T3 B7 Dialogue W Commissioners Fdr- Notes Re 11-17-03 Team 2 Meeting W Kojm And Hamilton 096

Meeting of Team 2: Kevin Scheid, Lorry Fenner, Lloyd Salvetti and Gordon Lederman with Chris Kojm and Vice-Chairman Hamilton November 17,2003 Notes Taken by Ben Rhodes Mandate: Kevin Scheid discussed the Team's mandate. In addition to intelligence management, collection and analysis, he said the team will look at Congressional oversight, resources, and covert operations - which overlaps with Team 3. Help from Commission: Lee asked what the Commission could do to help the Team's work. Kevin Scheid said the Team would benefit from more interaction with Commissioners. They are beginning to form opinions, and don't want to draft a monograph that contradicts the feelings of the Commission. Lee asked about the best way to do this. Kevin Scheid suggested interaction with Commissioners who are particularly interested in intelligence. For instance, the Team had a very good luncheon with Secretary Lehman. There are likely three or four other Commissioners with a particular interest in the Team's work. Lee said he would raise the issue at an upcoming meeting. Access: Lee asked if the Team is getting the access it needs. Kevin Scheid said they have done well with NSA - less well with CIA and DoD. Since Lee's meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld things have gotten better at DoD. They are still waiting for the classified addendum to Rumsfeld's anti-ballistic missile report. The document has Rumsfeld's feelings about management of the intelligence community (1C) and the Commission should see it, but it is not clear who controls the document - DoD or Congress. The CIA is still a problem. Lee asked if the problem is bureaucratic or stonewalling. Kevin Scheid said it's a little of both - the Point of Contact at CIA would rather do less than more. Lee said for Wednesday he wants each Team to do a summary of their access situation exactly what have they not received that they requested, and what can the Commission do to help? On CIA, Lee said he is willing to see Director Tenet. Meeting with Rumsfeld went well - a similar meeting with Tenet could preclude the need for a subpoena. Lee asked about subpoenas. Kevin Scheid said he would not recommend one at this point. Report: Lee asked about the report. Kevin Scheid said they have conducted 95 interviews and are beginning to draft a narrative. They have an outline for their monograph, and are halting interviews temporarily to do some writing in December. Lee asked if they could make the May deadline. Kevin Scheid said yes. They could have a draft monograph in January or February. The question will be how thorough their answers, findings and recommendations can be by May. Lorry Fenner said the Team will need Commissioners to pinpoint gaps in the Team's work. Chris Kojm said the Commission could meet on a draft monograph sometime in January or February to provide guidance. Kevin Scheid reiterated that the sooner the dialogue with interested Commissioners begins, the better.

Ideal Intelligence Community: Lee said his ideal I.C. would be independent of the Executive Branch. The problem is our intelligence chiefs are politicians, thus intelligence is tilted to the President's view. An example of a more independent entity is the Federal Reserve - while not wholly autonomous, it has a tradition of independence and is rarely challenged by the President. Lee said he was not sure of other Commissioners' views, but he feels the DCI did not call it like he saw it in the run-up to 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Part of the problem was a lack of independence. Lee said he knows it's a fantasy, but thinking of the ideal I.C. is a good starting point. TTIC: Lee asked how TTIC is doing. Lorry Fenner said they have conducted some interviews but not gotten into nuts and bolts. Lloyd Salvetti said Director Brennan has a vision for where TTIC can go, the question is whether they can get there. He views it as independent but there are turf-conflicts with the CIA's CTC. Gordon Lederman disagreed. He said TTIC is not the entity we need - it resembles building a car by pulling pieces together from a junkyard when what we need is a sportscar. Lee said the vision is often good with ideas like TTIC - the problem is in the implementation. Management: Lee raised DCI authority. He suspects the Commission wouldn't go all the way to a DNI because of the problems of implementation and DoD. He asked about the "middle-ground" of a strengthened DCI. He said the Team should be pragmatic, but at the same time recommend what is best for the I.C. and not withhold judgments that are tough to implement - the Commissioners will then make political judgments. Kevin Scheid asked if the Commission will be looking for options. Lee said the Team should identify the major recommendations and offer the pros and cons of each one. Lee asked about the Under Secretary of Defense of Intelligence. Kevin Scheid said it could be value-added if he worked with the DCI, but is counter-productive if he competes with the DCI or attempts to fill a perceived vacuum of power around the DCI. Information-Sharing: Lee raised information-sharing. Clearly there was a problem connecting dots between CIA-FBI-DoD and others. The Team should say what went wrong, what has been done, and what more needs to be done. Kevin Scheid said TTIC is part of this, but there is a constellation of organizations charged with CT - DoD, CTC, DBA, DHS, the military services, and now TTIC. No one has rationalized who does what. Lee said there is a line between strategic and tactical intelligence, but Kevin Scheid said that line is now being blurred. Analysis: Lee raised analysis. We collect mountains of data, but have problems with analysis. Lee recognizes the necessary swing back to HUMINT, but we must recognize the limitations of HUMINT - we are not going to infiltrate UBL. Kevin Scheid said what we need is not more HUMINT but the right kind of HUMINT. We need to move past people working under embassy-cover to meet new transnational threats like terrorism. Lloyd Salvetti said he thinks we are moving towards more creative ways of doing things. Lee said the Team should highlight positive steps that have been taken - for instance more focus on linguistic expertise - to give re-enforcement.

Lloyd Salvetti said there was a strategic gap after the Cold War - we cut back collection and analysis. We used to look at the Soviets strategically, thinking 5-10 years ahead. Nobody did this on terrorism. TTIC has a long-term strategic component. The I.C. needs components that look beyond the PDB, 5-10 years in the future. Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Kevin Scheid said the Team cannot locate a comprehensive, integrated counter-terrorism strategy for the I.C. Emphasis pre-9/11 was on tactical operations - not strategic analysis. There was no sense of the threat. Lee said this is a very important criticism. The Team should offer an assessment of what's been done to remedy this, and what needs to be done. Warning: Kevin Scheid said the Team cannot locate who is responsible for warning in the I.C. - the National Intelligence Council has an officer for warning who says CTC is responsible. CTC has nobody who does this. The Team has drawn the conclusion that nobody is responsible for warning and - because of minders - people in the I.C. know this conclusion has been drawn. Accountability: Gordon Lederman said the central theme as he sees it is a lack of accountability. For instance, TTIC may be the right model, but if it doesn't work nobody is responsible. Lee said this problem permeates the entire USG - people don't want accountability. Gordon Lederman said post-World War II we opted for a decentralized approach thinking we could put up with problems while protecting our democracy. Now different threats have made the price of decentralization too high. Lee added that he thinks the I.C. has developed in too many different directions. Everybody wants intelligence and anyone with enough power and resources sets up their own operation. Resources: Lee raised the issue of resources. Congress has a pattern on this - an intelligence failure happens and they throw money at it. We need to look at costeffectiveness. It's not popular, but the Commission should address it. Priorities: Lee raised setting priorities. He said this responsibility has to lie with the policymaker. It's not as simple as when all we wanted to know about were Soviet missiles - now people want intelligence on everything. The tough problem is making judgments. Presidents Clinton and Bush missed terrorism as a national security judgment. Kevin Scheid said this too was missing in the I.C. - a presidential directive from the mid908 set priorities, but there was no review of priorities in the I.C. from 1995-2002. There has been a new presidential directive and priorities are being reviewed, but thus far CIA has rejected the document request for this review as beyond the Commission's scope. Privacy: Lee raised the issue of privacy. We need to make observations about intrusiveness - the American people may not be ready for what is coming. What safeguards should be in place to draw the line between liberty and security? Chris Kojm said this is primarily Team 6's responsibility but Team 2 had some overlap. Lorry Fenner raised the example of Canada's internal security service. There is a split agency that issues a public report every year on secrecy. Lee said it comes back to management structure. The benefit of having domestic intelligence in the FBI is the institutional

respect for the rule of law. He is not sure if the same culture permeates the intelligence community. There may have to be an independent entity for review - like the Canadian model - if the American people are to accept a domestic intelligence agency. Oversight: Lee said we need recommendations for more vigorous oversight. We have Congress and PFIAB, which is not independent of the President. Tim Roemer is talking to Members on the Intelligence Committees; many favor permanent appointments. The Leaders don't want to do this because it is a sought after appointment. The Commission needs to look at this while remaining cognizant of the acute political sensitivity. Budgeting: Lee said another Congressional issue is budgeting through supplementals. Lloyd Salvetti said the I.C. plans on supplementals. Lee said this is an abomination there is no legislative process, and the authorization and appropriations process breaks down. Everything is in an omnibus or supplemental. Kevin Scheid said there should be an Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence - this would at least establish some financial accountability with the DCI which could trickle down. Lee suggested that recommendations may have to be floated with some Members during the vetting process. Public Knowledge and Classification: Lee said another problem is public awareness. The CIA closes itself off and this arouses deep public suspicions. The incentives are in the wrong direction - the notion is "when in doubt, classify." Kevin Scheid said there is an Annual Report required by the DCI that does little more than relate some of the I.C.'s accomplishments. Lloyd Salvetti said none of the think-tanks - and almost no Universities - have intelligence projects. We need venues where people study, debate and report on intelligence - perhaps a Congressionally funded Center. But academics won't do projects without access. Kevin Scheid added that there are no watchdog groups either. Leaks: Lorry Fenner raised the issue of leaks. There have been enormous leaks that have cost us dearly - this make the I.C. gun-shy with declassification. Leaks have not been pursued by DoJ. For openness to increase, there needs to be a parallel effort to crack down on leaks of necessarily classified information. Lee said you have to talk to prosecutors - why are leaks so tough to prosecute? Is it too difficult legally? The severity of some leaks - including regarding UBL - is a point worth making. Foreign Travel: Lee asked about the Team's travel. Kevin Scheid spoke about the recent staff trip and how it was illuminating to get an outlook on foreign intelligence from abroad, and that they were able to draw on diverse perspectives. The Team was looking at how we work with host countries to form transnational solutions to transnational problems. Lee asked what additional travel would be necessary. Kevin Scheid said the Team would benefit from a trip to Asia - perhaps for 10 to 14 days - as they are detailing activity by the 9/11 plotters in Kuala Lumpur as a case study. The Team would also benefit from a European trip to see how we are working with intelligence services beyond the U.K. Lee said he was supportive of the need for more travel, and would raise the issue with the Commission.