T3 B9 Final Report Publication Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Withdrawal Notices- Lists Of Questions And Answers Talking Points 989

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Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Tuesday, June 29, 2004 4:37 PM

To:

Bonnie Jenkins; Walter Hempel; Team 3

Cc:

Stephanie Kaplan

Subject: RE: Graphics for Final Report

Great idea. Original Message From: Bonnie Jenkins Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 4:32 PM To: Warren Bass; Walter Hempel; Team 3 Cc: Stephanie Kaplan Subject: RE: Graphics for Final Report Team 3 and Stephanie, I note the list includes an illustration of the damage to the USS Cole. Do we want one of the bombings of the African embassies? Bonnie —Original Message— From: Warren Bass Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 3:12 PM To: Walter Hempel; Team 3 Cc: Stephanie Kaplan Subject: RE: Graphics for Final Report

P.S. I should add that I feel a bit of a twinge about printing art of the armed version. I suggest we just use an image of the recon bird—though the images of the armed bird seem easier to find, so I guess who are we trying to tod... WB. Original Message From: Walter Hempel Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 2:53 PM To: Team 3 Cc: Stephanie Kaplan Subject: Graphics for Final Report Stephanie has given me your May 28, 2004 response to her request for illustrations. You listed the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Photo of the Predator - do you have a picture of the correct model/type that was used? Overhead photo of Tarnak Farms and/or Derunta Camp Photo of bomb blast damage to the USS Cole Stills of the famous "Man in White", aka UBL, as shot from the Predator. You mention that CIA has these and the networks have shown them. Stills of the footage of the nighttime commando raid on Mullah Omar's compound on October 19, 2001. Again the networks have shown them.

Please send any electronic images to me. If I need to work off of printed documents, get them to me at GSA.

6/30/2004

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I would prefer not to get into any copyright problems with images on the web. I can search the government sites but if you have images please get them to me. Anything you think is really important I would like to work on. The final decision as to whether the image is included is still down the road. It will depend on many factors including the quality of the source illustration. Electronic formats are best.

6/30/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Tuesday, June 29, 2004 3:10 PM

To:

Walter Hempel; Team 3

Cc:

Stephanie Kaplan

Subject: RE: Graphics for Final Report

Just did some quick web-surfing, Walt, and I think I've answered some of the mail here: 1. Armed Predator (USAF photo) httr)://www.cnn.com/20Q2/US/ll/Q4/predator.background/ 2. Tarnak Farms—see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 392; nothing on Derunta 3. Cole attack (Navy photos) http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.hrml/fu^^ 4. "Man in white" from Predator (NBC photos; also include Oct. 2001 shot of Tarnak) http://www,msnbc.msn,CQrn/id/4549030/ 5. Nothing on the October 2001 commando raid I'm sure we could get the permissions from NBC to run the Predator art. We could also ask Coll or his source if they'd let us run their images of Tarnak. The USAF and Navy images should be public domain. The rest of the gang may have bright ideas of their own. And I'm sure Norton's art and permissions department could help, too. Best, Warren

Original Message From: Walter Hempel Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2004 2:53 PM To: Team 3 Cc: Stephanie Kaplan Subject: Graphics for Final Report Stephanie has given me your May 28, 2004 response to her request for illustrations. You listed the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Photo of the Predator - do you have a picture of the correct model/type that was used? Overhead photo of Tarnak Farms and/or Derunta Camp Photo of bomb blast damage to the USS Cole Stills of the famous "Man in White", aka UBL, as shot from the Predator. You mention that CIA has these and the networks have shown them. Stills of the footage of the nighttime commando raid on Mullah Omar's compound on October 19, 2001. Again the networks have shown them.

Please send any electronic images to me. If I need to work off of printed documents, get them to me at GSA. I would prefer not to get into any copyright problems with images on the web. I can search the government sites but if you have images please get them to me.

6/29/2004

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Anything you think is really important I would like to work on. The final decision as to whether the image is included is still down the road. It will depend on many factors including the quality of the source illustration. Electronic formats are best.

6/29/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Stephanie Kaplan

Sent:

Thursday, June 24, 2004 3:43 PM

To:

staff

Subject: Report Illustrations

Colleagues: At today's meeting, the Commissioners reemphasized their desire to see tables and illustrations throughout the final report. The graphically inclined Walt Hempel of Team 5 has been drafted to help the front office coordinate this process. He will start with Chapter 1 (Teams 7/8) tomorrow. Chapters 5/7 (Team 1 A) and Chapter 9 (Team 8) are on deck. Please be as responsive as possible to his requests, and many thanks to Walt for his expertise and assistance. Stephanie

STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN

9-11 COMMISSION T (202) 331-1125 F (202) 296-5545 www.9-11commission.gov

6/24/2004

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 3 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/21/2008

BOX: 00004

FOLDER: 0001

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 1

DOC ID: 31206889

6 (

ACCESS RESTRICTED I

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Report Publication & Roll Out Prep. DOCUMENT DATE: 06/18/1999

DOCUMENT TYPE: Report

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Special Analysis: Afghanistan

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Friday, May 28, 2004 10:46 AM

To:

Stephanie Kaplan

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: RE: Illustrations in Final Report Stephanie:

Team 3 has the following suggestions: -A photo of the Predator (should pose no classification problem because there are photos of it on the web). -Overhead photo of Tarnak Farms and/or Derunta Camp (these have been shown on the networks). Particularly useful to have these in the sections dealing with capture operations. -Photo of the bomb blast damage to the USS Cole. -Stills of the famous "Man in white", aka UBL, as shot from the Predator video footage of September 2000. CIA will probably grouse about this. But these, too, have been shown on network news. -Stills from footage of the nighttime commando raid on mullah omar's compound on October 19, 2001. These were shown on network news.

Original Message From: Stephanie Kaplan Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2004 3:19 PM To: staff Subject: Illustrations in Final Report Staff: The Chair and Vice Chair have expressed interest in incorporating illustrations (tables, graphs, timelines, pictures, etc.) into the final report. They believe that such devices, if selected carefully, will explain various aspects of the 9/11 narrative in a clear and efficient manner. Several weeks ago, I asked team leaders to begin thinking about which illustrations they might nominate. I'm now writing to request that each team send me a brief email with their nominations by COB Friday so that we can start the evaluation process. If you have no nominations, please send me an email indicating as much. The actual data need not be compiled by Friday, although if the information is readily available, feel free to send it as well. I look forward to receiving your proposals. Please let me know if you have any questions. Stephanie

5/28/2004

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STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN 9-11 COMMISSION

T (202) 331-1125 F (202) 296-5545 www.9-11commission.gov

5/28/2004

Q&A's for Final Report Rollout Team 3—Counterterrorism Policy

Was 9/11 Preventable? Q. Could 9/11 have been avoided? A. In hindsight, it's possible. Both the CIA and the FBI had opportunities to collate information on some of the would-be hijackers months before 9/11. It's possible that if these individuals had been arrested and questioned, or followed, they would have been prevented from carrying out the plot. But there are no assurances that even had that happened, the government would have caught all of them before they could carry out their plan. Deficiencies in the CIA and FBI contributed to their inability to connect the dots.

Which Options Were Taken, and Which Were Not Q. Al Qaeda blew up our embassies in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000. Why didn 't we send troops into Afghanistan to wipe them out? A. Before 9/11, al Qaeda was responsible for the deaths of less than 50 Americans. This clearly showed it was a danger. But all senior policymakers of both the Clinton and Bush administrations agreed it would have been impossible to invade Afghanistan before 9/11. The Commission, however, found that neither administration organized a robust effort to shape congressional, American public, or international opinion about the necessity of using force against Bin Ladin. Q. Why didn't we put military "boots on the ground" in Afghanistan before 9/11 ? A. There were some officials in the Pentagon who advocated doing so. But it is a major political and security decision to invade a country. An invasion would have required basing and support from Afghanistan's neighbors, such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Many officials told us this would have been hard to obtain before 9/11. Q. Does the Commission believe that the Pentagon unduly resisted the option of using force in Afghanistan? A. The U.S. military follows orders. If ordered to deploy troops to Afghanistan for commando raids, or other operations it would have done so. The military when asked came up with options for using force in Afghanistan. In the commission's view, however, it gave both Presidents Clinton and Bush limited and uncreative options, and was reluctant to take a position on which options would be most effective for reducing

the Bin Ladin threat. It was more engaged in taking defensive measures against al Qaeda than proposing offensive actions. The U.S. military was reluctant to deploy troops to Afghanistan. It would have done so had it been ordered to do so by the President. But the military's position was that it lacked actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, without which it would have meant that its forces would be exposed to great risk with a low probability of succeeding. Q. Who is responsible for the failure to protect our country from al Qaeda? A. The Commission's view is that many committed officials were aware of the al Qaeda threat and worked hard to counter it. The broader government as a whole, however, had a difficult time changing our security and intelligence institutions to effectively combat this new kind of nonstate enemy. Both Presidents Clinton and Bush were genuinely concerned about the threat. But the government did not organize a government-wide effort to defeat the threat until after the 9/11 attacks made clear that our homeland was in danger. Q. Did both the Clinton and Bush administrations underestimate the threat posed by Bin Ladin and al Qaeda? A. Both Presidents Clinton and Bush were concerned about the threat. The Commission found that across the government, there was a failure of imagination concerning the threat. Few had internalized the idea that al Qaeda could launch catastrophic attacks in the United States. Q. Did President Clinton make the right choice in not authorizing missile strikes on those occasions when the CIA provided intelligence on Bin Ladin's location in Afghanistan? Did we miss an opportunity here? A. Officials in the Clinton administration, including National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and DCI George Tenet told us that on the three major occasions when the CIA provided decision makers with real-time intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, the intelligence itself was found to be insufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for cruise missile attacks. Officials were also concerned about the possibility of killing or injuring innocent civilians in proximity to Bin Ladin. As Berger told us, the DCI would tell policymakers, "We just don't have it." Q. You say that before 9/11 the U.S. never adopted the elimination ofal Qaeda as a clear strategic objective? Why? A. It was difficult for our government to understand that the terrorist threat that it had dealt with for 30 years, one that was state-sponsored, had transformed; and that by the late 1990s, al Qaeda, a nonstate terrorist organization, had become highly dangerous. Therefore, it dealt with al Qaeda using largely the means and elements of national power

it had employed against terrorist organizations traditionally. These means were insufficient. Q. Your report indicates the CIA produced numerous reports about the possible use of airlines as weapons. Why weren 't these paid attention to? A. Some officials in the government did pay attention to them. But there were often so many threat reports that streams of reporting got lost in the greater flood of information policy makers had to consider. Then, too, the CIA and intelligence community failed to pull the threads together. In 1998, Richard Clarke performed a tabletop drill with Pentagon and FAA officials to ask what could be done if terrorists hijacked a Learjet from Atlanta, stuffed it with explosives, and headed toward Washington, DC. The answer was, with the Pentagon still focused outward rather than inward, rather little. Q. President Clinton had eight years to deal with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, and President Bush had less than eight months before 9/11. Doesn 't more fault lie with President Clinton for failing to kill or capture Bin Ladin and damage al Qaeda? A. The commission found that both Presidents were genuinely concerned about the al Qaeda threat. They each used the FBI, CIA, and other instruments of national power to respond to the threat. President Clinton authorized a cruise missile attack against al Qaeda in August 1998 in response to the attacks on our embassies. But our government at no time before 9/11 authorized a government-wide organized response to this threat on the order of the commitment we made, for example, in the Balkans. Q. Was the CIA risk-averse? Why didn 't the CIA ever put its personnel on the ground in Afghanistan to deal with Bin the Ladin problem? A. Teams of CIA officers did go into Afghanistan on numerous occasions before 9/11, risking their lives on hazardous missions. At the working level, we found no reluctance to risk such dangers. But policymakers and senior CIA managers were more cautious. Afghanistan was a country in the midst of civil war. There were no reliable means for inserting or extracting officers. Senior officials should be cautious about exposing U.S. personnel to great risk. Before 9/11, these officials weighed the risks of deploying U.S. personnel against the gains, and made their choices. As a result, the U.S. government relied on proxy forces to carry out covert action programs. Q. Your report says the CIA relied for years on proxies to capture or kill Bin Ladin and that CIA management placed little confidence in the effectiveness of the proxies. Why did they persist in relying on them? A. The Afghan tribal members the CIA used did provide some good intelligence on Bin Ladin and his organization. The CIA hoped these agents would capture or even kill Bin Ladin. But it is clear that, at least at the senior management level, the CIA was very skeptical that the tribals could ever produce the result the government wanted. The

Commission believes both the Clinton and Bush administrations should have considered other options. Q. Did Executive Order 12333 's ban on assassinations limit our choices with regard to this major national security threat? A. No. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice made clear that the ban had no application to Bin Ladin, an enemy of the United States. Under the law of armed conflict, action directed against Bin Ladin was justified as an act of self defense. Q. Did President Clinton give the CIA authority to kill Bin Ladin? A. President Clinton and his top national security officials told us that his intentions were clear: He wanted Bin Ladin dead. They said that this was communicated to the CIA. Our examination of the authorities signed by President Clinton showed that the language is sometimes ambiguous. For one of the documents he signed, language was crafted to give the CIA extraordinary authority that went beyond capture, but the extreme sensitivity of this document meant that very few people saw it. On another occasion, President Clinton clearly authorized an action that, if carried out, could only have resulted in Bin Ladin's death. CIA officials, however, told us that they believed they were authorized to capture Bin Ladin and that he could only be killed in the context of a capture operation.

Q. Did the confusion on kill vs. capture get in the way of dealing with Bin Ladin? A. It is unclear what impact this confusion had, as the proxies used by CIA never came close to either killing or capturing Bin Ladin. Director Tenet told us—and President Bush—that he had all the authority to go after Bin Ladin that he wanted. The CIA's inability to either capture or kill Bin Ladin before 9/11 seems to be a question not so much of authority as capability. Q. As part of his response to the al Qaeda attack on our two embassies in East Africa in August 1998, President Clinton authorized a cruise missile attack on the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum. Was that the right decision? A. Clinton administration officials told us that intelligence indicated that traces of an ingredient for the deadly nerve agent VX were found at this pharmaceutical plant owned by Bin Ladin. They thought that perhaps one day a weapon containing VX produced at this plant might one day be used against the United States. Thus, they thought destroying the plant was justified by national security concerns. Q. Critics have accused President Clinton of "wagging the dog "—using the August 1998 missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan to distract the public and media from his political troubles. Did he?

A. No. We have found no evidence whatsoever to suggest that President Clinton's decisions were made on grounds other than national security, in either documents or interviews. Q. The Clinton administration seemed to rely heavily on using cruise missiles to kill Bin Laden and hurt al Qaeda. Was this stand-off method the right approach? A. Policymakers thought cruise missiles might be an effective way to kill Bin Ladin and his lieutenants. The cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan in August 1998 were based on intelligence that Bin Ladin and his principal aides would be gathered at a camp near Khowst, Afghanistan. But cruise missiles could result in death or injury to innocents. Bin Ladin could also change his location during the interval between when a cruise missile attack was authorized by the President and when the missiles hit their targets several hours later. Thus, there were limitations to reliance on them. CIA attempted to improve its intelligence to increase the probability a cruise missile attack would succeed and to make possible commando strikes on Bin Ladin's camps. President Clinton asked senior military officials about using commandos to raid al Qaeda facilities. We found that the Pentagon often produced unimaginative options and was reluctant to recommend any of them, leaving both Presidents Clinton and Bush with few appealing options between cruise missile strikes and outright invasion. As Rice told us, the military didn't particularly want this mission. Q. When should the U.S. government have first known that Bin Ladin posed a lethal threat to the United States, and al Qaeda was a worldwide organization? A. Officials who followed intelligence on Bin Ladin closely had this picture by 1996. This is why the CIA established a unit devoted to tracking and finding Bin Ladin, and disrupting al Qaeda's operations. But it was not until the August 1998 attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa that the full lethal nature of al Qaeda began to be understood by the broader U.S. government. During the months that followed, the extent of the al Qaeda network also became better-known to the government. Q. Why didn 't the CIA produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Bin Ladin and al Qaeda after 1997? A. Responsibility for a government-wide appraisal of terrorism and al Qaeda had been moved from the National Intelligence Council to CIA's Counterterrorist Center. Much of the work of analysts in CTC was devoted to analyzing daily threats. Less analysis was focused on the strategic nature of the threat. This likely explains why a National Intelligence Estimate was not produced in the late 1990s. Q. The December 1998 president's daily brief that President Clinton received indicated that terrorists linked to Bin Ladin were planning on hijacking a U.S. airliner.

Did the Clinton administration react to this intelligence? Why didn 't we do more to enhance domestic security in light of this threat? A. Working through Richard Clarke's CSG, the Clinton administration produced a vigorous response, putting airlines and airports on alert and working with agencies including the FAA and the FBI to ensure that the threat was handled. We should note that this was one of many threats the U.S. government received on al Qaeda. It seems particularly important now. There appears to have been no significant change in overall airline security measures after the 1998 threat. We should note that this warning referred to a "traditional" hijacking, not to a suicide attack like 9/11. Q. How did the Clinton administration handle the terrorist threats around the Millennium? A. The Commission found that the Millennium threat was generally well-handled and an important exception—a significant episode where information was shared well between agencies. Even the FBI, which had persistent problems about disclosing what it knew to other parts of the intelligence community and the government, worked well in the interagency process to handle the threat, including cabinet-level meetings. Q. Did the interagency fight over who would fund the Predator flights get in the way of using this capability? A. Several officials testified to us that this squabble between the CIA and the Pentagon did not interfere with deploying the Predator. Budget fights—who pays for what?—happen all the time in government, even as projects go forward. The Commission does believe, however, that the disagreements over a relatively small amount of money suggest that the broader U.S. government had not yet fully appreciated the seriousness of the al Qaeda threat. If it had had such an appreciation, we think these bureaucratic spats would have been resolved more quickly. Q. Could an armed Predator have flown before 9/11? In other words, was this a lost opportunity? A. All those involved in the development of the armed Predator told us that this was one of the fastest-moving technical projects they had ever seen in their time in government. A testing program that would normally take years was rushed through in mere months. Although it is arguable that an armed Predator could have been deployed in early summer 2001, Air Force personnel told us the weapon would not yet have been reliable and that this would have been a very high-risk venture. Armed Predators were used over Afghanistan weeks after 9/11, including one mission that killed one of Bin Ladin's chief lieutenants, Muhammad Atef. Q. Didn't the U.S. have sufficient evidence by mid-December 2000 that al Qaeda operatives attacked the Cole? And shouldn 't the U.S. have responded?

A. Senior levels of the Clinton administration, as well as CIA officials, told us that virtually everyone believed al Qaeda was behind the attack on the Cole. Administration officials, including National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, said that just such a belief was not sufficient to justify a U.S. military response against al Qaeda in Afghanistan to the American public or to the international community. The President needed, he said, firm and clear conclusions from the FBI and CIA directors that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan were involved in the attacks. Berger told us that this conclusion had not been presented before the end of the Clinton administration. Richard Clarke told us that the first time any administration stated publicly that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the Cole came in a speech by President Bush immediately following 9/11. The Commission concluded that there should have been some response to the attack on the Cole; that neither President Clinton nor President Bush had authorized a military strike; and that that was a mistake, which may have emboldened Bin Ladin.

Congress Q. How did Congress perform pre-9/11 ? A. We found significant problems in Congress's performance. Congress did not systematically address the al Qaeda threat or educate the nation about it before 9/11. Its oversight of the intelligence community regarding terrorism was episodic and lacked depth. Substantial reforms are called for in Congress's committee structure, including over the new Department of Homeland Security. We address these in our report.

The Clinton-Bush Transition Q. Did the fight over the 2000 presidential election and resulting shortening of the transition between the two administrations harm our readiness to deal with al Qaeda? A. The transition period was unusually short. The incoming Bush administration told us that outgoing Clinton officials communicated the al Qaeda threat well during the transition. President Clinton discussed the threat with President-elect Bush. Incoming principals received briefings that spotlighted al Qaeda, including a briefing from Richard Clarke to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. But it is also clear to us that transitions between administrations are a time when our country is particularly vulnerable. This is why we recommend changes such as instituting procedures for confirming cabinet level and deputy cabinet level officials on an expedited basis. The American people's right to be defended should not be interrupted. Q. Did the Bush administration hold over the expertise on counterterrorism from the Clinton administration?

A. The Bush administration made the initial decision to keep in place the White House coordinator for counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, and his entire staff. Moreover, it kept in place the Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as many working-level officials

The Bush Administration Q. On January 25, 2001, Richard Clarke urgently asks National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice for cabinet-level decisions related to the al Qaeda threat. And yet the principals didn 't meet until September 4. Why was a meeting delayed for so long? A. Clarke asked for decisions on issues including aid to the Northern Alliance and a response to the Cole. Bush administration officials told us that their emphasis was on the need to conduct a policy review of our approach to al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Only by including the regional dimension, they told us, could they fashion a more comprehensive strategy. They did not wish to adopt a "tit-for-tat" approach, reacting to attacks from al Qaeda without an overall policy. They conducted the policy review through the summer of 2001. Their first Principals Committee meeting on al Qaeda was held on September 4,2001, after they had completed their policy review. The Principals Committee met 32 times on other topics in this period. Q. Richard Clarke said that the Bush administration saw the al Qaeda threat as important but not urgent. Was he right? A. The Bush administration has a different view. They said they regarded the threat as urgent, but that what was needed most urgently was a comprehensive policy. We believe that both administrations took their responsibility to defend the country seriously. Rice and Clarke differ on interpretation here, not on the facts; both agree that the review was underway, and one calls it fast while the other calls it slow. The fact, is however, that neither administration, before 9/11, made eliminating al Qaeda the number one national security priority before 9/11. Q. Was the strategy for dealing with al Qaeda developed by the Bush administration significantly different from the strategy of the Clinton administration? A. Rice saw it as the embodiment of a comprehensive new effort to use all instruments of national power to eliminate the al Qaeda threat. Clarke saw it as essentially similar to earlier ideas from his office. There were some new measures in the strategy: support for the Northern Alliance and a plan to aid southern Pashtun leaders to resist Bin Ladin. The Bush strategy did not call for military action against Bin Ladin, although it did call for renewed military planning. Q. How did the Bush administration plan to deal with the Taliban?

A. The administration's Deputies Committee worked on this problem for months. On September 10, it endorsed a three-phase plan. First, a diplomatic envoy would give the Taliban a last chance. Second, continued diplomatic pressure would be combined with covert action efforts encouraging anti-Taliban Afghans to move against al Qaeda. Third, if the first two phases hadn't worked, the United States would try to use covert action to topple the Taliban's leadership from within. Q. President Bush told the Commission he had become impatient with what he called "swatting flies. " Does the Commission agree that President Bush followed through with a more aggressive plan? A. The Bush administration worked on a new policy document. It was a multi-year, multi-faceted plan. We describe Richard Clarke's earlier strategy papers as well as the draft Bush presidential directive but do not give a verdict on their similarities and differences. The Commission does not know how it would have been implemented had 9/11 not occurred. Q. Why didn 't the Predator fly in 2001 before 9/11? A. The military and the CIA were working on arming the Predator through the summer of 2001. The Commission found that some officials, including Clarke and some CIA officials, wanted to fly the Predator as a reconnaissance collection platform while that work was going on—to perhaps provide the elusive 'actionable intelligence' that would let Washington target Bin Ladin for a cruise missile strike. Others in the Pentagon and the CIA had a different view, arguing that more missions might make al Qaeda change its movements to evade the Predator and thus compromise the armed version's ability to attack Bin Ladin once it was ready. National Security Advisor Rice went along with the latter group's views, holding off on reconnaissance flights until the armed version was ready. At their September 4 meeting on the issue, principals determined that the armed version would not fly until spring 2002 but agreed on reconnaissance flights. The armed Predator flew within five weeks after 9/11. Q. What really came out of the September 4 Principals Meeting? A. The principals adopted the draft presidential directive designed to eliminate al Qaeda as a threat with little discussion. They also agreed that the United States needed to have armed Predators, although they were not ready yet, and discussed issues about getting the armed system up and running. The principals, including a previously reluctant DCI Tenet, also agreed to back Predator reconnaissance missions, which had not been flown since the winter of 2000.

Q. Does the commission believe we are safer from terrorist attacks than before 9/11?

A. The threat is ongoing. We have made important strides: our enemy has been set back but it is still capable of inflicting great damage. We are safer but not safe. The country must continue to focus on the fight for years into the future.

Recommendations Q. Does the Commission think the Homeland Security Council is a wise idea? A. No. We think it reinforces the divide between foreign and domestic agencies and should be abolished. Its responsibilities could be rolled into the existing National Security Council structure. Q. Does the Commission think al Qaeda is interested in getting weapons of mass destruction? A. Yes. We found evidence going back to the 1990s of avid al Qaeda interest in getting doomsday weapons. In 1998, before the East Africa embassy bombings, intelligence reports described Bin Ladin talking about wanting to cause a "Hiroshima." Significant progress has been made to secure "loose nukes" and other materials, but we recommend that much more be done to ensure that the world's most dangerous weapons do not fall into the hands of the world's most dangerous terrorists. Q. Does the Commission think we 're doing enough to "dry up the swamp " and stop potential recruits from joining al Qaeda? A. No. Important progress has been made, but much more remains to be done. We recommend the creation of an international youth assistance fund to promote educational alternatives to extremist religious schools in the developing world.

Afghanistan and Pakistan Q. Did the U.S. create al Qaeda or the Taliban to fight the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan? A. No. During the 1980s the U.S. assisted the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviets. U.S. aid was given to Pakistan, which in turn distributed it to the rebel groups, some of which counted Islamist radicals in their ranks. While Washington had no hand in creating al Qaeda or the Taliban, there was, in the 1980s, a general sense that Islamic zealots were beneficial in our strategy to stop Soviet expansion in South Asia.

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Q. Was the proposed UNOCAL pipeline a driving factor in Washington's Afghan policy? Did we "lower our standards " and align ourselves with the Taliban in hopes of receiving their support for the project? A. No. To the extent that Washington had an Afghan policy before 1998, it focused primarily on ending the bloody civil was in that country. As one possible way to bring the waning factions to the table, the State Department supported UNOCAL's pipeline project. But our research indicates that neither Washington nor UNOCAL favored the Taliban in hopes of securing a pipeline. Rather, Washington sought to work with all factions in securing a stable peace, a prerequisite for successful pipeline project. UNOCAL's pipeline project was abandoned after the 1998 embassy attacks. Q. Did the Sudanese offer to give us Bin Ladin? A. Based on our investigation and interviews with a number of officials, we have found no evidence that Sudan offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the U.S. in 1996. But we have also found no evidence that Washington asked Sudan to turn Bin Ladin over to us (though we encouraged the Sudanese to expel him from their country). Some officials have told us that because there was no indictment of Bin Ladin at that time, there would have been no basis for us to take hold of Bin Ladin. Q. How did we try to pressure the Taliban into giving up Bin Ladin—why didn 't it work? A. For over three years (spring 1998 - September 2001) American diplomats pressed the Taliban to turn Bin Ladin over. Washington directly (and indirectly through cooperating countries such as Saudi Arabia) demanded that the Taliban turn over Bin Ladin. We enacted sanctions against the Taliban and even threatened to hold them responsible for future al Qaeda attacks. But Bin Ladin's relationship with the Taliban's Mullah Omar had become so strong that Omar was probably never willing to expel him. Q. In our discussions with the Taliban, how did they react to our concerns and threats? A. After raising the topic with the Taliban, American diplomats were often left wondering what else could be done. Often the concerns and demands did not seem to register with the Taliban and they constantly provided excuses on why they could not expel Bin Ladin. For example, they said their culture prevented the from expelling "a guest." From time to time, the Taliban said they might be willing to try Bin Ladin themselves—but American diplomats felt this would be a farce. They wanted him to be turned over to a country where he would face a legitimate trial.

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Q. How much of an obstacle was Pakistan in our diplomatic efforts to solve the Bin Ladin problem? A. Elements of the Pakistani government, such as its intelligence bureau (ISID), were a serious problem. The ISID had a strong connection with the Taliban and did not want to press them on the Bin Ladin issue. And the country's political leadership was either unwilling or unable to force the ISID to change course on this issue. Q. Was there any difference in the way diplomacy was used by the Clinton and Bush administrations ? A. Before 9/11 both administrations used the same diplomatic tactics to press the Taliban on Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan. This included constant complaints, threats to "be held responsible" for future al Qaeda attacks and sanctions. Q. Are we doing enough in Pakistan and Afghanistan today? A. This is a tough battle. These are both poor countries that need a tremendous amount of attention to alleviate their long-term problems. We made a mistake in the 1990's by ignoring was going on in these countries—we can't make the same mistake twice. We are playing "catch-up" here and can't afford to abandon these two countries.

Saudi Arabia Q. Fifteen of nineteen hijackers were Saudis, and the Kingdom appears to have been the leading source of money for al Qaeda, How involved was the Saudi royal family? A. We have no credible evidence of direct Saudi government support for the 9/11 plot. However, the regime took few steps to stop al Qaeda fundraising and allowed support for jihadism to flourish when it was not directed at Saudi Arabia. Q. What were some of the problems the United States had with regard to counterterrorism and Saudi Arabia before 9/11? A. Saudi Arabia often did not share relevant information on al Qaeda. The Al Saud was reluctant to relay information that might embarrass the regime or that was linked to sensitive domestic political issues, such as the role of religious institutions or the degree of anti-American and anti-royal family sentiment. Q. How much of apriority was counterterrorism in the U.S.-Saudi relationship before 9/11?

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A. The United States often did not make counterterrorism a top priority in the bilateral relationship, with Iraq and the Middle East Peace Process taking precedence. Much of the emphasis within counterterrorism was on sharing information with regard to the Khobar Towers investigation, not on tracking and disrupting al-Qaeda. Q. How good is counterterrorism cooperation today with Saudi Arabia? A. Counterterrorism cooperation with the Kingdom is the best it has ever been after a long and trouble history. After the May 2003 attacks in the Kingdom, the regime took unprecedented measures to confront jihadists with the country and to crack down on terrorist financing. The Kingdom is cooperating today with several U.S. intelligence initiatives and is providing unprecedented access to information related to terrorism. The biggest problem today is not the Kingdom's willingness to cooperate, but rather its limited capacity for gathering, processing, and sharing important information.

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Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Monday, July 19, 2004 12:37 PM

To:

Front Office

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: Team 3's draft Q's and A's for the final report rollout

Philip, Chris, Dan, Steve: At the attachment please find our draft Q's and A's to prep commissioners for the final report rollout. Please let us know if we can be of further help on this. Mike

7/19/2004

Q&A's for Final Report Rollout Team 3—Counterterrorism Policy

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Was 9/11 Preventable? Q. Could 9/11 have been avoided? A. Jin hindsight, it's possible. Both the CIA and the FBI had opportunities to collate information on some of the would-be hijackers months before 9/11. It's possible that if these individuals had been arrested and questioned, or followed, they would have been prevented from carrying out the plot. But there are no assurances that even had that happened, ^he government would have caught all of them before they could carry out their plan. Deficiencies in the CIA and FBI contributed to their inability to connect the dots.

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Which Options Were Taken, and Which Were Not

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Q. Al Qaeda blew up our embassies in 1998 and the USS£o\e in 2000. Why didn 't we send troops into Afghanistan to wipe them out?

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A. Before 9/11, al Qaeda was responsible for the deaths of less than 50 Americans. This clearly showed it was a danger. But all senior policyrnakers of both the Clinton and Bush administrations agreed it would have been impossible to invade Afghanistan before 9/11. The Commission, however, found that neither admission organized a robust effort to shape congressional, American public, or international opinion about the necessity of using force against Bin Ladin. Q. Why didn't we put military "boots^onjhe^ground" in Afghanistan before 9/11?

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A. There werefsome officials in, the Pentagon who advocated doing so. But it is a major political and security decision to invade a country. An invasion would have required basing and support from Afghanistan's neighbors, such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Many officials told us this would have been hard to obtain before 9/11. Q. Does the Commission believe that the Pentagon unduly resisted the option of using force in Afghanistan? A. The U.S. military follows orders. If ordered to deploy troops to Afghanistan for commando raids, or other operations it would have done so. The military when asked came up with options for using force in Afghanistan. In the commission's view, however, it gave both Presidents Clinton and Bush limited and uncreative options, and was reluctant to take a position on which options would be most effective for reducing

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the Bin Ladin threat. It was more engaged in taking defensive measures against al Qaeda than proposing offensive actions. The U.S. military was reluctant to deploy troops to Afghanistan. It would have done so had it been ordered to do so by the President. But the military's position was that it lacked actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, without which it would have meant that its forces would be exposed to great risk with a low probability of succeeding. Q. Who is responsible for the failure to protect our country from al Qaeda? A. The Commission's view is that many committed officials were aware of the al Qaeda threat and worked hard to counter it. The broader government as a whole, however, had a difficult time changing our security and intelligence institutions to effectively combat this new kind of non,state enemy. Both Presidents Clinton and Bush were genuinely concerned about the threat. But the government did not organize a government-wide effort to defeat the threat until after the 9/11 attacks made clear that our homeland was in danger.

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Q. Did both the Clinton and Bush administrations underestimate the threat posed by Bin Ladin and al Qaeda? A. Both Presidents Clinton and Bush were concerned about the threat. The Commission found that across the government^ there was a failure of imagination concerning the threat. Few had internalized the idea that al Qaeda could launch catastrophic attacks in the United States.

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Q. Did President Clinton make the right choice in not authorizing missile strikes on those occasions when the CIA provided intelligence on Bin Ladin's location in Afghanistan? Did we miss an opportunity here? A. Officials in the Clinton administration, including T^tional Security Advisor Sandy Berger and DCI George Tenet told us that on the three,major occasions when the CIA provided decision makers with real-time intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, the intelligence itself was found to be insufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for cruise missile attacks. Officials were also concerned about the possibility of killing or injuring innocent civilians in proximity to Bin Ladin. As Berger told us. the DCI would tell policymakers. "We just don't have it.'?

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Q. You say that before 9/11 the U.S. never adopted the elimination ofal Qaeda as a clear strategic objective? Why? A. It was difficult for our government to understand that the terrorist threat that it had dealt with for 30 years, one that was state-sponsored, had transformed; and that by the late 1990,8., al Qaeda, a noi\state terrorist organization^ had become highly dangerous. Therefore, it dealt with al Qaeda using largely the means and elements of national power

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it had employed against terrorist organizations traditionally. These means were insufficient. Q. Your report indicates the CIA produced numerous reports about the possible use of airlines as weapons. Why weren 't these paid attention to? A. Some officials in the government did pay attention to them. Bui, there were often so many threat reports that streams of reporting got lost in the greater flood of information policy makers had to consider. Then, too, the CIA and intelligence community failed to pull the threads together. In 1998. Richard Clarke performed a tabletop drill with Pentagon and FAA officials to ask what could be done if terrorists hijacked a Leariet from Atlanta, stuffed it with explosives, and headed toward Washington. DC. The answer was, with the Pentagon still focused outward rather than inward, was rather little.

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Q. President Clinton had eighty ears to deal with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, and President Bush had less than eight months before 9/11. Doesn 't more fault lie with President Clinton for failing to kill or capture Bin Ladin and damage al Qaeda?

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A. The commission found that both Presidents were genuinely concerned about the al Qaeda threat. They each used the FBI, CIA, and other instruments of national power to respond to the threat. President Clinton authorized a cruise missile attack against al Qaeda in August 1998 in response to the attacks on our embassies. But our government at no time before 9/11 authorized a government-wide organized response to this threat on the order of the commitment we made, for example, in the Balkans. Q. Was the CIA risk^erse? Why didn 't the CIA ever put its personnel on the ground in Afghanistan to deal with Bin the Ladin problem? A. Teams of CIA officers did go into Afghanistan on numerous occasions before 9/11, risking their lives on hazardous missions. At the working level, we found no reluctance to risk such dangers. But policymakers and senior CIA managers were more cautious. Afghanistan was a country in the midst of civil war. There were no reliable means for inserting or extracting officers. Senior officials should be cautious about exposing U.S. personnel to great risk. Before 9/11, these officials weighed the risks of deploying U.S. personnel against the gains, and made their choices. As a result, the U.S. government relied on proxy forces to carry out covert action programs. Q. Your report says the CIA relied for years on proxies to capture or kill Bin Ladin and that CIA management placed little confidence in the effectiveness of the proxies. Why did they persist in relying on them? A. The Afghan tribal members the CIA used did provide some good intelligence on Bin Ladin and his organization. The CIA hoped these agents would capture or even kill Bin Ladin. But it is clear that, at least at the senior management level, the CIA was very skeptical that the tribals could ever produce the result the government wanted. The

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Commission believes both the Clinton and Bush administrations should have considered other options. Q. Did Executive Order 12333 's ban on assassinations limit our choices with regard to this major national security threat? A. No. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice made clear that the ban had no application to Bin Ladin, an enemy of the United States. Under the law of armed conflict, action directed against Bin Ladin was justified as an act of self defense. Q. Did President Clinton give the CIA authority to kill Bin Ladin? A. President Clinton and his top national security officials told us that his intentions were clear: He wanted Bin Ladin dead. They said that this was communicated to the CIA. Our examination of the authorities signed by President Clinton showed that the language is sometimes ambiguous. For one of the documents he signed, language was crafted to give the CIA extraordinary authority that went beyond capture, but the extreme sensitivity of this document meant that very few people saw it. On another occasion, President Clinton clearly authorized an action that, if carried out, could only have resulted in Bin Ladin's death. CIA officials, however, told us that they believed they were authorized to capture Bin Ladin and that he could only be killed in the context of a capture operation.

Deleted! Q. Based on this experience, shouldn 't Executive Order 12333 be changed to allow our government to assassinate a terrorist who has vowed to kill Americans?^ II A. The Executive Order did not restrict options against Bin Ladin. There may be other reasons why the government after a review might conclude that in the war on terrorism some changes to this order might be advisable. The commission has not taken a position on this.1

Q. Did the confusion on kill vs. capture get in the way of dealing with Bin Ladin? A. It is unclear what impact this confusion had, as the proxies used by CIA never came close to either killing or capturing Bin Ladin. Director Tenet told us—and President Bush—that he had all the authority to go after Bin Ladin that he wanted. The CIA's inability to either capture or kill Bin Ladin before 9/11 seems to be a question not so much of authority as capability. Q. As part of his response to the al Qaeda attack on our two embassies in East Africa in August 1998, President Clinton authorized a cruise missile attack on the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum. Was that the right decision? A. Clinton administration officials told us that intelligence indicated that traces of an ingredient for the deadly nerve agent VX were found at this pharmaceutical plant owned by Bin Ladin. They thought that perhaps one day a weapon containing VX produced at this plant^iight one day be used against the United States. Thus, they thought destroying the plant was justified by national security concerns. 0. Critics have accused Preside/it Clinton of "wagging the dog "—using the August 1998 missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan to distract the public and media from his political troubles. Did he?

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A. No. We have found no evidence whatsoever to suggest that President Clinton's decisions were made on grounds other than national security, in either documents or interviews. Q. The Clinton administration seemed to rely heavily on using cruise missiles to kill Bin Laden and hurt al Qaeda. Was this standoff method the right approach ? A. Policypakers thought cruise missiles might be an effective way to kill Bin Ladin and his lieutenants. The cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan in August 1998 were based on intelligence that Bin Ladin and his principal aides would be gathered at a camp near Khowst, Afghanistan. But cruise missiles could result in death or injury to innocents. Bin Ladin could also change his location during the interval between when a cruise missile attack was authorized by the President and when the missiles hit their targets several hours later. Thus, there were limitations to reliance on them. CIA attempted to improve its intelligence to increase the probability a cruise missile attack would succeed, and to make possible commando strikes on Bin Ladin's camps.

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President Clinton asked senior military officials about using commandos to raid al Qaeda facilities. We found mat the Pentagon often produced unimaginative options and was reluctant to recommend any of them, leaving both Presidents Clinton and Bush with few appealing options between cruise missile strikes and outright invasion. As Rice told us, the military didn't particularly want this mission. Q. When should the U.S. government have first known that Bin Ladin posed a lethal threat to the United States, and al Qaeda was a worldwide organization? A. Officials who followed intelligence on Bin Ladin closely had this picture by 1996. This is why the CIA established a unit devoted to tracking and finding Bin Ladin, and disrupting al Qaeda's operations. But it was not until the August 1998 attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa that the full lethal nature of al Qaeda began to be understood by the broader U.S. government. During the months that foliowed^ the extent of the al Qaeda network also became better^cnown to the government.

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Q. Why didn 't the CIA produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Bin Ladin and al Qaeda after 1997? A. Responsibility for a government-wide appraisal of terrorism and al Qaeda had been moved from the National Intelligence Council to CIA's Counterterrorist Center. Much of the work of analysts in CTC was devoted to analyzing daily threats. Less analysis was focused on the strategic nature of the threat. This likely explains why a National Intelligence Estimate was not produced in the late 199Qs. Q. The December 1998 president's daily brief that President Clinton received indicated that terrorists linked to Bin Ladin were^planning on hijacking a U.S. airliner.

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Did the Clinton administration react to this intelligence? Why didn 't we do more to enhance domestic security in light of this threat? A. Working through Richard Clarke's CSG. the Clinton administration produced a vigorous response, putting airlines and airports on alert and working with agencies including the FAA and the FBI to ensure that the threat was handled. We should note that this was one of many threats the U.S. government received on al Qaeda. It seems particularly important now. JJiere appears to have been no significant Change in overall airline security measures after the 1998 threat. We should note that this warning referred to a "traditional'' hijacking, not to a suicide attack like 9/11. Q, How did the Clinton administration handle the terrorist threats around the Millennium?

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A. The Commission found that the Millennium threat was generally well-handled and an important exception—a significant episode where information was shared well between agencies. Even the FBI, which had persistent problems about disclosing what it knew to other parts of the intelligence community and the government, worked well in the interagencv process to handle the threat, including cabinet-level meetings. Q. Did the interagency fight over -who would fund the Predator flights get in the way of using this capability? A. Several officials testified to us that this squabble between the CIA and the Pentagon did not interfere with deploying the Predator. Budget fights—who pays for what?—happen all the time in government, even as projects go forward. The Commission does believe, however, that the disagreements over a relatively small amount of money suggest that the broader U.S. government had not yet fully appreciated the seriousness of the al Qaeda threat. If it had had such an appreciation, we think these bureaucratic spats would have been resolved more quickly.

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Q. Could an armed Predator have flown before 9/11 ? In other words, was this a lost opportunity? A. All those involved in the development of the armed Predator told us that this was one of the fastest^moving technical projects they had ever seen in their time in government. A testing program that would normally take years was rushed through in mere months. Although it is arguable that an armed Predator could have been deployed in early summer 2001, Air Force personnel told us the weapon would not yet have been reliable and that this would have been a very high-risk venture. Armed Predators were used over Afghanistan weeks after 9/11. including one mission that killed one of Bin Ladin's chief lieutenants. Muhammad Atef. Q. Didn't the U.S. have sufficient evidence by mid-December 2000 that al Qaeda operatives attacked the pole"? And shouldn 't the U.S. have responded?

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A. Senior levels of the Clinton administration, as well as CIA officials, told us that virtually everyone believed al Qaeda was behind the attack on the Pole. Administration officials, inc hiding j^jfttional Security A/ivisor Sandy Berger. said that just such a belief was not sufficient to justify a U.S. military response against al Qaeda in Afghanistan to the American public or to the international community. The President needed, he said, firm and clear conclusions from the FBI and CIA directors that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan were involved in the attacks. Berger told us that this conclusion had not been presented before the end of the Clinton administration. Richard Clarke told us that the first time any administration stated publicly that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the Cole fame in a speech by President Bush immediately following 9/11.

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The Commission concluded that there should have been some response to the attack on thejCo/e; that neither President Clinton nor President Bush had authorized a military strike; and that that was a mistake, which may have emboldened Bin Ladin.

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Congress Q. How did Congress perform pre-9/11 ? A. We found significant problems in Congress's performance. Congress did not systematically address the al Qaeda threat, or educate the nation about u, before 9/11. Il£ oversight of the intelligence community regarding terrorism was episodic and lacked depth. Substantial reforms are called for in Congress's committee structure.! including over the new Department of Homeland Security. We address these in our report.

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The Clinton-Bush Transition Q. Did the fight over the 2000 presidential election and resulting shortening of the transition between the two administrations harm our readiness to deal with al Qaeda? A. The transition period was unusually short. The incoming Bush administration told us that outgoing Clinton officials communicated the al Qaeda threat well during the transition. President Clinton discussed the threat with President-elect Bush. Incoming principals received briefings that spotlighted al Oaeda. including a briefing from Richard Clarke to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. But it is also clear to us that transitions between administrations are a time when our country is particularly vulnerable. This is why we recommend changes such as instituting procedures for confirming cabinet level and deputy cabinet level officials on an expedited basis. The American people's right to be defended should not be interrupted.,

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Q. Did the Bush administration hold over the expertise on counterterrorism from the Clinton administration?

A. The Bush administration made the initial decision to keepTin place theTWhite House coordinator for counterterrorism. Richard Clarke, and his entire staff. Moreover, it kept in place the Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as many working-level officials.

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The Bush Administration Q. On January 25, 2001, Richard Clarke urgently psks National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice for cabinet-level decisions related rojhe al Qaeda threat. And yet the principals didn 't meet until September 4. Why was a meeting delayed for so long? A. Clarke asked for decisions on issues including aid to the Northern Alliance and a response to the Cole. Bush administration officials told us that their emphasis was on the need to conduct a policy review of our approach to al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and Pakistan^ Only by including the regional dimension, they told us. could theyTfashion.la more comprehensive strategy. They did not wish to adopt a "tit-for-tat" approach, reacting to attacks from al Qaeda without an overall policy. They conducted the policy review through the summer of 2001. Their first frincipals. Committee meeting on al Qaeda was held on September 4, 2001, after they had completed their policy review. The Principals Committee met 32 times on other topics in this period. Q. Richard Clarke said thatfhe Bush administration saw the al Qaeda threat ps important but not urgent, Was he right?

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A. The Bush administration has a different view. They said they regarded the threat as urgent, but that what was needed most urgently was a comprehensive policy. We believe that both administrations took their responsibility to defend the country seriously. Rice and Clarke differ on interpretation here, not on the facts: both agree that the review was underway, and one calls it fast while the other calls it slow. The fact, is however, that neither administration, before 9/11, made eliminating al Qaeda the number one national security priority before 9/11. Q. Was the strategy for dealing with al Qaeda developed by the Bush administration significantly different from the strategy of the Clinton administration? A. Rice saw it as the embodiment of a comprehensive new effort to use all instruments of national power to eliminate the al Oaeda threat. Clarke saw it as essentially similar to earlier ideas from his office. There were some new measures in the strategy: support for the Northern Alliance and a plan to aid southern Pashtun leaders to resist Bin Ladin. The Bush strategy did not call for military action against Bin Ladin^ although it did call for renewed military planning. O. How did the Bush administration plan to deal with the Taliban?

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A. The administration's Deputies Committee worked on this problem for months. Qn September 10. it endorsed a three-phase plan. First, a diplomatic envoy would give the Taliban a last chance. Second, continued diplomatic pressure would be combined with covert action efforts encouraging anti-Taliban Afghans to move against al Qaeda. Third, if the first two phases hadn't worked, the United States would try to use covert action to topple the Taliban's leadership from within. Q. President Bush told the Commission he had become impatient with what he called "swatting flies. " Does the Commission agree that President Bush followed through with a more aggressive plan? A. The Bush administration worked on a new policy document. It was a multi-year, multi-faceted plan. We describe Richard Clarke's earlier strategy papers as well as the draft Bush presidential directive but do not give a verdict on their similarities and differences. The Commission does not know how it would have been implemented had 9/11 not occurred.

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Q. Why didn 't the Predator fly in 2001 before 9/11 ? A. The military and the CIA were working on arming the Predator through the summer of 2001. The Commission found that some officials, including Clarke and some CIA officials, wanted to fly the Predator as a reconnaissance collection platform while that work was going on—to perhaps provide the elusive "actionable intelligence' that would let Washington target Bin Ladin for a cruise missile strike. Others in the Pentagon and the CIA had a different view, arguing thatfliore missions might fliake al Qaeda Tchange its movements to evade Jhe Predator and thus compromise the armed version's ability to attack Bin Ladin once it was ready,. National Security Advisor Rice went along with the latter group's views, holding off on reconnaissance flights until the armed version was ready. At their September ^meeting on the issue, principals determined that the armed version would not fly until spring 2002 but agreed on reconnaissance flights. The armed Predator flew within five weeks after 9/11.

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Q. What really came out of the September 4 Principals Meeting? A. TThe principals adopted the draft presidential directive designed to eliminate al Qaeda as a threat with little discussion. They also agreed that the United States needed to have armed Predators, although they were not ready vet, and discussed issues about getting the armed system up and running. The principals, including a previously reluctant PCI Tenet, also agreed to back Predator reconnaissance missions, which had not been flown since the winter of 2000.

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Deleted: <#>Has the decision to attack Iraq and the commitment of our forces there gotten in the way of the war on terrorism?^

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Q. Does the commission believe we are safer from terrorist attacks than before 9/11?

A. This is a political question and the American public will need to make their own decisions. What we can say is that terrorism continues to be the major threat against the United States and we need to devote more resources and attention to it, offensively and defensively.H

A. The threat is ongoing. We have made important strides: our enemy has been set back but it is still capable of inflicting great damage. We are safer but not safe. The country must continue to focus on the fight for years into the future.

Recommendations Q. Does the Commission think the Homeland Security Council is a wise idea?^

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A. No. We think it reinforces the divide between foreign and domestic agencies and should be abolished. Its responsibilities could be rolled into the existing National Security Council structure.

O. Does the Commission think al Oaeda is interested in getting weapons of mass destruction?

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A. Yes. We found evidence going back to the 1990s of avid al Oaeda interest in getting doomsday weapons. In 1998. before the East Africa embassy bombings. intelligence reports described Bin Ladin talking about wanting to cause a "Hiroshima." Significant progress has been made to secure "loose nukes" and other materials, but we recommend that much more be done to ensure that the world's most dangerous weapons do not fall into the hands of the world's most dangerous terrorists. 0. Does the Commission think we 're doing enough to "dry up the swamp " and fitop potential recruits from joining al Oaeda? A. No. Important progress has been made, but much more remains to be done. We recommend the creation of an international youth assistance fund to promote educational alternatives to extremist religious schools in the developing world.

Afghanistan and Pakistan Q. Did the U.S. create al Qaeda or the Taliban to fight the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan? A. No. EJuring the 198Q,s the U.S. assisted the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviets. U.S. aid was given to Pakistan, which, in turn distributed it to the rebel groups, some of which counted Islamis], radicals in their ranks. While Washington had no hand in creating al Qaeda or the Taliban, there was, in the 198Qs, a general sense that Islamic zealots were beneficial in our strategy to stop Soviet expansion in South Asia.

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Q. Was the proposed UNOCAL pipeline a driving factor in Washington's Afghan policy? Did we "lower our standards " and align ourselves with the Taliban in hopes of receiving their support for the project? A. No. To the extent that Washington had an Afghan policy before 1998, it focused primarily on ending the bloody civil was in that country. As one possible way to bring the warring factions to the table, the State Department supported UNOCAL's pipeline project. But our research indicates that neither Washington nor UNOCAL favored the Taliban in hopes of securing a pipeline. Rather, Washington sought to work with all factions in securing a stable peace, a prerequisite for successful pipeline project. UNOCAL's pipeline project was abandoned after the 1998 embassy attacks. Q. Did the Sudanese offer to give us Bin Ladin? A. Based on our investigation and interviews with a number of officials, we have found no evidence that Sudan offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the U.S. in 1996. But we have also found no evidence thatTWashmgton asked Sudan to turn Bin Ladin over to us (though we encouraged the Sudanese to expel him from their country). Some officials have told us that because there was no indictment of Bin Ladin at that time, there would have been no basis for us to take hold of Bin Ladin.

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Q. How did we try to pressure the Taliban into giving up Bin Ladin—why didn 't it work? A. For over three years (spring 1998 - September 200 L) American diplomats pressed the Taliban to turn Bin Ladin over. Washington directly (and indirectly through cooperating countries such as Saudi Arabia) demanded that the Taliban turn over Bin Ladin. We enacted sanctions against the Taliban and even threatened to hold them responsible for future al Qaeda attacks. But Bin Ladin's relationship with the Taliban's Mullah Omar had become so strong that Omar was probably never willing to expel him. Q. In our discussions with the Taliban, how did they react to our concerns and threats? A. After raising the topic with the Taliban, American diplomats were often left wondering what else could be done. Often the concerns and demands did not seem to register with the Taliban and they constantly provided excuses on why they could not expel Bin Ladin. For example, they said their culture prevented the from expelling "a guest." From time to time, the Taliban said they might be willing to try Bin Ladin themselves—but American diplomats felt this would be a farce. They wanted him to be turned over to a country where he would face a legitimate trial.

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Q. How much of an obstacle was Pakistan in our diplomatic efforts to solve the Bin Ladin problem ? A. Elements of the Pakistani government, such as its intelligence bureau (ISID), were a serious problem. The ISID had a strong connection with the Taliban and did not want to press them on the Bin Ladin issue. And the country's political leadership was either unwilling or unable to force the ISID to change course on this issue. Q. Was there any difference in the way diplomacy was used by the Clinton and Bush administrations? A. Before 9/11 both administrations used the same diplomatic tactics to press the Taliban on Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan. This included constant complaints, threats to "be held responsible" for future al Qaeda attacks and sanctions. Q. Are we doing enough in Pakistan and Afghanistan today? A. This is a tough battle. These are both poor countries that need a tremendous amount of attention to alleviate their long-term problems. We made a mistake in the 1990's by ignoring was going on in these countries—we can't make the same mistake twice. We are playing "catch-up" here and can't afford to abandon these two countries.

Saudi Arabia Q. Fifteen of nineteen hijackers were Saudis, and the Kingdom appears to have been the leading source of money for al Qaeda. How involved was the Saudi royal family? A. We have no credible evidence of direct Saudi government support for the 9/11 plot. However, the regime took few steps to stop al Qaeda fundraising and allowed support for jihadism to flourish when it was not directed at Saudi Arabia. Q. What were some of the problems the United States had with regard to counterterrorism and Saudi Arabia before 9/11? A. Saudi Arabia often did not share relevant information on al Qaeda. The Al Saud was reluctant to relay information that might embarrass the regime or that was linked to sensitive domestic political issues, such as the role of religious institutions or the degree of anti-American and anti-royal family sentiment. Q. How much of apriority was counterterrorism in the U.S.-Saudi relationship before 9/11?

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A. The United States often did not make counterterrorism a top priority in the bilateral relationship, with Iraq and the Middle East Peace Process taking precedence. Much of the emphasis within counterterrorism was on sharing information with regard to the Khobar Towers investigation, not on tracking and disrupting al-Qaeda. Q. How good is counterterrorism cooperation today with Saudi Arabia? A. Counterterrorism cooperation with the Kingdom is the best it has ever been after a long and trouble history. After the May 2003 attacks in the Kingdom, the regime took unprecedented measures to confront jihadists with the country and to crack down on terrorist financing. The Kingdom is cooperating today with several U.S. intelligence initiatives and is providing unprecedented access to information related to terrorism. The biggest problem today is not the Kingdom's willingness to cooperate, but rather its limited capacity for gathering, processing, and sharing important information.

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Bonnie D. Jenkins 7/16/2004 Questions

1. Why did the military not conduct an invasion into Afghanistan to capture al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin before 9/11? 2. Why did the military not employ the use of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan before 9/11? 3. Why was there no military response to the October 2000 USS Cole attack? 4. Were cruise missiles the best military means for going after Bin Ladin and al Qaeda before 9/11? 5. Were there any other military option considered for the U.S. response to the African embassy bombings besides cruise missiles? If so, why were those options chosen? 6. What is meant by the term "actionable intelligence," and why was that a limit to military operations prior to 9/11? 7. Why were President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld displeased with the military options presented by the Department immediately after 9/11?

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, July 08, 2004 7:19 AM

To:

Team 3

Subject: FW: Looking Ahead -- Press Guidance

Hi Team 3: I'd like each of you to begin working on this tasking from the front office. Please draft questions for your particular areas of responsibility. Please follow the format contained in the attached memo. Let's talk about this on Friday. We have until next Friday to get it done. But I suggest we aim for completing it on Wednesday, July 14. That'll give us a day or two to go over it as a group and make sure we have the questions most likely to be raised well covered. This is a chance to shape the message we want the public to hear concerning our work. Mike Original Message From: Chris Kojm Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 8:54 PM To: Team Leaders Cc: Front Office; Al Felzenberg; Jonathan Stull Subject: Looking Ahead - Press Guidance Team Leaders: We need to start preparing press guidance for the roll-out. What I would ask each of you to do is to prepare draft questions and suggested answers on key issues in your respective subject area, relating both to the narrative and recommendations. By now, you know the basic questions the press & families are asking. Please complete drafts by Friday July 16th. We need them by then so that we can turn them around for Commissioners by early the next week in preparation for the roll-out. Reminder: All tasks related to footnotes and the text of the final report take priority. BUT I am sending this note now so that you can plan your work between now and COB July 16th. For guidance on style/format/tone/length of response, see the attached

7/8/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Chris Kojm

Sent:

Wednesday, July 07, 2004 8:54 PM

To:

Team Leaders

Cc:

Front Office; Al Felzenberg; Jonathan Stull

Subject: Looking Ahead - Press Guidance Team Leaders: We need to start preparing press guidance for the roll-out. What I would ask each of you to do is to prepare draft questions and suggested answers on key issues in your respective subject area, relating both to the narrative and recommendations. By now, you know the basic questions the press & families are asking. Please complete drafts by Friday July 16th. We need them by then so that we can turn them around for Commissioners by early the next week in preparation for the roll-out. Reminder: All tasks related to footnotes and the text of the final report take priority. BUT I am sending this note now so that you can plan your work between now and COB July 16th. For guidance on style/format/tone/length of response, see the attached

7/8/2004

Questions and Answers

Q. Moussaoui's defense attorneys claim that we have harmed his ability to get a fair trial. How do you respond? A. We have a duty to perform, under the law, to provide a full and complete accounting. We are doing our job. Mr. Moussaoui's attorneys are doing theirs.

Q.

Did General Larry Arnold lie to you when he testified last year?

A. General Arnold made clear that the Commission's investigation helped him to learn the facts, and he understands that those facts are different from his testimony last year. He agreed with the analysis in the staff statements.

(If pressed) Q. Did General Arnold lie? Did he knowingly mislead the Commission? A. We have no judgment on that question.

Q. This is your second go-round with NORAD and third with FAA. What have you learned? A. Well, we believe we now have the full, authoritative story. It is a complicated story. It took us some time to put it together. The main conclusion we draw about the day is confusion and poor communication. The civilian and military leaders struggled to get situational awareness, and did not achieve it before the four hijackings had concluded.

Q. Are you satisfied that NORAD can now intercept a hijacked aircraft and defend the country? A. NORAD has testified that it can carry out the mission today. Many steps have been taken to improve NORAD and FAA communication. Protocols, procedures, training, and exercises have changed significantly since 9/11.

Q. Are you satisfied that the President, and not the Vice President, gave the shoot down order? A. We have the testimony of the President and the Vice President that they spoke before before the shoot-down order, and that the President authorized the shootdown. Dr. Rice believes she heard the Vice President's side of that conversation. Among the sources that reflect other important events that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, although the relevant sources are incomplete. (If pressed) We told you what we know.

Q.Do we know why the Secretary of Defense was not in the chain of command that morning? A. The Secretary of Defense was in the parking lot helping with rescue efforts after the Pentagon was hit. He then joined the Air Threat Conference call by 10:39 AM, after the Vice President had already passed the shoot-down authorization.

Q. Why did the President stay at the elementary school after he learned of the second hit? A. The President has addressed this question, and his answer is reflected in the staff statement. He wanted to project strength and calm while his staff tried to better understand what was happening. He and his staff then left the school after arranging their departure and after the President delivered a brief statement.

Q. We heard that the Secret Service wanted to get the President airborne as fast and has high as possible. Why? A. Air Force One can go higher than most aircraft. They thought it was the safest place for him at that time. Then they decided to proceed to Barksdale AFB, the nearest military base. Then they decided to proceed to Offutt Air Force Base, where they believed the President could best exercise command and control.

Q. Given all you have made public, what is most important to tell the American people about 9/11 and the threat we face today? A.The single point I would emphasize is that al Qaeda is a sophisticated, capable, entrepreneurial organization. The system as a whole - the Intelligence Community and the policymakers - took a long time to assimilate and understand the gravity of the threat. Government officials believe they disrupted some of al Qaeda's operations post 9/11. We also know that al Qaeda adapted. Al Qaeda's intent to hit us again is clear. Our goal is to make sure that we deny them that capability. Over the long term, we need to win hearts and minds in the Arab and Muslim world and thereby deny al Qaeda any base of support.

Q. What have you really found out about the Iraqi connection? A. We know that Bin Ladin had ties to several governments - above all, with Sudan and Afghanistan. Over time, he did have contacts with Iran and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.

Q. Why didn't you tell us the real names of the CIA officials? A.

The Agency requested this step for security reasons. We accommodated their request.

Q. How do you assess the role of Saudi Arabia and the role of the hijackers? Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. Funding for Al Qaeda came from charities and rich donors in the Gulf, many of them from Saudi Arabia. We have investigated this issue exhaustively, and our investigation still continues. We have no credible evidence of support by the Saudi government for the 9/11 plot.

Q. What happened in San Diego and Los Angeles with Hazmi and Mihdhar? Hazmi and Mihdhar had assistance from the Muslim community. It appears that most of this help was unwitting. Some of their contacts within the United States were suspicious. We discuss what we know of these individuals in the staff statements.

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 3 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/21/2008

BOX: 00004

FOLDER: 0001

TAB: 2

DOC ID: 31206890

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Report Publication & Roll Out Prep. DOCUMENT DATE: 07/14/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Possible Q&A on Saudi

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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Mike Hurley From:

Scott Allan

Sent:

Tuesday, July 13, 2004 2:49 PM

To:

Mike Hurley

Subject: RE: Q's and A's for final report rollout I'm going to try to get a start on my q&a's this afternoon. I'm trying to step into the shoes of a lay person who has given the book a "quick" read and have come up with the following: Did the U.S. create Al Qaeda or the Taliban to fight the Soviets? Was the proposed UNOCAL pipeline a driving factor in Washington's Afghan policy? Did we "lower our standards" and align ourselves with the Taliban in hopes of receiving their support for the American pipeline? Did the Sudanese offer to give us Bin Ladin or information on Al Qaeda? Did we miss an opportunity to "snatch" him in Sudan? How did we try to pressure the Taliban to give up Bin Ladin—why didn't it work? How much of an obstacle was Pakistan in our diplomatic efforts to solve the Bin Ladin problem? Why not push them harder or give them a reward to induce cooperation? In our discussions with the Taliban, how did they react to concerns and threats? What options did they provide to our diplomats? Was there any difference in the way diplomacy was used by the Clinton and Bush administrations? --S

Original Message From: Mike Hurley Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2004 1:58 PM To: Team 3 Subject: Q's and A's for final report rollout

Teammies: Just a reminder that amidst all the madness we're still on the hook to draft questions and answers on CT policy issues for commissioners' use when the report is rolled out.

7/13/2004

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Our draft q's and a's are due this Friday. Last week I forwarded you Chris Kojm's suggested format. We should aim for perhaps 20 - 30 (that's just a guesstimate). Let's meet tomorrow Wednesday to come up with ideas on the key questions we need to cover. For Dan Byman: We'll let you know as soon as we agree on a time for this, and it would be great if you could come. If you're not able, send in any q and a suggestions you have, using the format Chris provided last week. You're the best authority for q's and a's on Saudi Arabia; but also send in ideas you have for questions Commissioners are likely to get asked on any of the CT policy issues we've looked at. Dan, we value your advice. Thanks, Mike

7/13/2004

SHA'S TALKING POINTS (7/13) 1-Did the U.S. create Al Qaeda or the Taliban to fight the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan? No. During the 1980's the U.S. assisted the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviets. U.S. aid was given to Pakistan who in turn distributed it to the rebel groups, some of which counted Islamic radicals in their ranks. While Washington had no hand in creating Al Qaeda or the Taliban, there was, in the 1980's, a general sense that Islamic zealots were beneficial in our strategy to stop Soviet expansion in South Asia. 2-Was the proposed UNOCAL pipeline a driving factor in Washington's Afghan policy? Did we "lower our standards" and align ourselves with the Taliban in hopes of receiving their support for the project? No. To the extent that Washington had an Afghan policy before 1998, it focused primarily on ending the bloody civil war in that country. As one possible way to bring the warring factions to the table, the State Department supported UNOCAL's pipeline project. But our research indicates that neither Washington nor UNOCAL favored the Taliban in hopes of securing a pipeline. Rather Washington sought to work with all factions in securing a stable peace, a prerequisite for a successful pipeline project. UNOCAL's pipeline project was abandoned after the 1998 embassy attacks. 3-Did the Sudanese offer to give us Bin Ladin? Based on our research and interviews with a number of officials, we have found no evidence that Sudan offered to turn Bin Ladin over to the U.S. in 1996. But we have also found no evidence that the USG asked Sudan to turn Bin Ladin over to us (though we encouraged the Sudanese to expel him from their country). Some officials have told us that because there was no indictment of Bin Ladin at that time, there would have been no basis for us to take hold of Bin Ladin. 4-How did we try to pressure the Taliban into giving up Bin Ladin—why didn't it work? For over three years (spring 1998-September 2001) American diplomats pressed the Taliban to turn Bin Ladin over. Washington directly (and indirectly through proxies such as Saudi Arabia) demanded that the Taliban turn over Bin Ladin. We enacted sanctions against the Taliban and even threatened to hold them responsible for future Al Qaeda attacks. But Bin Ladin's relationship with the Taliban's Mullah Omar had become so strong that Omar was probably never willing to expel him. 5-In our discussions with the Taliban, how did they react to our concerns and threats? After raising the topic with the Taliban American diplomats were often left wondering what else could be done. Often the concerns and demands did not seem to register with the Taliban and they constantly provided excuses on why they could not expel Bin Ladin. For example, they said their culture prohibited them from expelling "a guest". From time to time the Taliban said they might be willing to try Bin Ladin themselves - but American diplomats felt this would be a farce. They wanted him turned over to a country when he would face a legitimate trial. 6-How much of an obstacle was Pakistan in our diplomatic efforts to solve the Bin Ladin problem? Elements of the Pakistani government, such as its intelligence bureau (ISID), were a serious problem. The ISID had a strong connection with the Taliban and did not want to press them on the Bin Ladin issue. And the country's political leadership was either unwilling or unable to force the ISID to change course on this issue.

7-Was there any difference in the way diplomacy was used by the Clinton and Bush administrations? Before 9-11 both administrations used the same diplomatic tactics to press the Taliban on Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan. This included constant complaints, threats to "be held responsible" for future Al Qaeda attacks and sanctions. 8-Are we doing enough in Pakistan and Afghanistan today? This is a tough battle. These are both poor countries that need a tremendous amount of attention in connection with immediate and long term problems. We made a mistake in the 1990's by ignoring what was going on in these countries—we can't make the same mistake twice. We are playing "catch-up" here and can't afford to abandon these two countries.

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Mike Hurley From:

Daniel Byman

Sent:

Tuesday, July 13, 2004 1:51 PM

To:

Mike Hurley; Team 3

Subject: Re: Q's and A's for final report rollout

Mike, I'll try to come in tommorrow afternoon (I have a morning home repair appointment and a 2:30 meeting, but I'll try to come in before and after the 2:30). Dan

Mike Hurley wrote: Teammies: Just a reminder that amidst all the madness we're still on the hook to draft questions and answers on CT policy issues for commissioners' use when the report is rolled out. Our draft q's and a's are due this Friday. Last week I forwarded you Chris Kojm's suggested format. We should aim for perhaps 20 - 30 (that's just a guesstimate). Let's meet tomorrow Wednesday to come up with ideas on the key questions we need to cover. For Dan Byman: We'll let you know as soon as we agree on a time for this, and it would be great if you could come. If you're not able, send in any q and a suggestions you have, using the format Chris provided last week. You're the best authority for q's and a's on Saudi Arabia; but also send in ideas you have for questions Commissioners are likely to get asked on any of the CT policy issues we've looked at. Dan, we value your advice. Thanks, Mike

7/13/2004

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