of the information provided by CTC and FBI during the detention and deportation hearings. /* The INS tried to convince the CIA that some of the information should be declassified so that it / could be used in the hearings to lock up people but was not well received. If it weren't for the X^ JTTFs the INS would not have access to some of the key intelligence data. He stated that the FBI ground rules for working on the JTTFs is that all detailees must use Form 302s to write-up investigations. These rules sometime bog down the process. He said that at the time that the INS sent people to the JTTFs the INS had no MOD with the FBI to share information. Now they have a MOU but it took some time before it was agreed to. As to the INS and State linkage it is through a different office than his. He does not always see what comes through the National Security Unit. TIPOFF connects to the INS command center that report to INS HQ Intel and not NSU. Similarly, CIA's excuse for not connecting to NSU is that their SLUG already copies INS/HQ/INT. He questioned the reasoning by the CIA. They should copy all. The INS did not know about the Ken Williams memo and it was not shared with them even though there were issues with immigration. The INS folks present did not know if the INS agent in Phoenix who has been part of the JTTF for 3 years was aware of the Williams memo. We were told that in some JTTFs INS is the co-equal and in others it is subservient. 9/27/2002 2:15PM 2

Questions for Dan Cadman October 7, 2003 Background. 1.

the creation, mission and resources of the NSU

2.

leadership support to the NSU and internal enforcement pre 9/11

3.

Congressional interest/support of NSU and CT pre 9/11

4. TIPOFF and your relationship with State and the Lookout Unit pre 9/11

5.

special interest cases

6.

the ATRC

7.

the CSG working group

8.

the nineteen, and individual records associated with them

9. 9/11 itself, what happened at the borders and what directives went to the field

10. if we have time this round, the Office of Visa Enforcement

Janice Kephart-Roberts From: Sent: To:

Cc: Subject:

Janice Kephart-Roberts [[email protected]] Monday, October 06, 2003 8:01 AM 'Cadman, Dan' '[email protected]' RE: 10/7 interview

Dan, That sounds great. in having you take them available for you, that would be about:

I've got a couple of binders with documents that we may be interested a look at; many of the documents have your name on them. I'll have you to look at, but if you have some documents you'd like to bring with fine too. Here are some areas of interest I'd like to talk to you

1. the creation, mission and resources of the NSU 2. leadership support to the NSU and internal enforcement pre 9/11 3. Congressional interest/support of NSU and CT pre 9/11 4. TIPOFF and your relationship with State and the Lookout Unit pre 9/11 5. special interest cases 6. the ATRC 7. the CSG working group 8. the nineteen, and individual records associated with them 9. 9/11 itself, what happened at the borders and what directives went to the field 10. if we have time this round, the Office of Visa Enforcement Thanks so much and look forward to seeing you too. Janice Original Message From: Cadman, Dan [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, October 03, 2003 11:02 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re:10/7 interview Yes, that's fine per date, time and place. I'll plan on being there for as long as you wish/need. No, a secret level should do for meeting space. Look forward to seeing you then! !

Reply Separator Subject: 10/7 interview Author: "Janice Kephart-Roberts" <[email protected]> Date: 10/2/2003 4:22 PM Dan,

Is 10/7 at 11 am okay here at GSA Rm. 5125? Will we need a greater than secret scif? That's what we got here. You can come in thru the 7th st employee entrance (7th and D SW), since you've got a DHS id, I think.

We've got a lot to talk about!

Janice Kephart-Roberts National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service

HQOPS50/5.11-P Office of the Executive Associate Commissioner Office of the General Counsel

4251Street NW Washington, DC 20536

FEB 1 8 1999 MEMORANDUM FOR

COMMISSIONER xA*

FROM:

ichael Pearson Executive Associate Commissioner, Field Operations Paul Virtue General Counsel

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Understanding Department of State Automated TIPOFF System

Attached, for your information and review, you will find a copy of a proposed memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Department of State (DOS), the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We recommend approval. This MOU relates to DOS's automated TIPOFF system. That system is the intragovernmental repository for terrorist information that feeds the DOS consular lookout system, CLASS; the USCS lookout system, TECS II; and the INS lookout system, NAILS. The MOU revises the language of a previous version to incorporate updated practices and procedures. More importantly, it expands the TIPOFF system beyond terrorism, and authorizes the entry of data relating to organized crime suspects, initially from territories of the former Soviet Union, and internationally thereafter. The language is the result of negotiations and discussions among the signatory agencies, along with the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government that provide the predicating data to the Department of State. The Offices of Field Operations and General Counsel represented INS at the discussions. The Department of State is proposing a signing ceremony in the Treaty Room of their headquarters, to be held at 10:00 a.m., March 12, 1999. The signatories would be you, Customs Commissioner Kelly, and Assistant Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley. We request your participation in the ceremony. Attachment

CC: Official file copy HQCOU/ENF (All staff) HQOPS/ENF/NSU (All staff) HQOPS/ENF/SCO (All staff) HQOPS/INP (Attn: Carrier Affairs/Lookout Unit) HQPGM/INP HQPGM/INV TIPOFF W/F INS:HQOPS/NSU:WDCadman:02/02/99 C.-TIP-FNLDOC

HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED BY

JOINT INQUIRY - CHECK FILE IN SAFE

Thomas 11. Kean CHAIR

DHS INTERVIEW REQUEST NO. 3

Lee H. Hamilton VICE CHAIR

Richard Bcn-Veniste Max Cleland Fred F. Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests interviews with the following Department of Homeland Security personnel during the weeks of September 29 and October 6, 2003. Please provide a proposed date, time, and location for each interview no later than September 24, 2003. The anticipated length of each of these interviews is three hours.

Slade Gorton

l.DanCadman(ICE) John Lehman Timothy J. Roemer

2. Tim Goyer (CBP)

James R. Thompson

3. Gary Bradford (BCIS)

Philip D. Zelikow

4. Maurice Berez (BCIS)

E X E C U T I V E DIRECTOR

We anticipate that these interviews will involve the discussion of classified information. The Commission reserves the right to reinterview these individuals based on the results of the requested interviews and the needs of the Commission. August 29, 2003

Daniel Marcus General Counsel

TKL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-1 lcommission.gov

tO 99 b ' /A?

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+*

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JI03000191 Committee Sensitive INS Group. 6/02 Dan Cadman, Chief, Counter-terrorism office, National Security Unit, Tim Haugh INS Cong Rel In 1997, INS decided to create a CT coordination position. He was not given any control over the unit, and only a handful of people. Not given control over the LOOKOUT unit, which he thought he should have. INS already had a number of units involved in CT but spread out in INS. The new CT coordination unit not linked to any of them. INS rep in DCI/CTC. Had indirect control over 4 rep to FBI/TTOS and detailees to JTTFs, but not control over iNS/NAILS and INS/TIPOFF reps. 110 agents/2 supervisors/46 of 47 JTTFs. Before 9/11, INS/NSU had 14 intel analysts and 42 people total. Key issue for him in INS-FBI relations was the Alien Terrorist Removal Court provision of AEDPA. INS asked to tie up loose ends on hearings to deport individuals suspected of terrorist linkages but the actual information used was from the FBI. The INS sometimes was not aware of the info b/c of FIS As and the involvement of IOPR from DOJ. AG Reno did not like to use ATRC or AEDPA. Judges know that and would frown on the process. AG Reno was not persuaded of efficacy and propriety of the law. INS tried to get some relief on the access to data by signing a letterhead memo with CIA and FBI. INS did not have any problems with the credibility of the information provided by CTC and FBI during detention and deportation hearings. INS tried to convince CIA to declassify some info to be used in hearings to lock up people but was not well received. If not for JTTFs, INS would not have access to some of the key intel data. FBI req'd details to use Form 302 to write up investigations. These rules sometimes bog down the process. At the time INS sent people to JTTFs there was no MOU with the FBI to share information, now they have one, took some time to get. INS-State linkage not thru his office. Does not always see what somes thru the NSU. TJPOFF connects to INS command center that report to INS HQ intel not NSU. Similarly CIA excuse for not connecting to NSU is that their SLUG already copies INS/HQ/INT, thinks they should copy all. INS did not know about Ken Williams memo and it was not shared with them even though there were issues about immigration. INS folks did not know if the INS agent in Phoenix on the JTTF 3 yrs was aware of Williams memo. In some JTTFs INS subservient in others co-equal.

9/11

Law Enforcement Privacy

I

Janice Kephart-Roberts From: Sent: To: Subject:

..

Cadman, Dan {[email protected]] Tuesday, September 16, 2003 2:04 PM [email protected] Re:nice to talk to you!

What a pleasure it\was for me too. Sorry for a relatively late response to your e-mail. Today's been absolutely crazy. So, here are a few names — Mark LaMonte, NSU supervisor at ICE. Mark worked for me prior to, and after 9/11. really helped keep things..rolling during that time.

He

Laura Baxter, counsel to the -.Deputy AG. (You may recall Laura; she worked at INS, then moved to the House Subcommittee., then came back briefly to INS as chief of the national security law div, then onward to-.DOJ. You may already have planned to chat w/her anyway.) James Castello, Assoc Deputy AG during the Reno years at DOJ (of course, gone by 9/11, but a fountain of knowledge acoul KtillU'S dim viewi. LUWaTd Immigration national security cases (so-called "secret evidence" case) .. .sho.uld he choose to open up to you. However, he will likely put quite the spin on their efforts, given everything that's happened since. Sarah Kendall, present chief of the nationals-security law division at what is now ICE. Veronica Gates, who worked for me at NSU, right from the very beginning through when I left to go to Madrid. She's now at DHS in their 24-hour watch center. I

1 who is now an Asst_SA£L-At—XHELin Arlington. VA fhg was the former INS Washington District ADD for iWprTor to the breakup) . j fyTorked for me at FBIHQ, and was in the heart of the UBL unit at Int'l Terrorism Ops Section for a few months prior to, and several months after, 9/11. How about Dan Benjamin, who worked for Richard Clarke at NSC during the Clinton administration? (He later went on to write the book, "Sacred Age of Terror" which includes a discussion of the frustrations and ultimate lack of success in getting CIPRIS moved along. He mentions me as a 'senior INS counterterrorism official' which amuses me greatly...never been more than middle management and have no illusions about that.) Maurie Berez, who was the brains behind CIPRIS.

Maurie |

Jcertainly had the right idea where CIPRIS was concerned.It was a more robust,better system than SEVIS, its pale successor, ever will be. Anyway, as I think of more names, I'll relay them along. Look forward to getting-back stateside. Just can't stand too big a slice of this little piece of earthly paradise here, y'know? Later! _Reply Separator Subject: nice to talk to you! Author: "Janice Kephart-Roberts" <jkephart-roberts@9-llcommission'.gov> Date: 9/15/2003 5:30 PM Let me know who those CT policy people are!

Great to talk; we've got a lot to cover. 9/11 Personal Privacy

PRIORITY INS Staff Routing Sheet TO: Kenneth J. Elwood SUBJECT: Security alert to all INS offices EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

THRU: Louis Nardi

SUSPENSE DATE: None 1

1 . Purpose. To advise all offices and employees of the indictment of Usama bin Laden, international terrorist, and direct hei ghtened security measures. 2. Discussion. The indict ment may result in the targeting of U.S. government facilities and employees for terrorist acts of the kind that resulted in bombing of U.S. embassies abroad. It requires heightened aw/areness, and the taking of specific steps at ports of entry and with regard to apprehensions of speci fie nationalities. Recommendation. Approv e and sign the heightened alert for dissemination by the INS Command Center, and via message e itry into TECS II. This dissemination -will not take place until after the formal announcement oft}te indictment by DOJ at 4PM on November 4, 1998.

NAME W.D. Cadman L.F. Nardi K.J. Elwood

CONCURRENCES SIGNAjmE

OFFICE OPS/NSU /v/z/#~~ x) /°^A^ OPS/ENF D/EAC OPS J&v~~e#fJ (£&*V+^ fcr 1^ ^Vr

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l__,

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ACTION OFFICER/OFFICE/EXTENSION: WDCadman 5-173 1

C:\antiterr\usama-alert.rte

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DATE "/«/?&

COMMENTS

1 1-1-12

ii- v-77

DATE: 1 1/4/98

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HEIGHTENED SECURITY ALERT (For immediate distribution via the HQ Command Center to all INS regions, districts, sectors, suboffices, stations and ports of entry, including overseas. Also for entry into TECS II via the Office of Carrier Affairs.) On the afternoon of November 4, 1998, the Justice Department announced the indictment of international terrorist Usama bin Laden on criminal charges stemming from the bombing attacks on U.S. Embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. There is no specific threat information to be provided at this time. However, as a result of this action, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is issuing a heightened security alert, applicable to all INS employees and offices throughout the world. All INS personnel are directed to exercise a high level of caution with regard to their physical surroundings while on duty. This extends particularly to the presence of unauthorized individuals or unattended items in and around INS installations. Suspicious incidents observed by employees are to be immediately reported to management for response and handling according to established security procedures in place for each site where INS conducts operations. The following measures are also to be taken: •

Any individuals taken into custody born or residing in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Bosnia, Albania, Serbia/Montenegro (former Yugoslavia), Macedonia, Tanzania, or Kenya should be handled as "Special Interest Cases" as outlined in the HQOPS policy directive dated July 10, 1997.

•

Adverse actions at U.S. land, sea, and air ports of entry involving aliens born or residing in ^ Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Bosnia, Albania, Serbia/Montenegro (former Yugoslavia), Macedonia, Tanzania, Kenya encompassing the following sections of the Immigration & Nationality Act ~212(a)(3), and -212(a)(6)(C),or(D) are also to be handled and reported to INS Headquarters pursuant to the same policy directive. •

Commercial air and sea traffic arriving from transit or final embarkation points of Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Bosnia, Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, Tanzania, Kenya, Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece, Jordan, Turkey, Oman, United Arab Emirates should be closely scrutinized for admissibility.

/Kenneth J. Elwood Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner Office of Field Operations

CC:

Official file HQOPS 50/11.18-C HQCOS (Attn: VCerda) HQCOU HQICC HQINT (Attn: TDurand) HQOPS/ENF (NSU) HQOPS/INP/OCA (Attn:RNeighbors) HQSEC

C:\antiterr\usama-alert.doc

.uthor: Mark X McGraw at HQ-ICC-001 Date: 11/4/98 4:32 PM Priority: Urgent TO: Dan Cadman at HQ-EXM-001, Thomas H Durand bject: Alert janLou asked me to ask you to make sure we have the security alert passed through Winona Varnon in HQSEC as well. / Let me know when you have a signed copy and I will walk it through.